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This Chapter 1 is broken down into the following Sections:
A. Overview
B. What is Administrative Law?

1
2

C. Agency Authority and Judicial Oversight

3

D. Administrative Procedure Acts

4

E.Investigative Role of an Agency

5

A. Overview.

Inan increasingly bureaucratic society, government, both state and federal, plays a dominant role.
Traditional issues such as the rightto a driver's license, to operate a business, or to practice a profession
continue to produce conflicts between citizens and government, but are nowsubject to
greater due process scrutiny than ever before. Additional sources ofdispute, such as entitlement to
benefits, protection against unjust termination ofgovernmental employment, educational and
environmental issues, child abuse or neglect dispositions, workplace safety, human relations and a host of
other potential conflicts have presented themselves, fairly recently, for resolution. All adjudicated
resolutions ("contested cases") must now meet due process scrutiny and utilize more ofthe general rules
of constitutional courts.

The remarkable growth of governmental agencies, regulations, policies, statutes and case law can be
daunting. When combined with the vastly increased attention to due process, both procedural and
substantive, since the sixties and early seventies, procedural protection against arbitrary or mistaken
governmental action has become quite complex. In turn, quasi-judicial or"trial-type" hearings have
become the norm. In many states with independent administrative "courts," such as Maryland, the

process is frequently referred to, only half in jest, as the "fourth branch ofgovernment."1

The workings of State of Maryland administrative agencies in contested cases are governed, forthe
most party, bya State Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), contained in SG §10-201, et. seq. ofthe
Maryland Code and theRules of Procedure ofthe Office of Administrative Hearings, as well as
procedural rules ofthe agencies. Both State and county administrative law istreated inthis book. The
book isprimarily concerned with the "contested case" functions ofadministrative agencies rather than
with agency rulemaking. We are notconcerned with the application of a substantial evidence rule orthe
business judgment rule applicable to private, as opposed to public, entities such as a physician
credentialing committee in hospitals.
1Administrative Law Judge Guy J. Averyof theOffice of Administrative Hearings of the State of Maryland has been kind
enough to contribute these first two paragraphs to this overview.
2Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare, 378 Md. 509, 836 A. 2d 655(2003) wasconcerned with the proper test to be applied to a

judicial review ofthe acts ofahospital credentialing committee when acircuit court action focused on claims ofabreach of

Through the yearsthere has been case lawdiscussion and some confusion as to what authority and
how much authority can legally be delegated by the legislature to an administrative agency without
running afoul of the separation of powers doctrine inherent in government structure. There is "this" police
power thatthe State has to protect the health, safety andgeneral welfare of the people of the State, andthe
question of how muchflexibility there is or has to be in the exercise of this discretion by an
administrative agency. "It is well settledthat when legislative authority is delegated to administrative
officials, there must be sufficient standards for the guidance of the administrative officials. The modern
tendency of the courts is towards greater liberality in permitting grants of discretion to administrative
officials in order to facilitate the administration of the laws as the complexity of governmental and

economic conditions increases."3 As with so much of our law, "it" (the ability to delegateand the
standards to be applied to determine the permissible extent of that delegation) depends on the facts and

circumstances ofthe particular case.4 ". . . [I]n determining whether a state administrative agency is
authorized to act in a particular manner, the statutes, legislative background andpolicies pertinent to that

agency are controlling."5
B. What is Administrative Law? 6
Administrative law functions include adjudication of disputes, rule making and regulation. Following an

examination ofthe history of administrative agencies, this book considers the lawof Maryland State and
County administrative law incontested cases. Many more attorneys become involved with the dispute
adjudication aspect of administrative law than the regulatory aspect of administrative law.
In his Administrative Law Treatise7, Richard J. Pierce, Jr. saysthis:

contract andtort. Judicial review of internal hospital decisions is usually limited to what is termed the "business judgment" rule,

now codified inCorps. &Assoc. §2-405.1. 378 Md. at522. This rule has been applied insituations involving internal voting
rules orvoluntary membership associations and corporate disputes. 378 Md. at526. Circuit court actions alleging common law
and statutory causes ofaction incontract and tort law may not always be disposed ofby summary judgment on the basis ofa
business judgment orsubstantial evidence rule. Hospital bylaws may beregarded ascontractual innature under some
circumstances. 378 Md. at 542-43. Two judges intheSadler case concurred stating that themajority holding onthecontract/tort

exception toapplication ofthe business judgment rule, may not have been as clear as the majority thought itwas. 378 Md. at547.
3Sullivan v. Bd OfLicense Comm 'rs, 293 Md. 113,121, 442 A. 2d558 (1982). Article 8 oftheMaryland Declaration ofRights
isspecific: "That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers ofGovernment ought tobe forever separate and distinct from
each other; and no person exercising thefunctions ofone ofsaid Departments shall assume ordischarge the duties ofany other."
Maryland State Police v. Warwick Supply &Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 624 A.2d 1238 (1993) saw the Court explaining:
The delegation doctrine prohibits a legislative body from delegating its law-making function to any other branch of
government orentity and isa corollary ofthe separation ofpowers doctrine implicit inthe United States Constitution
and expressly provided inthe Maryland Constitution. Nonetheless, we have long sanctioned delegations oflegislative
power toadministrative officials where sufficient safeguards are legislatively provided for the guidance ofthe agency
in its administration of the statute. As ChiefJudge Murphy recently observed in Insurance Commissioner v. Bankers
Independent Insurance Company [326 Md. 617, 602A. 2d 1072 (1992)],
"a legislatively delegated power to makerules and regulations is administrative in nature, andit is not
and cannot be the powerto make laws; it is onlythe powerto adopt regulations to carry into effectthe
willof the legislature asexpressed by the statute. Legislation may not be enacted by an administrative

agency under the guise of itsexercise of the power to make rules and regulations by issuing a rule or
regulation which is inconsistent or out of harmony with, or which alters, adds to, extendsor enlarges,
subverts, impairs, limits, or restricts the act being administered."
326Md. at 624,606 A.2d at 1075. [Emphasis by bold] It is axiomatic, therefore, that an administrative regulation must
be consistentwith the letter and policy of the statuteunder whichthe administrative agencyacts.
Warwick, 330 Md. at 380-81. (citations omitted)

4A number of casedecisions on this point are collected and analyzed in Sullivan. 293 Md., at 121-24.
5Lussier v. Md. Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 686, 684 A. 2d 804 (1996).
6 See 2 Am. Jur 2d. Adm. Law §§1-5.

7Aspen Law &Business, 4th ed, 2002, with a 2006 supplement.

Judge Friendly has provided a particularly good definition of administrative law. "Administrative
law includes the entire range of actionby government with respect to the citizen or by the citizen
with respect to the government, except for those matters dealtwith by the criminal law andthose
left to private civil litigation wherethe government's participation is in furnishing an impartial
tribunalwith the power of enforcement," Friendly, New Trends in Administrative Law, 6 Md.

BarJ.No.3,p.9(1974).8
According to 2 Am.Jur2d. Administrative Law §1, "administrative law" has no authoritative
definition. However, Am. Jur then goes on to say: "Administrative law is concerned with the legal

problems arising outofthe existence of agencies which combine ina single entity legislative, executive,
and judicial powers which were traditionally kept separate. It is also generally concerned with the
problems of administrative regulation, rather than with those of administrative management."

Basically what all of this means isthat there came a time long, long ago thatboth theexecutive and
legislative branches of government came tothe conclusion that the Legislature could not long endure
passing a statute for every problem that surfaced toassure that laws were properly executed. More hands
on supervision by specialists inthe field was needed. Therefore, it is"enabling" legislation that ispassed
giving general authority and instruction to an agency ofthe executive branch to operate within a statutory
framework, andat the same timeto make its own rules (regulations) in furtherance of the legislative

directive given to itso asto make the system work. The executive branch administers legislative
authority. Just how and when the judiciary becomes involved in this process in the protection ofpublic
and private rights remains a question defined day to day by case law decisions. It is the rule oflaw that
agencies act within the statutory authority granted to those agencies and that individuals dealing with
agencies areto be protected against an abuse of agency power.

For example, when the Maryland Health Resources Planning Commission adopts and updates a
Maryland State Health Plan in accord with HG §§19-101 through 19-123 it performs a quasi-legislative
function. HG §19-114(d) requires the Commission toadopt regulations "that ensure broad public input,

public hearings, and consideration oflocal health plans in the development ofthe State health plan."
Applying for acertificate ofneed within the State Health Plan is a different process. Acertificate ofneed
is required before a person may develop, operate, expand, change, or invest capital in health care facilities

or services.10 Application for acertificate ofneed is aquasi-judicial process.11 Therefore, it is improper to
make application for a certificate ofneed to operate open heart surgery units ata hospital and thereby to
challenge the validity and applicability ofthe State Health Plan. It iswithin the parameters ofthe State
Health Plan (viaexecutive function) thatan application for need is denied or granted.

Separation ofpowers requires a recognition that agencies generally are constituted for the
enforcement ofthepublic right, as opposed to civil courts which enforce a private right. Thus, the
functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government areto remain separated.
C. Agency Authority and Judicial Oversight.

Agencies derive their power from enabling statutes that govern them. They are creatures ofstatute and
have no inherent powers. In the words of the Court of Appeals of Maryland:
8Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise, §1.1 What Is Administrative Law, p. 1.
9Adventist Healthcare v. Suburban Hospital, 350 Md. 104, 122-23, 711 A. 2d 158 (1998).
10 Adventist Healthcare, 350 Md. at 107.
11 Adventist Healthcare, 350 Md. at 123.

12 Adventist Healthcare, 350 Md. at 122-23. The Court explained that alternative remedies could be seen in HG 19-114(c) to file

apetition to review changes needed in the plan and also that aDeclaratory Judgment Action might be appropriate under Cts. §3406. 350 Md. at 126.

. . . [Administrative agencies] are "established by legislative bodies, administrative agencies
[and] derivetheir powerfrom enabling statutes that govern them." An administrative agency is a
"creatureof statute, [which] has no inherentpowersand its authority thus does not reach beyond
the warrant provided it by statute." Generally, absent express legislative intent, the role of [a]
Court is to determine whether an agency is empowered to decide the issue in controversy and
whetherthe agency's procedures can be "performed withinthe confines of the traditional
standards of procedural and substantive fair play." When it is doubtful that the General Assembly
has vested powers in an agency to decide certain issues, the agency's abilityto exercise that

power willbe circumscribed by the courts. [The judicial] task, therefore, is to determine whether

the legislature intended, when itenacted [a statute]13
Principles of statutory construction are applied to determine the intent of the legislature.
No doubtthe role of the judiciary is limited. Still, personal rights are involved and constitutional

guarantees to due process attend liberty and property interests. In 2006 there is a rather strong view inthe
private sector that agencies have too much power and that the fairness oftheir actions incontested cases
is sometimes to be doubted.

D. Administrative Procedure Acts.

Authority isgiven bythe Maryland Legislature orCounty legislative authority to a particular agency. In
addition to the substantive law, there are legislatively created procedural acts to govern the process

whereby agency authority isto be exercised. On the federal level, there is Chapter 5 ofTitle 5 ofthe
United States Code which contains the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Subchapter 1 contains

general provisions and Subchapter II isthe Administrative Procedure Act. In Maryland State
Government, there is a Maryland Administrative Procedure Act in the State Government Article.
(MAPA) Title 10 of thatArticle deals with Governmental Procedures. Subtitle 1contains the
Administrative Procedure Act dealing withregulations. Subtitle 2 contains the Administrative Procedure
Act dealing with Contested Cases. There is also Subtitle 3 containing Administrative Procedure Act

statutes dealing with Declaratory Rulings.15
Administrative Procedure Acts and/orrules and regulations exist in Maryland's subdivisions and

some municipalities to govern thework of agencies when dispute resolution or quasi-judicial function.

13 Adamson v. Correctional Medical, 359 Md. 238, 250-51, 753 A. 2d 501 (2000) (citations omitted). In this case, the task wasto

determine whether the legislature intended, when it enacted thePrisoner Litigation Act,"thataprisoner asserting medical

malpractice against aprivate contractor providing medical services for the State first berequired to file his alleged grievance with
the [Division of Correction] and/or the [Inmate Grievance Office] before filing acommon law tort complaint in state courts."
The Court's holding wasthatgoing through the administrative process first was notrequired. 359Md. at272.
14 Adamson, 359 Md. at 251-52.
15 Within Title 10 are other subtitles:

Subtitle 4. Compliance with Workers' Compensation Act Required.
Subtitle 5. Meetings. "Open Meetings Act"
Subtitle 6. Records. Access to Public Records and Exceptions.
Subtitle 7. Reorganizations.
Subtitle 8. Written Policies for Public Communication.

Subtitle 9. Automated Mapping-Geographic Information Systems.
Subtitle 10. Civil Penalties.

Subtitle 11. Equal Accessto Public Services for Individuals withLimited English Proficiency.
Subtitle 12. Toil-Free Telephone Numbers.

E. Investigative Role of an Agency

Many, if not most agencies have the rightto perform investigations to determine if statutory provisions
have been violated. This authority is in addition to the quasi-legislative right of an agency to pass

regulations andthe quasi-judicial rightof an agency to adjudicate disputes. For instance, the Board of
Physicians is given authority, pursuant to HO §14-401, to perform an investigation to determine whether
there are grounds for disciplinary or other action against a physician. Quite extensive is the authority of
the Consumer Protection Division of the State of Maryland to investigate complaints to ascertain issues
and facts toward a determination as to whether there has been a violation of Maryland law. See Com.

Law §13-401, et. seq. Likewise, the Securities Commissioner of Maryland has broad authority to
investigate whether there has been a violation ofMaryland's Securities Act. See Corps. & Assoc. §11701. Investigations and subpoenas.

This 2006 bookdoesnot deal specifically with the agency investigative process. A body of lawon

the subject has developed through the years, and is recently growing. Throughout the book, there are
references in thetext andto Significant Case Decisions concerning investigations andthe enforcement
authority of particular agencies.

Attorneys involved inthe practice ofadministrative law deal with a system where anagency is
required toact within the statutory authority granted to itand the protection ofindividuals against any
abuse ofpower by the agency.16

16 Although not an administrative agency case, Twigg v. Riverside, 168 Md. App. 351, 896 A.2d 439 (2006) talks about the
importance ofunderstanding and analyzing the authority ofgovernment. The Court said that amunicipal corporation possesses
only limited powers and that counties and municipalities are normally bound bytheir contracts to the same extent as private
entities, and that governmental immunity isnot generally recognized in defense ofgovernment contracts. 168 Md. App. at 362.
Thus, an agreement between aproperty owner and the City ofFrederick Maryland was void regarding aspecial fee levy and a
waiver of other fees was void asan ultra vires act requiring theenactment of anordinance to be affective. 168 Md. App. at375.
Certiorari was granted from the opinion inthiscase dated April 12, 2006.
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A. Generally Comments on the MAPA

Maryland hasadopted a State Administrative Procedure Act(MAPA). There is a Uniform Law
Commissioners' Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961) with Maryland listed along with 27

other states as having adopted that Act. "The model administrative procedure act was developed to

encourage amore uniform procedural process for administrative agencies."2 There is also aUniform Law
Commissioners' Model State Administrative Act (1981) with three states, of which Maryland is not one,

listed as having adopted these provisions. Aswith any model act, care must betaken to compare the
provisions ofthe model act with those enacted inany particular state. Annotations to the model act are
onlyas useful as the correlation of a particular statute to the Act.
As stated above, unless excluded,the Maryland Administrative ProcedureAct applies to all agencies

ofthe State ofMaryland, except those specifically excluded.3 There is a federal administrative procedure

act.4 Maryland's APA was adopted in 1956 and has been revised since that time.5
In 2002, the Court of Appeals gave this historical summaryof the MAPA:

2Bregunier Masonry v. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App.698, 705, 684 A. 2d 6 (1996).
3SG 10-102. See also: Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, Baltimore CityPolice Dep't, 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert,
denied, 382U.S. 849, 86 S. Ct. 95, 15L. Ed. 2d 88 (1965). The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §551 provides
that an agency means "each authority of theGovernment of theUnited States, whether ornot it is within or subject to review by

another agency." It does notinclude theCongress, courts of theUnited States, governments of territories orpossessions orthe
government of the District of Columbia.

45USCA§§551,et.seq.
5InDept. ofHealth v. Chimes, 343 Md. 336, 681 A.2d484, (1996), the late ChiefJudge Robert Murphy detailed history behind
the MAPA enactment and its revisions:

In 1952,the Commission on Administrative Organization of the State, appointedby Governor McKeldin,
recommended adoption of the 1946 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) "to the endthat
administrative agencies may be subjected to essential controls but not undulyhampered in the performance of their
functions." Seventh Reportofthe Commissionon Administrative Organization of the State 70 (1952). That statute was

designed to ensure that"certain basic principles of common sense, justice and fairness," including notice to interested
parties, are applied in administrative procedures, Id., "without unduly restricting the agencies in the performance of
their various tasks." Id. at 8; see also MarylandCode (1995 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) §10-201 of the State Government

Article (declaration of policy); Commission to Revise theAdministrative Procedure Act, Initial Report on Subtitles 2
and4 of the APA 2 (1992). The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act (APA), adopted by Ch. 94 of the Acts of 1957
and based on the MSAPA, therefore, sought to balance the State'sinterestin efficient administration againstthe
individuals' interest in fairness. Cf. Bonfield, State Administrative Rule Making §1.2.2 (1986 & Supp. 1993)

(discussing the 1981 MSAPA); Woodland Private Study Group v. State, 109 N.J. 62, 533 A.2d 387, 393 (1987) (in
determining whether the intra-agency statements exception from the New Jersey APA applies, the court focuses upon
"whether the agency's interest in streamlined procedure is outweighed by the importance of the interests thatare
affected."); seealso Emma AhHov. Cobb, 62 Haw. 546, 617 P.2d 1208,1213 (1980) (discussing the federal APA
contracts exception).
Id., at 338-39.

The State APAwas enacted initially in 1957, seeChapter 94, Acts of 1957 (originally codified at Md. Code

(1957), §§Art. 41,244-256), and iscurrently codified atMd. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.),
State Government Art., §§10-101-10-305 . Thepurpose of the State APA is to provide a "standard

framework of fair and appropriate procedures for agencies that are responsible forboth administration and
adjudication oftheir respective statutes." The APA prescribes procedures for two types ofproceedings: (1)
procedures for the adoption ofregulations, see APA §§ 10-101-10-139, and (2) adjudicatory procedures for
deciding contested cases, see APA §§ 10-201-10-227.21 It "applies to allstate administrative agencies not
specifically exempted." See APA § 10-203 (expressly excluding certain entities from the contested cases
subtitle of the APA). Although the Executive branch stateagencies excluded from the embrace of the State
APA's contested cases provisions include some substantial portions of the State bureaucracy (theWorker's
Compensation Commission, the State Department ofAssessments & Taxation, and thePublic Service
Commission, to name a few), the bulkof the Executive branch agencies are included. Thisjudicially
noticeable fact gives weight andimpetus to thebroad sweep of the fundamental principles of State
administrative law which should extendto similar proceedings beyondthose conductedby administrative

bodies strictly covered by the State APA.6
There is a section in the Maryland Administrative Procedure Actthat allows a smallbusiness or non

profit organization torecover litigation expenses incurred in a contested when an agency brings an action
inbad faith orwithout substantial justification.7 A contested case "is a proceeding before, or dispute with,

an agency that entitled a party to an agency hearing."8 "Investigation" ofa possible antitrust violation
prior to the filing ofa complaint by the Consumer Protection Division does not constitute a contested
case.9
Significant Case Decisions

o

The Police Department of Baltimore City is a State agency and therefore theAdministrative Procedure Act
applied to a case where an individual was refused a taxicab operator's license inKaufman v. Taxicab
Bureau, Baltimore City Police Dep 'L, 236Md. 476,479-80,204 A. 2d 521 (1964). TheMAPA applies to

all State agencies except those expressly excluded therefrom. Id.10
B. Contested Case Provisions of the MAPA.

Subtitle 2, of Title 10 of the State Government (SG)Article is entitled: "AdministrativeProcedure Act Contested Cases." All sections should be prefixed by SG to indicate they appear in the State Government
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Within Subtitle 2 are the following sections:

6 Coleman v. AnneArundel Police, 369 Md. 108, 136-37, 797 A. 2d 770 (2002). (citations and footnotes omitted)

7SG §10-224. Maryland Pharmacists v. Office ofthe Attorney General, 115 Md. App. 650, 694 A. 2d 492 (1997).
8Maryland Pharmacists, 115 Md. App. at 658.
9Maryland Pharmacists, 115 Md. App. at658. This case involved anallegation by the Hallmark Card Co., Inc. concerning
activities of the Maryland Pharmacists Association, Inc. and mail order prescription plans. Id., at 653. Analogyto Maryland Rule
2-101(c) and theinstitution of a civil action wasmade by the Court in determining whenanissue is contested. No such
document to generate a contested casewas ever issued by the Attorney General in this case. Id., at 659.
10 The Courtdiscussed the fact that Taxicab companies in Maryland are common carriers. "Within constitutional limitations,
local authorities may be authorized to regulate taxicabs. This includes the right to license theiroperators in order to protect the

public health, welfare, morals, and safety." Id, at483-84. No error was found inthedecision notto issue ataxicab license to Mr.
Kaufman. Id., at 484.

The text of the MAPA contested case provisions is reproduced below:
The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act
Subtitle 2. Administrative Procedure Act - Contested Cases

SG §10-201. Declaration of policy.
The purpose of this subtitle is to:

(1) ensure theright of all persons to be treated in a fair and unbiased manner intheirefforts to resolve disputes in
administrativeproceedings governed by this subtitle; and
(2) promote prompt, effective, and efficient government.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-202. Definitions.

(a) Ingeneral- In this subtitle the following words have the meanings indicated.
(b) Agency.- "Agency" means:

(1)an officer or unitofthe State government authorized by law to adjudicate contested cases; or
(2) a unit that:
(i) is created by general law;

(ii) operates in at least 2 counties; and
(iii) is authorized by law to adjudicate contested cases.
(c) Agency head.- "Agency head" means:

(1) anindividual or group of individuals inwhom the ultimate legal authority of anagency is vested by any
provision of law; or

(2) the secretary ofthe State department that isresponsible for State programs that are administered bythe
Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services.
(d) Contested case.-

(1) "Contested case"means a proceeding before an agency to determine:

(i)a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege ofa person that isrequired bystatute or constitution to be
determined only after an opportunityfor an agencyhearing; or

(ii) the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or amendment of a license thatis required bystatute or
constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an agencyhearing.

(2) "Contested case" does notinclude a proceeding before anagency involving an agency hearing required only
byregulation unless theregulation expressly, orbyclear implication, requires the hearing to beheld inaccordance
with this subtitle.

(e) License.- "License" means all or any part of permission that:
(1) is required by law to be obtained from an agency;
(2) is not required only for revenue purposes; and
(3) is in any form, including:
(i) an approval;
(ii) a certificate;
(iii) a charter;
(iv) a permit; or
(v) a registration.

(6) Office.- "Office" means the Office of Administrative Hearings.

(g) Presiding officer.- "Presiding officer" means the board, commission, agency head, administrative law judge,
or otherauthorized person conducting an administrative proceeding under this subtitle.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41,§§ 244,250A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1996, ch. 476, ch. 476; 2004, ch. 25,§ 6.]
SG §10-203. Scope of subtitle.

(a) General exclusions.- This subtitle does not apply to:

(1)the Legislative Branch of the State government or an agency of the Legislative Branch;
(2) the Judicial Branch of the Stategovernment or an agency of the Judicial Branch;
(3) the following agencies of the Executive Branch of the State government:
(i) the Governor;

(ii) the Department of Assessments and Taxation;
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(iii) theInsurance Administration except asspecifically provided intheInsurance Article;
(iv) the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund;

(v) the Maryland Parole Commission ofthe Department ofPublic Safely andCorrectional Services;
(vi) the Public Service Commission;
(vii) the Maryland Tax Court;

(viii)the State Workers' Compensation Commission;
(ix) the MarylandAutomobile Insurance Fund; or
(x) the Patuxent Institution Boardof Review, when acting on a parole request;
(4)an officer or unitnot part of a principal department of State government that:
(i) is created by or pursuant to the Maryland Constitution or general or local law;
(ii) operates in only 1 county; and

(iii) is subject to the control of a local government oris funded wholly or partly from local funds;
(5) unemployment insurance claim determinations, tax determinations, and appeals inthe Department ofLabor,
Licensing, and Regulation except as specifically provided inSubtitle 5A ofTitle 8 ofthe Labor and Employment
Article; or

(6) any otherentityotherwise expressly exempted by statute.

(b) Applicability to property tax assessment appeals boards and correction ofdeath certificates.- This subtitle
does apply to:

(1) the property tax assessment appealsboards; and

(2) as torequests for correction ofcertificates ofdeath under §5-310 (d) (2) ofthe Health-General Article, the
office of the Chief Medical Examiner.

(c) Public hearings.- Apublic hearing required orprovided for by statute orregulation before an agency takes a
particular action isnot an agency hearing under § 10-202 (d) ofthis subtitle unless the statute orregulation:
(1) expressly requires that the public hearing beheld inaccordance with this subtitle; or
(2) expressly requires that any judicial review ofthe agency determination following the public hearing be
conducted in accordance with this subtitle.

(d) Contested cases arisingfrom Stateprogram administered by Montgomery County Department ofHealth and
Human Services.-

(1) Subject to paragraphs (2)and (3)ofthis subsection, this subtitle does apply to a contested case that arises
from a State program administered bytheMontgomery County Department of Health andHuman Services inthe
same manner as the subtitle applies to a county health department or local department of social services.
(2) Forpurposes of this subtitle, the Office of the Attorney General, after consultation with theCounty Attorney

for Montgomery County, shall determine if the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
administers a State program.

(3) This subsection isnotintended to extend or limit the authority oftheMontgomery County Department of
Health and Human Services to administer Stateprograms in the manner of a county health department or local
department of social services.
[An Code 1957, art. 41, §244; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1986, ch. 567; 1987, ch. 311, § 1; 1989, ch. 5,§ 1; 1990, ch. 71, §3; 1991, ch. 21, §3; 1992,
ch. 547; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536, § 1; 1995, ch. 120, § 19; 1996, ch. 476; 1997, ch. 16; ch. 70, §4;2008, ch.660 §4. ]

SG §10-204. Political subdivisions and instrumentalities.

A political subdivision of the State or an instrumentality of a political subdivision is entitled, to the same extent as
other legal entities, to be an interested person, party, orpetitioner in a matter under this subtitle, including anappeal.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 256A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1;1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-205. Delegation of hearing authority.
(a) Towhom delegated; limitation.-

(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2) of thissubsection, a board, commission, or agency headauthorized to
conduct a contested case hearing shall:
(i) conduct the hearing; or

(ii) delegate the authority to conduct the contested case hearing to:
1. the Office; or

2. with the priorwritten approval of theChiefAdministrative LawJudge, a person not employed by the
Office.

(2)A hearing heldin accordance with § 4-608(f) or § 5-610(f) of the Business Occupations andProfessions
Article may not be delegated to the Office.
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(3) With the written approval of theChief Administrative Law Judge, a class of contested case hearings may be
delegated as providedin paragraph(l)(ii)2 of this subsection.

(4) This subsection is not intended to restrict the right ofan individual, expressly authorized by a statute in effect
on October 1,1993, to conduct a contested case hearing.

(b) Scope of authority delegated.- An agency maydelegate to the Office the authority to issue:
(1) proposed or final findings of fact;
(2) proposed or final conclusions of law;
(3) proposed or final findings of fact and conclusions of law;

(4) proposed or final ordersor orders underArticle 49Bof the Code; or
(5) the final administrative decisionof an agency in a contested case.
(c) Procedure upon receipt ofhearing request.- Promptly after receipt of a request for a contested case hearing, an
agency shall:

(1)notify theparties thatthe authorized agency head, board, or commission shall conduct the hearing;
(2)transmit therequest to the Office so thattheOffice shall conduct thehearing in accordance with the agency's
delegation; or

(3) request written approval from theChief Administrative Law Judge to appoint a person notemployed bythe
Office to conduct the hearing.
(d) Delegationfinal; exception.-

(1) Except asprovided inparagraph (2) ofthis subsection, anagency's delegation and transmittal of allorpart of
a contested case to the Office is final.

(2) If anagency has adopted regulations specifying the criteria and procedures fortherevocation of a delegation
of a contested case, delegation of authority to hearallor partof a contested case maybe revoked, bythe agency
head, board, or commission, in accordance with the agency's regulations, at any timepriorto the earlier of:
(i) the issuanceof a ruling on a substantiveissue; or
(ii) the taking of oral testimony from the first witness.
(e) Duties ofthe Office.(1) The Office shall:
(i) conduct the hearing; and

(ii) except asprovided inparagraph (2) ofthis subsection orasotherwise required by law, within 90 days after
the completion ofthe hearing, complete the procedure authorized inthe agency's delegation to theOffice.
(2) The time limit specified inparagraph (l)(ii) ofthis subsection may beextended with the written approval of
the Chief Administrative Law Judge.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41,§251A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1991, ch. 181; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 2005, ch. 392.]

SG §10-206. Procedural regulations.
(a) Adoption by Office; conflict.-

(1) The Office shall adopt regulations to govern the procedures and practice inallcontested cases delegated to
the Office and conducted under this subtitle.

(2) Unless a federal or State law requires that a federal orState procedure shall be observed, theregulations
adopted under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall take precedence intheevent of a conflict.
(b) Adoption by agencies.- Each agency may adopt regulations to govern procedures under this subtitle and
practice beforethe agency in contested cases.

(c) Expedited hearings.- Regulations adopted under this section may include procedures and criteria for
requesting and conducting expedited hearings.

(d) Prehearingprocedures.- Eachagency andthe Office may adopt regulations that:
(1) providefor prehearingconferences in contested cases; or
(2) set other appropriate prehearingprocedures in contested cases.

(e) Explanatory materials.- Toassist the public inunderstanding the procedures followed byanagency orthe
Office in contested cases, an agency or the Office may develop anddistribute supplemental explanatory materials,
including therelated forms thatthe agency or Office requires andinstructions for completing the forms.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §§ 245,251A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1992, ch. 547; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536, §§ 1,2.]

SG §10-206.1. Legal practice.
(a) Practice before agency.- An agency may not:

(1)grant theright to practice lawto an individual who is notauthorized to practice law;
(2) interfere withthe right of a lawyer to practice before an agency or the Office; or

12

(3) prohibit any party from being advised orrepresented atthe party's own expense byan attorney or, if permitted
by law, other representative.

(b) Publiclyprovided legal services.- Subsection (a) ofthis section may notbe interpreted to require theState to
furnish publicly provided legal services in anyproceeding under thissubtitle.
[1994,ch. 536, §1.]

SG §10-207. Notice of agency action.

(a) Ingeneral- An agency shallgivereasonable notice of the agency's action.
(b) Contents ofnotice- The notice shall:
(1) state concisely and simply:
(i) the facts that are asserted; or

(ii)if thefacts cannot be stated in detail when thenotice is given, the issues that are involved;
(2)state thepertinent statutory andregulatory sections under which the agency is taking its action;
(3)state thesanction proposed or the potential penalty, if any, as a result of the agency's action;
(4) unless a hearing is automatically scheduled, state that the recipient ofnotice of anagency's action may have
an opportunity to request a hearing, including:
(i) what, if anything, a personmust do to receive a hearing; and
(ii) all relevant time requirements; and

(5) state thedirect consequences, sanction, potential penalty, if any, orremedy oftherecipient's failure to
exercise in a timely manner the opportunity for a hearing or to appear for a scheduled hearing.

(c) Consolidation ofnotices.- The notice of agency action under this section may be consolidated with the notice
of hearingrequired under § 10-208of this subtitle.

(d) Publication in Register.- For purposes ofthis section, publication inthe Maryland Register does notconstitute
reasonable notice to a party.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 251; 1984, ch.284, § 1; 1989, ch. 239; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-208. Notice of hearing.

(a) In general- Anagency or theOffice shall give all parties ina contested case reasonable written notice ofthe
hearing.

(b) Contents ofnotice.-The notice shall state:
(1) the date, time, place, and nature of the hearing;

(2)theright to callwitnesses andsubmit documents or other evidence under § 10-213 (f) of thissubtitle;
(3) any applicable right to request subpoenas for witnesses and evidence and specify the costs, if any, associated
with such a request;

(4)thata copy of thehearing procedure is available onrequest andspecify the costs associated with such a
request;

(5) any right or restriction pertaining to representation;

(6)thatfailure to appear for the scheduled hearing may result in an adverse action against the party; and
(7)that, unless otherwise prohibited by law, the parties may agree to the evidence and waive their rightto appear
at the hearing.

(c) Consolidation ofnotices.- Thenotice of hearing may be consolidated withthe notice of agency action required
under § 10-207 of this subtitle.

(d) Publication inRegister.- For purposes of thissubtitle, publication in the Maryland Register does not constitute
reasonable notice to a party.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-209. Notice mailed to address of licensee.

(a) Ingeneral- Where a licensing statute provides forservice other thanby regular mail, notice under thissubtitle
may be sentby regular mailto the address of record of a person holding a license issued by the agency if:
(1) the person is required by law to advise the agency of the address; and

(2) the agency has been unsuccessful in givingnoticein the mannerotherwise provided by the licensing statute.
(b) Hearing.- Upona showing thatthe person neither knew nor hadreasonable opportunity to know of the factof
service, a personservedby regularmail under subsection (a) of this section shall be granteda hearing.
(c) Reasonable opportunity to know ofservice.- A person holding a license shall be deemedto have had a
reasonable opportunity to know of the fact of service if:

(1)the person is required by lawto notify the agency of a change of address within a specified period of time;
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(2) the person failed to notify the agency in accordance withthe law;
(3) the agency or the Office mailed the noticeto the address of record; and
(4) the agency did not have actualnotice of the change of address prior to service.
[1993,ch. 59, §1; 1994, ch. 141.]

SG §10-210. Dispositions.

Unless otherwise precluded by law, an agency or the Office may dispose of a contested case by:
(1) stipulation;
(2) settlement;
(3) consent order;
(4) default;
(5) withdrawal;
(6) summary disposition; or
(7) dismissal.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 251A; 1984,ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-211. Hearings conducted by electronic means.

(a) Permitted.- In accordance with subsection (b)ofthis section, a hearing may be conducted by telephone, video
conferencing, or other electronic means.
(b) Objections.-

(1)Forgood cause, a party may object to the holding of a hearing by telephone, video conferencing, or other
electronic means.

(2)If a party establishes good cause in opposition to theholding of a hearing by telephone or other similar audio
electronic means, the hearing shallbe heldin person or byvideo conferencing or othersimilar audiovisual electronic
means.

(3) If a party establishes good cause in opposition to the holding of a hearing by video conferencing or other
similar audiovisual electronic means, the hearing shall be conducted in person.
[1993,ch.59,§l;1996,ch.96.]

SG. §10-212. Open hearings.

(a) In general- Except as otherwise provided by law, a contested case hearing conducted by the Office shall be
open to the public.

(b) Subtitle 5 notapplicable.- Hearings conducted by the Office are not subject to Subtitle 5 of this title.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-212.1. Interpreters.

(a) IngeneraL-

(1) In a contested case,a party or witness mayapply to the agency for the appointment of a qualified interpreter
to assist that partyor witness, if the party or witness is deafor, because of a hearing impediment, cannotreadily
understand or communicate the spoken English language.

(2) On application of the party or witness the agency shallappoint a qualifiedinterpreter.
(3) In selecting a qualified interpreter for appointment, the agency may consult the directory of interpreters for
manual communication or oral interpretation to assistdeaf persons that is maintained by the courts of the State.
(b) Compensation.-

(1) An interpreter appointed underthissection shallbe allowed the compensation that the agency considers
reasonable.

(2) Subjectto paragraph (3) of this subsection, the compensation shall be paid by the agency.
(3) If the agency has die authority to tax for services and expenses as a part of the costs of a case,the agency may
taxthe amount paidto an interpreter as a partof these services andexpenses in accordance withthe federal
Americans with Disabilities Act.
[An. Code 1957, art. 30, § 1; 1997, ch. 31, § 1.]

SG §10-213. Evidence.
(a) In general.-

(1) Each party in a contested case shall offer all of the evidence that the party wishes to have made part of the
record.
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(2)If the agency has any evidence thatthe agency wishes to use in adjudicating the contested case, the agency
shall make the evidence part of the record.

(b) Probative evidence.- The presiding officer mayadmit probative evidence that reasonable and prudent
individuals commonly accept in the conductof their affairs and give probative effectto that evidence.
(c) Hearsay.- Evidence may notbe excluded solely onthe basis that it is hearsay.
(d) Exclusions.- The presidingofficermay exclude evidence that is:
(1) incompetent;
(2) irrelevant;
(3) immaterial; or
(4) unduly repetitious.

(e) Rules ofprivilege.- The presidingofficershallapplya privilege that law recognizes.
(f) Scope of evidence.- On a genuine issue in a contested case, each party is entitledto:
(1) call witnesses;

(2) offer evidence, including rebuttal evidence;

(3) cross-examine any witness that another partyor the agency calls; and
(4) present summation and argument.

(g) Documentary evidence.- Thepresiding officer may receive documentary evidence:
(1) in the form of copies or excerpts; or
(2) by incorporation by reference,
(h) Official notice offacts.-

(1) The agency or the Office may take officialnotice of a fact that is:
(i) judicially noticeable; or

(ii) general, technical, or scientific and within the specialized knowledge of the agency.
(2) Beforetaking officialnotice of a fact, the presiding officer:

(i)before or during thehearing, by reference in a preliminary report, or otherwise, shall notify each party; and
(ii) shall give each party an opportunityto contestthe fact,

(i) Evaluation.- Theagency or the Office may use itsexperience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge in the evaluation of evidence.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 252; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-214. Consideration of other evidence.

(a) Findings based on evidence ofrecord.- Findings of fact must be based exclusively on the evidence of record in
the contested case proceeding and on mattersofficially noticed in that proceeding.
(b) Regulations, rulings, etc., binding.- In a contested case, the Office is bound by anyagency regulation,
declaratory ruling, prioradjudication, or other settled, preexisting policy, to the sameextent as the agency is or
would have been bound if it were hearing the case.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-215. Transcription of proceedings.
All or part of proceedings in a contested case shall be transcribed if any party:
(1) requests the transcription; and
(2) pays any required costs.
[An. Code 1957,art. 41, § 252A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993,ch. 59

SG §10-216. Exceptions.
(a) Notice ofproposed decision; consideration of'exceptions.-

(1) In the case of a single decision maker, if the final decision maker in a contested case has not personally
presided overthe hearing, the final decision maynot be made until eachparty is given noticeof the proposed
decision in accordance with § 10-220 of this subtitle and an opportunity to:
(i) file exceptions with the agency to the proposed decision; and

(ii) present argumentto the final decisionmaker that the proposed decision should be affirmed, reversed, or
remanded.

(2) In the case of a decision-making body, if a majority of the officials who are to make a final decision in a
contested case have not personally presided over the hearing, the officials may not make the final decision until each
party is given notice of die proposed decision in accordance with § 10-220 of this subtitle and an opportunity to:
(i) file exceptions to the proposed decision with the agency; and
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(ii)present argument to a majority of the officials who areto make the final decision.
(3) If a party files exceptions or presents argument under paragraph (1)or(2)of this subsection, theofficial or
officials who are to make the final decision shall:

(i)personally consider each partof therecord that a party cites in its exceptions or arguments before making a
final decision; and

(ii)except as otherwise provided by law or by agreement of theparties, make the final decision within 90 days
afterthe exceptions are filed or the argument is presented, whichever is later.

(b) Changes to proposed decision.- The final decision shall identify any changes, modifications, or amendments to
theproposed decision andthe reasons for the changes, modifications, or amendments.
[1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1995,ch. 3, § 1;2003, ch. 391.]

SG §10-217. Proof.

The standard ofproofin a contested case shall bethe preponderance of evidence unless the standard of clear and
convincing evidence is imposed on the agency by regulation, statute, or constitution.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-218. Contents of record.

The presiding officerhearing a contested case shall make a record thatincludes:
(1) all motions and pleadings;

(2) all documentary evidence that the agency or Office receives;
(3)a statement of each fact of which the agency or Office has taken official notice;

(4) any staff memorandum submitted to an individual who isinvolved in the decision making process ofthe
contested case byan official or employee ofthe agency who isnot authorized to participate inthe decision making
process;

(5) each question;
(6) each offer of proof;

(7) each objectionand the ruling on the objection;
(8) eachfinding of fact or conclusion of law proposed by:
(i) a party; or

(ii) the presiding officer;

(9) eachexception to a finding or conclusion proposed by a presiding officer; and
(10) each intermediate proposed andfinal ruling byor forthe agency, including each report or opinion issued in
connection with the ruling.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 252A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-219. Ex parte communications.
(a) Restrictions.-

(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2)of this subsection, a presiding officer may not communicate ex parte
directly or indirectly regarding themerits of any issue inthecase, while the case is pending, with:
(i) any party to the case or the party's representative or attorney; or
(ii) any person who presided at a previous stage of the case.

(2)Anagency head, board, or commission presiding over a contested case may communicate with members of
anadvisory staffof,or any counsel for, the agency, board, orcommission who otherwise does notparticipate inthe
contested case.

(b) Communications prior tohearing.- If, before hearing a contested case, a person receives an ex parte
communication of a typethatwould violate subsection (a) of this section if received while conducting a hearing, the

person, promptly after commencing the hearing, shall disclose the communication inthe manner prescribed in
subsection (c) of this section.

(c) Disclosure.- An individual who is involved in the decision making process and who is personally aware of an
ex parte communication shall:
(1) give notice to all parties;
(2) include in the record of the contested case:
(i) each written communication received;

(ii) a memorandum that statesthe substance of eachoral communication received;
(iii) each written response to a communication; and
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(iv) a memorandum thatstates the substance of each oral response to thecommunication; and
(3) send to each party a copyof eachcommunication, memorandum, andresponse.
(d) Rebuttal- A party may rebut an exparte communication ifthe party requests the opportunity to rebut within
10 days after notice of the communication.
(e) Remedial action.-

(1) Toeliminate theeffect of an exparte communication that ismade in violation ofthis section, thepresiding
officer or, if thepresiding officer is a multimember body, the individual board or commission member, may:
(i) withdraw from the proceeding; or
(ii) terminate the proceeding without prejudice.

(2) Anorder to terminate the proceeding without prejudice shall state the lastdate by which a party may
reinstitute the proceeding.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §254A; 1984, ch.284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-220. Proposed decisions and orders.

(a) Preparation.- Ifthe Office conducts a hearing under this subtitle, the Office shall prepare proposed findings of

fact, conclusions of law, or orders in accordance with the agency's delegation under § 10-205 of this subtitle.
(b) Submission.- The Office shall send itsproposed findings, conclusions, or orders:
(1) to the parties and the agency directly; or

(2) ifthe agency's delegation under § 10-205 ofthis subtitle requires, tothe agency for distribution by the agency
to the parties.
(c) Review and issuance.-

(1) Within 60 days after receipt ofthe Office's proposed findings, conclusions, ororder under subsection (b) (2)

of this section, the agency shall:

(i) review the Office's proposed findings, conclusions, or order;

(ii) issue the proposed decision, which may include the Office's proposed findings, conclusions, ororder with or
without modification; and

(iii) send the proposed decision and a copy ofthe Office's proposed findings, conclusions, ororder tothe
parties.

(2) The time limit specified inparagraph (1) ofthis subsection may beextended by the agency head, board, or

commission with written notice to the parties.

(d) Form and contents.- Aproposed decision ororder, including proposed decisions ororders issued for contested
case hearings subject to this subtitle but notconducted bytheOffice, shall:
(1) be in writing or stated on the record;
(2) contain separate findings of fact and conclusions of law;

(3)include an explanation of procedures andtime limits forfiling exceptions; and
(4) ifthe Office conducted the hearing and the agency's proposed decision includes any changes, modifications,
or amendments to the Office's proposed findings, conclusions, or orders, contain an explanation of thereasons for
each change, modification, or amendment.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-221. Final decisions and orders.

(a) Form.- A final decision or order in a contested case that is adverse to a party shall be inwriting or stated onthe
record.

(b) Contents.-

(1) A final decision or order in a contested case, including a remand of a proposed decision, shall contain
separate statements of:
(i) the findings of fact;
(ii) the conclusions of law; and
(iii) the order.

(2) A written statement of appeal rights shallbe included withthe decision.

(3) If thefindings of fact are stated in statutory language, the final decision shall state concisely and explicitly the
facts that support the findings.

(4) If, in accordance with regulations, a party submitted proposed findings of fact, the final decision shall state a
ruling on each proposed finding.

(c) Distribution.- The final decision maker promptly shall deliver ormail a copy ofthe final decision or order to:
(1) each party; or
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(2) the party's attorney of record.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 254; 1984, ch. 284, § 1;1993, ch. 59, § 1;1995, ch.3, § 1.]

SG §10-222. Judicial review.
(a) Review offinal decision.-

(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a partywho is aggrieved by the final decision in a
contestedcase is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section.

(2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested caseto the Office, is entitled to judicialreview
of a decision as provided in this sectionif the agency was a partybeforethe agencyor the Office.
(b) Review of interlocutory order.- Where the presiding officer hasfinal decision-making authority, a person in a
contested case who is aggrieved by an interlocutory order is entitledto judicial review if:
(1)the party would qualify underthis section forjudicial review of anyrelated final decision;
(2) the interlocutory order:
(i) determines rights and liabilities; and

(ii) has immediate legal consequences; and

(3) postponement of judicial reviewwouldresultin irreparable harm.
(c) Jurisdiction and venue.- Unless otherwise required bystatute, a petition forjudicial review shall be filed with
the circuit court for the county where any party resides or has a principal place of business.
(d) Parties. -

(1)The court may permit any other interested person to intervene in a proceeding under thissection.
(2) If theagency hasdelegated to the Office theauthority to issue thefinal administrative decision pursuant to §
10-205 (a) (3) ofthis subtitle, and there are 2 or more other parties with adverse interests remaining inthecase, the

agency may decline to participate inthe judicial review. An agency that declines to participate shall inform the court
in its initial response.
(e) Stay ofenforcement.-

(1) The filing ofa petition for judicial review does not automatically stay the enforcement ofthe final decision.
(2) Except asotherwise provided bylaw, the final decision maker may grant orthe reviewing court may order a
stay ofthe enforcement ofthefinal decision onterms that the final decision maker or court considers proper.
(f) Additional evidencebefore agency.-

(1) Judicial review of disputed issues offact shall beconfined tothe record for judicial review supplemented by
additional evidence taken pursuant to this section.

(2) The court may order the presiding officer totake additional evidence onterms that the court considers proper
if:

(i)before the hearing date in court, a party applies for leave to offer additional evidence; and
(ii) the court is satisfied that:
1. the evidence is material; and

2. there were good reasons forthefailure to offer the evidence intheproceeding before thepresiding
officer.

(3) On the basis ofthe additional evidence, the final decision maker may modify the findings and decision.
(4)The final decision maker shall file with thereviewing court, as partof the record:
(i) the additional evidence; and
(ii) any modifications of the findings or decision.
(g) Proceeding.-

(1)Thecourtshallconduct a proceeding under thissection without a jury.

(2) Aparty may offer testimony onalleged irregularities inprocedure before thepresiding officer that donot
appear on the record.
(3) On request, the court shall:
(i) hear oral argument; and
(ii) receive written briefs.
(h) Decision.- In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or

(3)reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right ofthepetitioner may have been prejudiced because a
finding, conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;

(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker;
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(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;

(v)is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
[An. Code art41,§255; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536, § 1,2005, ch. 25,§§ 12,13.]

SG §10-222.1. Administrative orders.

(a) Enforcement- A party to a contested case may timely seek civil enforcement of anadministrative order by
filing a petition for civilenforcement in an appropriate circuit court.

(b) Jurisdiction and venue.- Unless otherwise required by statute, a party shall file a petition for civil enforcement
of an administrative order in the circuit courtfor the county where any party resides or has a principalplace of
business.

(c) Parties - Defendants.- Inanaction seeking civil enforcement ofan administrative order a party shall name, as
a defendant, each alleged violator against whom the party seeks to obtain civil enforcement.

(d) Same - Plaintiffs.- A party may file an action for civil enforcement ofanadministrative order ifanother party
is in violation of the administrative order.

(e) Remedies.- A party in an action for civil enforcement ofan administrative order may request, and a court may
grant, one or moreof the following forms of relief:
(1) declaratory relief;

(2) temporaryor permanent injunctive relief;
(3) a writ of mandamus; or

(4) any other civil remedy provided by law.
[2000, ch. 377.]

SG §10-223. Appeals to Court of Special Appeals.
(a) Scope ofsection.- This section does not apply to:

(1) a case that arises under Title 16 ofthe Transportation Article unless a right to appeal tothe Court ofSpecial
Appealsis specificallyprovided; or
(2) a final judgment on actions of the Inmate Grievance Office.
(b) Rightofappeal.-

(1) Aparty who isaggrieved bya final judgment ofa circuit court under this subtitle may appeal tothe Court of

Special Appeals in the manner that law provides forappeal of civil cases.
(2) An agency thatwas a party inthe circuit court may appeal under paragraph (1)of this subsection.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41,§256; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536, § 1.]

SG §10-224. Litigationexpenses for small businesses and nonprofit organizations.
(a) Definitions.-

(1) In this section, the following wordshavethe meanings indicated.
(2)"Business" means a trade, professional activity, or other business thatis conducted for profit.

(3) "Nonprofit organization" means anorganization that isexempt or eligible forexemption from taxation under
§ 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
(b) Scopeofsection.- This section applies only to:
(1) an agency operating statewide;

(2)a business that, on the date when the contested case or civil action is initiated:
(i) is independently owned and operated; and

(ii) has less than 50 employees, including, if a corporation owns 50% or more of thestock of the business, each
employee of the corporation; and
(3) a nonprofit organization.

(c) Reimbursement authorized.- Subject to thelimitations inthis section, an agency or court may award to a
business or nonprofit organization reimbursement for expenses that the business or nonprofit organization
reasonably incurs in connectionwith a contestedcase or civilactionthat:
(1)is initiated against the business or nonprofit organization by an agency as partof an administrative or
regulatory function;

(2) is initiated without substantial justificationor in bad faith; and
(3) does not result in:

(i)an adjudication, stipulation, or acceptance of liability ofthebusiness or nonprofit organization;
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(ii) a determination of noncompliance, violation, infringement, deficiency, or breach onthepartof thebusiness
or nonprofit organization; or

(iii) a settlement agreement under which thebusiness ornonprofit organization agrees to takecorrective action
or to pay a monetary sum.

(d) Claim requiredin contested case.-

(1) To qualify for an awardunderthis section when the agency has initiated a contested case,the business or
nonprofit organization mustmakea claim to the agency before taking anyappeal.
(2) The agency shall act on the claim.
(e) Amount-

(1) An award under this section may include:
(i) the expenses incurred in the contested case;
(ii) court costs;

(iii) counsel fees; and
(iv) the fees ofnecessary witnesses.

(2) An award under this section may not exceed $10,000.

(3)The court may reduce or deny an award to the extent thattheconduct of thebusiness or nonprofit
organization during theproceedings unreasonably delayed the resolution of thematter in controversy.
(f) Source ofaward.- Anaward under this section shall bepaid asprovided inthe State budget.
(g) Appeals.-

(1) Ifthe agency denies an award under this section, the business or nonprofit organization may appeal, as
provided in this subtitle.

(2) An agency may appeal an award that a courtmakes under this section.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §§ 244,255A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1986, ch. 256; 1988, ch. 110, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-225. Suspension of provisions.

(a) In general- Upon a finding bytheGovernor that there isanimminent threat within a time certain ofa loss or
denial of federal funds to the Statebecause of the operation of any section of this subtitleor of Title 9, Subtitle 16 of

this article, theGovernor by executive order may suspend the applicability of partor all of thissubtitle or of Title 9,
Subtitle 16 of this article to a specific class of contested cases.

(b) Duration.- A suspension under this section iseffective only solong as, and tothe extent, necessary to avoid a
denial or loss of federal funds to the State.

(c) Contents oforder.- The executive order shall explain the basis for theGovernor's finding and state theperiod
of time duringwhich the suspension is to be effective.

(d) Termination.- The Governor shall declare the termination of a suspension when it is no longer necessary to
prevent the loss or denial of federal funds.
(e) Publication of order.- An executive order issued under thissection shall be:
(1) presented to the Legislative Policy Committee; and

(2)published intheMaryland Register pursuant to § 7-206 (a)(2)(viii) of thisarticle.
[1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 141; 1996,ch. 10, § 1.]

SG §10-226. Licenses - Special provisions.
(a) Definitions.-

(1) In this sectionthe following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) "License" means all or any part of permission that:
(i) is required by law to be obtained from a unit;
(ii) is not required only for revenue purposes; and
(iii) is in any form, including:
1. an approval;
2. a certificate;
3. a charter;

4. a permit; or
5. a registration.

(3) "Unit"means an officer or unit that is authorizedby law to:
(i) adopt regulations subject to Subtitle 1 of this title; or
(ii) adjudicatecontested cases under this subtitle.
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(b) Renewal and expiration- If, at least 2 calendar weeks before a license expires, the licensee makes sufficient
application forrenewal of the license, the license does notexpire until:
(1) the unit takesfinal action on the application; and
(2) either:

(i) the time for seekingjudicial review of the action expires; or
(ii) anyjudicial stay of the unit's final action expires.
(c) Revocation ofsuspension.-

(1) Except asprovided inparagraph (2) ofthis subsection, a unit may not revoke orsuspend a license unless the
unit first gives the licensee:

(i)written notice of the facts thatwarrant suspension orrevocation; and
(ii) an opportunity to be heard.

(2)A unitmay order summarily the suspension of a license if theunit:

(i)finds that the public health, safety, orwelfare imperatively requires emergency action; and
(ii) promptly gives the licensee:

1.written notice of the suspension, thefinding, and thereasons thatsupport the finding; and
2. an opportunity to be heard.
[1993,ch. 59, §1; 1995,ch. 538.]
Cross references. See Revision of subtitle and Editor's notes under § 10-201of this article.

C. Regulations Enacted.

This book is concerned with "contested cases" withinthe meaningof MAPA. Subtitle 2 of Maryland's
Administrative Procedure Act contains the statutes applicable to "contested cases." Subtitle 1 of

Maryland's Act isconcerned with the adoption ofregulations by agencies. A comprehensive statutory
scheme is setforth forthe adoption of regulations. Regulation is defined by SG §10-101(g) as follows:
(g) Regulation.-

(1)"Regulation" means a statement or anamendment orrepeal of a statement that:
(i) has general application;
(ii) has future effect;
(iii) is adopted by a unit to:
1. detail or carry out a law that the unit administers;
2. govern organization of the unit;
3. govern the procedure of the unit; or

4. govern practice before the unit; and
(iv) is in any form, including:
1. a guideline;
2. a rule;
3. a standard;

4. a statement of interpretation; or
5. a statement of policy.
(2) "Regulation" does not include:
(i) a statement that:

1. concerns only internal management of the unit; and

2. does not affect directly the rights of the public or the procedures available to the public;

(ii) a response of theunit to a petition for adoption of a regulation, under § 10-123 of this subtitle; or
(iii) a declaratory ruling of theunit asto a regulation, order, orstatute, under Subtitle 3 ofthis title.
(3) "Regulation", as used in §§ 10-110 and 10-111.1, means allor any portion of a regulation.

The definition is wordy. Case law has addressed the issue of what constitutes a regulation. The

importance ofthe definition is seen inthe fact that a "regulation" has general application to the individual
and entity regulated byan agency and requites notice and comment or a requirement that emergency rule

making procedures be followed, before the regulation is operative.11 Some agency rules are not a
11 Dept ofHealth v. Chimes, 343Md. 336, 338, 681 A. 2d484 (1996).
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"regulation" in the sense contemplated by theMAPA and need nothave been promulgated according to

the MAPA rulemaking procedures.12
TheCourt of Appeals has detailed and summarized the statutory process required for the approval of
proposed regulations.
TheAPArequires Stateagencies to submit proposed regulations to the Attorney General for approval as to
legality, §10-107(b) of the State Government Article, andalso to the JointCommittee on Administrative,
Executive, and Legislative Review (AELR Committee) for preliminary review 15 days prior to publication.
§10-110(b). The agency mustpublish the proposed regulation in theMaryland Register andmay adopt the
regulation 45 days later. §10-111 (a)(1). For30outofthe45 days, the agency must accept public comment

ontheproposed regulation. §10-111 (a)(3). The AELR Committee may delay adoption of theregulation to
allow moretime for review. § 10-11 l(a)(2)(i). TheAELRCommittee considers whetherthe regulation is in

conformity with the statutory authority of theagency and the legislative intent of the statute under which
theregulation is promulgated. §10-111.1 (b). If the AELR Committee votes to oppose adoption of the
regulation, the agency may withdraw ormodify the regulation, orsubmit it tothe Governor for approval.
§10-111.1(c)(2). The Governor may then order the agency to withdraw, modify, or adopt the regulation.
§10-111.1(c)(3). Notice of theadoption ofthe regulation must beprinted intheMaryland Register. §10114. Thisprocess is commonly known as "notice andcomment" rulemaking.
The APA also provides for "Emergency Adoption" of regulations. If an agency deems it necessary, §
10-111(b) (1)allows immediate adoption of regulations by submitting the regulation anda fiscal impact
statement to the AELR Committee. A majority of theAELRCommittee or the chair or co-chair may

approve the regulation. §10-111(b)(2)(f). Apublic hearing must be held atthe request ofany member ofthe
AELR Committee. §10-111(b) (2) (ii). The circuit courts must declare invalid anyregulation adopted in

violation ofthese procedures. §10-125(d).13

When agency procedures do not change existing law orformulate rules ofwidespread application, the
process to adopt a regulation is notrequired for those procedures to be effective.
Units of government intheExecutive branch are included within the provisions ofthesubtitle.
Legislative and Judicial branch activities are excluded aswell as the promulgation of regulations
concerning the Injured Workers' Insurance fund, a board of license commissioners orthe Rural Maryland
council. SG §10-102. "A regulation isnot effective unless it contains a citation ofthe statutory authority
for the regulation." SG §10-106. Provisions are made for preliminary review, SG §10-110; there are time
limitations and public hearings, SG §10-111; and provisions for opposition to be filed to theadoption of
regulations. SG §10-111.1. Publication ofthe proposed regulation must occur, SG §10-112; provisions
are made for changes in a proposed regulation, SG §10-113; and proposed regulations may be withdrawn.
SG §10-116.

Declaratory judgment is a procedure that may beutilized to contest thevalidity of a regulation:
SG §10-125. Declaratory judgment.
(a) Petition authorized.-

(1)A person may file a petition fora declaratory judgment onthe validity of anyregulation, whether or
not the personhas askedthe unit to consider the validity of the regulation.
(2)A petition under thissection shall befiled with thecircuit court forthe county where thepetitioner
resides or has a principal place of business.
12 Chimes, 342 Md. at 348.

13 Chimes, 343 Md. at339-40. The Chimes decision addressed cost containment measures adopted by The Developmental
Disabilities Administration (DDA), and whether regulations had tobe promulgated by DDA attempting to stay within itsbudget.
Id., at 342, 344. The growth cap did not change existing law. Id., at 346.

14 Chimes, 343 Md. at345 citing Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304 Md. 731, 756, 501 A. 2d48(1985); Baltimore gas
& Elec. V. PublicServ. Comm 'n, 305 Md. 145, 169,501 A. 2d 1307 (1986); andCBSv. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 692-93, 575
A. 2d 424 (1990).
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(b) Authority to consider.- A court maydetermine thevalidity of any regulation if it appears to the court
that the regulation or itsthreatened application interferes withorimpairs orthreatens to interfere withor
impair a legal right or privilege of the petitioner.

(c) Unit asparty.- The unitthat adopted theregulation shall be made a party to the proceeding under this
section.

(d) Finding ofinvalidity.- Subject to § 10-128 of this subtitle, the court shall declare a provision of a
regulationinvalid if the court finds that:

(1) the provision violates any provision of theUnited States or Maryland Constitution;
(2) the provision exceeds the statutory authority ofthe unit; or
(3)the unit failed to complywith statutory requirements for adoption ofthe provision.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 249; 1984, ch. 284, § 1.]

Separate statutes address invalid provisions, and aRegulatory Reviewand Evaluation Act exists. SG
§§10-128, et. seq.; 10-130, et. seq.

COMAR Titles containing adopted regulations are listed below:
Title 01. Executive Department
Title 02. Office of the Attorney General
Title 03. Comptroller of the Treasury
Title 04. Department of General Services

Title 05. Department of Housing and Community Development
Title 07. Department of Human Resources
Title 08. Department of Natural Resources

Title 09. Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation
Title 10. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Title 11. Department of Transportation
Title 12. Department of Public Safety andCorrectional Services
Title 13 a. State Board of Education

Title
Title
Title
Title
Title
Title

13B. Maryland Higher Education Commission
14. Independent Agencies
15. Department of Agriculture
16. Department of Juvenile Justice
17. Department of Budget and Management
18. Department of Assessments and Taxation

Title 19a. State Ethics Commission
Title 20. Public Service Commission

Title 21. State Procurement Regulations
Title 22. State Retirement and Pension System
Title 23. Board of Public Works

Title 24. Department of Business and Economic Development
Title 25. Office of the State Treasurer

Title 26. Department of the Environment
Title 27. Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission
Title 28. Office of Administrative Hearings

Title 29. Department of State Police
Title 30. Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (Miemss)
Title 31. Maryland Insurance Administration
Title 32. Maryland Department of Aging
Title 33. State Board of Elections
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Significant case decisions

Legislative regulations vs. administrativeregulations

o State v. Copes, 175 Md. App. 351,358, 927 A. 2d426 (2007) was a case involving a claim formedical
malpractice byhealth care providers against the State ofMaryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act and
theinterpretation of SG 12-106 requiring notice to the State Treasurer within a one-year period oftime
prior asa condition precedent to filing a claim against the State under theMaryland . The "State Insurance
Program" subtitle of COMAR contained regulations relevant tothe inquiry (COMAR 25.02.03.02) and a
consideration of the issue caused the Court to comment on a difference between "legislative" and

"interpretative" administrativeregulations:

Administrative regulations have theforce of law when they are "legislative" andnotmerely
"interpretive." A regulation is "legislative" when it "'affects individual rights and obligations'" and
"the agency intended therule to belegislative as'evidenced bysuch circumstantial evidence asthe
formality thatattended themaking ofthe law, including rule making procedure and publication.'"
Moreover, a "legislative" regulation is enacted under theauthority of anexpress delegation of

power from the legislature, (alegislative rule "is the product ofan exercise ofdelegated legislative
power to makethe lawthrough rules") (citation omitted).
An "interpretive" regulation, in contrast, "simply state[s] what the administrative agency
thinks the statutemeans, and onlyremind[s]' affected parties of existing duties." While an

interpretive regulation does notcarry the force of law, it is entitled to deference because it reflects
the agency's interpretation of its own statute.

175 Md. App. at379-80. (citations omitted)15
Regulations must be consistent with thestatutory authority authorizing them to bepassed
o Fields v. DCDSS, 176 Md. App. 152, 931 A. 2d 824 (2007) decided that procedural steps set forth in a
COMAR regulation were void because theregulation made more burdensome the statutory appeal process
for an individual contesting a determination of "indicated" child abuse. There wasa two stepprocess for
persons appealing a finding of responsible for indicated child abuse or neglect: (1)filing anappeal to the
local department by notice within 60 days oftheruling, and (2)the requirement to take an additional step
of sending a contested case nearing request to OAH within 60 days of the ruling. Theformer requirement
is oneof statute, but the latterrequirement was passed by regulation. "To require a partywhoobjects to the
actions of an agency andwho hasnotified it of his/her intent to appeal, to takea second step (send the
contested Case Hearing Request Form to OAH) within sixty days, exceeds the scope of what FL Section 5706(b)(1) permits andunfairly decreases thetime theobjecting party hasto act." 176 Md. App at 160. The
ALJhad dismissed the appeal because Fields failed to submit the contested case form to OAH priorto the

expiration ofthe sixty-day period. 176 Md. App. at 156.16 Regulations must be consistent with the
statutory authority under which they are authorized.

15 What was before the court in this case was the issue of who the claimant was that had to file a written claim to the State

Treasurer in a case whereonly one of three sisters files awrongful death action and thatbrought into playthe interpretation of
statutes and regulations concerning whether the claim of all three sisters had been timely filed. Copes, 175 Md. App. at357-58.

Regulations by the State Treasurer interpreted theterm "claimant" inthestatute (SG §12-106). "We conclude that, for the
wrongful death of adecedent, notall thebeneficiaries under theWDA [Wrongful Death Act] are required to file separate written
claims with the State Treasurer." 175 Md. App. at 382.

16 The Court discussed case lawdealing with regulations which are consistent with and not consistent withthe letter and spirit of
the law. DECSS, 176 Md. App. at 161.
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D. Declaratory Rulings.

There is a provision inthe State Government article for declaratory rulings thatcanbe made by
administrative agencies. Subtitle 3 of Title 10contains the applicable sections.
Subtitle 3. Administrative Procedure Act - Declaratory Rulings.
10-301."Unit" defined.

10-302. Scope of subtitle.
10-303. Political subdivisions and instrumentalities.

10-304. Petition for ruling.
10-305. Ruling.

SG §10-304. Petition for ruling.

(a) Authorized.- Aninterested person may submit to a unit a petition fora declaratory ruling with respect
to the manner in whichthe unit would apply a regulation or orderof the unit or a statutethat the unit
enforces to a person or property on the facts set forth in the petition.
(b) Regulations.- Each unit shall adoptregulations that set:
(1) the form for a petition under this section; and
(2)procedures forthe submission, consideration, and disposition of thepetition.
[An. Code 1957, art.41, § 250; 1984, ch. 284, § 1.]

SG §10-305. Ruling.

(a) Authorized.- A unit may issue a declaratory ruling.

(b) Effect.- A declaratory ruling binds the unit and thepetitioner onthefacts setforth inthepetition.
(c) Appeal- A declaratory ruling under this section is subject to review in a circuit court inthemanner
that Subtitle 2 of this title provides for the review of a contested case.
[An.Code 1957,art. 41, § 250; 1984,ch. 284, § 1.]

Significant case decisions
Standard to apply on judicial review

o

Potomac Valley Orthopaedic Associates v. Maryland Board ofPhysicians, 417 Md. 622, 12A. 3d. 84
(2011) discussed the standard of review when a State agency makes a Declaratory Ruling pursuant to SG §
10-304(a).

The Declaratory Ruling of a StateAdministrative Agency is subjectto judicial reviewin the same
manneras providedfor a "contested case" decided underthe Administrative Procedure Act. SG §§
10-305(c) and 10-223(b)(l). As the ruling at issue doesnot involve any disputes of fact, our role is
"limited to determining ... if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous
conclusion of law." UnitedParcel Serv., Inc. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md.
569, 577, 650 A.2d 226,230 (1994). Whenthe issue is whether an administrativeagency has
made an erroneous conclusion of law, the "agency's interpretation and application of the statute
which the agencyadministers shouldordinarily be givenconsiderable weight by reviewing
courts," Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172,783 A.2d 169,177 (2001).. . .

417Md.622,635-36.17
Uponbackground information set forth in the opinion and statutory interpretation (reading of statute,
legislative history of H.B. 1280, effect of rejection by Legislature of efforts to achieve legislatively that
17 Inthis case, theCourt was called upon forJudicial Review ofa decision bytheBoard ofPhysicians decision thattheMaryland
Patient Referral Law(Subtitle 3 of Title 1 of HO)prohibited an orthopaedic surgeon from furnishing patients withMRIor CT

doiagnostic services within his/her office or group even when theorthopaedist complies with the 'group practice' exemption or
directsupervision exemption contained in the applicable statutes. 417Md. at 626.
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whichthe court was asked to grant, opinions of the attorney general), the Court stated that the Board of
Physician declaratory holdingwas found to be correct. 417 Md. at 625, 639-41.
From our review of the record, we hold that the Board was correct in ruling that (1) the "group

practice" exemption does notpermit an orthopedic surgeon to refer his or her patient for a MRI or
CT scanto be performed by another member of the orthopedic surgeon's practice group, and (2)
the "direct supervision" exemption, which is limited to referrals to "outside" entities, requires that
the referring physician be "personally present within the treatment area whenthe service is
performed and eitherpersonally providing the service or directly supervising that service." As the
Board and the Attorney Generalhave pointedout, a contrary conclusionwould offend severalwell
established principles of statutory construction.
417 Md. at 639.

A declaratory ruling vs. the requirement ofa regulation

o

Baltimore City Board v. City Neighbors Charter School, 400Md. 324, 929A. 2d 113 (2006) heldthatthe
state Board of Education could establishby declaratory rulingsstandards for determiningthe amountof

funding thatthree public charter schools were entitled to receive from theirrespective county boards of
education and that the State Board need not engage in the rulemakingprocess to make these decisions.

Discussing Charter Schools as beingin the nature of semi-autonomous public schools, the federal and
Maryland law by which they are created andfunded, the Court set forth the contentions of the three charter
schools who initiated the litigation. No statewide formula or methodology exists for determining how local
school systems fund theirschools andthe State Board concluded thata reasonable starting point for
determining the commensurate amount to be given to thecharter schools was "thetotal annual school
system operating budget thatincludes allfederal, State, andlocal funding withthe approved appropriations
for eachof the majorcategories" as specified in the Maryland law. 400 Md. at 336-37. The State Board has
broadstatutory authority overthe administration of the public school system in Maryland. 400 Md. at 342.
Rulemaking (SG§ 10-101(g)) wasdiscussed as wellas the declaratory rulingprocedure underSG §
10-305. 400 Md. at 345. The comprehensive law governing public charter schools"requires a county board
of education to 'disburse to a publiccharterschool an amount of county, State, and federal moneyfor
elementary, middle, and secondary students thatis commensurate withthe amount disbursed to other public
schools in the localjurisdiction.'" 400 Md. at 346. Theattack by the charterschools on the State Board's
perpublic expenditure measure could notbe upheld. The statute was heldto be "patently ambiguous." 400
Md. at 347. Statutory interpretation tools, including legislative history, meantthat the requirement of ED §
9-109(a) allowedthe School Boardto makethe decision it made by declaratory ruling. 400 Md. at 356-57.
Twojudges dissentedand Judge Rakerwritingfor the dissentstated:
This court has never addressed when, if, or to what extent agencies may implement policies

through declaratory rulings. Our cases addressing situations when agencies mustproceed through
formal rulemaking, as opposedto adjudication, are however, instructive on this point.
400 Md. at 358. [Emphasis by bold]

... It is clear that in issuing its declaratory rulings, SBE created newpolicies ofgeneraland
widespread application wherenoneexisted before. SBEshouldhave engagedin formal
rulemaking procedures. . .
400 Md. at 361.

We have recognized that administrative agencies have discretion to establish policy either
through the adoption of regulations or through ad hoc contested case adjudications and that
it would be "patently unreasonable" to conclude that "every time an agency explains the
standards through which it applies a statute in a contested proceeding it is promulgating
rules." Declaratory rulings are thus a permissible mechanism by which SBE may exercise its
statutory authority to "explain the true intent and meaning" of the public school laws and
decide "controversies and disputes" under those laws. [Emphasis by bold]
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The rulings at issue here were specificto three individual cases that happened to involve
some common issues relating to the construction of ED § 9-109. That statute, like the charter
schoolmovement generally, was a newone,not at all free from ambiguity, and SBEwas well
within its discretion to proceedin the manner it did ~ adjudicating the cases before it and offering
"guidance" to other applicants, rather thanproceeding with more formal and binding regulations.
345-46. (citations omitted) [Emphasis by bold]
From the dissent:

The above cases demonstrate that administrative agencies do not possess unfettered discretion to

issue policiesthroughwhatever procedure they choose. We have noted repeatedly that an
administrativeagency's discretionshould be limitedwhere it (1) changes existing law, (2) applies
new standards retroactively, or (3) creates rules of widespread application. Further, we have
concludedthat an agency must engage in formal rulemaking when it changes existing laws or
creates new standards that have retroactive effect.

The majority states that formal rulemaking was un-necessary in this case because the "rulings
at issue here were specificto three individual casesthat happenedto involvesome common issues
relating to the construction of ED § 9-109." Maj. op. at 24. / disagree. It is clearthat in issuingits
declaratory rulings, SBE created newpoliciesofgeneraland widespread application where
none existedbefore. SBE shouldhave engagedinformal rulemakingprocedures.
As noted, priorto issuing these declaratory rulings, SBEhad never interpreted § 9-109(a). With
limited inputfrom the parties involved, andnone from outside parties with an interest in the
interpretation of § 9-109(a), SBE adopted a general formula to determine the appropriate amount
of funding to be disbursed to public charter schools, required that each "charter agreement mustbe
completed within30 calendar days from the dateof the decision approving the charterap
plication," and mandated that the "total average per pupil amount shallbe adjusted by a 2%
reduction as a reasonable cost to the charter school for these required central office functions."

These are not rulings "specificto three individual cases." SBE noted as much when it stated as
follows: "We have issued this Opinion as guidance and direction not only to the parties in this

appeal but alsoto the othercharter school applicants andlocalschool systems in Maryland..."
Formal rulemakingwas necessary to createthe policiesat issue. A declaratoryruling, which
failed to provide even the quasi-judicial protections of an administrative adjudication, was an
inappropriatemechanismfor the formation of such widespread policies. . .
400 Md. at 360-62. (footnote omitted)

E. References.

There are a number of Opinions from the Attorney General of Maryland relating to the statutory scheme
for the adoptionof regulations. Case law has interpreted provisions of the statute over the years.
References to case law decisions are included throughout these materials. There are law review articles
the reader may find helpful.

(1). Opinions of the Attorney General.
(2). MICPEL Publications.
(3). Law Review Articles.
(4). Treatise Authority.

(1). Opinions of the Attorney General.

Listed below are some opinions of the Attorney General concerning the MAPA:
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87 Op. Att'y Gen. - (Mar. 11, 2002).

A policy statement issued bythe Subcabinet for Children, Youth, and Families thatestablished a
strict two-year limiton services provided to an eligible child under the State's "Return/Diversion"
initiativefit the definition of "regulation" in the State Administrative Procedure Act and was

required to be adopted under the rulemaking provisions of the act in orderto be enforceable.
79 Op. Att'y Gen. 354 (May 13, 1994).

Procedural regulations. - TheAdministrative Procedure Act, which under subsection (a) of this
section applies to virtually every unitintheExecutive Branch, prescribes the procedural
requirements for the adoption of a regulation.
75 Op. Att'y Gen. 37 (January 23, 1990).

The Medical Assistance Program's document informing physicians of a new documentation

requirement for prescriptions of brand-name drugs did not constitute a regulation subject to the
adoption procedures of theAdministrative Procedure Act as it falls within the internal
management exception to the definition of regulation.
61 Op. Att'y Gen. 6 (1976).

Notice where final text of proposed agency rule differs from original version. - When the final
text of a proposed agency rule contains provisions which are substantially different from thetext
as originally proposed and published, the adequacy ofnotice depends onwhether the affected
class reasonably could have anticipated from thepublished notice the substance of a regulation
finally proposed for adoption, and if not, the agency should treat its revised version as a newly
proposed rule and give the public additional notice and anopportunity to beheard.
(2). MICPEL Publications.
o Judicial Review of Agency Decisions, Wilner, Alan (1997)

o Maryland Administrative Law, Rochvarg, Arnold (2001) and Supplement (2004)
1. Administrative Law - Maryland.

o

2. Delegated Legislation - Maryland.
3. Administrative Agencies - Maryland.
Maryland State Board of ContractAppeals Decisions (1994)

o

New Administrative Procedure Act and How it Affects OAH Practice (1996)

o Update for the General Practitioner (1996) 1.Administrative Law
(3). Law Review Articles.
35 Md.L. Rev. 414 (1976)
Constitutional Limits on the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administrative Agencies in

Maryland, by Edward A. Tomlinson.
The Law of Judicial Review in Maryland
The Limits on the Judicial Role
The Limits on the Administrative Role
Conclusion
56 Md.L. Rev. 196

The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act; Forty Years Old in 1997, by Edward A.
Tomlinson.
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416
425
440
456

Introduction

196

I. Rulemaking v. Adjudication in Maryland
A. Rulemaking Procedures in Maryland
B. Contested Case Procedures in Maryland

202
204
211

C. Application of Rulemaking vs. Adjudication Dichotomy
II. Rulemaking and the Maryland APA
III. Adjudication and the Maryland APA
A. Relationship BetweenAdjudication and Contested Case
B. Overview of Adjudication in Maryland

219
229
240
240
245

C. What Is a Contested Case?
Conclusion

255
271

29 U. Bait. L. Rev. 1(2001)

"Principles of Maryland Procurement Law"

7 U. Bait. J. Envtl. L. 210 (2000)
RECENT DEVELOPMENT: Behoir Farms Homeowners Assn., Inc v. North: [355 Md. 259, 734

A. 2d 227 (1999) Applying Proper Standard for Granting a Zoning Variance for Boat Slips
in a Critical Area.

27 U. Bait. L. Rev. 515(1998)

NOTE: Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission [343 Md. 681, 684 A. 2d 804 (1996)],
Maryland's Court of Appeals Upholds a Fine Imposed by an Administrative Agency
Despite a Lack of Specific Authorization to Fine from General Assembly.
WhileMaryland is not bound by the doctrine of separation of powersthat has developed
under the federal Constitution, Maryland courts have articulated analogous principles.
Article 8 of the MarylandDeclaration of Rights provides that "the Legislative, Executive
and Judicial powers of Government oughtto be foreverseparate." Thus, unlike the
federal Constitution, Maryland's Constitution contains an explicit reference to the
separation of powers. Anydelegation of legislative orjudicial powerto an administrative
agency appears to contradict Article 8 because, in theory, administrative agencies fall
under the executive branch. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has

recognized the right of the General Assemblyto delegate legislative powers to
administrative agencies for over 125 years. As the court of appeals has construedArticle
8, the separation of powers doctrine does not act as a complete bar to the transfer of
power among the three branches of government.
As with the federal courts, Maryland courts have adopted and developed their own
nondelegation doctrinejurisprudencethat regulates the transfer of power from the
General Assembly to administrative agencies. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has
aptly recognized that "the delegation doctrine ... is a corollary of the separationof
powers doctrine." Thus, Maryland's nondelegation doctrine curtails violations of
Maryland's constitutional separation of powers doctrine.
Id., at 539-40 (footnotes omitted)
23 U. Bait. L. Rev. 461 (1994)

Article: Bold Promises but Baby Steps: Maryland's Growth Policy to the Year 2020 by
Philip J. Tierney.
The author comments on Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia formation of the

Chesapeake Bay Commission to coordinate legislative planning and programs to restore
the Bay and on the adoption of the Maryland Economic Growth, Resource Protection,
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andPlanning Act of 1992. Flexible techniques in the types of available zoning in
Maryland are discussed. Id. 483-91.

(4). Treatises.

Not allthat much is available by way of treatises on State and County Administrative Law. The author
refers the reader to the following:

A. Maryland Administrative Law, Professor Arnold Rochvarg, MICPEL, 2001 with 2004
Supplement.

B. Administrative Law Treatise, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Aspen Law & Business, 4th edition (2002)
(deals primarily with federal law)
C. State Administrative Law, Frank E. Cooper, A Research Project of the American Bar Foundation
and The University of Michigan Law School, The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc. 1965.

D. Maryland LawEncyclopedia (M.L.E.), Administrative Lawand Procedure, West Group, with
2006 pocketpart, (not very reliable in the opinion of the author ofthis Chapter 1).

E. Maryland Digest, 2nd. Administrative Law, West Publishing Co. with 2006 pocket part.
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Maryland State and County Administrative Law
Chapter 3.

County and Municipal
Administrative Agencies
2012CH3Cnty 1/3/2012

Copyright 2012
Diane O. Leasure and John F. Fader II

County governments and municipalities have their own administrative agencies, contested hearings and
procedures for adjudicating cases. Finding rules of procedure applicable to these proceedings requires
inquiry at a local level. With the advent ofthe internet, some Maryland subdivisions have rules of
procedure on-line.

This Chapter 3 is divided into the following sections:

A. Baltimore County- A Charter County
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B. Other Rules of Procedure
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Reference is made to the Annotated Code of Maryland where it is provided that a Maryland

subdivision or part of a subdivision may electa particular form of government. Among the choices are:
Art. 23A. Corporations - Municipal.
Art. 23B. Municipal Corporation Charter.
Art. 24. Political Subdivisions - Miscellaneous Provisions.

Art. 25. County Commissioners.
Art. 25A. Chartered Counties of Maryland.
Art. 25B. Home Rule for Code Counties.
Art. 26. Miscellaneous Governmental Entities.

This Chapter 3 is divided into the following subsections:

A. Baltimore County - A Charter County.

Article 25A of Maryland's Annotated Code is entitled "Charted Counties of Maryland." A Maryland
county may adopt a chartedform of government. Section 5 containsenumeratedexpress powers granted
to and conferred upon any county which forms a charter form of government. Baltimore County,
Maryland has electedthis form of government. Among those statutory powers is the following:
(U)
County Board of Appeals

To enact local laws providing (1) for the establishment of a county board of appeals whose members shall
be appointed by the county council; (2) for the number, qualifications, terms, and compensation of the
members; (3) for the adoption by the board of rules of practice governing its proceedings; and (4) for the
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decision by theboard on petition by any interested person and after notice and opportunity for hearing and
on the basis of the record before the board,of such of the following matters arising (either originally or on
review ofthe action of an administrative officer or agency) under any law, ordinance, or regulation of, or

subject to amendment orrepeal by,the county council, as shall be specified from time to time by such local
lawsenacted underthis subsection: An application for a zoningvariation or exception or amendment of a

zoning ordinance map; the issuance, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, ormodification of
any license, permit, approval, exemption, waiver, certificate, registration, orother form of permission orof
any adjudicatory order; and the assessment of any special benefit tax: Provided, thatuponany decision by a
county board of appeals it shall file an opinion which shall include a statement of the facts found and the
grounds for its decision. Any person aggrieved by the decision of the board and a party to theproceeding
before it may appeal to the circuit court for the county which shall havepower to affirm the decision of the
board, or if such decision is not in accordance with law, to modify or reverse such decision, with or without
remanding the case for rehearing as justice mayrequire. Any party to the proceeding inthe circuit court

aggrieved by thedecision of the court may appeal from the decision to theCourt of Special Appeals inthe
same manner as provided for in civil cases.

As part of itscharter, Baltimore County provides for a Board of Appeals withdifferent sections of its
charter governing appointment to the Board of Appeals (Sec. 601) and the powers and functions of the
Board (Sec. 602). Among powers and functions of the Board of Appeals are to hear:
(a). Appeals from orders relatingto zoning.
(b). Appeals from orders relatingto licenses.
(c). Appeals from orders relating to building.

(d). Appeals from executive, administrative and adjudicatory orders.
(e). Original and exclusivejurisdiction over all petitions for reclassification.

Rules of practice and procedure have been adopted. (Sec. 603). Appeals from decisions of theBoard
may bemade to thecircuit court of Baltimore County (Sec. 604) by one "aggrieved" within thirty (30)
days "after any decision of the county board of appeals." Authority is given to the circuit court to inthat
court "to modify or reverse such decision, with orwithout remanding the case for rehearing, asjustice
may require."

Whenever suchappeal is taken, a copy of the notice of appeal shall be served on the board by the
clerk of said court, and the board shall promptly give notice ofthe appeal to all parties to the
proceeding before it.The board shall, within fifteen days after the filing of the appeal, file with
the court the originals or certified copies of all papers and evidence presented to the board in the
proceeding before it,together witha copy of its opinion which shall include a statement of the
facts found and the grounds for its decision. Within thirtydays afterthe decision ofthe circuit
court is rendered, any party to the proceeding who is aggrieved thereby may appeal such decision
to the court of appeals ofthis state. The review proceedings provided by this section shall be
exclusive.

On the State level, various statutes, the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act and rules and

regulations inthe Office of Administrative Hearings contain the procedure to be followed for hearings in
contested cases. In Baltimore County, the Rules adopted for practice before the Board of Appeals are the
following:
Rule I. General.

a. The county board of appeals shall select one of its members to be the chairman ofthe board, andhe
shallserve as chairman at the pleasure of the board. The chairman shall presideat all meetings ofthe
county board of appeals, and in his absence he shall designate another memberof the board to sit in his
place as acting chairman.

b. Meetings of the countyboard shall be heldasdetermined by the chairman, but never lessthan
weekly; andthe board shall meet at suchother times asthe board may determine.
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c. Three (3) members of the board of appeals, asdesignated by the chairman, shall sit for the purpose
of conducting the business ofthe board; and amajority voteof two (2) members shall be necessary to
render a decision, except that, in the event of illness ordeath of a sitting member, uponagreement of
counsel of record orparties of record, two(2) members may continue to sit for purposes of concluding any
matter before the board of appeals.

d.

All appeals to the board from decisions of the zoning commissioner or deputy zoning

commissioner shallbe in conformance with the rules of the zoning commissioner of BaltimoreCounty with

respect to the form of appeal, and the filing fees shall be as established either by said rules of the zoning
commissioner or by the Zoning Regulations of Baltimore County.
Rule 2. Notice.

a.

No hearing shall be conducted without atleast ten(10) days' notice to all parties of record ortheir

counselof record, unless otherwiseagreed to by all such parties or their counsel of record.

b. Postponements and continuances will begranted atthe discretion of theboard only upon request in
writing by an attorney of record, addressed tothe board and with acopy of every other attorney of record,
orparty of record (if notrepresented by counsel) entitled toreceive notice, in accordance with section
500.11 of the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations, setting forth goodandsufficient reasons for the
requested postponement.

c. No postponement shall be granted within fifteen (15) days next prior to thehearing date except in
extraordinary circumstances and for areason satisfactory totheboard, given by the party requesting such
postponement indicating that the circumstances requiring the postponement are of any unusual and
extraordinary nature.

d.

All records and dockets of the boardshall be open to the public duringnormalbusiness hours.

e. In appeals from decisions of the zoning commissioner, formal notice of hearings, continuances and
decisions of die board will be provided onlyto those persons entitled to receive same in accordance with
section 500.11 of the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations.
Rule 3. Appeals.

a.

No appeal shall be entertained by the board of appeals unless thenotice of appeal shall state the

names and addresses of the persons taking such appeal.

b. An appeal may bewithdrawn ordismissed atany time prior to the conclusion of thehearing onsaid
appeal.

c. Unless otherwise provided for by statute, all appeals to the board of appeals, subject to and limited
by statutory authority to hear appeals, shall bemade within thirty (30) days from the date of the final action
appealed.
Rule 4. Conduct ofhearings.

a. All hearings heldby the county board of appeals shall be open to the public. No hearing shall be
private even though all parties agree. The county board of appeals shall have the power to administer oaths,
and all witnesses shall testify under oath.

b.

The chairman shallregulate the course of the hearing and shallrule upon procedural matters,

applications, modifications and objections made during thecourse of the hearing, subject to the
concurrenceof a majority of the board conducting the hearing.

c. A hearing may be adjourned from timeto time for good cause shown andif the time and place of
reconvening the hearing is announced atadjournment, no further notice of reconvening shall be required. If
the time andplace of reconvening is not announced at adjournment, noticeof time and place of
reconvening shall be given as required in rule 2a.

d.

Depositions shall not be allowed unless by agreement ofall parties or their counsel ofrecord.1

1This rulewas referred to in Hammen v. Baltimore County PoliceDept, 373 Md. 440, 453, 818 A. 2d 1125(2003) where

Hammen sought a surveillance tape that was going tobeused by Baltimore County in a proceeding to reevaluate hisdisability
pension benefits. The County Attorney made an offer to exchange the tape for the right totake Hammen's deposition and this
rulewas mentioned with the Courtstating that in the proceedings depositions couldnot otherwisebe taken, except by agreement.
Id., at447. The Court stated thatthe rules of practice and procedure before the Board of Appeals are silent regarding discovery
except for this rule. Id., at 453.
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Rule 5. Subpoenas.

a. The county board of appeals shall have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and to
require the production of records anddocumentary or other tangible evidence.
b. The board may cause subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecumto be issuedupon its own motion, or

upon the application of any party to any hearing; butsubpoenas willnotbe issued upon application unless
such application is inwriting and sets forth the persons, records, books, papers orother documents to be
producedand a general statement as to the purpose.

Rule 6. Appearances andpractice before the boardof appeals.

a. Any individual who is a party to a proceeding before theboard may appear in his ownbehalf; and
member of a partnership may appear as representing said partnership if it is a party; a duly authorized
officer of a corporation, trust oranassociation mayappear as representing said body, if it is a party to the
proceedings; and a duly authorized officer oran employee of any political subdivision orbody or
department may represent the samebefore the board.
b. Any party maybe represented in any proceeding by an attorney-at-law admitted to practice before
the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

c. No person shall appear before the board inarepresentative capacity, engage in practice, examine
witnesses or otherwise act in a representative capacity exceptas provided in sections a. andb. above.
d. When an attorney wishes to appear in any proceeding in a representative capacity which involves a

hearing before the county board of appeals, he shall file withtheboard a written notice of such appearance,
which shall state his name, address, telephone number, andthe namesand addresses ofthe persons on
whose behalf he has entered his appearance.
Rule 7. Evidence.

a. Any evidence which would beadmissible under the general rules of evidence applicable injudicial
proceedings inthe State of Maryland shall beadmissible inhearings before the county board of appeals.
Proceedings before the board being administrative innature, theboard willnotbe bound by thetechnical
rules of evidence but will apply suchrules to the endthatneedfulandproper evidenceshall be most
conveniently, inexpensively and speedily produced while preserving the substantial rights of the parties.
Any oral ordocumentary evidence maybe received; buttheboard reserves the right as a matter of policy to

provide for theexclusion of immaterial orunduly repetitious evidence, and thenumber of witnesses may be
limited if it appears that their testimony may be merely cumulative.
b. All evidence, including records and documents in the possession ofthe agency, of whichit desires
to avail itself, shall be offered andmadepart of the record. Documentary evidence may be received in the
form of copies or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference.

c. Prepared statements maybe read by participants inthe hearing if they include factual material and
donot include argument, provided copies of said statements have been delivered to the board and opposing
counsel at least five (5) days prior to hearing, and their admissibility ruledupon,the same as if the factual
content were presented in the usual manner. "Prepared statements" within the meaning of thissection shall
not include factual reports, written summations, letters, expert opinions of professional expertwitnesses
and other such similar documents.

d.

Except asmay otherwise be provided by statute orregulations, the proponent of action to be taken

by the board shall have the burden of proof.

e. Any officialrecord orentries therein whenadmissible for any purpose may be evidenced by an
official publication thereoforby a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, and the
appearance of the officer will not be required unless demanded by a party to the case and for good cause
shown to the board. This rule does not preventany party from summoning any properwitness to attendany
hearing before the board.

f.

Records of other proceedings beforethe board may be offered in evidence by the production ofthe

files containing said records of such other proceedings.

g. In such cases as the board may determine, it mayby order require that the direct testimony of all
"expert" witnesses be submitted in writing, accompanied by copies of all exhibits to which reference is
therein made, unless such are of a voluminous nature orwithinthe files of, or readily available to, the board

of appeals, inwhich case adequate reference shall be made thereto, which testimony shall be submitted by
the parties required soto do and under thetime and service provisions as contained in said order.
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Thereafter, said"expert" witnesses shall bepersonally present at the hearing for affirmation of their written
statementand exhibits previouslysubmitted and for cross-examination.

Rule 8. Special rule pertaining topersons appearing before the board as representatives ofcivic or
improvement associations.

a.

Before any personshalltestify on behalfof anycivicor improvement association, it shallbe shown

thattheperson hasaccurate knowledge ofthe number of members intheassociation andgeographical
limits of the association.

b. Before anysuch person shall testify it shall also be shown thatthe person is authorized to speak for
and presentthe views of the civic or improvement association.
c. Such authorization shall consistof presenting at the hearingor prior thereto a resolution in

duplicate duly adopted bythe association at its annual meeting or first meeting of each year, signed bythe
president and attested bythe secretary, providing that the responsibility for review and action onall zoning
matters be placed in its boardof directors or a duly elected zoning committee.
d. Before any such authorized person shall testify, it shall be shown by written affidavit in duplicate,

signed bythe president ofthe association and attested bythe secretary, that the person is currently a duly
electedmemberof the board of directors or zoning committee of that association, or is a duly designated

employee or anauthorized representative ofthat association, or is an attorney-at-law appointed to represent
the board of directors or zoning committee.

e. Before anysuch authorized person shall testify, a resolution stating the position of the association
asadopted bythe board of directors orzoning committee, signed bythe president and attested bythe
secretary, shallalso be producedin duplicate at the hearing.

Rule 9. Special rule pertaining to originalpetitionsforreclassification, special exception and/or variance.
a. Application of Rule: This rule shall apply only to petitions for reclassification, special exception
and/or variance filed withthe boardpursuant to section 2-58.1 of Article V, "Boards and Commissions,"
Division 4, "Board of Appeals," Title 2, "Administration," of the Baltimore County Code, as now in force
andeffect or as hereafter amended. It applies to the filing, processing, advertising and scheduling of

hearings onsuch petitions and is supplemental to such other rules ofthe board and section 2-58.1 ofthe
Baltimore County Code as now in force and effect or as are hereafter amended or adopted. Once filed and
scheduled forhearing under theprovisions ofthis special rule, such petitions shall be heard and decided in
accordance with all other rules of the board.
Editor's note:

Because of the reorganization ofthe Code inthis publication, the Code references inthis
section should read asfollows:

u... Article 32, Title 3, Subtitle 5 of the Baltimore County Code ... such other rules of the
b.

board and Article 32, Title 3, Subtitle 5 of the Baltimore County Code
Definition of Petition. As used herein the term "petition" shall mean:

"

1.
2.

Request for reclassifications of property, including all material filed with said request.
Request for special exceptions and/or variances, thegranting of which are dependent upon a
reclassification of the property in question, including all material filed therewith.
c.

Filing.

1. Petitions may be filed in the office of the board of appeals throughout the year, exceptduring
theperiod from April 16, 1979, through October 15,1980, and all like periods beginning onApril 16,1983,
and every fourth year thereafter.

2. Petitions accepted for filing, no later than forty-five (45) days priorto April 16willbe processed
during theApril-October cycle, and petitions accepted for filing no later than forty-five (45) days prior to
October 16 will be processed during the October-April cycle.
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1. and2. above, petitions exempted from the regularcyclical

procedure dueto public interest or because of emergency may be filed and processed at anytime.
d.

Processing and File Maintenance Procedure.

1.

Upon receipt of a petition, the board shall establish a file and promptly transmit it to thezoning

commissioner's office for processing andpreparation of a written report. Saidreportshallbe prepared by
thezoning staff; shall reflect thecomments ofthe zoning plans advisory committee; andshall indicate the

petition's compliance, with regard tothe zoning laws and regulations, and each reviewing agency's adopted
standards or policies.
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2.

Petitions may be amended priorto the hearing only if said amendment takes placepriorto the

first public advertisement of the petition.

3.

The zoning staff shallmaintain possession of saidfile throughout the zoningreview andreport

processing procedure.

4. Upon completion ofthe zoning review and report process, including distribution of copies of
pertinent material to the planning staff, and thenecessary advertising andposting, thefile, complete with
the zoning report and planning boardrecommendations, shallbe returned to the board for the hearing.
5. The board shall maintainpossession of the file until such time as the case has been completed
withall pending appeals satisfied. Thereafter, saidfile shall be returned to the zoning office for
microfilming and retention on behalf of the board.
e. Scheduling, Posting and Advertising for Public Hearings.

1.

The zoningstaff shallschedule andotherwise prepare the necessary newspaper advertisements

and arrange fortheposting of property in accordance with section 2-58.1 of the Baltimore County Code.
However, all hearing dates and times shall be established by the board.

2.

Allpostponed hearings shall be readvertised and the properties posted in accordance with the

requirements for final advertising and posting pursuant to section 2-58.1(g) ofthe Baltimore County Code.
The cost of such advertising and posting shall be borne by the party requesting the postponement.
Editor's note:

Because of the reorganization ofthe Code in this publication, section 2-58.1 referred to inthis
section is now Article 32, Title 3, Subtitle5 ofthe Code.

f.

Guide for Preparation of Reclassification Petitions. Each petition request shall be filed on forms

provided bythe county board of appeals. As a matter ofconvenience, the board will make available a guide
containing information for use in the preparation of petitions for reclassification.
Rule 10. Revisorypower ofthe board.

Within thirty (30)days after the entry of an order, theboard shall have revisory power andcontrol over
the order in the event of fraud, mistake or irregularity.
Rule 11. Amendments ofrules.

Theserules may be amended fromtimeto timein accordance with section603 of the Baltimore County
Charter.

Significant case decisions

A denovo appeal to the Board ofAppeals
The meaning ofdenoto

o

Maryland's Express Powers Art(Art. 25A §5(U)) authorizes each Maryland county to create a board of
appeals. Anne Arundel County's charter (§603) created its Board of Appeals as an independent unit of
county government and vested the Board with de novo authority to hearall appeals authorized by the
Express Powers Act. "TheBoard is a statutory creature and may exercise only those powers expressly
granted to it by law or those which can be fairly implied." Halle v. Crofton Civic Association, 339 Md.
131,140-141, 661 A. 2d 282 (1975)

The nature of a de novo hearingwas discussed at length. Halle, 339 Md. at 141-43,146-49.The Court
addressed a question of first impression regarding the scope of a boardof appeals denovo review. At issue
was whether the Board had the authorityto addressaccessto a landfill, gravel and rubble proposed site
when that particular road was not part of the original application andwhether conditions imposed by the
Board as to the use of that access road was proper. Halle, 339 Md. at 143. De novo means an entirely new

hearing andthe Board exercises jurisdiction akin to original jurisdiction. TheCourt rejected the position of
the Protestants that wouldpreclude the Board from addressing "by condition any aspectof a zoning
proposal which might affect the public welfare. The access issue was so inextricably intertwined withthe
administrative hearing officer's decision that it was an issue properly beforethe Boardwhich couldbe
addressed." Halle, 339 Md. at 145-46 "The powerof the boardto address all issues properly before it by
condition goes hand-in-hand with the authority to take whatever action the administrative hearing officer
could take if presented with the same evidence. After determining thatpermitting the proposed operations
wouldbe in the best interestof the public, therefore, the Boardhad the authority to address the access issue
by imposing conditions as part of its denovo power." Halle, 339 Md. at 146
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B. Other Rules of Procedure.

Listed below are some references to where local rules of procedure and/or administrative procedure acts

may be found for some other subdivisions. Sometimes, there is going to be no substitute but to contact
the individual county or municipality and obtain a copy of the rules from that entity. If you have a case
wherever, rules and conduct of the proceedings are all important.
Anne Arundel County, Maryland (as of 5/28/06)
www.co.anne-arundel.md.us
Land Use and Construction

AA County Code
Article 3. Boards, Commissions, and Similar Bodies
American Legal Publishing
COntents

Appendix, Rules of Practice and Procedure Board of Appeals
Montgomery County, Maryland
www.montgomervcountvmd.gov (as of 5/28/06)
Departments

Board of Appeals
Rules of Procedure (PDF Format)

Prince George's County, Maryland
www.co.pg.md.is
Government
Charter

Anne Arundel County, Maryland
www.aacountv.org

Government

AA County Code
Boards and Commissions

County Agencies
Talbot County, Maryland
www.talbotgov.org

E-Codes- Municipal (Codes on Internet) www.generalcode.com

Maryland - Codes and Charters for Counties andTowns, including Talbot
Code putsyou intoBoard of Appeals Rules selection which can be made.
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There are minimal procedures thatmust befollowed to satisfy due process requirements in a quasijudicial hearing before an administrative agency. This isto insure fairness. Basic due process
constitutional rights includenotice and the opportunity to be heard. Bullet point considerations
include:

o
o

Notice of the charges
Notice of the hearing

o

How much notice is sufficient and fair notice

o

A "meaningful" opportunity to be heard

o

What is "meaningful"?

Proceedings before agencies are not as formal or as strict asthose required before courts. There are

any number ofMaryland cases stating this general principal1, but not to be found is acase enumerating all
the rights available in a contested case before an agency. "Both the Maryland declaration ofRights and
the Constitution of the United States guarantee that a person will not be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV: Md. Declaration ofRights art. 24."2 In

order for a person to establish a violation ofprocedural due process, that person must first show that state

action has resulted in his being deprived ofa liberty or property interest.3 "A party has avalid property
interest inanadministrative appeal."4
Due process and other constitutional issues are sometimes generated to attack the conduct ofagency
hearing. "When a proceeding meets the definition ofa 'contested case' the agency must provide trial type
procedures. The MAPA 'itself does not grant a right toa hearing. The right must come from another
source such as a statute, a regulation, or due process principles.'"5
In Section A, below, there is a general enumeration of rights available underMAPA. Constitutional
and other issues of fairness are often an issue when it is alleged that these hearing rights or any of them
are violated.

1SeeTrovers v. Baltimore Police Department, 115 Md. App.395,407, 693 A. 2d 378(1997). "For a hearing to be a fair one, in
an administrative agency asin more formal tribunals, adequate notice and opportunity to beheard mustbe afforded." Bernstein
v. Bd. OfEducation, 245 Md. 464, 473, 226 A. 2d 243 (1967).

2Bregunier Masonry v. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App.698, 711, 684 A. 2d6 (1996).

3Breguiner, 111 Md. App. at712 citing Vavasori v. Commission on Human Relations, 65 Md. app. 237, 243, 500 A. 2d307
(1985).

4Breguiner, 111 Md. App. at712.
5North v. KentIslandLimitedPartnership, 106Md. App. 92, 103,664 A. 2d 34 (1995).
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This Chapter 4 contains the follow sections.
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48
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A. MAPA Rights Enumerated.

Within the MAPA, the following rights are stated. They are reflective of due process requirements and
then some:

1. notice of the agency proposed action is to be concisely and simply statedas to the alleged
violations of law, accompanied by statutory and regulatory citations, along with the proposed

sanction or penalty;6
2. notice of the direct consequence, sanction, potential penalty, if any, or remedy if the recipient
fails to exercise, in a timely manner, the opportunity for a hearing or to appear for a scheduled

hearing;7

3. notice ofthe right to a hearing and notice ofthe time, date and place ofthe hearing;8
4. the right to a copy of the hearing procedures available with information specifyingthe costs

associated with obtaining the copy;9
5. that a hearing may be conducted by telephone, video conferencing, or other electronic means, and

that good cause objections may be made to this procedure;10
6. the right to call witnesses and submit documents or other evidence pursuant to SG §10-213(f);11
[SG §10-213 is titled, "Evidence." Subsection (f) deals with the scope of evidence]
7. that the evidence (including rebuttal evidence) considered by the agency is to be probative
evidence that reasonable and prudent individuals commonly accept in the conduct of their

affairs;12

8. that evidence may not be excluded solely on the basis that it ishearsay;13
9. that evidence may be excluded ifitis incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, orunduly repetitious;14
10. that the agency may accept documentary evidence in the form of copies or excerpts or materials

may be incorporated byreference;15
11. that there is a right to reasonably cross examine any witnesses that another party or the agency

calls;16

12. that privileges recognized by law shall be recognized in the agency hearing;17
6SG §10-207(a)(b). See SG §10-209 asto notice mailed to address of licensee.
7SG §10-207(b)(5) & SG §10-208(b)(6).
8SG §10-207(b)(4) & SG §10-208.
9SG§10-208(b)(4).
10 SG §10-211.
11 SG §10-208(b)(2) & SG §10-213(f).
12 SG §10-213(b) & SG §10-213(f)(l)(2).
13 SG§ 10-213(c).
14 SG§ 10-213(d).
I5SG§10-213(g).
16SG§10-213(f)(3).
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13. that theagency may: (a)take official notice ofa fact that isjudicially noticeable, or (b)general,
technical, or scientific and within the specialized knowledge of the agency, but before taking
official notice the agency mustgive notice of the intent to eachpartyand the opportunity to
contest the fact;18

14. any applicable right to request subpoenas for witnesses and evidence, along with a statement of

the costs, ifany, associated with such a request;19
15. the right to be represented by counsel or another representative, if applicable, and any restriction

pertaining tothat representation;20
16. that, unless otherwise prohibited by law, the parties mayagree to evidence and waive theirright

toappear atthe hearing;21
17. that an individual may be entitled to the services of a qualified interpreter appointed by the
.22

agency, at the cost of the agency:

18. that hearings areto be open to the public, except as otherwise provided by law; 23

19. that a party may present summation and argument;24
20. that witnesses shall be sworn or put underaffirmation to tell the truth;

21. thatin itsdecision the agency may use itsexperience, technical competence, and specialized

knowledge in the evaluation ofevidence;26
22. that the proceeding will berecorded and may be transcribed upon request and payment of any
required costs;27
23. that the burden of proofis by a preponderance oftheevidence unless the standard of clear and
convincing evidence is imposed bytheagency byregulation, statute or the constitution;
17 SG §10-213(e). Porter Hoyden v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998) states that a party may not obtain information
that isprivileged. With appreciation to Judge Dale R. Cathell for this summary, the decision lists various privileges that may be
available and asserted:

Under the general discovery rule, a party may obtain discovery ofinformation that is relevant and not privileged.
Privileges prohibiting or limiting theintroduction ofevidence are created bytheUnited States Constitution, the
Maryland Constitution, statutes, and common law. The Fifth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution and Article
22oftheMaryland Declaration ofRights protect against compulsory self-incrimination. Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660,
682, 637A.2d 117, 128, cert, denied, 513 U.S. 833,115 S. Ct. 109, 130 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1994); Choi v. State, 316Md.
529, 535, 560 A.2d 1108, 1111 (1989); Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 246-47, 513 A.2d 299, 306-07, cert, denied,
475U.S. 1086, 106S. Ct. 1469, 89 L. Ed. 2d 725(1986). There are alsonumerous Maryland statutory privileges. See

Md. Code (1974,1995 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), § 9-105 ofthe Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ)
(confidential marital communications privilege); CJ §9-106 (spousal privilege); CJ § 9-107 (privilege against selfincrimination); CJ§ 9-108 (attorney-client privilege); CJ§ 9-109 (patient-psychotherapist privilege); CJ§ 9-109.1
(client-psychiatric mental health nursing specialist privilege); CJ§ 9-110 (client-accountant privilege); CJ§ 9-111
(priest-penitent privilege); CJ§ 9-112 (newspaper person-news source privileged); and CJ§ 9-121 (social workerclient privilege). Certain common-law rules also prevent thediscovery or use at trial of certain matters. Hamilton v.
Verdow, 287Md. 544,562,414 A.2d914, 924(1980) ("The executive privilegeconcept has beenconsidered partof
the common law of evidence."). Respondents haveasserted no privilege pertaining to the amountsof the settlement
agreements they negotiated with otherpotentially responsible parties.
350 Md. at 461-62. [Emphasis by bold]

As to what elseis or is not privileged, Tax Returns were saidnotto be privileged inAshton v. Cherne Contracting Corp.,
102 Md. App. 87, 648 A.2d 1067 (1994) (claimant in Worker's Compensation case required to furnish state/federal, returns Goint
with hiswife) thatarerelevant to claim, as arepost-injury wages to the issue of actual incapacity in occupational disease cases)
102 Md. App. at94, 99. Judge Alpert writes anexhaustive review ofthe taxreturn privilege issue inthisopinion.
18SG§10-213(h).
19SG§10-208(b)(3).
20SG§10-208(b)(5).
21SG§10-208(b)(7).
22 SG§10-212.1.

23 SG §10-212. For example, theBoard ofPhysicians has adopted COMAR 10.32.02.08, providing that hearings before the
Board are confidential.

24SG§10-213(f)(4).
25 COMAR28.02.01.17D(3).
26SG§10-213(i).
27 SG §10-215.
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24. that ex parte communications are generally prohibited, both directly orindirectly, regarding the
merits ofany issue in the case, and there isa requirement that any exparte communications

attempted or made to a hearing officer or Board be disclosed;29
25. that disposition may bemade bystipulation, settlement, consent order, default, withdrawal,
summary disposition, dismissal or final order;
26. that an individual is entitledto a final decision of agency action which decision shall be specific

asto findings of fact, and conclusions orlaw, and decision shall becommunicated to the parties;

27. judicial review ofagency action may be available;32
28. that although judicial review is usually limited to the record before the agency, there are some
instances where additional evidence may be taken either by remand to the agency or before the
court;33 and that
29. in some cases a stay of enforcement ofthe administrative agency action may be sought and

obtained pending judicial review.34
B. Due Process of Law - What Process is due?

A denial ofprocedural due process is sometimes alleged when the right to attend a hearing, to cross
examine witnesses, to notice andan opportunity to beheard is less than whata particular individual feels
it should have been.

There are many allegations of a violation ofdue process inlitigation that do not properly fit into a
category of constitutional significance.

Maryland case law states that there are procedural safeguards attendant to contested cases before an

administrative agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.36 ". . . [T] he requirements of
procedural due process as guaranteed by theFourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and
Article24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rightsapplyto an administrative agency exercising

judicial orquasi-judicial functions.37 ". . . [I]t is well settled that the procedure followed in
administrative agencies usually is not as formal and strict as that ofthe courts."38 ". . . [F]or an
'appellant to establish a violation of procedural due process, hemust first show that state action has

28 SG §10-217. For example, HO §14-405(b)(3) provides that factual findings before theBoard of physicians shall be supported
by clear and convincing evidence for certain charges made against a physician.
29 SG §10-219.
30 SG §10-210.
31 SG §10-221. (Final Decision andOrder) & SG §10-220 (Proposed decisions and Order)
32 SG §10-222.
33SG§10-222(f).
34SG§10-222(f).
35 In Landsman v. Maryland Home Improvement Commission, 154 Md. App. 241, 259, 839 A. 2d 743 (2003), therewas an
allegation that retroactive application of a statute increasing an award from the Home Improvement Fund raised serious due
process issues because it would impose additional liability upon acontractor that he could notreasonably have foreseen atthe
time of the contract. Substantive due process was discussed.

36 Trovers v. Baltimore City Police Department, 115 Md. App. 395,407, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997). OstrezensH v. Siegel, Ml F.3d.

245 (1999) saw theCourt stating that members of a peer review committed are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Thus,
the allowance of a suitagainst conduct by peer reviewers was notallowed by law. Oneof the reasons given for the conclusion in
this case involving suitagainst a physician wasthatby givingnotice of disciplinary action andan opportunity to be heard (HO
§14-405(a)-(c)), anopportunity to callwitnesses, the right to offerevidence, cross examine witnesses, andpresent argument, due
process was afforded. (SG §10-215). Proofmustbe by clear and convincing evidence (HO §14-405(b)) and judicial review may
be sought (HO §14-408 & SG §10-222) 177 F. 3d. at 251.

It mustalways be remembered thatthe discussion here is about quasi-judicial functions. Dueprocess application to a legal
process does notrequire ahearing unless required by the rules and regulations of thebody and statutory considerations pertaining
to open meeting requirements.

37 Trovers 115 Md App. at407. See also: Regan v. Board ofChiropractic, 355 Md. 397,408,735 A. 2d 991 (1999).
38 Trovers, 115 Md. App. at 408.
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resulted in his being deprived of a property interest. A party has a valid property interest in an

administrative appeal"3

"Thefundamental requisites offairness are notice and an opportunity to be heard 'A0 Due
process inadministrative proceedings isnot a rigid concept. It isflexible and calls only for such
procedural protections asthe particular situation demands. The government balances the private and

government interests affected.41 Administrative procedure acts and regulations give rights to individuals
participating inadministrative proceedings. Sometimes those rights are reflective of constitutional due
process entitlements. The scope ofthe issue at a hearing is an important factor indetermining what
process is due.

What process is due? That will vary according to the case before the court.42 In acase involving
suspension ofa license before the State Racing Commission, the Court ofAppeals stated: "As has often
been stated 'due process does not require adherence to any particular procedure. Onthe contrary, due

process is flexible and calls only for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."

The "level ofdue process required must be decided under the facts and circumstances ofeach case."44
Significant Case Decisions

o Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 707 A. 2d 891 (1998), a#tf335 Md. 397,
735 A. 2d 991 (1999) heldthat". . . Dr. Regan has a legitimate property interest in the outcome ofthe
Board's proceedings regarding his license to practice Chiropractic." 120 Md. App. at 510.
o

At issue in Patrick v. Dept. ofPublic Safety, 156 Md. App. 423, 847A. 2d 450 (2004) waswhether a
inmate hada liberty interest, "protected bytheDue Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment ofthe
United States Constitution in avoiding continued incarceration" at a particularMaryland facility following
a charge hehadattempted to escape. 156 Md. App. at 431-43. In dicta (the inmate hadnotproperly

preserved the issue forreview), the Court examined the breadth of liberty interests afforded to inmates. 156
Md. App. at434-443. Quoting Supreme Court and other authority, the Court determined that a transfer ofa
prisoner from oneinstitution to another did notinvolve a liberty interest in the absence of a statute or
regulation that created such an interest, which interest is notcreated by any Maryland statute or regulation.
156 Md. App. at 435-36,440. "A protected liberty interest is implicated only if the conditions existing at
the facility where the inmate is housed areso 'atypical' thatexposure to them for a significant time
cimpose[s] a significant hardship ontheinmate inrelation to theordinary incidents of prison life'" 156 Md.
App. at456 quoting Sandin v. Conner, 550 U.S. 472,483-84 (1995). Upon a further review of case law, the
Courtdetermined: "long terms of disciplinary or administrative segregation alone, generally do not
implicatea liberty interest under Sandin." 156 Md. App. at 439.

39 Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 510, 707 A. 2d891 (1998), ajfd 335 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d991
(1999). TheRegan Court cited Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) identifying three factors to be considered when courts
address procedural due process issues in administrative settings:

First, the private interest that will be affected by theofficial action; second, the riskof anerroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved andthe fiscal andadministrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

120 Md. App. at510-11. Seealso: Bregunier Masonry v. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App.698, 712, 684 A. 2d6 (1996).
40 Coleman v. AnneArundelPolice, 369 Md. 108, 142, 797 A. 2d 770 (2002).
41 Coleman, 369 Md. at 142-43.

42 "The level of due process required mustbe decided based onthecircumstances of each individual case." Regan, 120 Md. App.
at511.

43 Maryland Racing Commission v Castrenze, 335 Md. 284,299, 643 A. 2d 412 (1994).
44 Bregunier Masonry v. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App.698, 713, 684A. 2d 6 (1996).
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o

Trovers v. Baltimore City PoliceDepartment, 115 Md. App. 395,407,407, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997) reminds
the readerthat in additionto other procedural safeguards,"... [A] police officer confronted with

disciplinary proceedings is entitled to the protections afforded bythe contested provisions ofthe Maryland
Administrative ProcedureAct (APA), Md. Code, stateGov't §10-201 et. seq., as well as those of the Law
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEORB), Md. Code, art. 27, §§727-734C."

o

There is a statutory rebutable presumption that the test results generated by certainbreathtest instruments
administered by trained technician are accurate. At issue in MVA v. Lytle, 31A Md. 37, 821 A. 2d 62 (2003)
was whether the ALJ hearinga casewas required to consider the marginof error in establishing the
accurate level of Lytle's blood alcohol contentbreadthtest. 374 Md. at 49. A due process argument was
made. A drivers license is a property interest protected by both the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 374 Md. at 70. A balancemust be struck
between the reason for the legislation to protect the public against drunk drivers and the right of a citizen.
Lytle's due process argumentfailed. 374 Md. at 71-72.

o

The County Commissioners of St. Mary's County virtually conceded thattheir notice of appeal to the
Board of Appeals was deficient Board ofCounty Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 837 A.
2d 1059 (2003). "An administrative proceeding is subject to therequirements of dueprocess. This
includes anadequateformulation and notice of the issues in the case" 154 Md. App. at 28. Based onall
information presented, theBoard ofAppeals proceeded denovo and everyone understood that safety inthe
development of landwasthe contested issue being reviewed. 154 Md. App. at 30.

o

The Court inBregunier Masonry v. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App. 698, 684 A.2d6 (1996) said it
found no infringement of due process inthe interplay between theMAPA and Maryland Occupational
Safety and Hazard Act [MOSH]. No infringement ofthe procedure was found asapplied tothe appellant in
this case. 111 Md. App. at 713. A violation could be seen in a case where an overzealous reviewing
agency, in an attempt to cure the defects in an ALJ finding, could denya party a fair opportunity to
be heard. Id.

o

Constitutional due process rights attended a COMAR provision giving an employee, deemed to have
resigned because she didnotreport to work, a chance to have theresignation expunged inDept. of
Corrections v. Thomas, 158Md. App. 540, 544, 857A. 2d 638 (2004). COMAR 17.04.04.03 provided in

part: "A resignation without notice may beexpunged bytheappointing authority when extenuating
circumstances exist, and the employee had goodcause for notnotifying the appointing authority." The
ALJ determination that Ms. Thomas was no longer an employee and therefore had no right to grieve was
said to have been in error. The grievance procedure had a "second look" provision was an integral
part of the provision applicable to one who is considered to have resigned. Due process concerns

underly the second look provision. "Ms. Thomas was a former employee for otherpurposes, the
constitutional right to Due Process requires that she be permitted to invokethe grievance procedure to
assert her claims under the Second Look provision." 158 Md. App. at 556. A remand was ordered because
the recorded failed to reveal that the Department exercisedits discretion as to whether to expunge the
resignation. 158 Md. App. at 544.

C. Notice and An Opportunity to beHeard.45
The MAPA requires that reasonable notice of agency action be given, and that all partiesbe givennotice
of the fact a hearing shall be held in a contested case. It is required that notice of agency action state
conciselyand simply the facts asserted, the issues involved, the pertinent statutory and regulatory

45 Issues of notice meeting due process of lawrequirements occur throughout the judicial process. Exceptions to a foreclosure
sale claiming lack of notice wasthe issue in Griffin v. Bierman, 403 Md. 186, 941 A. 2d 475(2008) withthe Court holding is that
sending notice of foreclosure action and sale by certified and first class mail complied with procedural dueprocess. Though this
case deals withmortgage foreclosure, Judge Harrell for theCourt discussed due process considerations. The reader may find the
discussion of the constitutional aspects of this casehelpful asthe issuearises in administrative law situations.
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sections under which agency action is taken, and the proposed sanction or potential penalty.

46

Stating the rightto entitlement to a hearing mustbe a part of the notice accompanied by a statement of
what, if anything,a person must do receive a hearing. All relevanttime requirements mustbe
stated.47 Notice must also be given of the "direct consequences, sanction, potential penalty, if any, or
remedy occasioned bytherecipient's failure to exercise ina timely manner the opportunity for a hearing

or to appear for a scheduled hearing."48 Notice ofagency action and a notice ofa hearing may be
combined.49 The purpose of notice is to provide a party with adequate knowledge of the reasons for
the action being taken.50
Notice of a hearing has additional

SG §10-207. Notice of agency action.

(a) Ingeneral- An agencyshall give reasonable noticeof
the agency's action.

requirements under the MAPA. Reasonable
notice must state:

(b) Contents ofnotice.- The notice shall:
(1) state concisely and simply:
(i) the facts that are asserted; or
(ii) if the facts cannotbe stated in detailwhenthe notice
is given, the issues that are involved;
(2) statethe pertinentStatutory and regulatory sections
under which the agency is taking its action;
(3) statethe sanction proposed or the potential penalty, if
any, as a result of the agency's action;
(4) unless a hearingis automatically scheduled, statethat
the recipient of notice of an agency's actionmay have an
opportunity to request a hearing, including:
(i) what, if anything, a person must do to receivea
hearing; and

(ii) all relevant time requirements; and
(5) state the direct consequences, sanction,potential
penalty, if any, or remedy of the recipient's failure to exercise
in a timely manner the opportunity for a hearing or to appear
for a scheduled hearing.

(c) Consolidation ofnotices.- The notice of agency action
under this section may be consolidated with the notice of
hearing requiredunder § 10-208 of this subtitle.
(d) Publication in Register.- For purposes of this section,

1. the date, time, place, and nature of the
hearing;
2. the right to call witnesses and submit
documents or other evidence;

3. any applicable right to request
subpoenas for witnesses and evidence

specifying the costs, if any, associated
with such a request;

4. that a copy of the hearing procedure is
available on request and specify the
costs associated with such a request;

5. any right or restriction pertaining to
representation;
6. that failure to appear for the scheduled
hearing may result in an adverse action
against the party; and
7. that, unless otherwise prohibited by
law, the parties may agree to the
evidence and waive their right to

appear atthe hearing.51

publication in the Maryland Registerdoes not constitute
reasonable notice to a party.

46 SG §10-207(a)(b)(l)-(3). InBregunier Masonry v. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App. 698, 684A. 2d6 (1996), theCourt
cited acase where an employer wasunfairly deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine orto present rebuttal evidence and
testimony. Theemployer learned the exact nature of itsalleged violation only after thehearing. "Due process in matters before
the Commission [Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission] requires that a party be afforded reasonable notice of the
nature ofthe allegations against it so thatthe party can prepare a suitable defense." Ill Md. App. at713. ". . . [F]airness
dictates that a party should be given some notice as to the identity ofthe issues before thereviewing agency. The difficult issue is
to definethe extent and formality ofthe notice, given the competing interests involved." 111 Md. App. at714.
47SG§10-207(b)(4).
48SG§10-207(b)(5).

49 SG §10-207(c) & SG §10-208(c). Thenotice must beactual notice. Publication intheMaryland Register does notconstitute
reasonable notice to aparty. SG §10-207(d) & SG §10-208(d).
50 School Boardv. Davis, 96 Md. App. 401, 427, 625 A. 2d 361 (1993).

51 SG §10-208(a)(b)(l)-(7). The right to call witnesses and submit documents is referenced to SG §10-213(f).
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Licensees are required to keep an agency aware of theircurrent address. If anagency has been
unsuccessful in giving notice inthe manner otherwise provided by a licensing statute, thatnotice may
then be given by regular mail.52 For example, there is a regulation requiring a registered pharmacist
licensee to notifythe Board of Pharmacy of a change of address:
COMAR 10.34.06.03 Mailing Address.

A. Each licensed pharmacist shall report to the Board thepharmacist's current mailing address
on the pharmacist's biennial license renewal form. The mailing address may be the pharmacist's
residence address.

B. Within 30 days ofthe date a pharmacist changes the pharmacist's mailing address, the

pharmacist shall notify the Board in writing ofany change in the information in Sec. A.

Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.53 Notice has to be "reasonable" notice
to the individual against whom the proceedings are instituted.54 The issues have to be identified in the
notice. As tothe quality ofthat notice and how itis to be evaluated against the argument that it is
insufficient, the Court of Special Appeals has stated:

Inan adversary proceeding, due process requires that an individual against whom proceedings are
instituted begiven notice and an opportunity tobe heard. The notice must be '"reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties ofthe pendency ofthe action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' A court, inconsidering the
reasonableness of notice, "must balance the interests ofthe state or the giver of notice against the
individual interest sought to beprotected by the fourteenth amendment." Thus, indetermining
whethernoticewas reasonable, a court must evaluate the specificcircumstances of each case. In

administrative proceedings, reasonable notice ofthe nature oftheallegations must be given tothe
party so that itcan prepare a suitable defense. Moreover, SG §10-207(a) oftheAPA also
requires an agency to give reasonable notice of itsaction.

52 SG §10-209. The statute provides that the licensee shall be deemed to have areasonable opportunity to know ofthe feet of
service when that person isrequired tonotify the agency ofaddress changes but fails togive that notice. Thus, where the agency
mails the notice to the address of record without actual notice of any change of address the notice is goingto be sufficient.

53 Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 519, 707 A.2d 891 (1998), affirmed, Regan v. Board of
chiropractic Examiners, 355 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d 991 (1999). It should be noted that in disposing ofthe "notice" argument and
affirming the Court of Special Appeals, the Court based its decision on the fact that the Board complied with SG §10-207 (Notice
of Agency Action) as opposed tocombining this with adue process argument. Regan, 355 Md. at 416-19.
54 Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 519, 707 A. 2d 891 (1998), affirmed, Regan v. Board of
chiropractic Examiners, 355Md. 397,735 A. 2d 991 (1999).

55 Regan, 120 Md. App. at 519. (citations omitted) When the Court ofAppeals considered this case in Regan v. Board of
chiropractic Examiners, 355 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d 991 (1999), Judge Eldridge noted for that court that itwas alleged byDr. Regan
that theState violated SG §10-205 requiring specificity innotice of agency action. Dr. Regan argued that theBoard did not

adequately notify him that itwould seek tohold him liable for an employee's (Ms. Tillman's) unauthorized practice of"physical
therapy," as opposed to the unauthorized practice of"chiropractic." 355 Md. at 417. The Court spend some pages ofanalysis to
conclude thatthe contentin the overall writtennoticeto Dr. Regan left no doubtasto the deficiencies charged against him:

The Board's findings and conclusions encompassed two primary areas of misconduct: improper delegation of
chiropractic duties and fraudulent billing practices. Dr. Regan was given reasonable notice inthe charging document of
thesematters. Furthermore, the Board's conclusions, forming the basis for the imposition of discipline, concerned

matters specifically encompassed bythe charging document. The Board and both courts below correctly held that Dr.
Reganhad reasonable notice ofthe charges against him.
355 Md. at 420.

Thus, itisinstructive from both Regan opinions that the constitutional significance of adequate notice requires adetailed

analysis ofthe charges made against the proof offered, that itis a"reasonable" notice approach, not an exact specific factual
recitation in the notice given that is going to control.
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It is notalways necessary that thenotice and opportunity to beheard come before disciplinary action
istaken by an agency.56 A party before an agency must have the opportunity to examine and challenge
reports and other evidence produced against him/her/it before the agency reaches itsconclusion.

Otherwise, the requisite of procedural fairness has not been met.57
Significant Case Decisions

o

Itwas alleged inRegan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 355 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d991 (1999) that the
Board failed to provide Dr. Regan with adequate notice of charges against him. SG §10-207 (Notice of
agency action) was sited. 355 Md. App. at 416. Dr. Regan alleged the Board did not notify him that it
would seek to hold him liable for Ms. Tillman's unauthorized practice of"physicaltherapy" as opposed to

"chiropractic." The Court stated that this argument missed the point that the"charge" was Dr. Regan was

not operating within the permissible scope ofhis chiropractic license. 355 Md. App. at 417. Likewise, the
fact that theBoard questioned Karen Trotta about whether Dr. Regan billed for chiropractic services not
rendered, which was beyond the scope of allegations concerning her inthe charging document, did not
matter because no conclusion concerning false reports and billswerebasedon anything concerning Ms.

Trotta. 355 Md. App. at 418.58

o "Bygranting ahearing promptly after the reciprocal actions [suspending ahorse trainer] went into effect,
and considering the limited scope ofthe issues at the hearing, the Maryland Racing Commission gave both
trainers the process that was due." Maryland Racing Commission v Castrenze, 335 Md. 284, 300, 643 A.
2d412 (1994). The case involved the automatic suspension of atrainer from racing inMaryland following
his suspension inDelaware. There was much discussion as towhat type of ahearing was required bydue
process. Reciprocal suspension did not entitle the trainer to ahearing as acontested case prior to
suspension. 335 Md. App. at 300.59 Asto the quality and quantity of due process rights afforded: "Another
factor isthe very limited scope ofthe issues to bereviewed at the hearing. Under theterms ofthe
reciprocity regulation, the Maryland hearing would seem to be limited to determining whether the trainer
was the same person who was subject tothe action inthe other state, whether the other state in fact
suspended thetrainer, and the period ofthe suspension." 335 Md. App. at300.

o Dept. ofCorrections v. Thomas, 158 Md. App. 540, 857 A. 2d 638 (2004) decided that adischarged
corrections officer generated due process rights when she invoked a second look provision contained in
COMAR 17.04.04.03D. She hadto be given ahearing on that issue. 158Md. App. at 556. Procedural

due process was violated when the hearing body gave "little or noattention" to this provision which
statesthat a resignation "may be expunged by the appointing authority when extenuating
circumstances exist, and the employee had good cause for not notifying the appointing authority [ofher
absence from employment without leave]. 158 Md. App. at 551.

o

Notifying a teacher that her "services" are no longer required is not adequate notice under

Maryland's Education Act. School Board v. Davis, 96 Md. App. 401,428, 625 A. 2d361 (1993). That is
notwhat happened in this case. "Here, theteachers were provided withwritten and oral comments over a
twoyear period, culminating inthewritten explanations ofthe 1990 year-end evaluations ... Moreover,
56 Maryland Racing Commission v Castrenze, 335 Md. 284, 300, 643 A. 2d 412 (1994).

57 Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 550 Md. 540, 625 A. 2d 914 (2004) stated this with acitation tothe prior Court of Appeals
case ofDalMaso v. Bd. OfCo. Comm 'rs, 238 Md. 333, 209 A. 2d62(1965) which was concerned with thepropriety of
considering evidence produced following the close of ahearing. 550 Md. at560.

58 Nothing in this decision pointed toan error that caused reversal. However, itisimportant to read the decision as acaution to
those filing charges that those charges should besituation and person specific, less the charging document run afoul ofthe
requirement that adequate notice be given.

59 There isaspecific statute inthe APArequiring written notice of suspension of alicense and an opportunity tobeheard prior to
suspension. Castrenze, 335 Md. at 296-97. SG §10-405(a) at the time ofthis case; now SG §10-226. Licenses - Special
provisions. This section was held not tobe applicable to the reciprocal suspension in this case. The automatic disqualification by
virtue of a foreign suspension "does not itself amount toalicense suspension bythe Maryland Racing Commission and,
therefore, does not require compliance with §10-405 of the APA." ". . . [D]ue process requirements are satisfied when the
trainer is promptly given written notice ofthefacts deemed to warrant the reciprocal ruling and isinformed oftheopportunity to
be heard on the matter." Castrenze, 335 Md. at 288.
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the Statements of Charges themselves clearly told the teachers precisely thestatutory basis for thendismissal, i.e. 'for incompetency'; similar notices have been used andapproved in the case. 96 Md. App. at
429. Incompetency isone ofthefive grounds for dismissal expressly set forth inthe statute. Educ. Art. §6202(a)(l)(iv). 96 Md. App. at 430.

o Due process constitutional concepts (Article 24, Maryland Declaration ofRights and 14th Amendment to
US Constitution) regarding notice were discussed inIn Re: Katherine C, 390 Md. 554, 890 A. 2d295
(2006) where ajudgment awarding child support was reversed where there was nonotice that issue would
bediscussed at a permanency plan review hearing injuvenile court. Reasonable notice isa requirement of
due process, and that notice must be"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties ofthependency ofthe action and afford them an opportunity topresent their objections."
390Md. at 574. Case lawwas reviewed: (1)Phillips v. Venker, 316 Md. 212, 557 A. 2d 1338 (1989) (lack

ofnotice to theparties that an issue would bedecided when judge placed telephone conference call to the
parties); (2) Van Schaik v. VanSchaik, 90 Md. App. 725, 90 Md. App. 782, 603 A. 2d908 (1992) (notice
that hearing would beon"visitation and child's possessions" meant the court could notterminate the
father's joint custody rights); and (3) Burdick v. Brooks, 160 Md. App. 519, 864 A. 2d300 (2004) (notice
of a status conference to last fifteen minutes meant the court erroneously announced modification of

custody and changing custody from the mother to the father).

D. The Right to Cross-Examination.60
SG §10-213(f), asa part ofthe MAPA provides that on a "genuine issue ina contested case, each party is
entitled to cross-examine any witness that another party or the agency calls."
SG §10-213. Evidence.

(f) Scope of evidence.- On a genuine issue in a contested case, each partyis entitled to:
(1) call witnesses;

(2) offer evidence, including rebuttal evidence;

(3) cross-examine any witnessthat another party or the agency calls; and
(4) present summation and argument.

". . . [A] basic tenetof fairness in administrative adjudications is the requirement of an opportunity
forreasonable cross examination.61 The Court of Special Appeals has reviewed cases on the issue of when
a denial ofthe right of crossexamination can mean a reversal of an administrative adjudication.
[In]. . . American Radio-Tel Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 33 Md. App. 423,434, 365 A.2d
314, 320 (1976) . . we concluded that it was error to admit two affidavitsbecausethe affiants
were not available for crossexamination. Further, in Tron v. Prince George's County, 69 Md.

App. 256, 517A.2d 113 (1986), the County, in order to dispute a disability claim, introduced the
written reports of three physicians who hadexamined Tron andthe testimony of a doctor who
examined those reports and concluded that the disability was not work-related. Once again, we
recognized that "a reasonable right of cross examination must be allowed," in an administrative
adjudicatory proceeding by statute and case law. Id. at 261 (quoting Hyson v. Montgomery
County Council, 242 Md. 55, 67, 217 A.2d 578, 585 (1966)). Accordingly, we concluded that
Tron's right to a fair hearing had been denied because "the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses is a requirement of administrative adjudicatory hearings ... [andb]ecause no live

witnesses were produced." 69 Md. App. at263.62
60 A problem mayarise when a contention is made that one has been prevented from properly cross examining awitness due to a
wantof documents not being furnished in discovery. There is not a provision for all agencies to allow discovery. See: Changing
Point v. Maryland Health Resources, 87 Md. App. 150; 172, 589 A. 2d 502 (1991) ("TheCommission didnot err in allowing Mr.
Feffer to testify without producing his files.")

61 Trovers v. PoliceDept, 115 Md. App. 395, 416-17, 693 A. 2d 378(1997).
62 Trovers, 117 Md. App. at 417.
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Under Maryland Law "the right of reasonable cross-examination attaches to adjudicatory
administrative hearings." "[W]hen an administrative board or agency isrequired to hold a public hearing
and to decide disputed adjudicative facts based upon evidence produced and arecord made,... a

reasonable right ofcross-examination must be allowed the parties."63 "[W]hen the board is functioning in
an adversary proceeding, the fundamentals applicable to the decision of adjudicative facts by any tribunal
must bepreserved" On the other hand, "no trial-type hearing [is] required incomprehensive rezoning,
which is aquasi-legislative proceeding."64

The right to cross examination is not unlimited.65 So long as there is no abuse ofdiscretion, an
agency may limit the scope ofcross-examination.66 Control over the scope ofcross-examination is
traditionally leftto thediscretion of atrial judge unless there is a showing of prejudicial abuse of
discretion may properly be applied in administrative hearings.
Significant Case Decisions

o

Disciplinary action against a police officers for statements he allegedly madeto a newspaper reporter meant
thatofficer"has a rightto cross-examine witnesses who testify against him." Prince George's County v.
Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 597, 822 A. 2d 537 (2003). The introduction of only an affidavit or

newspaper articles to provethe case would mean the officer"would be deprived of his fundamental
right to cross-examine" the reporters. 150 Md. App. 581

o

So: Is the nature ofthis hearing quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial? The "determination ofwhether to

impose a special assessment and the mode of imposing a special assessment are legislative determinations."
When there is a special assessment hearing, adjudicatoryin nature, held to determine the amount of
special assessment to be levied based on the amountof benefitto a specific piece of property, there is
an adjudicatory determination to whichthe right of cross examination attached. Rockville v.
Woodmont C.C., 348 Md. 572, 583,705 A. 2d 301 (1998). This case involved a challengeto the procedure

used by the Mayor and city Council of Rockville in levying special assessments against the property ofthe
Woodmont Country Club forthe construction of a road andwatertransmission main. This hearing was
adjudicatory in nature and the right of cross examination applied. 348 Md. at 574-75. Appraisers hired by
the City were not made available for crossexamination. 348 Md. at 579. This Court affirmed the Court
of Special Appealsdetermination thatthe proceedings levyingthe special assessments on Woodmontwere
invalid because ofthe denial of Woodmont's requestto cross-examine the city's appraisers. 348 Md. at
580-81.

o

A circuitcourt's ruling that a hearing officer has erred in restricting the right of cross-examination of a
police officer investigating instances of childabuse was reversed in Department v. Bo Peep, 317 Md. 573,
565 A. 2d 1015 (1989). The case involved the license of a day care center and the allegations of child
abuse at the center. "To the extent that Bo Peep sought to use Swam [the police officer] to 'fish' for
additional suspects, the issue is whetherClark [hearing examiner] abused his discretion in closely limiting
the scope of cross examination." "Clark was not obliged to let Bo Peep explorethrough Swam whether one

63 Rockville v. Woodmont CC, 348 Md. 572, 582, 705 A. 2d 301 (1998).
64 Woodmont, 348 Md. at 582-83. The determination of when a function is legislative, quasi-legislative, or adjudicative is
sometimes not all that easy to make. In this case, the Court reviewed a number of cases that had previously been decided, Id., at
584-90.The act of zoning or reclassificationof zoning is a functionthat is legislative in nature. When the legislative body makes
administrative findings of fact, drawingadministrative inferences, and arriving at administrative conclusionsand decisions, a
different type of proceeding occurs. Id., at 585. This difficult area requires a reviewofthe various appellate court decisions to
determine when a hearing is adjudicative andthe parties are entitled to a hearing andthe right to produce evidence andcrossexamine witnesses.

65 Department v. BoPeep, 317Md. 573, 608, 565 A. 2d 1015 (1989).
66 Comm 'n onMed. Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 435A. 2d 747 (1981).
67 Comm 'n onMed. Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 422, 435A. 2d 747 (1981).
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ormore other persons had, atone time oranother, been the object ofpolice attention when the matter
would beleft hanging, open ended, with only half ofthe story told." There was no abuse ofdiscretion by
thehearing examiner's limitation of cross-examination. 317 Md. at 604.
o

Dr. Stillman claimed that the Comm'n on Med. Discipline improperly restricted his cross-examination of

the physician head ofthePeer Review Committee which investigated his medical practice and
recommended that his license be revoked in Comm 'non Med. Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 419,

435 A.2d 747 (1981). Objection to thecross examination was thatit exceeded the scope of direct
examination. "Wehave long heldthatcross-examination can relate only to the facts and incidents
connected with matters stated in the direct examination ofthe witness, and if a party desires to
examine a witnessas to other matters, he mustdo so by making the witness his own." On judicial review
Dr. Stillman said the cross-examination had to do with an inquiry as to whether there an improper ex parte

communication bythewitness. Dr. Stillman did not call Dr. Berman "ashis own witness or advise the
Commission ofthe purpose of his inquiry." 291 Md. at 423.

E. The Right to Subpoena Witnesses.

Categorizing the absence ofa right to subpoena witnesses as a violation ofdue process is problematical.
Proper categorization onthe right to subpoena witness focuses on the fairness ofa hearing and the
opportunity to beheard under allthe facts and circumstances ofthe particular case. Throughout
Maryland's Annotated Code there are statutory provisions allowing administrative agencies to issue

subpoenas in the performance ofthe agency's investigatory68 and adjudicatory69 authority. Some statutes
do not provide for this authority.

Sometimes, there are specific statutory provisions regulating the subpoenaof records in a civil or
criminal court proceeding. For instance, a subpoena for records of a financial institution may result in
the disclosure or production of financial records or information only if the subpoenacontains a
certification that a copy or the subpoena has been served on the person whoserecords are sought by the
party seeking the disclosure or production or a court waives thatcertification of service for good cause.
OAH may issue a subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production

oftangible things on the written request ofa party orat the direction ofajudge.72 Requests should be filed
at least ten (10) days before the hearing.73 A significant number of case decisions inMaryland deal with
proceedings beforethe MVA, and disciplinary actions against policemen, both ofwhich have separate
procedures for the issuance of a subpoena. MVA regulations pertaining to Summary Suspensions for
Alcohol and Drug Related Offenses has a special provision for the issuance of a subpoena which requires
the requestfor the subpoenato be accompanied by "a profferofthe expectedtestimony or evidence and

68 For example: BR §11-211(e) (Horse Racing); CL §13-405 (Consumer Protection - Attorney General); FI §12-423
(Investigatory powersof Commissionerof Financial Regulation in the Department of Labor,Licensing, and Regulation).

69 For example: BOP §2-317 (Accountants); BOP §16-209 (State Commission of Real Estate Appraisers and Home Inspectors);
BR §8-312 (Home Improvement); BR §3-204(Amusement Attractions); HO §3-315 (Chiropractors); HO 8-317 (Nurses); HG
§4-306 (concerning investigations under Maryland's confidentiality of medicalrecords law); HG §2-104 (Secretary of Health and
Mental Hygiene); EN §11-313 (Environmental Sanatarians); EN §14-114 (Gas and Oil); SG §15-507 (State Ethics Commission).
70 HG §18-205(i)(l)(iii) (providing thatmedical laboratory reports and records are subject to subpoena or discovery in a criminal
or civil proceeding only pursuantto a court ordersealingthe courtrecord)
71 FI §1-304. Circuit courtjudges are sometimes called uponto waivethis notice uponthe application ofthe States Attorney
during an investigation of possible criminal conduct.
72 COMAR 28.02.01.11.

73 COMAR 28.02.01.11 is extensive and requires specific information to identify the individual subpoened and what is required
to be produced. Service and return of service provisions are contained within the rule. Id.
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its relevance tothe proceeding."74 Disciplinary proceedings against police officers have separate
procedures whereby the agency may issue subpoenas.

Case law has held that individuals who forgo their right to subpoena known, material witnesses will

usually waive any objections to denial ofan opportunity tocross-examine that witness.
When discussing the issuance of a subpoena, there may bean issue ofthe ability ofthe agency to

subpoena records, both in the investigatory stage ofaproceeding and in a contested case. The Court of
Appeals "has set forth athree-part test for determining the validity ofa subpoena issued by an
administrative agency." To "determine asubpoena's validity, a reviewing court must ask '[w]hether the
inquiry is authorized by statute, the information sought is relevant to the inquiry, and the demand is not
too indefinite or overbroad."77

COMAR 11.11.03.07 addresses the refusal of subpoena requests in MVA hearings. Not every request

for a subpoena must be granted. Whether to grant or deny a request depends on the general evidentiary
standards setoutinthe MAPA.78 Requests forsubpoenas are considered along with SG§10-213

concerning what evidence isallowed and excluded in administrative proceedings. Therefore, COMAR
11.11.03.07C provides that a request for the issuance ofa subpoena may denied ifthe evidence to be
offered is immaterial, irrelevant and/ordoes not pertain to a genuine issue in the case.
74 COMAR 11.11.03.07A(5). Title 11 ofCOMAR contains regulations for the Department ofTransportation. Administrative
procedures are contained inSubtitle 11. Complete address information must also accompany the request for a subpoena.
75 PS §4-107(d). Anumber ofrights are afforded topolice officers by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill ofRights contained in
PS §3-101. et. seq.

76 Trovers v. Baltimore Police Department, 115 Md. App. 395, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997). The Court stated:
Ordinarily, a complaining witness who isalso a "victim" cannot beviewed asneutral and detached. Such
concerns areless weighty in cases when hearsay statements come into evidence through a disinterested witness because

they tend tobemore reliable than statements introduced through a witness who has aninterest inthe subject matter
underlying thecontroversy. Thus, there issome force behind appellant's argument that ina hearing todetermine
whether he would bepermitted to retain hislivelihood, due process requires thathe be accorded theopportunity to
cross-examine a complaining witness.

Nonetheless, because appellant failed to exercise hisright to subpoena Ms. Nelson, seeMd. Ann. Code, art. 27 §
730Q)»we conclude thathe haseffectively waived hisright tocomplain about a denial ofthe opportunity to crossexamine Ms.Nelson. In 1971, the Supreme Court in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,28 L. Ed. 2d 842,91 S. Ct.
1420 (1971), upheld theadmission ofhearsay evidence ina proceeding before theSocial Security Board, noting that
Pearles's lawyer could have subpoenaed thehearsay declarant butdidnotdoso. Id. at 404-05. Although notciting
Pearles, we held inAmerican Radio [American Radio-Tel. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 33 Md. App. 423,434,365
A.2d 314,320(1976)] thattheerror in admitting affidavits, without subjecting theaffiant to cross-examination, was
harmless because the opponents "made norequest for... anopportunity to bring theaffiant in for cross-examination."

33 Md. App. at 435, 365 A.2d 320. Finally, inTron [Tron v. Prince George's County, 69Md. App. 256, 517 A.2d 113
(1986)], we distinguished Pearles onthe ground that Tron had not been furnished with subpoena power, while the
claimant in Pearles failed to exercise his rightunder the Social Security Actto subpoena adverse witnesses. We read
Pearles as standing forthe proposition that claimants who forgo their right to subpoena known, material
witnesses effectively waive any objections to denial of an opportunityto cross-examine. 69 Md. App. at 264, 517
A.2d 117. Accord Changing Point, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Comm'n, 87 Md. App. 150, 172, 589
A.2d 502 (1991); butcf. Kade, 80Md. App. at726, 566 A.2d at 151 (concluding thathearsay was reliable based onthe
fact thathearsay proponent didnotsubpoena declarant). We conclude that, in light of appellant's failure to subpoena
Ms. Nelson, the admission of herstatements to Officer Moore andLieutenant Henderson didnotvitiate appellant's
right to a fair administrative hearing.

115 Md. App. at 418-19. (Footnotes and somecitations omitted). [Emphasis by bold]
77 Solomon v. Board ofMedicine, 155 Md. App. 687, 700, 845 A.2d47 (2004) citing Banach v. State ofMaryland Comm'n on
Human Relations, 277Md. 502, 356A.2d242(1976). Solomon involved a disciplinary proceeding against a physician. The

Court said theBoard had theright to subpoena patients' records (arandom sampling) to yield information regarding the quality
ofmedical care Dr. Solomon provided, including diagnostic and treatment information. Inaddition, therecords would reveal
information concerning Dr. Solomon's coding and billing practices. 155 Md. App. at 700. The complaint against Dr. Solomon
was onthe basis that she had not properly informed a patient ofthediagnostic procedures and methods oftreatment. The Board
had informed Dr. Solomon that they would be performing a peer re-review of herpractice in6 months. 155 Md. App. at693.
78 Formanv. MVA, 332 Md. 201, 222, 630 A. 2d 753 (1993).
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Though most of this Section is concerned with the right of an individual to subpoena information,
there are anumber of agencies, with investigative authority, withthe right to issue subpoenas in
furtherance of an investigation.
Some of the Authority Pertaining to the Issuance of Subpoenas in Certain Administrative
Proceedings

SG §10-208. Notice of hearing.

(a) In general- An agency or the Office shall give all parties inacontested case reasonable written

notice ofthe hearing.

(b) Contents of notice.- The notice shall state:

(3) any applicable right torequest subpoenas for witnesses and evidence and specify the costs, if any,

associated with such a request;

SG §9-1605. Administrative law judges.

(c) Powers generally.- In any contested case conducted byan administrative law judge, the

administrative law judge may:

(1) authorize the issuance of subpoenas for witnesses;
Title 11. Department of Transportation
Subtitle 11. Motor Vehicle Administration - Administrative Procedures

Subtitle 03. Summary Suspensions for Alcohol and Drug-Related Offenses
COMAR 11.11.03.07 Request for Subpoenas.

A. A request for the issuance ofasubpoena to require the attendance ofwitnesses or the production of
documents shall be in writing and shall contain:

(1) The name andcomplete mailing address ofthe licensee;
(2) The driver's license number ofthe licensee;
(3) The date ofthe scheduledhearing, if known;

(4) The name, address, and telephone number ofthe attorney, if applicable;

(5) A proffer ofthe expected testimony or evidence and its relevance tothe proceeding; and
(6) The name andaddress ofthe requested witness.
B. The decision to issue a subpoena shall be in thediscretion ofthe Administration.
C. A request may be refused if thetestimony orevidence to be offered:
(1) Is immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious; or
(2) Doesnot pertain to a genuine issue in the contested case.

D. If asubpoena request ismade, the Administration may defer the decision onthe request until the
hearing isheld. The administrative law judge may take testimony and receive evidence to determine if the
request may begranted pursuant to Sec. C. The administrative law judge may entertain aproffer from the
licensee orthe licensee's attorney as to the nature ofthe witness' testimony. If the administrative law judge
decides to issue a subpoena for awitness, theadministrative law judge shall continue thehearing and stay

the suspension. The Administration may reschedule the hearing at alocation most convenient for the
witness.

E. A party, other than theAdministration, requesting the issuance of a subpoena, shall pay the
Administration a fee of $4 for each subpoena issued.

Enforcement of administrative subpoenas for investigatory matters or for adjudicatory hearings

involves application to thecircuit court to use its enforcement power. Agencies have no authority to
enforce their own subpoenas. Usually these subpoenas will beenforced if statutorily authorized, the
information sought is relevant, and thedemand is not indefinite, privileges and/or overly burdensome.
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Significant Case decisions

Forman v. MVA, 332 Md. 201,630 A. 2d 753 (1993) dealt withthe denial ofthe request for a subpoena by

Forman for a police officer to appear at anadministrative hearing. Important to theproceeding was whether
Forman had properly been advised ofthe consequences ofnottaking analcohol test. 332 Md. at 323-24.
TheCourt saidthere is a procedure to be followed when a request for a subpoena is denied and the
licensee then makes a profferat the hearing. "We can say that when faced with a licensee's proffer and
subpoena request, an ALJ has three distinct choices: (1) accept the proffer's contents as true, and indicate
this acceptance; (2) reach no conclusion regarding the truth ofthe proffer (essentially suspending
judgment), and issue the subpoena; or(3) reject the proffer and subpoena request entirely, and provide a
valid explanation ofthe rejection. 332 Md. at222. This third option enables the ALJ to dispose offrivolous
orotherwise improper subpoena requests. We emphasize that the ALJ may only avoid issuing thesubpoena
when he or she explicitly accepts the proffer orrejects the proffer and provides a basis for this rejection."
"As for the ALJ's decision to accept or reject a subpoena request, the legislature has given the MVA
subpoena power, providing that "[i]n any matter subject to its jurisdiction, the Administration may

subpoena any person ordocuments and take the testimony ofany person ..." 322 Md. at222. "Should the
ALJ decide notto accept a licensee's proffered testimony as true, then failure to grant licensee's subpoena

request may be an abuse ofdiscretion when the proffered testimony (1) does not fall within the categories
of excludable evidence found in COMAR and the Code and (2) the ALJ provides no valid reasons why the

proffer was rejected. 332 Md. at223. In Forman's case, the evidence proffered met both the statutory and
regulatory standards and there was no other apparent reason toreject the proffer." 332 Md. at224.
Solomon v. Board ofMedicine, 155 Md. App. 687, 705-06, 845 A. 2d47(2004). "As for Dr. Solomon's
patients, this Court has made clear that patients have no veto power over subpoenas issued by theBoard
in the course of investigating a physician." 155 Md. App. at 705. Patients of Dr. Solomon had objected
tothe production oftheir medical records inthe disciplinary proceedings against her. Neither the
Confidentiality ofMedical Records Act nor a physician-patient privilege precluded the production ofthese
records. 155 Md. App. at 707.79
In Travers v. Baltimore PoliceDepartment, 115 Md. App. 395, 693 A. 2d 378(1997), the Courtstated that
the failure ofthe officer to subpoena a witness meant a police officer could not complain about a

denial ofthe opportunity to cross-examine that witness.80 This was a disciplinary proceeding against an
officer alleged to have assaulted Ms. Nelson. Hearsay evidence was introduced as to herstatements
concerning the assault and that evidence was deemed credible as being introduced through a disinterested
witness. OfficerTraversdid not subpoena Ms.Nelson to testifyconcerning the matter. 115Md. App. at
418.

When a subpoena issued by theMaryland Securities Commissioner (allegations thatappellant was
engaging insecurities transactions without first registering with the Commissioner) and the appellant did
notrespond, theCommissioner sought enforcement inthe Circuit Court forAnne Arundel County in

Scheckv. Maryland Securities, 101 Md. App. 390, 391, 646 A. 2d 1092 (1994).81 The Court determined
thaton itsface, the subpoena was not unduly burdensome or oppressive as alleged byAppellant andit
was correctly andlegally issued pursuant to the investigatory authority ofthe Commissioner. 101 Md. App.
at 394.

Securities Commissioner v. Agora, 389Md. 1, 882 A. 2d 833 (2005) was an unsuccessful attempt by the
Securities Commissioner ofthe Stateof Maryland to subpoena information from Agora, Inc.to determine
whether Agora'sactivities, including the publishing a newsletter disseminating securities information,
79 Dr. Solomon had also generated an issue concerning theability ofthe Board of Physicians to subpoena her medical records.
Solomon, 155 Md. App. at 700-02.

80 Officer Travers had the right to subpoena witnesses under the provisions of LEORB, Md. Ann. Code, art. 27 §730(j). Troves,
115 Md. App. at 418.

81 CA §1 l-701(a) gives the Commissioner the authority torequest asubpoena in fulfilling his/her investigatory role. Maryland
Securities, 101 Md. App. at 393.
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violated the securities law ofthe State of Maryland.82 A motion to compel filed with a circuit court was
met with an affirmative defense byAgora that the protections ofthe First Amendment to theUnited States
Constitution and Article 40 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights precluded enforcement. 389Md. at 10.
At issuewas whetherthe Securities Commissioner may compel Agorato produce subscriber lists.

"Ordinarily, administrative agency subpoenas will be enforced if the agency's investigation is
statutorily authorized, the information sought by the subpoena is relevant to the investigation, and
the demand is not indefinite or overbroad." 389 Md. at 15. Discussing First Amendment law and the

protection itaffords includes the rights ofindividuals to read and receive ideas. 389 Md. at16-17. "The
Supreme Court has condemned as unconstitutional the deterrent effect on speech that could arise ifthe
government required readers to identify themselves before receiving through the mail certain reading
material." 389 Md., at 18. "The Supreme Court hasrecognized that government inquiry intoan
individual's choice of associates may produce a chilling effect on exercise ofthe freedom of association

protected bythe First Amendment." 389 Md. at 19. "To the extent that the Commissioner's subpoenas
require Agora, a publisher, todisclose the identities ofthose who subscribe toorpurchase its materials, the
subpoenas seek information within the protective umbrella oftheFirst Amendment." 389 Md. at22. "In
order to compel production ofthesubscriber information, the Commissioner must therefore establish a
substantial relationbetweenthe information soughtand an overriding and compelling State interest." 389
Md. at 23. "The Commissioner has failed to show a sufficient nexus between the investigation into

whether Agora acted as anunregistered investment adviser, ontheone hand, and the demand for a list of
those subscribers who received the Email on the other." 389 Md. at 23. In an opinion considering different

aspects ofthe affirmative defense asserted, the Court also considered the speculative value ofpurchaser
information sought anddetermined it does notoutweigh the burden thatcompelled disclosure would place
on the First Amendment interests ofthe individuals identified. 389 Md. at 25-26.

Whatthe Securities Commissioner alleged in this case,what she could allege given the information it
had,andwhatshe may be ableto allege in another case at another timewill all involve the sameanalysis
dealtwiththe Court in this opinion. It all depends. Only speculation of wrongdoing attended the request
for the issuance of a subpoena in this case, and speculation doesnot a good basismaketo furnish the nexus
of proofto overcome aFirst Amendment right. A very interesting case; an even more interesting
constitutional analysis; perhaps there is more to come.

Within a case involving judicial review of a successful administrative protectagainstthe renewal of a
liquor license, an issue arose concerning whether a subpoena should be compelled for the attendance of
witnesses. Boardv. GlobalExpress, 168 Md. App. 339, 896 A. 2d 432 (2006). The Court determined that
the liquorboardhad no responsibility to referthe matter to the circuitcourtto compel testimony following
an interpretation ofthe statutewiththe following comment: "The requestto issuethe subpoena came one
day before the hearing, without an acceptable explanation as to why it had not occurred earlier.. . . There
was no profferthat the witnesses wereproperly served pursuant to statute. The reasonable implication from

the record isthat thewitnesses, if served, were served bycounsel for thelicensees83. . . There was no
proffer ofthe expected testimony, but appellant assumed thatthe witnesses would testify that theyobserved
no activities that would constitute a disturbance ofthe public peace and safety. Appellant noted there was
considerable evidence to the contrary, [solicitedprostitutiondrugs, etc.]" 168 Md. App. at 350-51. Though
Art. 2B §16-410provided that if a witnesssummoned refusedto attend or testify the board had the

responsibility ("shall") to report the facts to the circuit courtto proceed by attachment against the witness,
that samesectionwas permissive ("may")as to whether the Boardhad a responsibility to issuea subpoena

when a request was made. 168 Md. App. at346-47.84 Troublesome isthe fact that the Court based its
opinion primarily on its reasoning that although the statute used theword "shall" as to the responsibility of
82 Inthe opinion, Judge Rakersets forth provisions ofthe Maryland Securities Act in the Corps. & Assoc. Articles and the
various allegations by the Securities Commissioner to support its investigation and request for a subpoena. Agora, 389Md. at310.

83 Interesting is the fact that the witnesses were members ofthe Prince George's County Police Department, whoworked parttime as security personnel atthelicensee's establishment. The witnesses briefly appeared atthehearing butgave notestimony as
giving testimony was said by them to be inviolation ofthe Police Department policy. Global, 168 Md. App. at342-43.
84 Judge James Eyler spend some time talking about dictionary definitions ofthe word "shall" and thenecessity to read the
context in which the word is used. Global, 168 Md. App. at 348-50.
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the Board to send the matter to the circuit courtfor enforcement if the witness did not appear or would not

testify: "The legislature clearly intended that the various licensing boards be empowered to regulate and
control the saleof alcoholic beverages, and requiring a board to report to the circuit court a failure of a

witness totestify inallsuch instances, would hinder the board inexercising its authority under Article 2B."
Too bad no subsequent appellate history.

The rightto subpoena may well become theresponsibility torequest a subpoena
o

In MVA v. Aiken, 418 Md. 11,12 A. 3d 656 (2011), the Courtstatedthat the statutedid not require the
MVA to introduce evidence at a suspension of license hearing that breadthtest was administered by a

"qualified person" and that the testing equipment was approved bya State toxicologist. 418 Md. at 16. As
totheremedy a driver has to assure that the operator ofthe equipment is qualified and that theequipment is
certified, the Courtstated that in thiscase the MVA didnotpresent to the ALJ"the Intox EC/IR strip

produced during Respondent's breadth test, which theoretically would have been useful inchallenging the
accuracy ofthe alcohol concentration test." Respondent was entitled to request from theALJ prior to the
hearing a subpoena forproduction ofthe statement inorder to rebut thepresumption of reliability ofthe
breadth test result. 418 Md. at 35.

Service of a subpoena is to be made on thecustodian of a public record. If that custodian is not
known and cannot be ascertained after a reasonable effort by a party in a legal proceeding, the party may

request a court to issue a subpoena forthe custodian of public records to be served on:
1. a resident agent designated for service on a local utility pursuant to Article 24 §1-110 of
the Code;

2. a resident agent designated for service on a State agencythat is not represented by the
Attorney General, that designation being under SG 6-109; or

3. the Attorney General or an individual designated by the Attorney General as provided
under the Maryland rules for service on a State agency that is represented by the Attorney
General.86

F. Discovery.

Not all administrative agencies allow discovery. What discovery is allowed differs from agency to

agency.87 If,when and under what circumstances a denial ofdiscovery can be said to deny an individual
the rightto a fair hearing, and thus a due process violation, is goingto depend on the facts and
circumstances ofthe case. The author of this book sees a future change in the appellate court approach to

discovery. I believe thatapproach is already demonstrated through recentappellate courtopinions noting
and allowing increased accessthroughthe Maryland Public Information Act. If the constitutions ofthe
United States and the State of Maryland assure one with a property interest due process, then there has to

be a pointwhere due process is goingto mean therightto discovery. No doubt, due process is a flexible
concept in administrative proceedings, but that does not mean that the issuesof a particular case are going
to allow an agency to deny discovery when no statutory or regulatory authorization exists. The facts and
circumstances are going to sometimes demand that the right to a fair hearing, means the right to
85 This service is the equivalent of personal service on acustodian of public records. CJ §6-410(c).
86 CJ §6-410.
87 Changing Point v. Maryland Health Resources, 87 Md. App. 150, 172, 589 A. 2d 502(1991). 2 Am. Jur Administrative Law
§327 states thereis no constitutional rightto pretrial discovery in administrative proceedings. Individual statutes determine what
discovery, if any, is available. Underthe federal APA, the rules of civil procedure do not apply to discovery in administrative
proceedings unless specifically provided by statute. The section continues: "The 1981 Model StateAdministrative Procedure Act
authorizes the hearing officer in an adjudicatory proceeding to issue subpoenas, discovery ordersand protectiveorders, in
accordance with the rules of civil procedure." (Model State Act 1981 §4-210(a))
2 Am. Jur. Adm. Law treatment of discovery includes the following sections: §327, Generally; §328, Scope; Sanctions;

§329, Privileges Precluding Discovery; §330, Jencks Discovery; and §331, Discovery UnderFreedom of Information Act.
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meaningful discovery on aparticular issue. We will be spectators and actors in the future development of
the law in this area.

When there is a hearing before OAH, a request may bemade not later than 30days before a
scheduled hearing for inspection orcopying ofany file memorandum, correspondence, document, object
ortangible thing that isrelevant tothe subject matter ofthe case, and not privileged. But, unless
otherwise provided by law orby agreement ofthe parties, "no other discovery procedure may be
required." Costs attend a request for documents, which cost may be waived inaccord with law.
COMAR 28.02.01.10 Discovery.

A. By written request filed not later than 30 days before the scheduled hearing, a party may require any
other party toproduce within 15 days, for inspection orcopying, any file, memorandum, correspondence,
document, object, or tangible thing:
(1) Relevantto the subjectmatterofthe case; and
(2) Not privileged.

B. Unless provided bylaw orby agreement ofthe parties, no other discovery procedure may be required.
C. Copies.

(1) Copies ofrequested documents and records shall bemade atthe expense ofthe party making the
request.

(2) The charge forcopies of requested documents and records may be waived bythecustodian ofthe
documents in accordance with State GovernmentArticle, § 10-611 et seq., Annotated Code of Maryland, or
other applicable law.

Statutes and regulations applicable to hearings before a particular agency must bereviewed to see if
additional discovery is allowed. For example, COMAR 10.34.01.09 dealing withthe discipline of

pharmacists provides (in supplement to OAH provisions discovery provisions) that a party may require
another party to produce (within 15 days):
1.

a list of witnesses to be called and/or

2. copies of documents intended to be produced at the hearing.
There is also mandatory discovery in a pharmacy contested hearing requiring that:

3. each party provide to the other party the earlier of not later than 15 days before any prehearing
conference, or 45 days before a scheduled hearing date: (a) the name and curriculum vitae of any
expert witness who willtestify at the hearing; and(b) a detailed written report summarizing the
expert's testimony including an opinion offered, the factual basis for the opinion andreasons
underlying the opinion;

4. anyreport may be excluded by the Board of Pharmacy or OAH if the reportis not sufficiently
specific or otherwisefails to complywith the requirements;
5. the Board of Pharmacy or OAH shallconsider and decideany arguments generated regarding the
sufficiency ofthe report at any scheduled prehearing conference or immediately before a
scheduled hearing;

6. that expertadoption of a sufficiently specific charging document as the expert's reportmeans that
adoption satisfies the requirement of submission ofthe report; and that
7. partieshave a continuingduty to supplement their disclosure of witnesses and documents.
Absent unforeseen circumstances that would otherwise impose an extraordinary hardship on a party,

witnesses or documents may not be addedto the list after any scheduled prehearingconference or later
than 15 days before a scheduled hearing. This prohibition against addingwitnessesdoes not applyto
witnesses or documents to be used for impeach or rebuttal purposes.
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COMAR 10.34.01.09 Discovery.

A. Discovery on Request. By written request served on the other party and filed with the Board orthe Office
ofAdministrative Hearings, asappropriate, a party may require another party to produce, within 15 days, the
following:

(1) A list of witnessesto be called;

(2) Copies of documents intended to beproduced atthe hearing; or
(3) Both § A(l) and (2) of this regulation.
B. Mandatory Discovery.

(1) Each party shall provide to the other party not later than 15 days before the prehearing conference, if

scheduled, or 45 days before the scheduled hearing date, whichever is earlier:

(a) The name and curriculum vitae ofany expert witness who will testify atthe hearing; and
(b) Adetailed written report summarizing the expert's testimony, which includes the:
(i) Opinion offered;

(ii) Factualbasis for the opinion; and
(iii) Reasons underlying the opinion.

(2) Ifthe Board orthe Office ofAdministrative Hearings, as appropriate, finds that the report is not
sufficiently specific, orotherwise fails to comply with the requirements of§B(l)ofthis regulation, the Board
orthe Office ofAdministrative Hearings, asappropriate, shall exclude from thehearing the testimony ofthe
expert and any report ofthe expert.

(3) The Board orthe Office ofAdministrative Hearings, as appropriate, shall consider and decide arguments

regarding the sufficiency ofthe report:
(a) At the prehearing conference, if scheduled; or
(b) Immediately beforethe scheduled hearing.

(4) Ifan expert adopts a sufficiently specific charging document as the expert's report, that adoption satisfies

the requirements set forth in § B(l) of this regulation.
C. Parties arenot entitled to discovery of items other than as listed in §§ A and B of this regulation.

D. Both parties have a continuing duty to supplement their disclosure ofwitnesses and documents.
E. Absent unforeseen circumstances that would otherwise impose an extraordinary hardship on a party,
witnesses or documents may not be added to the list:
(1) After the prehearingconference, if scheduled; or

(2)Later than 15 days before the hearing, if noprehearing conference is scheduled.
F.The prohibition against adding witnesses does not apply to witnesses or documents to beused for
impeachment or rebuttal purposes.
G. Construction.

(1) Inhearings conducted byan administrative law judge ofthe Office of Administrative Hearings, this
regulation shall, whenever possible, beconstrued assupplementing and inharmony with COMAR 28.02.01.
(2) Intheevent of a conflict between this regulation and COMAR 28.02.01, this regulation applies.
Indicative ofthe most extensive discoveryallowed in an administrative proceeding are the provisions

of COMAR 21.10.14 pertaining to TheMaryland State Board of Contract Appeals. Interrogatories,

depositions and protective orders may all be part ofthe process. While the discovery is notas inclusive as
that allowed in circuit court civil discovery, it is considerably broader than that allowed in most
administrative proceedings.

Maryland has not yetaddressed whether there isa due process right to discovery. In very limited and
particular circumstances federal and other law has stated due process considerations may attend the right
to discovery.88
88 It is notedin 2 Am. Jur. Adm. Law 217 that"due process fairness dictates thatdiscovery be permitted in some situations so

that the rights oftheparties may beprotected" California Teachers Ass 'n v. California Com 'n on Teacher Credentialing, 11 Cal.

App. 4th 1004, 4Cal. Reptr. 3d 369, 180 Law Rep. 239 (3 Dist. 2003); NLRB v. Rex Disposables, 494 F. 2d 588 (5th Cir. 1974)
are cited. Alsonoted isthat an agency which has promulgated discovery rules is bound by those rules and mustassure that its
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Significant CaseDecisions

Just whatdiscovery is allowedin Maryland administrative law cases

o There was a contention inChanging Point v. Maryland Health Resources, 87 Md. app. 150; 172, 589 A. 2d
502 (1991) that certain files should have been produced during flie hearing. The Court said production was

not required under the facts presented. "Additionally, the Commission's rules ofprocedure do not provide
for discovery ofthis type ofdocument by the parties." 87 Md. App. at 172. Aproblem may arise when a
contention ismade thatone has been prevented from properly cross examining a witness due to a want of
documents not being furnished indiscovery. There isnot a provision for all agencies to allow discovery.
Id.

Discovery ofthe thought processes ofa decision maker? (not an administrative law case, butillustrative)
o When dealing with governmental agencies, the thought processes ofthe decision makers is seldom
discoverable. Oneofthe issues inSt Mary's County v. Lacer, 393 Md. 414, 903 A. 2d 378(2006) was

whether the Court of Special Appeals "correctly reviewed and affirmed ... thecircuit court's relevant
order addressing a discovery dispute that implicated the St. Mary's County Open Meetings Act. . .""The
Circuit Court allowed Alfred A. Lacer, Respondent, to inquire in depositions intodiscussions heldduring a
closed executive session ofthe St. Mary';sBoard of County Commissioners, Petitioner, as those
discussions related to Lacer's employment contract with theBoard andits subsequent termination of
Lacer." 393 Md. at 419. The Court of Appeals concluded thatthe collateral orderdoctrine enabled

appellate review ofthe discovery portion ofthe Circuit Court's order." 393 Md. 428. Discussing the
collateral orderdoctrine and its elements (all4 elements must be met before an appeal may proceed) in

some detail, theCourt disagreed that thegovernment aspect ofthe discovery allowed theappeal. "While we

appreciate the sensitivity ofthe Court ofSpecial Appeals that a meaningful challenge tothe allowed
probing ofthe Board members' thought processes might be lost ifsuch a contention were not resolved on
appeal until following a trial, we perceive that the more limited inquiry permitted by the circuit Court's
order, with respect to Lacer's requested relief under the St. Mary's County Open Meetings Act, pertains to
functional aspects ofthe closed session discussion and not the thought processes ofthe decision makers."
Thus, theCourt distinguished itsopinions inPublic Service Comm 'n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200,477
A.2d 759 (1984) andMontgomery Co. v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 654 A. 2d 877 (1995), and thediscovery
order was not reviewable at this time. 393 Md. at 430-31.

Pre-hearing discovery in administrative hearings

o

From Sugarloafv. Department ofEnvironment, 344 Md. 271, 292, 686 A.2d 605, 616 (1996):
We find no merit in the plaintiffs' final argument that "theALJ'sdetermination that pre-hearing
discovery was not permitted denied [plaintiffs] due process of law as required by the United States
andMaryland Constitutions." (Plaintiffs' supplemental briefat 46). There is no provision inthe
Maryland Administrative Procedure Actwhich provides fordiscovery at thepre-hearing stage.
Furthermore, under COMAR 26.01.02.21A, whichgoverns the Departmentofthe Environment

contested case proceedings, "discovery may betaken only in accordance with the stipulation ofthe
parties." Parties may, however, "request governmental documents under theMaryland Public
Information Act, State Government Article, §10-611 et. seq." COMAR 26.01.02.21B. There was

no stipulation inthis case providing for discovery. Consequently, theALJ properly determined

procedures meet due process requirements citing Pacific Gas andElec. Co. v. F.E.RC, 746 F. 2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) and
McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F. 2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

What theCalifornia Teachers association held was that inthe "investigation" stage into allegations of misconduct (sexual
abuse) against acredentialed teacher isthat full discovery isnot required by due process. The Court cited a prior California case

to the effect that there is no due process right to prehearing discovery in administrative cases. 11 Cal. App. 4th at 1012. In the Rex
Disposables, the Court said that it exercised broad discretion torequire proceedings tobe fair. Sometimes that fairness may mean
that discovery berequired. Thecase involved an allegation of layoffs against individuals promoting unionization. The Court
cited Davis for his suggestion that theCalifornia Teachers case may well be followed by federal courts for itsgeneral noting that
an agency must provide prehearing discovery even inthe absence ofastatutory requirement. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
1970 Supp. §8:15. The holding inRes Disposables was that even if there was error ina failure toorder discovery, there was no
actual prejudice. 494 F. 2d at 592.

58

that, absent such stipulation, she was not authorized torequire the extensive discovery requested

by the plaintiffs. Moreover, pursuant to COMAR 26.01.02.21B, the plaintiffs requested certain
documents under the Maryland Public Information Actwhich they received without delay.
Finally, the plaintiffs do not dispute the respondents' representations that the plaintiffs were
furnished with several documents.

The plaintiffs do not argue that the ALJ orthe Department relied upon any document which
was notpreviously shown tothe plaintiffs, orwith regard towhich there was noopportunity for
rebuttal. Cf. Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126,129, 314 A.2d 113, 115 (1974) ("We agree
with Rogers thatunder thecircumstances here, with no opportunity forcross-examination or
rebuttal, fundamental fairness would preclude reliance uponthe report by an administrative

agency"). The plaintiffs have cited nocase inthe Supreme Court or in this Court, and weare
unaware of any suchcase, holding thatdue process mandates pre-hearing discovery in an
administrative proceeding. See Replacement Rent-A-Car v. Smith, 99 Md. App. 588, 593, 638
A.2d 1217,1219 (1994) ("The Maryland Rules relating to discovery apply only to proceedings in
the circuit courts andnotto proceedings before administrative agencies
It is equally wellestablished that there is no broad constitutional right to pre-hearing discovery in administrative

proceedings and that any general right to such discovery must come from the statutes orrules
governing those proceedings. * * *Neither the State Administrative Procedure Actnorthestatute
governing the [agency] provides such entitlement..."), andcases there cited.
Thus, we perceive no error in theALJ's refusal to require pre-hearing discovery.
344 Md. at 316-17.

Thepublicinformation act and theMatylandOpen Meetings Act
o Owners and two lessees of land in an urbanredevelopment area filed an action againstnot-for-profit City of

Baltimore Development Corporation under Open Meetings Actandthe Maryland Public Information Act
seeking access to information regarding BDC's meetings. Eminent domain authority was at issue. 395 Md.
at 315. Discussing the history of Maryland's open meetings Actwas discussed, 395 Md. at 320-339, the
Courtstatedthat although the Baltimore Development Corporation was not createdby legislative
enactment it is subjectto substantial controlby Baltimore City becauseof how closelythe two are
intertwined. Thus, in essence BaltimoreDevelopment Corporation is an instrumentality of BaltimoreCity
for purposes of Maryland's Public Information Actandit is a public bodywithin the meeting ofthe Open
Meetings Act. 395 Md. at 335.

THE MARYLAND PUBLIC INFORMATIN ACT - A VEHICLE FOR DISCOVERY
1. Attorneysfees under the MPIA

o

Stromberg v. University ofMaryland, 395 Md. 120, 909 A. 2d 663 (2006)focusedon the enactment of
Maryland's public information act, its history from 1970 and the provision allowing attorneys fees and
litigation costs for one whohas substantially prevailed. TheMaryland act is patterned afterthe federal
information act. 395 Md. at 127. A subcontractor sought records from public university under MPIA

relating to a construction project. The Courtsaidthe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
subcontractor's motion for costs and attorneys fees, though university conceded subcontractor was the

prevailing party. Consideration of awarding attorneys fees underPIA was the focus of discussion.
2. Who is the custodian ofrecords under the MPIA?

o

WTien an inmatesought records from the Warden ofthe facilitywhere he was incarcerated(documentary
information on health care providers,the cost and availability of medical services, complaintsfrom
prisoners regarding health care, institutional operations records relatingto securityrestrictions and
violations and complaints from inmates about theirconfinement, and the cost of making copies by inmates
within the institution), and the Warden replied that the request hadto be made on each department with
responsibility to mainthe respective files, the Court of Appeals saidthis waserrorto directthe inmate to go

elsewhere inIreland v. Shearin, 417 Md. 401, 404-405, 10 A 3rd. 754 (2012). Reviewing theprovisions of
the MPIA, the definition of "public record," the definition of "custodian," the statute did not limit requests
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upon the physical custodian. The Wardens' directive to go tothe individual departments "violated the
PIA'soverarching policy of providing access with the lease costs anddelay to the requesting party." 417
Md.at412.

3. But - is "this" a state agency subject to MPIA?

JnNapata v. University ofMaryland Medical System, 417 Md. 724, 717,12 A. 3d 144 (2011), the Court of
Appeals said it was called upon to determine the limits ofMaryland's Public Information Act asit
pertained tothe University ofMaryland Medical System brought byanindividual seeking records
concerning the award of a UMMS construction contract following theracketeering conviction offormer
State Senator Thomas Bromwell regarding his rolein influencing the award. "Although the General
Assembly created a separate corporate entity, it did notrelinquish all control of UMMS." 417 Md. at 730.
The intermediate appellate court held thatUMMS "was exempt from the PIAbecause the entity's enacting
statute expressly provided that thecorporation was not subject to laws affecting only governmental or

public entities." 417 Md. at732. "The PIA governs access topublic records." The Court stated ithad
"repeatedly announced that there isnosingle test for determining whether anentity is a unit or
instrumentality ofthe state." "Weemphgasized theimportance of examining all aspects ofthe governmententity relationship for purposes ofthePIA." 417 Md. at 733-34. Case law was reviewed and while the
attributes of UMMSs relationship withthe Statepointto its beingan instrumentality ofthe State

predominates, the statute creating UMMS (Ed. §13-303(a)(2) specifically provides that UMMS "shall not
bea State agency, political subdivision, public body, public corporation ormunicipal corporation and isnot
subject to any provisions of law affecting only governmental orpublic entities." The Court ruled that this
exemption controlled despite the Napata argument a public information act conflict because there should be
broad access to public information. 417 Md. at 737-738.

G. The Conduct of the Hearing.

The right to a hearing and the right to a meaningful hearing means due process rights are involved.
COMAR 28.02.01.17 governs the conduct of hearings before OAH. A party is entitled to call witnesses,
offer evidence, cross-examinewitnesses, and make openingand closing statements. Procedures are set

forth for telephone hearings and the right to object to proceedings by telephone.91 Hearings may also be
held by video conferencing and objections may be made to holding proceedings in this manner.92 Parties
may waive theirright to appear at a hearing and thatwaiver may result in a default 93
When an ALJ conducts a proceeding, thatjudge briefly explains the purpose and nature ofthe

hearing. The ALJ may allow theparties to present preliminary matters, and shall state the order ofthe

presentation ofthe evidence prior to the beginning ofthe hearing.94
Agencies have the right to control the procedure utilized in a hearing so long as that procedure
comports with due process of law and otherwise does not violate a right afforded to an individual bythe
constitution, a statute or a regulation.

The admissionof additional evidence by an agency after the hearing has closed is allowed so long as

there was compliance with due process.95 ". . . [D]ue process ordinarily requires that an opportunity for
89 Therehadbeen recent legislative history in 2007 attempting to include UMMS as subjectto the provisions ofthe public
information actwhich had failed to pass. "Although a failed statutory amendment is not an infallibleindicator of legislative
intent, we haveindicated that 'such action strengthens the conclusion thatthe Legislature did not intend to achieve the results'
that the amendment would have achieved, if adopted" 417 Md. 739 (cases cited omitted here).
90 COMAR 28.02.01.17A.
91 COMAR 28.02.01.17B.
92 COMAR 28.02.01.17C.
93 COMAR 28.02.01.17E.
94 COMAR 28.02.01.17D.
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cross examination and/or rebuttal be provided."96 When cross-examination, theopportunity to present
additional evidence and the allowance to make additional closing argumentwas given in a case. The

Court of Appeals stated: "The board fully complied with the due process requirements concerning
subsequent evidence which are set forth in our cases."

If an agency asks for additional evidence there may be acontention that due process was not afforded
because "the board's action [in asking for additional evidence itself] implied thatthe charges were not

sufficiently proven prior to the reopening. . ."98 No case has stated this type ofaction by the Board
constituted adenial of due process and areview ofthe record will be made to determine if the argument is

factually sound based on the facts and circumstances ofthe case.99 Actions by aBoard in reopening
proceedings asking for additional evidence is not automatically adenial of due process. Anagency
may exercise the same discretion afforded to trial judges in determining when toreopen proceedings.
Significant Case Decisions

When the trier offact callsfor additional witnesses?

o Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 350 Md. 540, 625 A. 2d914 (2004) involved a police disciplinary
proceeding. "After the two-day hearing, the board adjourned todeliberate." After abrief deliberation the
Board reconvened and said there were additional witnesses who should be called to testify before the

Board. 350Md. at449. Zeigler objected, butthewitnesses were produced andthe Board decision went

against Zeigler. The circuit court held that the Board acted inappropriately, and the Court of Special
Appeals agreed. 350 Md. at 550. "The intermediate appellate court refused to accord tothe Board the
same broad discretion to reopen that is generally given to trial courts in situations other than reopenings

during jury deliberations." 350 Md. at 556. "The Court of Specials' holding that the Board abused its
discretion in reopening thehearing was, as previously indicated, based entirely upon cases dealing with the
reopening ofthe evidentiary portion of judicial trials." 350Md. at 555.
The ability to defend at an administrative hearing

The present ability to consult with an attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
o

In Coleman v. AnneArundelCounty Police Dept, 136 Md. App. 419, 766 A. 2d 169 (2001) there was a
contentionthat Mr. Coleman was not competentto attend a police officer disciplinary hearing. A due

process violation was alleged. While theappellant was ontheFamily and Medical Leave Act due to mental
illness, 136 Md. App. at 428, there wasnothing in the record to indicate he was not able to attend the
hearing. No motions were filed onthe grounds of competency, and the issue of competency and need for a
further continuance had not been raised until after he had testified. 136 Md. App. at 435. The ability to

defend at an administrative hearing "is akinto competency to stand trial," which requires that a defendant
must exhibitboth the "present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding - and ... a rational aswell as a factual understanding ofthe proceedings against him." 136
Md. App. at436. Later testimony by Mr. Coleman indicated "thathe was able to comprehend fully what
was going on andto respond appropriately to questions thatwereaskedof him by both the prosecutor and
his own attorney. In short, there was nothingto give the Boardany indication that appellant was not
competent suchthathis competency should have been questioned suasponte." 136 Md. App. at436-37.
95 Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 550Md. 540, 625 A. 2d 914 (2004).
96 Zeigler, 550 Md. at559-60 (citations and analysis omitted)
97Ze/g/er,550Md.at560.
98 Zeigler, 550 Md. at560-61.
99 Zeigler, 550 Md. at560-62. ChiefJudge Bell dissented stating: 'The situation is critically different whenit is the agency,
rather than one ofthe parties, thatis the moving force behind the exercise of discretion [to reopen the case]" 550 Md. at 571-72.
He argued to allow the agency itselfto produce call for thisadditional evidence meant they were doing so"without fear either of
meaningful review orreversal," and that eventhough agencies were notbound by the common lawrules of evidence, he found
that "permitting [the reopening] onthat basis such aresult if absurd." He was the lone dissenter butdoes hehave a good point?
100 Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 550Md. 540, 560-62, 625 A. 2d914(2004).
101 Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 550Md. 540, 556, 625 A. 2d914(2004).
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H. Liberty Interest.

A constitutional liberty interest was at stake where an agency denied an applicant for a daycarelicense to
contest a prior finding of abuse found against a family member when there had been nofinal adjudication

by the agency.102 The right to pursue an application to earn a living was involved. The Court said that
"Fundamental liberty interests protected by the dueprocess clause ofthe constitution include:
"notmerely freedom from bodily restraint but alsothe right ofthe individual to contract, to

engage in any ofthe common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home andbring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to theorderly pursuit of

happiness by free men [and women]."103
Significant Case Decisions

Theprisoner's liberty interestright

o Patrick v. Dept. ofPublic Safety, 156 Md. App. 423, 847 A. 2d 450 (2004) saw an appellant arguing that he
had a protected liberty interest in avoiding incarceration in a certain correctional institution. 156 Md. App.
at432-31. Though hefailed to preserve the issue for review, the Court commented on the extent ofan
inmate's protected liberty interest by reviewing cases. 156 Md. App. at434-442. "[A] transfer ofa prisoner
from one institution to another. . . doesnot implicate a liberty interest in the absenceof a state statute or

regulation that creates such an interest." 156 Md. App. at 435. The protected liberty analysis examines the
nature ofthe conditionsthemselves, not the statute or regulation that creates them. Transfer to an
institution that has more burdensomeconditions is within the normal limits or range of custodywhich the

conviction hasauthorized the State to impose. 156 Md. App. at 436. Nothing in thiscase (norecord was

preserved) implicated a protected liberty interest. 156 Md. App. at439. "Long terms ofdisciplinary or

administrative segregation alone, generally do not implicate aliberty interest. . ." 156 Md. App. at 439.104

The right to a livelihood

o When a day care license was denied because a DSS investigation ofsome years prior resulted ina finding
ofabuse against a family member, the Court ofSpecial Appeals said the ALJ had erred innot allowing a
contest to thatDSS determination. Though theDSS report indicated "abuse indicated" this determination
was notmade while DSS was "acting in a quasi-judicial orjudicial capacity." "Norwas there a final

judgment relating to the alleged child abuse."105

"The ALJ'sdecision to preclude consideration ofappellee's challenge to the DSS finding infringed

Ms. Thompson's right toa meaningful hearing" on her application for a day care license. Itwas unfair to
preclude Ms. Thompson's right to pursue a livelihood without giving her aright to contest the underlying

administrative finding. Afundamental liberty interest was at issue.106
Aninmate alleges he was caused toserve more time than the law required

o InMassey v. Secretary ofPublic Safety, 389 Md. 496, 886 A. 2d585 (2005), Massey, an inmate, argued
that the finding hehadviolated certain institution directives (kind of conduct subjecting inmates to

discipline; procedure for charging; matrix of punishments; processing of inmate complaints)108 and had to

102 Dept. ofHuman Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175, 197, 652 A. 2d 1183 (1995).

103 Thompson, 103 Md. App. at 197 citing Bd. ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972)
(quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923))

104 Disciplinary proceedings inMaryland are reviewed inaccord with standards set forth inCOMAR 12.07.01.09B. A separate
process for institutional administrative decisions isgoverned byCOMAR 12.07.01.09(C). Patrick, 156 Md. App. at 441.
105 Dept. ofHuman Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175, 196-97, 652 A. 2d 1183 (1995).
106 Thompson, 103 Md. App. at 197.

107 Massey's complaint that the procedure was unlawful is set forth atMassey, 504-05 ofthe opinion.

108 The directives are set forth at Massey, 389 Md. 501-04.
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therefore serve additional prison time was illegal because directives adopted by the Safety regarding inmate

behavior were actually regulations109 notenacted inaccord with theState Administrative Procedure Act

(SG §§10-101 - 10-117) and therefore were void. The Court concluded110 that the "directives" were
"regulations," as defined in SG§ 10-101(g)(l) because they "constitute statements that have general
application throughout all ofthe correctional institutions in DOC and apply to all inmates inthose
institutions; they have future effect; theywere adopted by a "unit" to carry out laws thatthe unit
administers; and they are inthe form of rules, standards, statements of interpretation, and statements of
policy." The Court also said that the "regulations" "were not statements concerning only internal
management ofthe unit, that do not affect directly the rights ofthe public orthe procedures available tothe

public, thus rejecting the appellee's contention in that regard, that the exception, contained in" SG §10-101

(g) (2) applied.111 Therefore, the directives were invalid and ineffective.112 Other case law and authority
supports this holding regarding the requirement for regulations with regard to inmate discipline.11
The mandate ofthe case was delayed because the purpose ofthe regulations was to ensure prisoners

were afforded due process.114

109 Regulation is defined bySG §10-101(g)(l). The Court summarized the process for the adoption ofregulations. Massey, 389
Md. at 500, 507.

110 The process ofjudicial review which allowed the Court toaddress the issue was set forth inMassey, 389 at 507-08.
111 Massey, 389 Md. at 509, 511, reviewing the Correctional Services article, CS §2-109; CS §3-205 (The Commissioner has
broad authority to adopt regulations for the operation and maintenance of DOC facilities. The Court stated that both the nature
and history ofthedirectives made itclear that the directives are not merely guidelines pertaining to internal management, routine
or otherwise. Massey, 512. The Wilner traced the history of applicable due process requirements beginning from 1970 toaU.S.
District Court decision regarding transfer of inmates and additional punishment meted our to inmates which were part of a
consent order. Massey, 389 Md. at512-13. He points out that the due process underpinning ofthe procedures consented to

regarding revocation of earned diminution credits at risk was confirmed bythe Supreme Court in Wolffv. McDonnel, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) with afinding that adue process liberty interest was triggered and therefore astate-credited right isnot tobe
arbitrarily abrogated. Massey, 389 Md. at 513-14. Detailing the history ofthecreation oftheOffice of Commissioner of
Correction and theMAPA requirements for adopting new regulations. The regulations atissue inthis case were adopted in
January, 2002. Massey, 389 Md. at 514-15.

The fact that these procedures were designed to implement basic Federal due process requirements is powerful evidence they
are not merely guidelines for routine, oreven non-routine, internal management. Discipline may serve to lengthen an inmate's
period of incarceration. Massey, 389 Md. at 516.

112 The majority pointed toPollock v. Patuxent, 374 Md. 463, 823 A. 2d 626 (2003) tothe effect that as aminimum, an agency's
failure tocomply with its own regulations "automatically nullifies its action where the regulation ispromulgated toeffect
fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or afederal statute" and that nullification had been required even when "less
fundamental" rightswere involved. Massey, 389 Md. at 517-18.

Judge Robert M. Bell dissented in part because he did not agree with the majority view that Massey failed toraise the issue
ofhis guilt ofthe infractions with which he was charged. Massey, 389 Md. at 529. The summary ofthemajority opinion in this
paragraph is mostly taken byJudge Bell's summary ofthe majority position at the beginning ofhis dissent at 389 Md. p. 527-28.
113 Massey, 389 Md. at 519-24.

114 Recognizing that sometimes there may be athin line between substance and procedure, the Court concluded that the rights
here were procedural ones. Massey, 389 Md. at 525. The clerk was directed towithhold the mandate for 120 days togive the
Secretary time to comply with the MAPA. Massey, 389 Md. at602.
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A number of statutes and regulations are set forth in these materials in full version. Particularly
mentioned here for placement reference are:

SG §9-1601, et. seq. Office of Administrative Hearings.

SG §10-201, et. seq. Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) - Contested Cases.
COMAR 28.02.01.01, et. seq. OAH Rules of Procedure.

SG §9-1601, et. seq. is included inthis Chapter 5. SG §10-201, et. seq. and COMAR 28.02.01, et.
seq. are included in Chapter 6 dealing withthe"contested hearing."
Under the MAPA, thedelegation of matters to the OAH is nota mandatory function, butit is within
the discretion ofthe agency.1

The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) was established in 1989.2 It is presently codified
in the State Government Article, Title 9, Subtitle 16. There is general agreement throughout Maryland

that the system of using administrative law judges toconduct contested hearings has worked well. First
of all, it assures an independent decision maker, with professional training; second, because property and
liberty interests, as wehave seen, have become more numerous and difficult to analyze, expertise inthe
law is crucial; third, because it gives the appearance of fairness to the public whena person is nottried by

the same agency that "charged" him or her, fourth, because the de novo findings of fact which are crucial,
of course, depend upon an administrative law judge's skill in making demeanor- based credibility
determinations of witnesses and evaluations of expert witnesses and, in general, to make logical and

legally defensible evaluations oftherecord; and finally, because the administrative law judge must make
a decision based only on the record.

"When [the agency] delegates the hearing responsibility toan ALJ, the ALJ becomes an extension of
[the agency]. Any responsibilities not expressly given the ALJ remain with [the agency] and, unless
1Regan v. Board ofChiropractic, 120 Md. App. 494, 513, 707 A. 2d 891 (1998) aff'd 355 Md. 397 (1999).
2"The OAH was established by act ofthe General Assembly in 1989 and was codified inthe Md.Code (1984) as title 9,subtitle
16 ofthe State Government article (SG). Anderson v. Dep 'tofPublic Safety, 330 Md. 187, 628 A. 2d 198 (1993).
The OAH statute must be read in tandemwith the contested cases provisions ofthe Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), formerly codified inMd.Code (1957), Art. 41. In 1984 the provisions ofthe APAwere transferred tothe new
StateGovernmentarticle as Title 10, subtitle 2, in revised language but without substantive change. In 1989the APA

was amended to accommodate the provisions ofthe OAH statute. An agency may "delegate to the [OAH] theauthority

that the agency ... has to hear particular contested cases," SG § 10-207(a)(l), and "may delegate to [the OAH] the
authority to issue the final administrative decision ofthe agency inacontested case," SG § 10-207(a)(2).. . .
330 Md. at 191-92.

The PPS Appeal Board delegated its authority toOAH todetermine disputes for final reimbursement amounts from the
Developmental Disabilities Administration (DDA) to service providers in Dept ofHealth v. Chimes, 343 Md. 336, 343, 681 A.
2d. 484 (1996).
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statutorily proscribed, [the agency] reserves the right to review any aspect ofan ALJ decision."3 When
the ALJ files a proposed decision, the agency, the parties may file exceptions to the ALJ's proposed
order. The parties may then file exceptions to the ALJ's proposed order. COMAR § 31.02.02.10. The

agency then makes the final decision.4 When an agency delegates full hearing authority toan ALJ, the
agency has limited its authority to review an ALJ decision.5
Sections within this Chapter 5 are:
A. In General
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B. The Judges
(1) Caseload
(2) Facilities
(3) The Judges
(4) Hearings before"specialized" administrative lawjudges
C. Regulations
D. Representation of Persons before OAH
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74
74
75
76
78

A. In General.

". . . [U]nder the APA, the delegation of matters to the OAH is not a mandatory function, but a

function within the discretion ofthe administrative agency."6 Pursuant to APA §10-205(a)(l), an
administrative agency may delegate its authority to conduct the contested case to the Officeof
Administrative Hearings(OAH) for assignment ofthe matterto an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Delegation to OAH may be to submit: (1) proposed or final findings of fact; (2) proposed or final
conclusions of law; (3) proposed or final findings of fact and conclusions of law; (4) proposed or final
orders or orders under Article 49B [Human Relations Commission] ofthe Code; or (5) the final

administrative decision ofan agency in a contested case.7 Volume-wise, most OAH decisions are final.
3Berkshire Life v. Maryland Insurance Administration, 142 Md. App. 628, 645, 791 A. 2d 942(2002). Judge Guy J. Avery, a

prominent, and now retired ALJwith OAH, comments that although this isthe way thestatute reads, the concept of an extension
ofthe agency can be misinterpreted. Judge Avery's position is that theOAH is notentirely an"extension ofthe agency." He
points out that any communication with theagency byan ALJ would beex parte. He notes that theOAH "responsibilities,"
whether expressly given ornot, are still governed by the contested case provisions ofthe MAPAand generally, where applicable,
the Rulesof Evidence. OAH recognizes privileges, which includes Fifth Amendment claims, anda host of other evidentiary rules
promulgated by thecourts and thelegislature. Hearsay isnotprecluded simply because it is hearsay, and it is uptothe ALJto
determine the reliability of such evidence. If the OAHwere merely an extension ofthe agency, it would, in effect, be ruling
against itself. He points outthat theMAPA also contains a provision that the OAH is bound by "[A]ny agency regulations,
declaratory ruling, prior adjudication, orother settled, preexisting policy." SG §10-214(b). Judge Avery notes that OAHhas
refused to accept some agency policy directives that OAH believes that donot simply elucidate the regulations, but, rather,
amount to regulations themselves, without having been legally adopted. Due process, good findings of fact, and good legal
analysis remain thehallmark of a good decision, despite an agency's defense that the action taken was traditional, orbased on
policy, rather than law. Finally, Judge Avery points outthat the agency must give deference to the demeanor-based findings of
fact made by anALJ.Anderson v. Dep'tofPublic Safety, 330 Md. 187, 213, 627 A. 2d 198 citing General Dynamics v. OSHRC,
599F. 2d 453,463 (1st Cir. 1979). He notesthatthese are some ofthe differences between a"hearing officer" employed by an
agency, and an independent administrative law judge.

Judge Avery hasbeen kind enoughto review many of thesematerials for me. I have inserted his comments in these materials
at various places and tried to attribute his comments to his excellent work product. These comments are the voice of experience,
reflection, observation, and competence. This insight is very much appreciated.

4Berkshire Life v. Maryland Insurance Administration, 142 Md. App. 628, 645, 791 A. 2d 942 (2002).
5Bregunier Masonry v. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App.698, 710-11, 684 A. 2d 6 (1996).
6Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App.494, 511, 513, 707A. 2d 891 (1998). See also: Spencer v. Board of
Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 526, 846 A. 2d 341 (2004).

7Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 52, 805 A. 2d 662(2002).
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Title9, Subtitle 16 ofthe StateGovernment Article contains the law governing the operation and
authority ofthe Office of Administrative Proceedings. OAH applies to "each agency thatemploys or

engages one or more hearing officers to adjudicate contested cases8," except as stated in the statute. The
statute declaresthat OAH is "created as an independent unit in the Executive Branch of State

Government."10 Justhow independent OAH is or should be,and how reflective itsdecisions should be of
the purpose andexpertise of individual agencies is a matter of some dispute.

There is a State Advisory Council on Administrative Hearings.11 The Council consists primarily of
representatives of the agencies, lawyers, and others who have an interest intheOAH. It is advisory only,
dealing with organizational issues and how they can be improved. Needless to say, no individual cases
are considered. The Council provides valuable feedback to the OAH concerning practices and policies
which are working well or need to be improved.

There is a ChiefAdministrative Law Judge. Duties ofthe Chief Judge are set forth in the statute.

These duties include training, classification, continuing education, development of rules of procedure and
development of a code of professional responsibility.
Administrative law judgesare appointed bythe Chief Judge. These judgeshave the authority to issue

subpoenas, administer oath, examine witnesses, compel the production ofdocuments orother things.
Contempt proceedings for failure to comply with the order ofan ALJ are enforced inthe circuit court.
Generally, "an agency may not select orreject a particular administrative law judge for a particular
proceeding. Units of State government are mandated to cooperate with the ChiefJudge in the discharge
of his duties."13 Designation of an ALJ fora contested hearing is bythe ChiefJudge, but if OAH is
"unable to assign anadministrative law judge inresponse to anagency request, theChief Administrative
Law Judge shall designate in writing an individual to serve as an administrative law judge ina
proceeding" ifthe agency consents to assignment and the individual designated meets the qualifications
for an ALJ established bythe office.14
Atthe present time, there are two parts tothe Office ofAdministrative Hearings: (1) operations, and
(2) quality assurance. The quality assurance program keeps the ALJs up on the law and keeps them
appraised ofchanges in the law that affects the work they are required to do. OAH sets aside one day a
month for training and it isthejob for quality assurance to put ona program to keep judges up to date
with law and problems that may occur. This also allows judges the opportunity to get together totalk to
one another about the work they do and problems encountered.

Insertedhere is the whole of Title 9, Subtitle 16ofthe StateGovernmentArticle pertaining to the
Office of Administrative Hearings.

8SG §9-1601(b).

9SG §9-106(b) excepts theGovernor; units ofthe Judicial Branch and Legislative Branch; theComptroller ofthe treasury; the
inmate adjustment hearing officers; thePublic Service Commission; the Workers' Compensation Commission; theParole
Commission; theHealth Services Cost Review Commission; theMaryland Health Care Commission; unemployment insurance
benefit determinations; and employer obligation determinations intheDepartment of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation.
10 SG §9-1602.
11 SG §9-1608.
12 SG §9-1605.
13 SG §9-1606.
14 SG §9-1607.
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THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATUTORY
STATE GOVERNMENT ARTICLE

TITLE 9. Miscellaneous Executive Agencies.
Subtitle 16. Office of Administrative Hearings.

§9-1601. Applicability.
§ 9-1602. Establishment.

§ 9-1603. ChiefAdministrative Law Judge - In general.
§ 9-1604. Same - Powers and duties.
§ 9-1605. Administrative law judges.

§ 9-1606. Cooperation of State government units; audits; selection ofjudges.
§ 9-1607. Designation of administrative lawjudges.
§ 9-1607.1. Representation by person not licensed to practice law.
§ 9-1607.2. Applicability of proceduralregulations.

§9-1608. State Advisory Council onAdministrative Hearings - Establishment; composition; appointment.
§ 9-1609. Same- Terms; compensation; chairman.
§ 9-1610. Same - Powers and duties; meetings.

SG §9-1601. Applicability.

(a) Exceptions.- This subtitledoes not applyto:
(1) the Governor;

(2) any unit ofthe Judicial Branch;
(3) any unit ofthe LegislativeBranch;
(4) the Comptroller ofthe Treasury;
(5) the inmateadjustmenthearing officers;
(6) the Public Service Commission;
(7) the State Workers' Compensation Commission;
(8) the Parole Commission;
(9) the Health Services Cost Review Commission;
(10)the Maryland HealthCare Commission; and

(11) unemployment insurance benefit determinations and employer obligation determinations inthe Department

of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, and appeals from those determinations.

(b) In general.- Except as provided in subsection (a) ofthis section, this subtitle shall apply to each agency that
employs or engages one or more hearing officers to adjudicate contested cases unless the agency has been exempted

by the Governor undersubsection (c) of this section.

(c) Temporary exceptions.- Until July 1, 1994, the Governor may temporarily exempt an agency from this

subtitle.

[1989, ch. 788; 1991, ch. 21, §3; ch. 251; 1992, ch. 22, §§ 1,13; 1993, ch. 30; 1995, ch. 120, §5; 1999, ch. 702, §5.]

SG §9-1602. Establishment.

The Office ofAdministrative Hearings is created asan independent unit intheExecutive Branch of State
government.
[1989, ch. 788.]

SG §9-1603. Chief Administrative Law Judge - In general.

(a) Appointment.- The Office is headed by aChief Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Governor with the

advice and consent ofthe Senate.

(b) Term; other employment- The ChiefAdministrative Law Judge shall:
(1) be appointed for a term of 6 years;
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(2) devote full timeto the dutiesofthe Office; and
(3) be eligible for reappointment.

(c) Salary; qualifications; powers and duties generally.- The Chief Administrative Law Judge shall:
(1) receive the salaryprovidedin the Statebudget;
(2) be admitted to practice law in the State; and
(3) havethe powers and duties specifiedin this subtitle.

(d) Staff.- The ChiefAdministrative Law Judge may employ a staff inaccordance with the State budget.
[1989, ch. 788; 1991, ch. 181.]

SG §9-1604. Same - Powers and duties.

(a) Duties generally.- The ChiefAdministrative Law Judge shall:
(1) supervise the Officeof Administrative Hearings;
(2) establish qualifications for administrative lawjudges;

(3) appoint and remove administrative law judges inaccordance with §9-1605 ofthis subtitle;
(4)assign administrative law judges to conduct hearings in contested cases;

(5) ifnecessary, establish classifications for case assignment on the basis ofsubject matter, expertise, and case

complexity;

(6) establish and implement standard and specialized training programs and provide materials for administrative

law judges;

(7) provide and coordinate continuing education programs and services for administrative law judges, including
research, technical assistance, technical and professional publications, compiling and disseminating information, and
advise of changes in the law relative to their duties;

(8) develop model rules ofprocedure and other guidelines for administrative hearings;
(9) develop a code ofprofessional responsibility for administrative law judges; and
(10) monitor the quality of State administrative hearings.
(b) Powersgenerally; fees.(1) The Chief Administrative Law Judge may:

(i) serve as an administrative lawjudge in a contested case;

(ii) furnish administrative law judges on a contractual basis to other governmental entities;
(iii) accept and expend funds, grants, and gifts and accept services from any public orprivate source;
(iv) enter into agreements and contracts with any public orprivate agencies oreducational institutions;
(v) adopt regulations to implement this subtitle; and
(vi)assess fees to coveradministrative expenses as follows:
1. to file an appeal, a fee not exceeding:

A. $125 for anappeal of a driver's license suspension orrevocation related to a violation ofthe
Maryland Vehicle Law; and
B. $50 for all other types of appeals; and

2. to process a subpoena, a fee not exceeding $5.

(2) Fees charged under paragraph (1) ofthis subsection for administrative expenses may not be charged to:
(i) State agencies; or

(ii) petitioners who are determined by the Office ofAdministrative Hearings to be unable to pay the fees.
(3) Afee charged under paragraph (1) ofthis subsection for filing an appeal shall be refunded toa party who
initiates the appeal ifthe party receives a favorable decision from the administrative law judge.
(c) Reports.-

(1) The Chief Administrative Law Judge shall submit an annual report on the activities ofthe Office tothe

Governor and, subject to § 2-1246 of this article, to the General Assembly.

(2) This report may be prepared in conjunction with the annual report required under §9-1610 ofthis subtitle,
(d) Meetings and conferences with advisory council- The ChiefAdministrative Law Judge shall meet and confer

regularly with the Advisory Council on Administrative Hearings.
[1989, ch. 788; 1992, ch. 134; 1994, ch. 662, §6; 1997, ch. 635, §9; ch. 636, §9; 2004, ch. 430, §4.]

SG §9-1605. Administrative law judges.
(a) Ingeneral- An administrative lawjudge:

(1) shall be a special appointment in the State Personnel Management System;

(2) may be removed, suspended, or demoted by the ChiefAdministrative Law Judge for cause, after notice and

an opportunityto be heard;
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(3) shall receive the compensation provided in the State budget; and

(4) may not perform duties inconsistent with the duties and responsibilities ofan administrative law judge.
(b) Restrictions.- An administrative law judge may not be responsible to orsubject to the supervision ordirection
ofanofficer, employee, or agent engaged inthe performance of investigative, prosecuting, or advisory functions for
an agency.

(c) Powers generally.- Inany contested case conducted by an administrative law judge, the administrative law
judge may:

(1) authorizethe issuance of subpoenas for witnesses;
(2) administer oaths;

(3) examinean individual under oath; and

(4)compel the production of documents or other tangible things.
(d) Refusal to comply with order; to show cause.-

(1) Without good cause, a person may not refuse anorder byany administrative law judge to:
(i) appear for a hearing;
(ii) testify under oath; or

(iii) produce any relevant evidence, including documents orother tangible things.
(2) (i) An administrative law judge may apply, upon affidavit, toany judge ofa circuit court for an order,
returnable innot lessthan2 nor morethan5 days, to show cause why a person should not be committed tojail for
refusal to comply with an order issued under paragraph (1)ofthis subsection.

(ii) On the return ofan order issued under subparagraph (i) ofthis paragraph, ifthe judge hearing the matter
determines that the person is guilty ofrefusal tocomply with the order ofthe administrative law judge, the judge
may commit the offender to jail as in cases of civil contempt.
[1989, ch. 788; 1991, ch. 181; 1993, ch. 22,§ 1; 1997, ch. 743.]

SG §9-1606. Cooperation of State government units; audits; selection of judges.

(a) Cooperation ofState government units.- All units ofState government shall cooperate with the Chief

Administrative Law Judge in the discharge of his duties.

(b) Audits.- The Office shall be subject to audit and examination by the Office ofLegislative Audits ofthe
Department of Legislative Services under § 2-1220 of this article.

(c) Selection ofjudges.- Except as provided in this subtitle orin regulations adopted under this subtitle, an agency
may not select orreject a particular administrative law judge for a particular proceeding.
[1989, ch. 788; 1994, ch. 3, §3; 1995, ch. 3, § 1; 1997, ch. 635, §9; ch. 636, §9.]

SG §9-1607. Designation of administrative law judges.

If theOffice is unable to assign an administrative law judge inresponse to an agency request, the Chief
Administrative Law Judge shall designate inwriting anindividual to serve as anadministrative law judge in a
proceeding before the agency if:

(1) the individual meets the qualifications for an administrative law judge established bythe Office under §9-1604
(a) (2) of this subtitle; and

(2) the agency that employs the individual consents to the assignment.
[1989, ch. 788.]

SG §9-1607.1. Representation by person not licensed to practice law.

(a) Conditions.- An individual who isnot licensed topractice law inthis State may represent a party ina
proceedingbefore the Office if:
(1) authorized by law;
(2) the individual is representing:
(i) a recipient of or applicant for benefits that are:

1. basedon the recipient's or applicant's income andresources; and

2. provided bytheDepartment ofHuman Resources orthe Department of Health and Mental Hygiene;
(ii) a resident of a facility at a proceeding conducted under § 19-344 (q) (4) or § 19-345.1 ofthe Health General Article;

(iii) a health care facility, as defined in § 10-101 ofthe Health - General Article, at a proceeding under the
provisions of§ 10-632 or§ 10-708 ofthe Health - General Article or§3-121 oftheCriminal Procedure Article; or
(iv) a grievant ata proceeding conducted pursuant toTitle 10, Subtitle 2 ofthe Correctional Services Article
concerning a grievance submitted tothe Inmate Grievance Office, provided the representation isnot otherwise
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restricted forreasons of security or expense pursuant to regulations, rules, directives, or policies adopted by the
Division of Correction or Patuxent Institution;

(3) the individual is a designee of a corporation while appearing onits behalf inanadministrative proceeding
held under §27-613 ofthe Insurance Article;

(4) the individual isanofficer ofa corporation, anemployee designated byan officer ofa corporation, a general
partner ina business operated as a partnership oran employee designated by a general partner, oran employee
designated by the owner ofa business operated as a sole proprietorship while the officer, partner, oremployee is
appearing on behalf ofthe corporation, partnership, orbusiness inan administrative hearing held under:
(i) § 8-312 ofthe Business Regulation Article (Home Improvement Commission);
(ii) Title 5 ofthe Labor andEmployment Article (Occupational Safety and Health); or

(iii) regulations adopted pursuant to § 14-303 ofthe State Finance and Procurement Article, concerning the
decertification of a minority business enterprise to conduct business with theDepartment of Transportation;
(5) inthecase of an insurer, the individual is a designee ofthe insurer who:

(i) is employed by the insurer in claims, underwriting, or as otherwise provided by the Commissioner; and
(ii) has been given the authority by the insurer toresolve all issues involved inthe proceeding; or
(6) the individual isrepresenting a unit ofState government, atthe direction ofthe unit of State government.
(b) Business entities.-

(1) An employee designated bya business entity under subsection (a) (3) or(4) ofthis section:
(i) shall provide the Office a power ofattorney sworn to by the employer that certifies that the designated

employee is an authorized agent ofthe business entity and may bind the business entity on matters pending before
the Office; and

(ii)maynot be a disbarred or suspended lawyer in anystate.

(2) Abusiness entity may not contract, hire, or employ another business entity, other than an attorney, to provide
appearance services under subsection (a)(3)or(4) ofthis section.

(3) An employee designated by abusiness entity under subsection (a) (4) ofthis section may not be assigned on a

full-time basis to appear in administrative hearings before the Office onbehalf ofthe business entity.

(c) Right to represent self- This section may not be interpreted to limit the right ofan individual to appear on the
individual's own behalf.

[1993, ch. 59, §1; 1994, ch. 3, §1; 1996, ch. 10, §1; 1997, ch. 70, §4; 1998, ch. 618; 1999, ch. 64; 2001, ch. 10, §12; chs. 35,322., 2006 Ch. 44
§5]

SG §9-1607.2. Applicabilityof procedural regulations.

(a) In general- Subject to subsection (b) ofthis section, regulations adopted in accordance with § 10-206 (a) (1)
ofthis article shall apply toa proceeding before the office, regardless ofwhether the proceeding is subject to Title
10, Subtitle 2 ofthis article (Administrative Procedure Act - Contested Cases).

(b) Conflict- Unless a federal or State law or regulation requires that afederal or State procedure shall be
observed, the regulations specified in subsection (a) ofthis section shall take precedence in the event ofa conflict.
[1993,ch.59,§l]

SG §9-1608. State Advisory Council on Administrative Hearings - Establishment; composition; appointment.
(a) Establishment.- There isa State Advisory Council on Administrative Hearings.
(b) Composition - Number.- The Council consists of 10 members.
(c) Same - Representation.- Ofthe 10Council members:

(1) 1shall bea member ofthe Senate ofMaryland, appointed by the President oftheSenate;
(2) 1shall be a member oftheHouse ofDelegates, appointed by the Speaker oftheHouse;
(3) 1shall be the Attorney General or theAttorney General's designee;

(4) 1shall be a nongovernmental attorney who practices before the Office ofAdministrative Hearings;
(5) 2 shall be secretaries ordesignees from departments involved in the adjudication ofcontested cases;
(6) 2 shall represent theMaryland State BarAssociation; and
(7) 2 shall be from the general public.

(d) Appointment- The Governor shall appoint the members specified in subsection (c) (4) through (7) ofthis
section.

(e) Attorneys.- Ofthe members appointed under subsection (c), not more than 5shall be attorneys who practice

before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
[1989, ch.788; 1995, ch.415; 1999, ch.439.]
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SG §9-1609. Same - Terms; compensation; chairman.
(a) Terms.-

(1) The term of a member ofthe Council is 4 years.

(2) The terms ofthe members arestaggered asrequired bythe terms provided formembers ofthe Council on
January 1, 1990.

(3) A member is eligible to serve more than 1 term.

(b) Compensation and reimbursement ofexpenses.- Amember ofthe Council may not receive compensation, but
is entitled to reimbursement for expenses under the Standard StateTravelRegulations.

(c) Chairman.- The Council shall designate a chairman from among itsmembers.
[1989, ch. 788; 1990, ch. 107.]

SG §9-1610. Same - Powers and duties; meetings.
(a) Powers andduties.- The Councilshall:

(1) advise the ChiefAdministrative Law Judge in carrying outhisduties;

(2) identify issues ofimportance to administrative law judges that should beaddressed by the Chief
Administrative Law Judge;

(3) review issues and problems relating to administrative hearings and the administrative process;
(4) review and comment upon policies and regulations proposed by the Chief Administrative Law Judge;

(5) advise the Governor as tothose agencies for which acontinuing exemption under §9-1601 ofthis subtitle
should be maintained as consistent with the purposes of this subtitle; and

(6) submit an annual report, which may be prepared inconjunction with the report required under §9-1604 of
this subtitle and issubject to §2-1246 ofthis article, tothe Legislative Policy Committee ofthe General Assembly,
including a list ofthe agencies that are exempted from this subtitle under §9-1601 (c) ofthis subtitle and the reasons
for the exemptions.

(b) Meetings.- The Council shall meet ata regular time and place tobe determined by the Council.

[1989, ch. 788; 1991, ch. 55, §6;1993, ch. 30; 1994, ch. 662, §6; 1997, ch. 635, §9;ch. 636, §9.]

The reader should note thatthese statutory sections arelisted here as enacted through the 2006 legislative
session.

B. The Judges (authority, caseload, facilities)15
There were a number of reasons for the creation ofthe Office of Administrative Hearings. One ofthe

primary objections tothe old system was the perception ofunfairness when being "tried" by the same
agency which originally filed the charges and did the investigation. An old story illustrates this
perception. Adriver is stopped in a small town by Officer Phillips; he contests the stop incourt, where
the judge isalso named Phillips; henotices that the prosecutor, too, is named Phillips. The driver begins
to believe he has little chance to prevail in the hearing!

In other words, the negative perception of many litigants was influenced by the factthat employees of
anagency were the ones adjudicating contested cases. It would bedifficult indeed to believe that a
hearing officer would not rule inhis employer's favor, at least inclose cases. Whether ornot such undue
influence was ever exerted, the perception was certainly real.

Forthe most part, the hearing officers were nothighly trained individuals in dueprocess and

litigation procedure asare the ALJs. There was also a need for centralized rules ofprocedure, which
followed the tenants ofdue process and the APA.16
There were a number of reasons for the creation ofthe Office of Administrative Hearings. There was

a perception to many that fair treatment was not given when employees ofan agency were the ones
15 Thestatistics in this section comefrom a seminar given by ChiefJudge Thomas Dewberry at a MICPEL education conference
on November 4, 2004.

16 Judge Guy J. Avery's insight in writing thisintroductory paragraph is very much appreciated.
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adjudicating contested cases. For the most part, the hearing officers were not highlytrained individuals in
due process and litigation procedure as are the ALJs. Therealso was a need for centralized rules of
procedure.

Chief Judge Dewberry is a constant advocatebefore the Legislature that the ALJ salary should be
reflective ofthe enormous responsibility of the judges. He always correctly notes that the work of an ALJ
is important, interesting and challenging
(1) Caseload

In 2003, OAH had a case load of 66,000 cases. Not all these cases went to a hearing. Many ofthese

cases were dropped or resolved priorto a hearing but approximately % ofthe cases were heard. The bulk
ofthe OAH case load consists of Motor Vehicle Administration cases.

Maryland is oneofthe largest central panel states (OAH handling the contested casefunction for
administrative agencies) in the nation. Maryland hasthe broadest jurisdiction in conducting hearings for
State agencies. Other states thathave a central panel do nothave as many agencies who utilize its
services. ThisMaryland Central Panel Agency holds hearings for over30 stateagencies involving over
200 different programs. Maryland and New Jersey spearheaded the movement toward independent
administrative lawjudges, and continue to be leaders inthe field. Approximately 28 states utilize one
form or another ofthe central panel concept.

A number ofagencies delegate full authority to OAH. Since thetime OAH was formed, there is a
growing trend for agencies to delegate final decision authority tothe agency. Not allagencies are
comfortable withthe final authority delegation. The agency decides what kind of authority to giveto
OAH. Insurance Administration cases nowdelegate final authority in all cases. WSSC grants some final
decision making authority.

SG §10-205 provides for the delegation of authority to OAH.
SG §10-205. Delegation of hearing authority.
(a) To whom delegated; limitation.-

(1) Except as provided inparagraph (2) ofthis subsection, a board, commission, oragency head
authorized to conduct a contested case hearing shall:
(i) conduct the hearing; or

(ii)delegate the authority to conduct the contested case hearing to:
1. the Office; or

2. with the priorwritten approval ofthe Chief Administrative Law Judge, a person not
employed by the Office.

(2) Ahearing held in accordance with §4-608(f) or§ 5-610(f) ofthe Business Occupations and
Professions Article may not be delegated to the Office.

(3) With the written approval ofthe Chief Administrative Law Judge, a class ofcontested case hearings
may be delegated as provided in paragraph (l)(ii)2 ofthis subsection.

(4) This subsection isnotintended to restrict the right ofanindividual, expressly authorized bya statute
in effect on October 1, 1993, to conduct a contested case hearing.

(b) Scope ofauthority delegated.- An agency may delegate tothe Office the authority to issue:
(1) proposed or final findings of fact;
(2) proposed or final conclusions of law;

(3) proposed or final findings of factandconclusions of law;
(4)proposed or final orders or orders under Article 49B ofthe Code; or
(5)the final administrative decision of an agency in a contested case.

(c) Procedure upon receipt ofhearing request.- Promptly after receipt ofa request for a contested case
hearing, an agency shall:

(1) notify the parties that the authorized agency head, board, orcommission shall conduct the hearing;
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(2) transmit the request to the Office sothat the Office shall conduct the hearing inaccordance with the
agency's delegation; or

(3) request written approval from the ChiefAdministrative Law Judge to appoint a person not employed
by the Office to conduct the hearing.
(d) Delegationfinal; exception.-

(1) Except asprovided inparagraph (2) ofthis subsection, anagency's delegation and transmittal ofall
or part of a contested case to the Office is final.

(2) If anagency has adopted regulations specifying the criteria and procedures for the revocation of a
delegation ofa contested case, delegation ofauthority to hear all orpart ofa contested case may be
revoked, bythe agency head, board, or commission, inaccordance with the agency's regulations, at any
time prior to the earlier of:

(i) the issuance of a ruling on a substantive issue; or
(ii) the taking of oral testimonyfrom the first witness.
(e) Duties of the Office.(1) The Office shall:
(i) conduct the hearing; and

(ii) except asprovided inparagraph (2) ofthis subsection orasotherwise required bylaw, within 90
days after the completion ofthehearing, complete the procedure authorized in the agency's delegation to
the Office.

(2) The time limit specified inparagraph (1) (ii) ofthis subsection may beextended with the written
approval ofthe ChiefAdministrative LawJudge.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §251A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1991, ch. 181; 1993, ch. 59, § 1;2005 ch. 392.]

Most agencies do not have the time tohandle most ofthe contested cases that come before them.
Some agencies that do not fall under OAH authority. There are substantive reasons for this as well as
political reasons. Governors do not like togive up some authority they have. Some agency work is very
complex demanding the agency conduct the hearings, such as exists with utility law. The average was at
least a good 2 years for the Public Service Commission (PSC) to hear some of its simplest cases.
(2) Facilities

The main OAH facility is located in Hunt Valley, Baltimore County, Maryland. There are 23 different
hearing rooms atthe Hunt Valley location. Only 40% ofcases are heard inHunt Valley. The remainder
are heard at different facilities all over the State. MVA, Inmate Grievance, Forced Medication, DSS food

stamp applications, and Special Education cases are heard all over the State. Anywhere there is State of
Maryland action bya State agency, the OAH may be involved, (i.e. insurance policy renewal;
disciplinary action against nursing license; license suspension for failure to take a DWI test; home
improvement, etc.)
(3) The Judges

In 2004, OAH had 61 judges. Judges are cross trained and OAH does nothave any judgespecially

assigned to a particular area ofadjudication.17 The ChiefAdministrative Law Judge in Maryland
estimates it takes some 9-12 months for a new ALJ to become proficient enough to hear all cases that
comebeforeOAH. Each ALJ is required to take 40 hrs of mediation training. OAH mediates 300 cases a

year, mostly inthe area ofspecialized education contests. An ALJ iscalled upon sometimes to sitas a
settlement judge. When an ALJ is involved as a settlement judge, OAH takes care to make sure the one
conducting the settlement is not the judge assigned to hearthe contested case.

17 This is a matter of some controversy. Some agencies with more involved cases (Board of Physicians, environmental, etc.) have

expressed a preference for a more specialized A1J assignment so these agencies may have the benefit ofcontinued and
concentratedexpertise by an ALJ in a particular area.
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The ChiefAdministrative Law Judge in Maryland estimates it takes some 9-12 months for a new ALJ

to become proficient enough to hear all cases that come before OAH. In addition, each ALJ isrequired
to take 40 hrs of mediation training. OAH mediates some

300 cases a year, mostly inthe areaof specialized education conflicts. At times, an ALJis called upon to
sit as a settlement judge, as well. Thejudges must rule on motions and discovery requests, and, to a
certain extent, perform those functions associated with Circuit Courtjudges.

An ALJ is required to: (1) conduct a full, fair and impartial hearing; (2)avoid unnecessary delay in
disposition; (3) maintain order in the proceeding; and (4) "modify orwaive, reasonably, time periods" as
permitted by law.18

The ALJ isrequired to regulate the course ofa hearing, and the conduct ofthe participants inthat
hearing. He/She has authority to:
1.

Administer oaths and affirmations;

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Issuesubpoenas for witnesses andthe production of evidence;
Rule upon offers of proofandreceive relevant and material evidence;
Considerand rule upon motions in accordance withthis chapter;
Examine witnesses and call witnesses as necessary to insure a full and complete record;
Limit unduly repetitious testimony and reasonably limit thetime for presentations;

7. Grant a continuance or postponement;

8. Request parties to submit legal memoranda, proposed findings offact, and conclusions oflaw;
9. Make proposed or final decisions and take any other appropriate action authorized bylaw;
10. Issue orders as are necessary to secure procedural simplicity and administrative fairness, andto
eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay;

11. Conduct the hearing in a manner suited to ascertain the facts and safeguard the rights ofthe
parties to the hearing; and

12. Impose appropriate sanctions for failure to abide by this chapter or any lawful order ofthe
judge.19
(4). Hearings before "specialized" administrative law judges.

Specialized judges, such asrequested by the Board ofPhysicians and the Department ofthe
Environment, would make no difference in these or any other cases, in the opinion of OAH. It is the

position ofOAH: (First) ofall, in a proposed decision (which is the authority they designated tothe
OAH), the agency still has the last word, though having the last word may notbe in2006 what iswas
years ago. Case law has required that deference be given tothe ALJ's demeanor-based findings offact.
(Second), the ALJ's decision is now part oftherecord in the case. Thus, if an agency's decision departs
significantly from that ofthe ALJ, the agency must furnish some justification. If itdoes not, then itcould
be attacked as arbitrary and capricious. So-called specialists inthese areas would still be required to
consider only the record before them. Naturally, the expertise ofa Board or Department may becrucial to
the decision, butthat expertise mustbe made part ofthe record andnot simply resorted to because an
agency does not agree withthe ALJ's proposed decision.

Agencies have great expertise inthe area which they cover, but little orno expertise in making
findings offact, conclusions of law and sticking tothe record. It is only natural that a board member,

18 COMAR 28.02.01.08 A.
19 COMAR 28.02.01.08 B.
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with years ofexperience in his orher field, might substitute his or her opinion, perhaps not even realizing
it, instead of coming to a decision based solely on the record.

Boards and agencies urging the use ofjudges concentrating in particular areas ofthe law feel that

specialization by ALJ's is needed to facilitate and enhance the reliability ofdeterminations made during
the process. It isto be noted that the Maryland State Court system puts employs an assignment system so
that judges specialize in family law and business and technology law.
C. Regulations.

Regulations are required to be adopted by OAH in accord with SG §10-206(a)(l). These regulations are
"to govern the procedures and practice in all contested cases delegated to" OAH. OAH procedures take
precedence in the event ofaconflict in procedure with aparticular agency, unless a federal or state law
requires aspecific procedure be observed.21 Administrative agencies may also "adopt regulations to

govern procedures."22 Regulations may include procedures for expedited hearings,23 and for prehearing

procedures.24 Supplemental explanatory materials, including forms and instructions may be developed by

OAH through regulations.25 Regulations adopted by OAH shall apply toa proceeding before OAH
regardless ofwhether the proceeding is subject to SG §10-201, et. seq., unless federal or state law
requires a specific regulatory procedure.

COMAR Title 28 contain the OAH regulations. "The Rules of Procedure codified at COMAR

28.02.01 govern all hearings conducted by the OAH and serve to supplement the procedures required by
statute."27 Three separate subtitles are included in Title 28. Only Subtitle 2, dealing with the Rules of
Procedure for practice before OAH, are discussed in any detail in these materials. There are three separate
subtitles to COMAR Title 28.

TITLE 28. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
SUBTITLE 01. Administration
SUBTITLE 02. Rules of Procedure
SUBTITLE 03. Fees

Subtitle 01 contains administration provisions applicable to OAH. There are provisions for:

employee grievances; family relations policy; the removal, suspension, or demotion ofan ALJ; Public
Information Act requests; and a provision for the correction oramendment of personal records.
20 There isa difference ofopinion on the necessity and/or desirability forjudges who specialize indifferent areas. This position
ofOAH issubmitted byAdministrative Law Judge Guy J. Avery and reflects the consistent position ofOAH.
21 SG§10-206(a). COMAR 28.02.01.01C. & D.

22 SG §10-206(b). Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 805 A. 2d 662 (2002) iscited for this proposition and gives as an

example the Maryland Insurance Administration, which Agency has promulgated regulations in COMAR 31.02.02 governing

how a contested case hearing istobeconducted by the OAH. Insurance Commissioner control over delegated cases isretained.
371 Md. at 53. Likewise, the State Retirement and Pension System ofMaryland is required by controlling statute to adopt

regulations governing procedures under the MAPA. State Ret &Pension Sys. v. Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 63-64, 792 A.2d 277
(2002).

23SG§10-206(c).
24SG§10-206(d).
25SG§10-206(e).
26 SG §9-1607.2.
27 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 52, 805A. 2d 662(2002).
28 The Sections within this Subtitle are:
SUBTITLE 01.

ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER 01.

Family Relations Policy

CHAPTER 02.
CHAPTER 03.

Employee GrievanceProcedures - Repealed
Administrative Law JudgeRemoval, Suspension, or Demotion for Cause Charges
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COMAR 28:01.04, dealing with Public Information Act requests, will be dealtwith in Chapter 6. The
Contested Case,E ,where discovery is discussed. Otherwise, individuals who have an interestin any of
this section material should carefully examine the COMAR regulations.
Subtitle 2 of Title 28 deals with the OAH Rules of Procedure. No attorney can effectively practice

before OAH without knowledge of theserules. These Rules of Procedure will be examined in Chapter 6

(The Contested Case). A copy ofthe Maryland statutes dealing with OAH and theOAH Rules of
Procedure are attached to Chapter 6 as an Appendix B and Appendix C.
The sections within Subtitle 2 are:

SUBTITLE 02. RULES OF PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 01. RULES OF PROCEDURE29
COMAR 28.02.01.01 Scope.
COMAR 28.02.01.02 Definitions.

COMAR 28.02.01.03 Initial Pleading; Commencement of Case.
COMAR 28.02.01.04 Transmittal of Request for Hearing.
COMAR 28.02.01.05 Notice of Hearing.
COMAR 28.02.01.06 Expedited Hearings.
COMAR 28.02.01.07 Venue.

COMAR 28.02.01.08 Powers and Duties of Judges.

COMAR 28.02.01.09 Appearance of Parties at Hearings; Representation.
COMAR28.02.01.10 Discovery.
COMAR28.02.01.il Subpoenas.
COMAR 28.02.01.12 Intervention.

COMAR 28.02.01.13 Prehearing Conferences.
COMAR 28.02.01.14 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).
COMAR 28.02.01.15 Stipulations and Affidavits.

COMAR 28.02.01.16 Motions.30
COMAR 28.02.01.17 Conduct of Hearings.
COMAR 28.02.01.18 Evidence.

COMAR 28.02.01.19 Appointment of Interpreter.
COMAR 28.02.01.20 Failure to Attend or Participate in a Hearing, Conference, or Other
CHAPTER 04.
CHAPTER 05.

Public Information Act Requests
Correction or Amendment of Personal Records.

29 Chapter 1isthe only chapter inthis subtitle. As of 1/3/2009 this part ofCOMAR states that the authority to pass these
regulations isfound in SG §9-1604(b)(l)(v). It lists the last amendment as having occurred on January 7, 1994 referencing 20.25
Md. R. 1950

30 "The Maryland Insurance Administration ('MIA') revoked Allan J. Culver's Insurance producer's license." Culver v.
Insurance Commissioner, 175 Md. App.645, 647, 931 A. 2d537 (2007). "Anyone selling insurance in Maryland mustbe
licensed as an insurance producer by the MIA." 175 Md. App. at 648. Culver was disbarred from thepractice of law inMaryland

effective May 13, 2007. When the MIA revoked Culver's insurance producer's license heasked for acontested hearing and the
MIA moved for summary disposition ofthe matter. 175 Md. App. at 649. One ofthe grounds for revocation of alicense inINS.
§10-126 (a)(13) "has otherwise shown alack oftrustworthiness or incompetence to act as an insurance producer." 175 Md. App.
at651. Collateral estoppels was discussed by the Court with a focus on offensive nonmutual collateral estoppels. 175 Md. App.
at 654-55. "A summary decisions, such as the one inthis case, isauthorized by COMAR 28.02.01.16D. Theevidence that
appellant desired to put forth would have constituted nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the findings made in the
disbarment actions. As stated above, principles of collateral estoppels barred appellant from relitigating those issues. Because

appellant could not challenge the findings made in the disbarment actions, there were no material facts at issue. Therefore, his
case was disposed of appropriately bysummary decision." 175 Md. App. at 659. The MIA did not exceed its statutory authority
by revoking Culver's license on the basis of"attorney misconduct or the sanction ofdisbarment." BR §9A310 is applicable to
the denial of a license in Maryland. 175 Md. App. at 659-61.
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Proceeding; Default.50)
COMAR 28.02.01.21 Proceedings Open to the Public.
COMAR 28.02.01.22 Decision or Proposed Decision.
COMAR 28.02.01.23 the Record.
COMAR 28.02.01.24 Service.

COMAR 28.02.01.25 Postponements.
COMAR 28.02.01.26 Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution.
COMAR 28.02.01.27 Cases Remanded to the Office.
COMAR 28.02.01.28 Reconsideration and Revision.

Finally, there is Subtitle 03 of COMAR Title 28. That Subtitle pertains to the fees charged byOAH,
the waiver of thosefees, etc. Someprovisions of this Subtitle will be dealtwith in Chapter 6. The
Contested Case.31

D. Representation of Individuals Before OAH.

Representatives ofindividuals who appear before the OAH are not always required tobe admitted tothe
practice oflaw. There are provisions in Maryland law allowing non-attorneys torepresent individuals
who seek services such as those provided bytheDepartment of Human resources, the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene, a grievant; corporate designees in some insurance article proceedings;

officers oremployees ofcorporations or partnerships before the Home Improvement Commission,
MOSH, etc. Individuals who are not attorneys and who desire to represent others before the OAH must
consult the provisions of SG §9-1607.1 to determine their eligibility.

Aparty may represent himselfTherself ata hearing and may be represented byan attorney. Incertain
cases the partymay be represented by an individual who is not an attorney.

Aperson may represent himself/herself before an administrative agency.33 Entities such as
corporations and partnerships cannot berepresented by anofficer, director, employee or member without
specific statutory authorization allowing that representation. Attorneys may represent an individual or
entity. In specified situations, individuals other than attorneys may appear ina representative capacity.
Without specific statutory authorization to represent another individual, an individual, other than an
attorney, is committing a crime by practicing law without being admitted to the Bar.

31 The provisions in this Subtitle are:
SUBTITLE 03. FEES
CHAPTER 01. FEES

Comar 28.03.01.01 Scope.
Comar 28.03.01.02 Definitions.

Comar 28.03.01.03 Payment of Filing Fee.

Comar 28.03.01.04 Payment of Subpoena Processing Fee.
Comar 28.03.01.05 Assessment of Penalty for Insufficient Checks.
Comar 28.03.01.06 Waiver of Fees.

Comar 28.03.01.07 Penalty for Failure to Pay Fees.
Comar 28.03.01.08 Refund of Filing Fee.
32 COMAR 28.02.01.09 A & B.

33 SG §9-1607.1(c). See 2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law §326.
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1. Attorneys,

Asa general rule, there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel in an administrative
proceeding.34 Both the Federal APA and Maryland's APA (MAPA) permit anindividual to be

represented by counsel at the expense ofa party.35 MAPA provides that an agency may not:
1. grant the right to practice law to an individual who is notauthorized to practice law;
2. interfere with the right of a lawyer to practice before an agency or OAH; or

3. prohibit anyparty from being advised or represented at the party's ownexpense by an attorney

or, ifpermitted by law, other representative.36
There is a very limited legal requirement thatthe State of Maryland furnish publicly provided legal

services in any agency orOAH proceeding.37 For instance, individuals proposed for involuntary
commitment to a mental institution have the right to a Public Defender during the administrative

hearing.38

Only attorneys authorized to practice law inMaryland may appear in representation of an individual

or entity. Attorneys from otherjurisdictions are properly referred to the provisions ofrule 14,39 Special
Admission of Out-of-State Attorneys, which mustbe satisfied before an attorney can practice before a

Maryland court or an administrative body.40
2. Representation by non-Attorneys before OAH.
Under stated circumstances, there is a right of individuals, not admittedto the practice of law, to

represent individuals before the OAH.41 As stated above, a party may represent himself/herself before
OAH.42 An individual who is not licensed to practice law in Maryland may representa party in an OAH
hearing if that individual is authorized by law to represent:

34 2 Am Jur2d Administrative Law §321.

35 2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law §322 citing 5 U.S.C.A. §555(b) and the Model State Administrative Procedure Act §4203(b).

36 SG §10-206.1(a). In federal law, an agency may discipline or disbar individuals who appear before the agency. 2 Am Jur 2d
§325. No Maryland caselaw has yet been developedon this issue.

37 SG §10-206.1(b). To like effect see 2 Am Jur 2dAdministrative Law §322. Am Jur points outthat a party's statutory right to
counsel (as opposed to aconstitutional right) issafeguarded when the agency advises the party ofthe right and gives aparty alist
of free and inexpensive legal services inthe area, and postpones the hearing to allow timeto secure representation.
38 Judge Guy J. Avery has pointed outthis requirement of representation to me. The further development of these materials will
allow me to givemoreinformation on this aspect of legal representation inthe future.

39 Practically what this means isthat an attorney licensed inanother state, may practice before an administrative agency, butnot
until that attorney complies withthe procedures which require filing in acircuit court the amotion for admission and having an
ordersigned allowing that admission.

40 The practice of law isregulated inMaryland by the Judicial Branch of Maryland Government, and through Title 10 BOP
entitled, "Lawyers." This statutory scheme is properly referred to as the "Maryland Lawyers Act." Within BOP Title 10 are
provisions for admission tothe Maryland Bar, the establishment and maintenance ofthe client Protection Fund, and
miscellaneous provisions such as a statute onattorneys' liens. The unauthorized practice of law is acrime. Monetary penalties
and imprisonment may beimposed upon conviction. The Office ofthe Attorney General is authorized to investigate the alleged
commission of that crime. BOP §§ 10-404; 10-601 through 10-606.

Title 16, Chapter 700 ofthe Maryland Rules of Procedure contain provisions for disciplining attorneys. An Appendix tothe
Maryland rules contains the"Rules of Professional Conduct," binding onmembers ofthe Maryland Bar. There is also within the
Maryland Rules a section governing admissionbefore the bar.

41 SG §9-1607.1. 2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law §323 points outthat nothing inthe federal APA prohibits anon-attorney or
non-CPA(tax matters) from representing anindividual before an agency if permitted by agency rule.
42 SG §9-1607.1(c).

79

1. an individual who is a recipient or applicant for benefits, basedon the applicant's income,

provided by the Department ofHuman Resources orthe Department of Health and/or Mental
Hygiene43;
2. an individual who is a resident of a facility [comprehensive care facility or an extended care

facility]44 seeking compliance byor for a resident for statutory required services to be provided to
a resident ofthefacility [under HG §19-34345], who may be represented by next ofkin, a
guardian or the Department of aging;

3. a mental health care facility46 in an: (1) involuntary admissions proceeding;47 (2) a proceeding
when an individual refuses to take medication;48 or (3)when there are allegations of a violation of
the conditional release of an individual committedto the Department of Health and Mental

Hygiene after having been found not criminal responsible.49 The facility itself, however, must be
represented by counsel if it is a corporation.

4. one involved in a hearing where notice is given bya facility to a resident thathe/she will be

discharged ortransferred [under HG §19-345.1], which law requires notice tothe resident ofthe
right to consult with an attorney and the availability of"the services oftheLegal Aid Bureau, the
Older American Act Senior Legal Assistance Programs, andother agencies that may provide
assistance to individuals who need legal counsel, and also the availability ofthe Department of

Aging and local Office on Aging Long-term Care Ombudsman toassist the resident. Because the
notice of transfer or discharge must also be given to the next of kin, guardian, or anyother
individual knownto have acted as the individual's representative, it is a fair assumption that the
individual may also berepresented at a hearing byany ofthese individuals, to whom notice is
given.50
5. an individual in a hearing concerning an emergency evaluation [HG §10-622], which statute
authorizes any individual to appear before a court iftheperson has reason to believe that the

individual has a mental condition and presents a danger to himselforothers.51 The statute
authorizes a physician, psychologist, health officer or designee of a health officer or a peace
officer and an individual informed ofthe facts leading to the filing ofthe petitionto participate in
the court hearing and presumably in a follow up administrative proceeding;

6. an individual involved in a hearing where an institution is seeking to compel the administration of
medication [HG §10-708];
43 SG §9-1607.1(a)
44HG§19-343(a).

45 Requirements bythe statute include application to the facility, charges beyond medical assistance allowance, distribution from
funds belonging toaresident, providing statements relating toservices and charges, the resident's participation inplanning for
his/her care, confidential information requirements, communication between theresident and others, visitors, personal effects of
the residence, privacy issues, the right to file a grievance, etc.

46 Defined by HG §10-101(e) to mean "any public orprivate clinic, hospital, orother institution that provides orpurports to
provide treatment orother services for individuals whohave mental disorders."
47 HG §10-632.
48 HG §10-708 dealing with the rights of mentally ill individuals in mental facilities.
49 Crim.Proc. §3-121.

50 HG §19-345.1(b)(4)-(6). Note that HO §10-622 isconcerned with witnesses atahearing and it provides that when an
individual isthe subject of ahearing concerning an emergency evaluation, individuals may appear before acourt if the person has

reason to believe that the alleged disabled has amental condition and presents adanger to himself or others50 The statute

authorizes aphysician, psychologist, health officer or designee ofahealth officer or apeace officer and an individual informed of
the facts leading tothe filing ofthe petition to participate inthe court hearing and presumably in a follow upin the administrative
proceeding.
51 HG §§10-622-10-626.
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7. an inmate submitting a grievance to the Inmate Grievance Office [Title 10, subtitle 2 ofthe
Correctional Services article], "provided the representation is not otherwise restricted for reasons
of security orexpense pursuant to regulations, rules, directives, or policies adopted by the
Division of Correction or Patuxent Institution;"

8. the designee of acorporation under Ins. §27-605 concerning cancellations, nonrenewals, premium
increases or reductions in insurance coverage;

9. the individual is an officer of a corporation orthe designee of an officer, a general partner in a

partnership or the designee of a general partner, or an employee designed by the owner of a
business operated asa sole proprietorship in an hearing: (a) before the Home Improvement
Commission [BR §8-312]; (b) under the Occupational Safety and Health provisions ofthe

Maryland Code [LE, Title 5]; or (c) pursuant toregulations adopted bythe Board of Public
Works [SFP §14-303] for minority business preference participation in state contracts;

10. the designee of an insurer employed inclaims, underwriting, or as otherwise provided by the
Commissioner whois given authority by theinsurer to resolve all issues involved in the
proceeding;

11. an individual representing a unitof State government atthe direction of that unit;

When abusiness entity designated an employee representative, the designation isto beby way of a

power ofattorney sworn tobythe employer "that certifies that the designated employs is an authorized
agent ofthebusiness entity and may bind the business entity on matters pending before" OAH. The
individual may not be an attorney suspended or disbarred in any state.53 Also a"business entity may not
contract, hire, or employee another business entity, other than an attorney, to provide appearance services.
,"54 No business designated employee may beassigned ona full timebasis to appear in administrative
hearings before" OAH.55
COMAR 28.02.01.09C allows OAH to accept any properly executed powerof attorney meetingthe

requirements of SG §9-1607.1 to represent an individual or entity. OAH has the right to provide a form
power of attorney and to allow the power of attorney tobe kept on file at OAH. ALJ's are tobe provided
with apower of attorney allowing representation at the outset of any hearing. An appearance shall be
entered by the representative and that representative "shall becopied on all notices, pleadings and other
correspondence."

52 Title 27 ofthe Ins. Code is titled "Unfair Trade Practices and Other Prohibited Practices."

53 SG §9-1607.1(b).
54 Id.
55 Id.
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"When a proceeding meets the definition of a 'contested case' the agency must provide trial type
procedures. The MAPA 'itself does not grant a right to a hearing. The right must come from another

source such as a statute, aregulation, or due process principles.'"1
OAHhas promulgated its own rules or procedure for the conduct of contested cases. These rules are
to be found in COMAR 28.02.01, et. seq. As stated in Chapter 3 of this book, most agencies have the

right to utilize the services of OAH to conduct acontested hearing, and to have an ALJmake either a

proposed finding or final decision on an issue.2 Some agencies have promulgated their own rules of
procedure. In some places, the Maryland Code mandates that contested cases be heard and decided (final
decision) by OAH.3
This Chapter 6 is divided into the following sections:
A. What is a Contested Case?

85

(1) Agencies toWhich the MAPA isapplicable
(2) The Definition of aContested Case
B.Notice of Charges
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C. Notice of a Hearing
(1) Generally
(2) OAH
D. Motions and Other Prehearing Matters
(1) Prehearing Conferences
(2) Motions Practice
E. Discovery
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(2) Opening
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1North v. KentIslandLimitedPartnership, 106Md. App. 92, 103, 664 A. 2d 34 (1995).
2SG §10-205.
3For example:
Cor. §10-207(inmate grievance actions)
Ed. §5-203 (retirement contributions to local school systems)
Ed. §8-307 (admission to the schools for the deaf and blindO
Ed. §8-413 (special education cases)

FL §5-525 (foster care out-of-home placements)
FL §5-706.1 (neglect and abuse of children)
FL §10.119.3 (suspension of occupational licenses for childsupport arrearages)
P&P §5-310 (State whistle blower cases)
Art. 49B (Human Relations Commission hearings)
Art. 27, §255C (Washington County Gaming Commission)
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j. The Requirement of an Oath
(4) The Right to Present Evidence and Cross-Examine
(5) Privileges
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(2) Generally
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State Government (SG)
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§10-201. Declaration of policy.
§10-202. Definitions.
§10-203. Scope of subtitle.

§10-204. Political subdivisions and instrumentalities.
§10-205. Delegation of hearing authority.
§10-206. Procedural regulations.
§10-206.1. Legal practice.
§10-207. Notice of agency action.
§10-208. Notice of hearing.
§10-209. Notice mailed to address of licensee.
§10-210. Dispositions.
§10-211. Hearings conducted by electronic means.
§10-212. Open hearings.
§10-212.1. Interpreters.
§10-213. Evidence.

§10-214. Consideration of other evidence.
§10-215. Transcription of proceedings.
§10-216. Exceptions.
§10-217. Proof.

§10-218. Contents of record.
§10-219. Ex parte communications.
§10-220. Proposed decisions and orders.
§10-221. Final decisions and orders.
§10-222. Judicial review.
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§10-222.1. Administrative orders.
§10-223. Appeals to Court of Special Appeals.

§10-224. Litigation expenses for smallbusinesses and nonprofit organizations.
§10-225. Suspension of provisions.
§10-226. Licenses - Special provisions.

J. COMAR Regulations. The Office of Administrative Hearings Regulations. Rules of Procedure... 138
SUBTITLE 02.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 01.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

COMAR 28.02.01.01 Scope.
COMAR 28.02.01.02 Definitions.

COMAR 28.02.01.03
COMAR 28.02.01.04
COMAR 28.02.01.05
COMAR 28.02.01.06

Initial Pleading; Commencement of Case.
Transmittal of Request for Hearing.
Notice of Hearing.
Expedited Hearings.

COMAR 28.02.01.07 Venue.

COMAR 28.02.01.08 Powers and Duties of Judges.

COMAR 28.02.01.09 Appearance of Parties at Hearings; Representation.
COMAR 28.02.01.10 Discovery.
COMAR 28.02.01.11 Subpoenas.
COMAR 28.02.01.12 Intervention.

COMAR 28.02.01.13 Prehearing Conferences.
COMAR 28.02.01.14 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).
COMAR 28.02.01.15 Stipulations and Affidavits.
COMAR 28.02.01.16 Motions.

COMAR 28.02.01.17 Conduct of Hearings.
COMAR 28.02.01.18 Evidence.

COMAR 28.02.01.19 Appointment of Interpreter.

COMAR28.02.01.20 Failure to Attend or Participate in a Hearing, Conference, or Other Proceeding; Default.
COMAR 28.02.01.21 Proceedings Open to the Public.
COMAR 28.02.01.22 Decision or Proposed Decision.
COMAR 28.02.01.23 the Record.
COMAR 28.02.01.24 Service.

COMAR 28.02.01.25 Postponements.
COMAR 28.02.01.26 Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution.
COMAR 28.02.01.27 Cases Remanded to the Office.
COMAR 28.02.01.28 Reconsideration and Revision.

A. What is a Contested Case?

The MAPA is not applicable to all administrative hearings before all agencies ofthe State of Maryland.
A statute (SG §10-203) delineates what is covered by the MAPA, and what is not covered. Case law has
addressed disputes as to whether a particular agency proceeding is governed by the MAPA. Even if the
agency is within the ambit ofthe statutory direction that the MAPA governs its actions, a particular issue
before that agency may fall within the definition of a contested case.
There are time limits within which a contested hearing must be sought. In Prince George's County

DSSv. Knight, 158 Md. App. 130, 854 A. 2d 907 (2004),Telania Knight had 60 days after receiving
notice of an indicated abuse finding against her child to request a contested case hearing pursuant to FL

§5-706.1(b). The dispute as to whether issuance ofthe notice or receipt ofthe notice triggered the 60 day
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period was the subject to dictionary definition reference and statutory construction. Knight, 158 Md. App.
at 138-39.4

(1) Agencies to Which the MAPA is applicable
It is legislative policythat statutory procedures are enacted to:

(1) "ensure the right ofall persons to be treated in a fair and unbiased manner in their efforts to resolve
disputes inadministrative proceedings governed bythis subtitle; and

(2) promote prompt, effective, and efficient government."5
Generally, all agencies ofState Government are governed by Subtitle 2 (contested cases) ofTitle 10
(governmental procedures), unless excluded.

Throughout Subtitle 2 there are references toan "agency," and "agency," which isdefined to mean
1. "anofficer or unit of [Maryland] State government authorized by law to adjudicate contested
cases," or

2. "a unit that is created by general law; operates inat least 2 counties; andis authorized by law to

adjudicate contested cases.6
By specific statutory provision (SG §10-203), the MAPA does not apply to:
1. the Legislative or Judicial Branch of Maryland State Government, or
2. Executive Branch functions concerning:
A. the Governor;

B. the State Department of Assessments and Taxation;
C. many proceedings before the Insurance Administration;
D. the Injured Workers' Insurance fund;
E. the Maryland Parole Commission;
F.

the Public Service Commission;

G. the Maryland Tax Court;

H. the Worker's Compensation Commission;
I. the Maryland AutomobileInsurance fund;
J.

the Patuxent Institution Board of Review when acting on a parole request;

K. an officer or unitnot partof a principal department of State government created pursuant
to the Maryland Constitution or general or local law that operates in only 1 county and is
subject to thecontrol ofa local government orisfunded wholly or partly from local
funds;

L. Unemployment insurance claim determinations, taxdeterminations, and appeals inthe
Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation except as specifically provided in
Subtitle 5 ofTitle 8 in the Labor and Employment Article;8
M. propertytax assessment appeals boards;
4In this opinion, Judge Bloom detailed the responsibility of health practitioners, police and others toreport children subjected to
abuse, Knight, 158 Md. at 133, and the provisions of FL §5-706 requiring investigation by DSS and notice to an individual before
a name can be puton a central registry as anabuser. Knight, 158 Md. App. at 134.
5SG §10-201.
6SG§10-202(b).

7SG §10-203 states that this exclusion applies to"the Insurance Administration except as specifically provided inthe Insurance
Article."

8Subtitle deals with Board of Appeals of Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation. Within the provisions ofthis Subtitle
are references to ex parte communications, records, etc., whereby the provisions ofthe MAPAdo apply.
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N. requests for correction of certificates of death under HG §5-310(d)(2) pertaining to the
Office ofthe Chief Medical Examiner;

O. contestedcases arising from the Stateprogram administered by the Montgomery County
Department of Human Services in the same manner asthe Subtitle applies to a county
healthdepartment of local department of social services; and
P. any other entity otherwise expressly exemptedby statute.

When a public hearing is required or provided for by statute orregulation before anagency takes a

particular action, that agency isnot an agency as defined in the MAPA unless: (1) the statute orregulation
expressly requires that the public hearing be held in accordance with this Subtitle 2 oftitle 10 ofthe State
Government Article, or (2) expressly requires thatany judicial review ofthe agency determination
following thepublic hearing be conducted in accordance with this Subtitle 2.
Significant Case Decisions

Sometimes thegrievance right to a contested hearing may betrumped by anotherprocess

Walker v. Dept ofHuman Resources, 379 Md. 407, 842 A.2d 53 (2004) resulted ina holding that while
Title 12 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (SPP) sets forth a grievance procedure for most

Executive Branch State employees, thegrievance procedure was notavailable to employee ofthe Baltimore

City Department ofSocial Services, a unit ofthe State Department ofHuman Resources. 379 Md. at409.
Reviewing SPP §10-102, et. seq. and the grievance procedure, Judge Wilner focused ona 1999 enactment

by the General Assembly establishing limited collective bargaining rights for State Executive Branch
employees. 379 Md. at411. Walker and other employees were covered bya Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) entered into bythe State and Council 92ofthe American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and that meant this particular grievance (a complaint
against a supervisor who was alleged tohave caused many problems inthe working environment) was
covered bythe provisions ofthe MOU. Analyzing the grievance, the MOU and the SPP statutes, Judge
Wilner entered into a statutory construction to resolve the dispute of who was to resolve thegrievance. 379
Md. at 419-23.

The mere existence of an MOU does not, therefore, deprive an employee ofthe statutory

grievance procedure. Art. 30, § 1clearly precludes parallel and alternative procedures for
resolving disputes andcarefully delineates when each ofthe twoprocedures is exclusively
applicable. If thedispute falls within the ambit ofthe title 12 grievance procedure, the MOU
procedure isnot available; the employee has only the title 12 procedure. The exclusivity ofthe
MOU procedure comes into play only when (1)thebasis ofthe dispute arises solely from a
provision ofan MOU, (2) the dispute concerns the interpretation orapplication ofthe MOU, and
(3)thedispute no longer falls (orperhaps never fell) within thedefinition of a grievance for
purposes oftitle 12. We affirm the judgment ofthe Circuit Court because that isthe case here.
379 Md. at 423.

(2) The Definition of a Contested Case

"When a proceeding meets the definition of a 'contested case' the agency must provide trial type

procedures. The MAPA 'itselfdoes not grant a right to a hearing. The right must come from another
source such as a statute, a regulation, or due process principles.'"9 ". . . M[A] 'judicial' or'trial-type'
hearing is not a requirement of procedural due process where anadministrative agency does not actina
quasi-judicial capacity and the facts to be determined are 'legislative' rather than adjudicative innature."
"Itis the nature ofthe dispute, rather than the stage ofthe proceedings, thatdetermines whether or nota
9North v. Kent Island Limited Partnership, 106 Md. App. 92, 103, 664 A. 2d34(1995) quoting SugarloafCitizens Ass'n v.
Northeast Md. Waste DisposalAuth., 323 Md. 641, 652, 594 A.2d 1115 (1991).
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matter is a contested case."10 Under"the APA, a dispute resolved priorto a formal hearing may,

nonetheless, be a contested case."11
The MPHA (SG §202) defines a "contested case." This statute, along with case law, tells us what a
"contested case" is and what it is not.

A "contested case" is a proceeding before an agency to determine:

1. a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege ofa person that is required by statute or
constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing; or

2. the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, oramendment of a license that isrequired by
statute or constitution to be determinedonly after an opportunityfor an agency hearing.

A "contested case" does not include:

1. a proceeding before an agency involving an agency hearing required only by regulation unless the
regulation expressly, or by clear implication, requires the hearing to beheld inaccordance with
this subtitle,

2. Any proceeding before a person, body oragency excluded from the provisions oftheMAPA by
SG §10-203.

"It is well settled that a party is entitled to a quasi-judicial hearing before an administrative agency
only ifthat type ofhearing is required bystatute orregulation or mandated byconstitutional due process
concerns."14 ". . . [T]the General Assembly, in providing forjudicial review of actions by administrative
agencies, may not confer upon the courts the ability toreview quasi-legislative decisions by substitution

ofthe court's judgment, as to the wisdom ofthe administrative action, for that ofthe agency."15 For

example, the authority ofthe Maryland Insurance Administration to approve rates and forms is a quasilegislative function, not subject to an adjudicatory process that would require a quasi-judicial hearing.
Case lawdetermining whether a proceeding comes within the "contested case"provisions ofthe
MAPA focuses on the nature ofthe dispute andwhether that dispute entitles the parties to a hearing to
10 Weiner v. Maryland Insurance Adm., 337 Md. 181, 193-94, 652 A. 2d 125 (1995) citing Montgomery County v. Woodward &
Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 711-12, 376 A.2d 483,497 (1977) ("it isthe nature ofthe decision's fact-finding process, not the
ultimate effectofthe decision, that determines the party's right to an adjudicatory hearing"); SugarloafCitizens Ass'n v. Northeast

Md. Waste Disposal Auth, 323 Md. 670, 594 A.2d 1115 (1991); and Modular Closet Sys., Inc. v. Comptroller ofthe Treasury,
315 Md. 438,444,554A.2d 1221, 1224 (1989) (the right to an administrative hearing "depends on the character ofthe
proceeding and the nature ofthe interest ofthe person seeking relief)
11 Modular Closet v. Comptroller, 315 Md. 438,445, 554 A. 2d 1221 (1989). The episode that generated thisstatement from the
Court hadto do with Modular Closet's(seller of portable closet inserts) application for attorneys fees under the Small Business

Litigation Expenses Act(SG §10-217). Controversy focused onthe Comptroller's argument that ithad notpursued its
assessment of a retail salestax, andthus, no contested case hadoccurred to trigger the operation ofthe Act. "In the present case,

the levy ofthe assessment against modular moved theproceedings beyond thepreliminary investigation stage. At that point
Modular becameentitledto an eventualhearing." Thus, the issueof attorneys fees could be considered. 315 Md. at 447-448.
12SG§10-202(d).
13SG§10-202(d).

14 Weiner v. Maryland Insurance Adm., 337 Md. 181, 186, 652 A. 2d 125 (1995) citing SugarloafCitizens Ass'n v. Northeast Md.
Waste DisposalAuth., 323 Md. 641, 652, 594 A.2d 1115, 1120 (1991).

15 Weiner, 337Md. at 190 citing Department ofNatural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 21A Md. 211, 334A.2d
514(1975).

16 Weiner, 337 Md. at 193-94.
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determine theirrights and duties. Decisions do not focus on the timing ofthe proceedings or the stage at

which the dispute terminates.17 In addition tothe definition of"contested case" within the MAPA another
federal orstate statute may mandate administrative hearings.18 The right to a hearing depends onthe

character ofthe proceeding and the nature ofthe interest ofthe person seeking relief.19
Significant Case Decisions:
An agency cannot do an endrun around thecontested hearing requirement

o

Local DSS agencies were not allowed to maintain files on individuals investigated for child abuse which
resulted in findings either of "indicated" or "unsubstantiated" inMontgomery County DSS v. L.D. et. al,
349 Md. 239, 707 A. 2d 1331 (1998) without first affording a contested case hearing to the individuals

whose names DSS wanted to place in the registry.20 State law requires that before names ofindividuals
may be placed in a Central Registry (FL 5-714 & FL5-715) base, the individual "canrequest an

administrative hearing by responding to the local department's notice in writing. . ." 349 Md., at 248.21
Maintenance of Automated Master files and Client Information Systems were statewide registries and are

therefore subject to the contested case hearing procedures mandated by FL§5-703. 349 Md. at 260.
"Central registry" included theAMF and CIS databases operated bythe DHR and local departments.
"Accordingly, prior to theentry oftheir names as suspected child abusers and neglectors into these
databases, accused individuals must be provided a full contested case hearing andthe concomitant right to

judicial review . . ." 349 Md. at275. The holding: "Taking into consideration the plain meaning ofthe
term 'central registry' andthe legislative history and purpose ofthe Child Abuse andNeglect statute, we
hold thattheterm 'central registry' includes theAMF and CIS databases now operated by theDHR and

local departments. Accordingly, prior tothe entry oftheir names assuspected child abusers and neglectors
intothese databases, accusedindividuals mustbe provided a full contested case hearingand the

concomitant right tojudicial review in accordance with section 5-715 and ouropinion inC.S." 344 Md. at
275.

It is thenature ofthe dispute that determines whether a contested hearing is required

o Litigation expenses are authorized by SG §10-224 tobereimbursable to small businesses and non profit
organizations in"contested cases" before State agencies when State action is initiated without substantial
justification. Whether a proceeding is a contested case does not depend onthe timing oftheproceedings or
thestate at which the dispute terminates. Modular Closet v. Comptroller, 315 Md. 438,445, 554 A. 2d
1221 (1989). "Rather theCourt has focused onwhether the nature ofthe dispute entitles theparties to a
hearing to determine their rights or duties." Id. Because the levy ofa tax assessment against Modular
moved the proceedings beyond thepreliminary investigation state, Modular was entitled to aneventual
17 Modular Closet v. Comptroller, 315 Md. 438, 445,554A. 2d 1221 (1989).
18 Modular Closet, 315Md. at 446citing a casewhere a hearing was mandated for individuals denied emergency benefits under
the aid to families with Dependent Children program.

19 Modular Closet, 315Md. at 446 citingEliason v. State Roads Comm., 231 Md. 257,260, 189A.2d649,cert, denied, 375 U.S.
914, 84 S. Ct. 211,11 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1963).

20 Three cases wereconsolidated: (1) D.N. is a tenured public school teacher found responsible for indicated abuse of a student

arising out ofanincident where a student was burned ina shop class by a hot tool. D.N. asserted thecontact was accidental. (2)
T.E.P. isa private school teacher classified asan"indicated" abuser after anin-school paddling of a student byT.E.P. (3) L.D isa
day careproviderfound responsible for "indicated"neglect.

21 The Court detailed theprocedure of investigation of child abuse complaints andfindings made, L.D., 349Md. at 247-249; the
maintenance of records of abuse; and the 1966 enactmentprovidingfor a Central Registry,L.D. 349 Md. at 249-54.
22 The Court stated:

In this consolidated appeal, we mustaddress the issue leftunanswered in CS., 343 Md. at 34 n.8, 680 A.2d at 480 n.8:
"Whetherrecords stored in the AMF [and CIS] are ... 'centralregistries' within the meaning of [section] 5-714." We
answer this in the affirmative and hold that because the AMF and CIS registries are statewide, comprehensive

databases containing information identifying suspected child abusers, available on a statewide basis, these databases
constitute central registries and therefore are subject to the contested case hearing procedures mandated by section 5715 and CS.

/,.£>., 349 Md. at 260.

Thedecision in C.S., 343 Md. wasreviewed, statutory interpretation principals were applied, legislative history was setforth,
case law was reviewed, and the holding announced. L.D., 349 Md. at 262-275.

89

hearing andthe contested case provisions of MAPA became applicable. In this casethe dispute was
resolved prior to a formal hearing bytheabatement ofthe assessment by the Comptroller. 315 Md. at 443.
The trial court erred in determining that the "contested case" provisionsofthe MAPA did not apply.315
Md.at446.23

Approval ofrates bytheInsurance Commissioner is a quasi-legislativefunction
Some legislative hearings require a hearing, but that does notnecessarily mean a contested hearing
o In Weiner v. Maryland Insurance Adm., 337 Md. 181, 652 A. 2d 125 (1995), BlueCross andBlue Shield of

Maryland filed a form of contract with the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) to theeffect that the
insurer wouldenter into (a reimbursement formula) withparticipating pharmacies for filling prescriptions.
TheCommissioner's authority to approve rates is a quasi-legislative function. The proposal before the
Commissioner pertained to individuals who were insured under the plan, andthe policy determination was

a quasi-legislative rate setting function. Therefore, the pharmacists had noright to anadjudicatory hearing.
337 Md. at 194.

o

In construing a statute, the legislature is presumed aware ofthe words used in a statute. InSocial Services
v. Linda J., 161 Md. App. 402, 869 A.2d404 (2005), when theLegislature said thatan individual found

guilty ofa criminal charge ofabuse orneglect is not entitled tocontested case hearing, that includes the
receiptof a PBJ on that guiltyfinding. 161 Md.App. at 409.

There was no right to a contested hearing when DSS "indicated child abuse" inthis case before the
name of Ms. J's name would be placed in the agency's central registry of suspected child abusers.
The criminal charge against herforstriking hereight-year-old foster daughter witha beltwas
disposed ofwith a PBJ. FL §5-706.1 setting forth the procedure for notification and appeal ofa
finding of"indicated child abuse orneglect" states that iftheindividual is found guilty there isno
right to a contested hearing. A person receiving a PBJ isfirst determined to beguilty and no
contested hearing is allowed. 161 Md. App. at 409-510.

B. Notice of Charges

MAPA states specific requirements an agency must follow to constitute notice of agency action.
Whatever notice is given, the notice must be"reasonable." A basic tenant of fairplay in administrative
proceedings isthe right ofa party to be given adequate notice ofthenature ofthe proceeding inorder that

he may prepare his defenses.24
In an adversary proceeding, dueprocess requires thatan individual against whom proceedings are
instituted be given notice and an opportunity to beheard. The notice must be"reasonably" calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties ofthe pendency ofthe action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. A court, inconsidering the reasonableness of notice, "must
balance the interests ofthe stateor the giverof notice against the individual interest sought to be protected
23 Inthis 1989 decision, Judge Eldridge for the Court of Appeals listed a number of cases addressing the issue of whether a
proceeding was a contested casewithin the meaning ofthe MAPA:
. . . Donocam Assoc, v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm'n, 302 Md. 501, 512-513, 489 A.2d 26 (1985); Prince George's Co. v.

Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 295-296, 418 A.2d1155 (1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S. Ct. 869, 66L. Ed. 2d808
(1981); State Dep't ofA. &Tax. v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 395-396, 380 A.2d28(1977); Montgomery County v. One Park
North Associates, 275 Md. 193, 202,338 A.2d 892(1975); Criminal Injuries Compensation Boardv. Gould, 111 Md.
486,499, 331 A.2d 55 (1975); Murray v. State Dep't ofSocial Services, 260 Md. 323, 326-327, 272 A.2d 16(1971);
Bernstein v. BoardofEd. ofPrince George's Co., 245Md. 464, 471-472, 226 A.2d 243 (1967). See also Eliason v.
StateRoadsComm., 231 Md. 257, 260-261, 189A.2d 649, cert, denied, 375 U.S. 914, 84 S. Ct. 211,11 L. Ed. 2d 152
(1963).
Modular Closet, 315 Md. at 445.

In addition to the listing, the Court specifically addressed fact situations in many ofthe cases cited during its analysis ofthe
issue. Modular Closet, 315 Md. at 445-47.

24 Ferguson v. UPS, 270 Md. 202, 206, 311 A.2d 220 (1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 1000, 94 S. Ct. 1602, 39L. Ed. 2d895
(1974).

90

by the fourteenth amendment." Thus, indetermining whether notice was reasonable, a court must evaluate
thespecific circumstances of each case. In addition to constitutional due process requirements, SG§10-

207(a) (MAPA) also requires an agency to give reasonable notice ofits action:25
o

The facts asserted stated concisely and simply

o Thepertinent statutory and regulation sections under which State action is taken
o
o
o

o

The sanction or proposed penalty
The right to request a hearing and how to make that request
All relevant time requirements
The consequences of not appearing
SG §10-207. Notice of agency action.

(a) In general- An agency shall give reasonable notice ofthe agency's action.
(b) Contents ofnotice.- The notice shall:
(1) state concisely and simply:
(i) the facts that are asserted; or

(ii) ifthefacts cannot be stated indetail when the notice isgiven, the issues thatare involved;
(2) state thepertinent statutory and regulatory sections under which theagency istaking itsaction;
(3) state the sanction proposed orthe potential penalty, if any, as a result ofthe agency's action;
(4) unless a hearing isautomatically scheduled, state that the recipient ofnotice ofanagency's action
mayhave an opportunity to request a hearing, including:
(i) what, if anything, a person must do to receive a hearing; and
(ii) all relevant time requirements; and

(5) state thedirect consequences, sanction, potential penalty, if any, or remedy ofthe recipient's failure
to exercise in a timely manner the opportunity for a hearing or to appear for a scheduled hearing.

(c) Consolidation ofnotices.- The notice ofagency action under this section may beconsolidated with
the notice of hearing required under § 10-208 of this subtitle.

(d) Publication in Register.- Forpurposes ofthis section, publication intheMaryland Register does not
constitute reasonable notice to a party.

[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 251; 1984, ch.284, § 1; 1989, ch.239; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

Significant Case Decisions

Adequacy ofthe notice depends on the totality ofthe circumstances

o

One ofthe allegations in Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494,511, 707A. 2d
891 (1998), affirmed, Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 355 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d 991 (1999) was
thatadequate notice wasnot given ofthe charges against Dr. Regan. Dueprocess violations were not
accompanied by specifics. Therecord supported thefact that Dr. Regan had delegated duties to employees
not authorized to perform them andthathe billed patients for treatments that werenot rendered, as alleged
by the Board in the complaintfiled against him. 120Md. at 519-23

C. Notice of a Hearing

An agency is required to give reasonable notice, anopportunity to be heard, and to conduct a fair hearing
as part of basic due process requirements.

25 Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 511,519, 707 A. 2d891 (1998), affirmed, Regan v. Board of
Chiropractic Examiners, 355 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d991 (1999). Separate and apart from whatthe notice requirements ofthe
statute orregulations are, there is a requirement of fundamental constitutional due process that reasonable notice ofthe charges
against anindividual must be givento that individual prior to commencement of a hearing.
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(1) Generally

The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act requires that allparties in a contested case shall begiven
"reasonable" written notice ofthe hearing. SG §10-208 specifically spells out what that notice is to

include. The statutory requirement goes well beyond stating thata contested hearing is going to be heard
at a stated time in a specific place. What is required isthatthe notice contain the following:
1. the date, time, place, and nature ofthe hearing;

2. theright to call witnesses and submit documents orother evidence under SG §10-213 (f) [scope
of evidence] ofthe Administrative Procedure Act

3. any applicable right to request subpoenas for witnesses and evidence, and the cost, if any, to
request a subpoena;

4. that a copy ofthe hearing procedure isavailable on request, and thecost, if any, to obtain that
copy;

5. any rightor restriction pertaining to representation;
6. that the failure to appear forthe scheduled hearing may result inan adverse action against the
party; and

7. that, unless otherwise prohibited by law, the parties may agree to the evidence and waive their
right to appear at the hearing.

COMAR 28.02.01.05 applies to OAH hearings and this regulation also sets forth requirements to be
contained inthenotice ofthe hearing. Basically, the regulation parallels the statute, butdoes add a notice
that a party has theright to cross examine a witness produced byanother party.
8. theright to cross examine witnesses any witness that another party calls
Both thenotice of hearing andthenotice of agency action may be combined. SG §10-208(c).
Publication intheMaryland Register ofthe fact that a hearing will beheld does notconstitute reasonable
notice to a party. SG §10-208(d).

Always, the attorney representing a client before an agency must do a complete review ofall statutes
and regulations pertaining to a hearing before that agency to ascertain the notice requirements. Agency
hearing notice provisions are diverse as indicated bythefollowing three examples:
BR §17-324 concerns hearings involving Real Estate Brokers. In addition to other hearing
requirements, that section sets forth notice of hearing requirements:
(d) Specific notice requirements.-

(1)At least 10days before thehearing, the hearing notice to be given to the individual shall be:
(i) served personally on the individual; or

(ii) sentby certified mailto the lastknown business address ofthe individual.
(2)If the individual is an associate real estate broker or a real estate salesperson, at least 10days before
the hearing, the Commission shall give notice ofthe hearing to each real estate broker withwhom the
associate real estate broker or the real estate salesperson is affiliated by sendingnotice by certified mail to
the last known business address ofthe real estate broker.
and

HO §13-317 concerned with PhysicalTherapists simplyprovides:
26 SG §10-213(f) dealing withthe scope of evidence that may beproduced ona genuine issue in a contested case specifically
provides for the"cross-examination of anywitness that another party orthe agency calls."
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(b) Application ofAdministrative Procedure Act.- The Board shall give notice and hold thehearing in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
and

Com. Law §13-403 allows the Consumer Protection Division ofthe Office ofthe Attorney
General to hold a hearing to determine if a violation ofthe Consumer Protection Lawshas
occurred. As to charges filed and notice:
(a) Hearing.-

(1) The Division may hold a public hearing to determine if a violation of this title has occurred.
(2) The Division shall serve:

(i) A statement of charges on the alleged violator; and
(ii)A notice ofthe timeand place of hearing on each party of record.

In addition there is COMAR 02.01.02.02 dealing with the hearingprocedures initiatedby the
Consumer Protection Division which states:
COMAR 02.01.02.02 Hearing Notice.

A. Every hearing notice shall bear an identifying number which shall bethe number assigned to all
hearings, orders, and communications between the parties relating tothe subject matter ofthe hearing.
B. Every hearing notice shall include:
(1) The names of all parties of record;

(2) The date,time, and place designated for the hearing;
(3) Copies of any exhibitsfiled with the petition;

(4) All allegations, made by the party proponent (for definition of"party proponent" see Regulation .14,
below), ofviolations ofthe Consumer Protection Laws orregulations promulgated thereunder, committed
by the party respondent.

(2) OAH

"TheRules of Procedure codified at COMAR 28.02.01 govern all hearings conducted by the OAH, and

serve tosupplement the procedures required by statute." SG §10-206(a)(l) requires OAH to "adopt
regulations togovern the procedures and practice in all contested cases delegated tothe Office [of
Administrative Hearings] and conducted under this [(Administrative Procedure Act- Contested Cases)]
subtitle."27 "In addition, the [M]APA authorizes an agency to adopt its own regulations to govern

procedures in contested case hearings." SG §10-206(b) states that "each agency may adopt regulations to
govern procedures under this [(Administrative Procedure Act - Contested Cases)] subtitle and practice
before the agency in contested cases."28 These regulations "shall be construed to ensure the fair and

expeditious determination of every action."29 These regulations are lengthy. Many terms are defined.30

The timeliness of actions commenced by anagency depends onrelevant statutes or regulations, and
ifno time period isspecified an action must be commenced "within 30 days ofthe date ofthe notice of
contested action." Time is computed in accord with Article 1, §36 ofthe Code of Maryland.

To obtain a hearing, a requestfor a hearing must befiled. That request is considered filed "within
the time period specified byrelevant law" or"within 30 days ofthedate ofthe notice ofcontested action"

27 Mehrling v. Nationwide Insurance, 371 Md. 40, 52-53, 806 A. 2d662(2002).
28 Mehrling 371 Md. at53.
29 COMAR 28.02.01.01. A & B.
30 COMAR 28.02.01.02.
31 COMAR 28.02.01.03.
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if no time period isspecified.32 The request for a hearing isto be "filed" on the earlier ofthe date the

request is postmarked, or is received by OAH or the agency.33
OAH (and most agencies) provideforms onwhich a request for a hearing may be made. It is best to
use these forms though it is also permissible to request a hearing "in any other manner permitted by
law."34 Regulations are specific in stating that the requestfor a hearing must contain thefollowing:
1. the name and address ofthe requesting party;

2. thenotice (or a copy) of agency action orthe name ofthe person or agency against whom the
hearing request is filed;

3. any documents, or other information required by law; and

4. any fees required.35

Expedited hearings "may" be given upon a motion setting forth the reasons for the request. If an
expedited hearing is granted and the matter is heard by an ALJ, that ALJ "shall render the proposed or
final decision within 30 days after the close ofthe record, unless the parties agree to a longer period or a
shorter period is prescribed by law."

D. Motions and Other Prehearing Matters

SG §10-206 requires OAH to adopt regulations to govern the procedures and practice inall cases
delegated tothe Office and conducted under Subtitle 2 (MAPA - Contested Cases) ofTitle 10
(Government Procedures). Statutory authorization is given for an administrative agency and/or OAH to
adopt regulations that:

1. provide for prehearing conferences in contested cases; or
2. set other appropriate prehearing procedures in contested cases.
(1) Prehearing Conferences

Pursuant to the statutory authority, OAH has passed regulations for prehearing conferences. These
prehearing conferences are not required in every case, ("may" hold a prehearing conference.) COMAR
28.02.01.13 governs these conferences. Many matters may bediscussed at a prehearing conference.
Maryland Rule 2-504.2 deals with a pretrial conference in the circuit court. There is no reason why most
ofthe matters considered at a circuit court conferencecannot be the subject matter of discussion prior to

an administrative hearing. The Rule identifies areas for possible discussion.
COMAR 28.02.01.13 Prehearing Conferences.

A. When appropriate, thejudge may hold a prehearing conference to resolve matters preliminary to the
hearing.

32 COMAR 28.02.01.03 B. "Computation of Time. Time shall becomputed in accordance with Article 1, § 36,Annotated Code
of Maryland." COMAR 28.02.01.03 C.
33 COMAR 28.02.01.03 D.
34 COMAR 28.02.01.04 A.
35 COMAR 28.02.01.04 B.

36 COMAR 28.02.01.06 Expedited Hearings.
A. A motion for an expedited hearing may be filed by any party.
B. The motion shall set forth the reasons for expediting the hearing.

C. All partiesshall be notifiedpromptlyofthe decision on the motion.

D. Ifthemotion forexpedited hearing is granted, thejudge shall render the proposed or final decision within 30days after the
close ofthe record, unless the parties agreeto a longerperiod or a shorter period is prescribed by law.
37SG§10-206(d).
38 COMAR 28.02.01.13A.
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B. The judgemay require theparties to submit information before the prehearing conference.
C. A prehearing conference maybe convened to address the following matters:
(1) Issuance of subpoenas;
(2) Factual and legal issues;
(3) Stipulations;
(4) Requests for official notice;

(5) Identification and exchangeof documentary evidence;
(6) Admissibility of evidence;
(7) Identification and qualification of witnesses;
(8) Motions;

(9) Discovery disputes;
(10) Order of presentation;
(11) Scheduling;
(12) Alternate dispute resolution; and

(13) Any other matters thatwill promote the orderly and prompt conduct ofthe hearing.
D. Conduct. Except asotherwise indicated inthis chapter, atthe discretion ofthe judge, all orpart ofa
prehearing conference may be recorded.
E. Prehearing Orders.

(1) Unless otherwise stated inthis chapter, when a prehearing conference has been held, a prehearing
order shall be issued by the judge.

(2) The prehearing order shall setforth the actions taken orto betaken with regard to any matter
addressed at the prehearing conference.

(3) Ifa prehearing conference is not held, the judge may issue a prehearing order toregulate the conduct

ofthe proceedings.

(4)Theprehearing ordershall be a partofthe case record.

(2) Motions Practice

OAH has also adopted COMAR 28.02.01.15 titled "Motions." The regulation deals with pre-hearing
motions, motions made during a hearing, motions to dismiss, motions for a decision, and a motion for
judgment. As tothe pre-hearing and during the hearing motions, the applicable provisions are:
COMAR 28.02.01.16 Motions.

A. Unless otherwise provided bythis chapter, this regulation pertains to allmotions filed with theOffice.
B. Unless otherwise provided by this chapter:

(1) A partymay move for appropriate reliefbefore or during a hearing;
(2) A partyshall submitall motions in writing or orally at a hearing;
(3) Written motions shall:

(a) Be filed as far in advance ofthe hearing as is practicable,
(b) Stateconcisely the question to be determined, and
(c) Be accompanied by any necessary supporting documentation;
(4) An answer to a writtenmotion shallbe filed on the earlierof:
(a) 15 days after the date the motion was filed, or
(b) The date ofthe hearing;

(5) Upon notice to allparties, thejudge may schedule a conference to consider a written motion;
(6) Thejudgemayissue a written decision on a motion or state the decision on the record;
(7) If a ruling ona motion isnotstated onthe record, the ruling shall be included inthejudge's proposed
or final decision;

(8)Thefiling or pendency of a motion does notalter or extend any timelimitotherwise established by
this chapter.
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E. Discovery

Notallagencies have regulations allowing any discovery to theparties participating in a hearing. OAH
has adopted discovery rules, though these rules are very limited See Chapter 4. DueProcess andOther
Rights in ContestedHearings. F. Discovery, (page 51) The extent to which theallowance of discovery is
part of due process entitlement has not been developed to much of anextent by case law.
(1) Generally

OAH regulations allow discovery, providing it is requested in writing filed not later than 30 days before
a hearing. Discovery requested isto be produced within 15 days ofthe request soasto allow the

requesting party to copy any file, memorandum, correspondence, document, object orintangible thing
relevant tothe subject matter ofthe case, and not privileged. No other discovery is provided unless there
is an agreement between the parties.39 Copies ofmaterial requested in discovery shall be made atthe
expense ofthe party making the request, but that cost may be waived in accord with the provisions of
Maryland's Public Information Act.40
". . .[A]bsent a statute to the contrary, the rules ofdiscovery applicable to circuit court proceedings

are not, generally, applicable with respect to MPIA [Maryland Public Information Act] proceedings."41
"The Maryland rules pertaining to pre-trial discovery in circuit court cases do not, generally, apply to
administrative proceedings."42
(2) Public Information Requests.

"Aparty to an administrative proceeding might, pursuant to a proper MPIA [Maryland Public
Information Act] request, be able to access information not normally available to thatparty under the
prevailing administrative rules or ifthat party were a party toa court action and making such a request

subject to the discovery rules."43
The basis of Maryland's Public Access to Information Act(SG §§10-611- 628) is that except as
otherwise provided by law, a custodian of government documents shall permit a person to inspect any

public record ata reasonable time. The provisions ofthe Act "reflect the legislative intent that citizens of
the State ofMaryland beaccorded wide-ranging access to public information concerning the operation of

their government." Thus, the Act is to be construed in favor ofdisclosure.44 SG 10-615(1) requires a
custodian to deny inspection of a public record orany part of a public record if,"by law, the public record

is privileged or confidential."45 Acustodian is permitted to deny inspection of"any part ofan interagency
or intra-agency letter or memorandum thatwould not be available by law to a private party in litigation
with the [governmental unit].46 MPIA specifies time limits and procedures for requesting and furnishing

information 47 One denied access torecords may file an action in a circuit court.48

39 COMAR 28.02.01.10 A & B.

40 SG 10-601. et. seq.
41 Hammen v. BaltimoreCounty, 373 Md. 440, 453, 818 A. 2d 1125(2003).
42 Hammen 373 Md. at 457.

43 Hammen v. Baltimore County, 373 Md. 440, 457, 818 A. 2d 1125 (2003).
44 Hammen v. Baltimore County PoliceDept, 373 Md. 440,455-56, 818 A. 2d 1125 (2003).

45 Strombergv. University ofMaryland, 382 Md. 151, 156-56, 854 A. 2d 1220 (2004) citing SG §10-615(1).
46 Stromberg, 382 Md. at 157 citingSG §10-615(b).
47 Stromberg, 382 Md. at 159-60.
48 Stromberg, 382 Md. at 160. See §10-623 (Judicial review)
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SG §10-618 is titled "permissible denials." This section allows a custodian to deny inspection of a

public record if inspection "would be contrary to the public interest." A custodian may deny inspection of
interagency or intra-agency information; licensure examination material; research projects; real estate
appraisals; records of certain governmental investigations by law enforcement authority; trade secrets,
etc.

There is a Federal Freedom of Information Act (FIOA), 5 U.S.C. 552 (Public Information, Agency
Rules, Opinions, Orders, Records and Proceedings).

Inmany administrative agency proceedings, discovery rules are limited ornon-existent. "... [I]n
court cases discovery rules are applicable and are designed to assure a balance, and thus the applicable
discovery rules, might, under circumstances of a particular case, beinterpreted to prohibit adocument or

tape from being subject to discovery." Administrative agency proceedings in which there are no such
discovery rules cannot trump or thwart the very purpose ofthe MPIA, which permits a person to gain
board access. The MPIA contains its own exemptions.50
Absenta statute to the contrary, the rules of discovery applicable to circuit court proceedings are not

generally applicable in respect to MPIA proceedings.51 The MPIA may be used to obtain documents that
maybe produced asevidence in administrative proceedings.
Significant Case Decisions
There Is to be broad access to public records

Bow, private information (such aspersonnel records) is a different thing
o Hammen v. Baltimore County Police Dept., 373 Md. 440,453, 818 A. 2d 1125 (2003) decided an issue

under Maryland's Access to Public Records Act in the public interest, even though the matter was moot.53
Hammen suffered a disability due to aninjury sustained in 1993. Videotapes taken of his activities were

sought by him in relation to are-evaluation ofdisability benefits proceeding. 373 Md. at 442-43.54 The

request was denied. 373 Md. at 448. The Board of Appeals of Baltimore County correctly noted ithad no
power toenforce subpoenas or requests for information under the Maryland Access to Public Records
Act.55 As to arequest under MPIA, the Hammen Court stated: "The affording of broad access to public
records by citizens is the very purpose ofthe MPIA, which generally affirm citizens' rights to access

government records especially when they involve the requesting citizen. Such situations are very different
from civil actions between private parties. An MPIA action is an attempt to gain statutorily guaranteed

access to "public records," not private information. The MPIA permits an interested party torequest and
49SG§10-618(bMi).
50 Hammen, 373 Md. at456. Inthiscase the Court said access was permitted to allow Hammen to gain access to avideo

surveillance tape that was going tobeused by Baltimore County inaproceeding tore-evaluate his entitlement todisability
benefits. Code §23-58 allowed periodic re-evaluation of disability. The videotapes were part of an investigation done bythe
Baltimore County Office of Law. Id., at 446.

51 Hammen v. Baltimore County PoliceDept., 373 Md. 440,453, 818A. 2d 1125 (2003).
52 Hammen, 373 Md. at 458. (concurring opinion summary)

53 Appellant had already received the surveillance tapes. The doctrine ofmootness was discussed and the circumstances under
which an opinion will begiven toresolve amatter of public concern or an issue capable of repetition yetevading review. The
Court held that the circumstances of this case fit both categories. Hammen, 373 Md. at 451.

54 The Hammen Court notedin FN 4 thatanonymous individuals reported thatHammen was an active memberof a volunteer fire
department while collecting disability.

55 The Board of Appeals urged Baltimore County to give upthe tape stating that if thetape was released atthehearing and a
request was made for acontinuance, the Board "will be inclined togrand such acontinuance," to give Hammen the opportunity
to present additional evidence tocounter the videotape. Hammen, 373 Md. at 447. The County Attorney made an offer to
exchange the tape for its ability totake Hammen's deposition, but that offer was declined. The Hammen Court stated the
obvious: "A party to an administrative proceeding, pursuant toaproper MPIA request, cannot first berequired to submit toa
deposition before receiving surveillance videotapes, towhich heisstatutorily entitled." 373 Md., at454.
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receive the surveillance videotapes from the governmental agency possessing thembecause he or she is a

party ininterest and hasa right to thetapes from the custodian of record." 373 Md., at 456-57.
Freedom ofinformation act used for discovery

o

Office ofthe AG v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 753 A.2d 1036 (2000) addressed the issue as to whether
documents otherwise subject to disclosure under Maryland's Freedom of Information Act were

privileged as containing attorney mental impressions or attorney work product, The Court stated:
Such records have not heretofore been discoverable pursuant to Rules 2-402(c) and 4-263(c). As
this Court made clear in Faulkv. State's Attorneyfor Harford Co., 299 Md. 493, 510,474 A.2d 880,

889 (1984), the Public Information Act "was not intended to be a device to enlarge the scope of
discovery beyondthat provided by the Maryland Rules
" On the contrary, the Act explicitly

provides, in § 10-615, "that effect isto begiven to court rules when to allow public inspection of
public records would contravene those rules." State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, supra, 356 Md.
at 133,737 A.2d at 600.

359 Md. at 347-48. [Emphasis by bold]
The Court reviewed the Act and stated that the Act makes it clear that exemptions in the Act to

documents otherwise subject to disclosure means that a person in interest cannot avoid allother exemptions
under theActsimply because he is seeking disclosure of aninvestigatory file pursuant to St.Gvt. §10618(f). 359 Md. at 348-355.

Public records and an executive or legislative privilege against disclosure

o InStromberg v. University ofMaryland, 382 Md. 151, 854 A. 2d 1220 (2004), a subcontractor sought to
inspect and copy public records pertaining to a construction project atthe University ofMaryland College
Park campus under MPIA. Executive privilege and confidential commercial information the claim asserted
in opposing disclosure. 382 Md. at 157.56 The Court: "What is really atissue here is the broader
deliberative process privilege that arose from the common law, from rules ofevidence, and mostly from
rules governing discovery incivil judicial proceedings - a privilege that, with the advent ofdisclosure
statutes, was incorporated into exemption provisions like SG §10-618(b) and 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5) [The
Federal Public Information Act] to protect from legislatively mandated disclosure interagency or intra-

agency memoranda orletters that would not be available by law toa private party inlitigation with the
unit."57 The somewhat difficult to clinically understand concept of confidential commercial information,

pertinent to information generated by the Government, was discussed. 382 Md. at 168-69.58 Affirming the
trial court decision to redact certain information, the Court stated:

We agree with theUniversity that the limited and time-sensitive exemption for confidential
commercial or financial information that has been read into FOIA, §552(b)(5), is part of SG §10-

618(b) . . . That kind of information may be shielded from discovery by a protective order under
Maryland Rule 2-403, as it is under F.R. Civ. Proc. 26(c). That does notavail theUniversity in
this case, however, for two reasons. For onething, the University does not asserta time-limited

privilege, aswas recognized inthe Federal cases, butseems to assert that thenumber inquestion
may never be revealed. That extends well beyond what the Federal courts have allowed under
§552(b)(5). More important, for the reasons discussed with respectto the deliberative process
privilege, we failto seehow the number would disclose any time-sensitive confidential
commercial information. As we have indicated, it is an aggregate number that does not reveal Mr.

Mitchell's, or anyone else's, views as to the validity or value of claims or the future status ofthe
project.
Stromberg, at 169-70.
56 The confidential commercial information claim of privilege was asserted underSG §10-618(b). The Courtdiscussed executive
privilege. 382 Md. at 161-62.

57 Stromberg, 382 Md. at 163. Judge Wilner discussed the deliberative process privilege and itsapplication through case law. 382
Md. 164-166. A distinction is drawn between purely factual data and deliberative opinions, notingthatthe distinction is
sometimes not allthatclear. "If the deliberative aspects could be separated from the purely factual aspects, they might be subject

to shielding." There is noMaryland law onthe State's assertion of aconfidential commercial information privilege. 382 Md. at
166-68.

58 One example given pertained tothe immediate release of directives that would significantly harm theGovernment's monetary
functions or commercial interests. Stromberg, 382 Md. at 169.
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COMAR 28.01.04 is concerned with public information requests as it relatesto OAH. Procedures for

filing requests with OAH for the inspection and copying of records under thePublic information Act (SG
§10-611, et. seq.) are setforth. Requests are to be inwriting, and there is a procedure for notification of
persons who may beaffected bydisclosure. A hearing procedure exists for use when a request is denied.
Fees may be charged.

The MPIA provides that copies may be made ofrecords that are subject to public disclosure.59 There
are limitations on some disclosures and the statute must be reviewed. Generally, "reasonable" fees are

charged, the reasonableness ofwhich depends on the "costs incurred by the governmental unit."60

Employee time may not be charged "for the first 2 hours that are needed to search for a public record and
[to] prepare itfor inspection."61 Unless some other law applies, the custodian ofrecords may charge for
the making orsupervising the making ofa copy, printout, orphotograph ofa public record and for the
cost ofproviding facilities for the reproduction ofthepublic record ifthe custodian does not have the
facilities.62

Waiver ofthe fee maybe made upon bythecustodian "after consideration ofthe ability ofthe

applicant to pay the fee and other relevant factors" ifthe custodian determines waiver tobe in the public
interest.63

F. The Hearing

Basically, an administrative hearing isconducted similar to a trial. The MAPA does not give that much
detail asto how a hearing isto be conducted, but with allthe procedures it mandates, it is clear thata

"trial type" proceeding is anticipated for acontested case.64 OAH has adopted rules and procedures for
the conduct of hearings and it is fair to say that the OAH procedures are reflective of what occurs inan
agency hearing whether OAH is involved ornot. Throughout the Maryland Code, there are references to
the hearing process in statutes regulating agencies. For example, HO §14-405(b)(l), concerned with
hearing procedures before the Board ofPhysicians, states the "hearing officer shall give notice and hold
the hearing inaccordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. HO §12-305(b)(c), concerned with the
procedures for the disciplining ofpharmacists, has reference tothe MAPA and also states specific
procedures as to notice requirements, the right tocounsel, and the issuance of subpoenas and the
administering of oaths. Individual agency and board statutes have to beconsulted and compared and
coordinated withOAH procedures when bothOAH and the agency are involved in the process.

Hearings are open to the public, unless otherwise provided by law. SG §10-212. While, the author of
this book questions the legality and wisdom ofthe confidentiality of some proceedings, certain Boards
have provided for confidentiality. Title 4 ofHG isconcerned with the confidentiality ofmedical records.
HO §1-401 istitled, "Medical Review Committees." Section §1-401(d) makes some records in some
situations confidential, not discoverable and not admissible into evidence. The Boardof Physicians takes

the position that hearings before that body are confidential and a regulation has been passed to make those
proceedings confidential. Ofcourse, once Judicial Review occurs, the record is open to the public. Even
59 SG 10-620.

60 SG 10-621(b).
61 SG 10-621(c).
62 SG 10-621(d).
63 SG 10-621(e).

64 While many hearings, such asthose involving the suspension of alicense to drive maynotlast that long other hearings are

quite lengthy. The hearing consumed 7 days and resulted ina92 page opinion bythe Board of Chiropractic. Regan v. Board of
Chiropractic, 120 Md. App.494, 507, 707 A. 2d891 (1998) ajfd 355 Md. 397 (1999).
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with Judicial Review, every attempt is made toprotect patient identity when it is necessary to discuss
medical records and procedures.

One oftheregulations passed by the Board ofPharmacy provides that its proceedings are confidential
"and that confidentiality may notbewaived by the parties." While it is easy to see that patient records
can and should be protected, in the disciplining ofpharmacists, is itwise to prohibit public access tothe

proceedings? What chance does this section have ofbeing declared constitutional when itsays that the
person being disciplined may not waive the confidentiality, say to tell the press what is happening in the
proceeding? Time will tell.
COMAR 10.34.01.03 Confidentiality of Proceedings.

A. Except as otherwise provided by law, the proceedings ofthe Board are confidential and that
confidentiality may not be waived by the parties.

B. The Office of Administrative Hearings' proceedings involving the adjudication of a Board formal

disciplinary action and the administrative law judge's recommended decision are confidential.
C. The respondent may not waive the confidentiality ofthe:
(1) Proceedings; or

(2) Patients whose medical records orcare are reflected in the record oftheproceedings.
D. To the extent possible, even after the close ofaformal disciplinary action, the parties shall refrain
from revealing:
(1) Legal documents;
(2) Oral statements; or

(3) Information thatwould reveal theidentity ofpatients involved in thematter.
Significant Case Decisions

Evidencepresentedmust be under oath
o At issue in Heard v. Foxhire Associates, LLC, 145 Md. App. 695, 806 A. 2d 348 (2002) was whetherthe
evidence was sufficient to sustain the decision ofthe Board of Appeals granting a special exception to

extend the entrance to a retail shopping center. The record showed thatthe Board decision wasbased on
trial counsel's narrative in argument to theBoard. Was thatnarrative evidence? "It is imperative that

evidence given before anadjudicatory body be under oath, whether from an attorney orlay person, a lay
witness or an expert witness." The Board could notrely onthe opening statement by counsel as
"evidence." The Court held there was no evidence in support ofthe special exception granted by the

Board. 145 Md. App. at708-09.65

(1) OAH In General

Asto "venue", hearings shall be conducted at the site designated by OAH in accordance with

applicable law.66 Statutes and regulations need to be checked.
The role ofthe ALJ is spelled out in the OAH statute and regulations promulgated by OAH. Forthe
most part, all agency hearings are going to follow a model. An ALJ is required to: (1) conduct a full, fair
and impartial hearing; (2) avoid unnecessary delay indisposition; (3) maintain order inthe proceeding;

and (4) "modify or waive, reasonably, time periods" as permitted by law.67 The ALJ is required to
regulate thecourse of a hearing, the conduct ofthe participants, and has the authority to:
65 TheCourt commented onthewaythe oath can be administered during a zoning hearing. There is noreal substitute for a

procedure whereby an individual issworn in individually as awitness and the identity ofthewitness appears the record. Foxhire,
145 Md. at 709.

66 COMAR 28.02.01.07
67 COMAR 28.02.01.08 A.
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1.

Administer oaths and affirmations;

2. Issue subpoenas for witnesses and the production of evidence;
3. Rule uponoffersof proof and receive relevant and material evidence;
4. Consider and rule upon motions;
5. Examine witnesses and call witnesses as necessary to insure a full and complete record;

6. Limit unduly repetitioustestimonyand reasonably limit the time for presentations;
7. Grant a continuance or postponement;

8. Request parties to submit legal memoranda, proposed findings of fact, and conclusions of law;
9. Make proposed or final decisions and take any other appropriate action authorized by law;
10. Issue orders as are necessary to secure procedural simplicity and administrative fairness, andto
eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay;

11. Conduct the hearing in a manner suited to ascertain the facts and safeguard the rights ofthe
parties to the hearing; and

12. Impose appropriate sanctions for failure to abide by this chapter or any lawful order ofthe
judge.68
(2) Opening

COMAR 28.02.01.17A(4) specifically states that opening statements may be made when a proceeding
occurs before OAH. Attorneys attest to the benefit of a concise, clear andwell oriented opening
statement.

(3) Evidence

Provisions ofthe Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, case law, and due process govern the
admissibility andconsideration of evidence in administrative law cases. This section of Chapter 5 is
divided into the following subsections:
a. Generally
b. Hearsay
c. Business Records

d. Illegally Obtained Evidence
e. Additional Evidence
f. Issue Preclusion

g. Judicial Determination
h. Polygraph Evidence
i. Relevancy.
j. Telephone Testimony
k. Videotape Testimony
1. The Requirement of an Oath
(3) a. Generally.

SG §10-213 "specifies with particularity the evidence which may be offered and considered in a
contested case, and provides generally that 'each party in a contested case shall offer all ofthe evidence
thatthe party wishes to have made partofthe record.'" SG §10-213(a)(1). "Findings of fact mustbe
based exclusively on the evidence of record in the contestedcase proceeding and on matters officially

noticed inthat proceeding." SG §10-214(a).69 When a contested hearing is held before an ALJ, COMAR
28.02.01.18 dealing with "evidence" is also applicable.

68 COMAR 28.02.01.08 B.

69 Mehrling v. Nationwide Insurance, 371 Md. 40, 53,806 A. 2d662 (2002).
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Probative evidence "that reasonable and prudent individuals commonly accept in the conduct of their

affairs to which they give probative effect 'may' be admitted in agency proceedings."70 Evidence may
not be excluded solely on the basis that it ishearsay.71 Case law has shown that not all hearsay evidence
may be admitted.

Administrative agencies are not generally bound bythetechnical common lawrules of evidence.
Evidence inadmissible in a judicial proceeding is notperse inadmissible in an administrative proceeding.

Agencies must observe the basic rules of fairness as to parties appearing before them, and admit

evidence that has sufficient reliability and probative value to satisfy procedural due process.7 The
Maryland Rules ofEvidence do not apply to State Administrative Law Proceedings and Local
Government Administrative Proceedings.73 Rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative
proceedings.74 Courts ofAppeal countenance "the relaxation ofevidentiary rules so long as they are not
applied in an arbitrary oroppressive manner that deprives a party of his or right to a fair hearing.
Constitutional procedural due process, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment tothe Constitution
and Article 24ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights apply to anadministrative agency exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence "may" be excluded.77 Privileges
recognized by the law must be applied in administrative proceedings.78 As with judicial proceedings
evidence ismainly produced through witnesses and through the introduction ofdocumentary evidence.
Documentary evidence may be introduced in the form ofexcerpts orby incorporation by reference.
Facts may be judicially noticed as may general, technical, or scientific knowledge within the specialized
knowledge of particular evidence. Before noticing afact, parties must be notified ofwhat will be noticed
and they must be given an opportunity tocontest the fact. "The agency orthe office may use its

experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation ofevidence."79 It should
be noted that the official notice taken is a notice of existingfacts. As to the evaluation of evidence

through expertise, the agency may rely on all the evidence produced, both fact and opinion.
"Findings offact must bebased exclusively on the matters ofrecord inthe contested case proceeding
and on matters officially noticed in thatproceeding. Ina contested case, the office is bound by any agency

regulation, declaratory ruling, prior adjudication, orother settled, pre-existing policy, tothe same extent

as the agency is or would have been bound ifit were hearing the case."80
70SG§12-205(b).
71SG§12-205(c).

72 Dept. ofPublic Safety v. Cole, 342 Md 12, 31-32, 672 A2d 111 (1996). (videotape evidence) In Travers v. Baltimore Police,
115 Md. App. 395,407,693 A. 2d 378 (1997), the Court stated: "In drafting the aforementioned provisions oftheAPA and
LEOBR, the General Assembly implicitly recognized that the formal rules of evidence possess far greater utility injury trials
than an agency hearing before apresumably expert hearing officer." 115 Md. App. at 409. Judge Harrell quotes Richard J. Pierce,
Use ofthe Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 19Admin. L. Rev, 17-19 (1987) forhis commentson

this issue. 115 Md. App. at409-411. See also: Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor ofAssessments, 267 Md. 519, 298 A. 2d 148

(1973), an often cited case for the proposition that administrative agencies are not bound bythe technical rules of evidence. 115
Md. App. 523 (Tax assessment and consideration ofcomparable sales and reproduction costs in reaching an assessment amount)
73 Murphy, Maryland Evidence Handbook (Lexis), §1500. "There are many non-judicial proceedings in which the 'formal' rules
of evidence do not apply. Theextent to which therules are 'relaxed' may vary from proceeding to proceeding." Id.
74 Travers v. Baltimore CityPolice Department, 115. Md. App. 395, 408, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997).
75 Travers, 115 Md. App. at 412.

76 Travers 115 Md. App. at407 citing functions. Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 559, 625 A.2d 914 (1993);

Board ofMedical Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 582, 102 A2d 248 (1954).
77SG§12-205(d).
78SG§12-205(e).
79SG§12-205(g)(i).
80 SG §10-204.
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Specific evidence problems that havearisen in appellate courtcasesare discussed throughout this
Section of Chapter 6.

Failure to object to the introduction ofevidence, means the issue is not preserved for appeal.81 "The
initiative in excluding answers to improper questions rests upon the shoulders ofthe opposing party. If the
opponent fails to object, he will not later be heard to complain thatthe evidence should nothave been
admitted."82

Significant Case Decisions

Evidence considerations are different in administrative hearings

T. §16-205.2 permits police officers to administer a preliminary breath test licensees stopped onsuspicion
ofDUI and provides that test isto beused asa guide and may not beused asevidence bythe State inany
courtaction. In this casethe preliminary testresult showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16.
390/122.83 MVA v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 125, 887 A. 2d 1042 (2005) heldthat the preliminary testresult
canbe introduced in an administrative proceeding. Statutory interpretation rules were utilized focusing on

the fact the statute prohibited the use ofthese preliminary test findings ina "court" action and/or a "civil"

proceeding. 390 Md. at 134. Citing Black's Law Dictionary, prior case law and the fact that administrative
hearings are distinguishable from court actions, the Court held the preliminary breadth test evidence was
admissible in administrative proceedings. 390 Md. at135-138.84
(3) b. Hearsay

Evidence may notbe excluded inanadministrative proceeding solely onthebasis that it is hearsay,

85

but case law has shownus that not all hearsay evidence may be admitted. To be admissible, hearsay must

becredible and probative, and if so, that evidence "may bethe sole basis for a decision of an
administrative body."86 Appellate court decisions have "developed guidelines to assure that evidence
which is credited and reliable and competent" is the type of evidence that may be utilized in

administrative proceedings.87 "It is improper for an agency to consider hearsay evidence without first
carefully considering its reliability and probative value. One important consideration for a hearing body is
the nature ofthe hearsay evidence. For instance, statements that are sworn under oath are ordinarily

presumed to possess a greater caliber ofreliability."88
81 Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md. App. 229, 236, 403 A. 2d. 858 (1979). "The appellants, inthe instant case, objected totwo ofthe
questions asked Mr. Coady. They did so on the basis ofthe evidence's having been closed. Both times they objected their
objections were sustained. What appellants did not do was tocontinue toobject tothe subsequent questions. Thus, the answers to
those questions were admitted into evidence and, inferentially, considered bythe Board. Id.
82 Ginn, 43 Md. App. at 236.

83 In great detail, the Court reviewed the advice ofrights provisions ofthe Maryland Code and the laws concerning the use of
alcohol concentration tests andthe effects of a failure to take a test on the rightandresponsibility ofthe MVA to suspend a
license. Weller, 390 Md. 123-25.

84 Case law states generally that agency hearings are different from court actions and civil actions, and they are ordinarily
informal in nature. Whileadversary proceedings require preservation of fundamentals applicable to the decision of adjudicative
facts, administrative agencies are not bound by thetechnical rules of evidence. Weller, 390Md. at 137-35
85SG§12-205(c).

86 Kade v. Hickey School, 80 Md. App. 721, 727, 566 A. 2d 148 (1989) citing Redding v. Bd. ofCounty Comm'rs, 263 Md. 94,
110-11,282 A.2d 136 (1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 1791, 32 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972); SG §§ 10-208(b) and 10-208(c);
and COMAR 06.01.03.04. In Travers v. Baltimore Police, 115 Md. App. 395, 407,693 A. 2d 378 (1997), the Court commented:

"Indeed, hearsay statements are admissible inan administrative proceeding and if found tobecredible and probative, may form
the solebasis forthe agency's decision." Travers, 115Md. App. at 412.
87/fa<fe,80Md.App.at727.
88 Travers v. Baltimore Police, 115 Md. App. 395, 413, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997).
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Significant Case Decisions

Testimony from the criminal proceeding Introduced Into the civilproceeding?

o

Eichberg v. Maryland Bd. ofPharmacy, 50 Md. App. 189,436 A.2d525 (1981) approved theintroduction
of evidencein the administrative licensing hearing from Eichberg's earlier criminal trial. The testimony

under oath inthe criminal proceeding included cross-examination ofthe witness by Eichberg's counsel,

who represented him inboth the criminal and administrative matters. The witness at the criminal trial,
whose testimony was used inthe administrative proceeding, was notavailable atadministrative hearing. 50
Md. App. at 192.

What didyour deceased husband tellyou? Corroborated?

o Hearsay testimony before the State Industrial Accident Commission from awidow, as to what her deceased
husband told her ofthe circumstances thatlead to his death, was said to be credible in Standard Oil Co. v.

Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 252, 127 A. 850 (1925). This evidence was corroborated byother people who had
beentoldby the decedent thathe hadhad an accident. Id.

o

InCommercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 580-81, 227 A.2d20(1967), hearsay statements

given by awife under oath were admissible where the husband, the declarant, had died and where other

witnesses corroborated the testimony.

Hearsay evidence in theform of statements byother individuals?

o Objection to the introduction ofwritten reports offellow employees and students to prove acase against a
state employee charged with loud and disrespectful conduct toward afellow employee at the Charles H.
Hickey School were not reliable, credible or competent in Kade v. Hickey School, 80 Md. App. 721, 72627, 566 A. 2d 148 (1989). The statements were relevant but not under oath and there was no information as
to how they were obtained. Statements submitted by students were not sworn or dated and there was no
evidence ofthe age ofthe students or any other evidence these students were competent witnesses. No
information was given as to why the declarants were unavailable. Thus, the Court stated: "[The] hearing
officer had no basis for evaluating the credibility ofthedeclarants ofthewritten statements on which she

based her proposed order. Without that ability, appellant's right to afair hearing on the allegations of
appellees was compromised."89

Statements by thevictim made topolice? Reliable hearsay?
o Comment was made in Travers v. Baltimore Police, 115 Md. App. 395,407, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997) that

statements byMs. Nelson were admissible against Officer Travers arising out ofadomestic dispute. The
Court stated that these statements, though not sworn, nonetheless were made to officers and falsehood

could have subjected her to criminal penalties. 115 Md. App. at 413.90 More trustworthy (not the Court's

comment, but the author's comment) was the fact the statements were made arelatively short time after the
incident.91 "Thus, while Ms. Nelson's statements might not constitute an 'excited utterance,'. . . their

89 Kade, 80 Md. App. at 727-28. There was alot wrong with the hearsay evidence attempted to be introduced in this case. Does
this mean that other statements inother cases, say where the statements were made under oath and presented inan affidavit will
be admitted? Time will tell. It all depends.

Changing Point v. Maryland Health Resources, 87 Md. App. 150; 589 A. 2d 502 (1991) involved an argument that "a

number ofdocuments and certain testimony constituted hearsay evidence. . ."and should not be admitted. 87 Md. App. at 170.

The Court analyzed the contention and determined that the right to cross-examination was not denied because: "there is no

indication that the Commission relied on the Goldman letter inconcluding that there was nodirect relationship between Dr.
Fishman and Mountain Manor." The "Commission's decision relied on the testimony of Dr. Fishman, Charles Nabit and Mary

Roby, not the Goldman letter," and therefore "the admission ofMr. Goldman's letter was not aviolation ofthe principles of

Kade, Changing Point, 87 Md. App. at 172.

90 This was adomestic dispute and therefore this conclusion by the Court is disturbing. If anything iscertain from trial attorneys
involved indomestic matters, it isthat testimony indomestic disputes byone party against the other are circumspect in 13 cases

out of12. Certainly, corroboration ofthose statements existed in this case. However, to allow this statement concerning the
reliability ofthe hearsay tosit inthe opinion unguarded is at odds with most domestic practitioner experience.
91 The Travers Court quoted Consolidated Edison v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938): "mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence."
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relative proximity in timeto the allegedly heated incident is a factor that enhances the reliability of her
statement." Corroboration was also found in the police testimony noticing red marks on both sides of Ms.
Nelson's neck and that her face was puffyand red against the Traverscontention that he did not assault,
strike, or choke her. 115 Md. App. at 414.

In Travers, where the Officer's employment wasterminated for his off duty actions. The Courtstated:

"Ordinarily, a complaining witness who is also a "victim" cannot be viewed as neutral anddetached. Such
concerns are less weighty in caseswhen hearsay statements comeinto evidence through a disinterested
witness because they tend to be more reliable than statements introduced througha witness who has an
interest in the subject matterunderlying the controversy." TheOfficer had the rightto subpoena this
witness but failed to do so and thus was said to have waived his right to complain about a denial ofthe

opportunity to cross-examine her. 115 Md. App. at 418.92
Atissue inMotor Vehicle Administration v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d 511 (1995)93 was whether

ata probable cause hearing for a suspension ofdriving privileges for a second refusal totake an alcohol
concentration test, an ALJmay give greater credit to the sworn written statement of an absent police

officer, who was not subpoened byeither party, than tothe testimony ofthe motorist which conflicts with
the written statement. The driver acknowledged thatthe officer requested that he take a test andadvised
him that he could refuse the test. He said that he was told that if he did not take the test his license would

beautomatically taken from him for 120 days. "He stated ... that had hebeen told that his license could be
suspended for one year, he would have taken the test." The motorist testified that he had no recollection of
the officer's advising him ofthe consequences ofa taking the test and getting a high reading. 340 Md. at
277-78.

"The sworn statement ofthe arresting officer isprimafacie evidence of a test refusal." Unless

explained orcontradicted, the sworn statement is sufficient to establish that the driver refused totake an
alcohol concentration test. 340 Md. at 282-83. The ALJ did not find the driver's testimony sufficient to

negate the officer's sworn statement. ". . . [T]he officer's sworn statement provides adequate support for
theALJ's conclusion thattherespondent was fully advised. Hearsay evidence, if reliable, is admissible in

an administrative proceeding and, thus, may support an administrative decision." 340 Md. at285. "Inthe
instant case, by not subpoenaing the arresting officer and offering only his sworn testimony, directly
conflicting the arresting officer's sworn statement on a critical point, the respondent presented the ALJ with
an all ornothing choice. Either the ALJ must accept his testimony, inwhich case the primafacie evidence
ofthe officer'ssworn statementwould be rebutted, or he must reject it and leave theprimafacie evidence

intact. The ALJ didthe latter. Clearly, under this scenario, theALJ was under no obligation to believe the

respondent. Nor, in the absence ofarequest to do so, was he obliged even toconsider whether to subpoena
the arresting officer." 340 Md. at 289.

(3) c. Business Records.

"Maryland rule 5-803(b)(6) sets out the well-established exception tothe rule against hearsay for
records ofa regularly conducted business activities. There are times when items made part ofand
included within an official record may be admitted into evidence as part of a business record admitted
under this exception."94 Many government records qualify as business records. There are times when

appellate courts approve the use ofthe Maryland Rules ofEvidence for use in administrative proceedings.

92 While one may wonder how effective it may befor the Officers tohave called this adverse witness tothe stand to crossexamine her, this doctrine of harmless error sometimes has credit in the law when the right to subpoena an available witness is
not exercised. There may well beadifference when no authority isavailable tohave asubpoena issued. See Judge Harrell
comments and citation to other case law at Travers, 115 Md. App. at 418-19.

93 See comment on this case at 26 U. Bait. L. Rev. 63, Annual Review of Maryland Law (1996).

94 Dept. ofPublic Safety v. Cole, 342 Md 12, 27-28, 672 A. 2d 1115 (1996).
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Maryland Rule 5-803. Hearsay exceptions: Unavailability of declarant not required.
*

*

*

(6) Records of regularly conductedbusiness activity.- A memorandum, report, record, or data

compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses if (A) it wasmade at or nearthe time ofthe
act, event, or condition, or the rendition ofthe diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge or
from information transmittedby a personwith knowledge, (C) it was made and kept in the course of a

regularly conducted business activity, and(D) theregular practice of thatbusiness was to make andkeep
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation. A recordof this kind may be excluded if the source
of information or the method or circumstances ofthe preparation ofthe record indicate that the information

in the recordlackstrustworthiness. In this paragraph, "business" includes business, institution, association,

profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or notconducted for profit.
Significant Case Decisions

Videotape ofextraction ofinmatefrom his cell

o Videotape was admissible in a hearing terminating the employment ofa correctional officer (alleging
unnecessary force inremoving inmate from a cell). Itwas found to beadmissible ontwo different theories,
one of which was that it was a business record in Dept. ofPublic Safety v. Cole, 342 Md 12,27-28, 672 A.

2d 1115 (1996).95 The videotape was "properly authenticated aspart ofthe correctional institution's
business records." It "was theregular practice ofthe correction institution to make andretain videotaped

cell extractions, presumably as a protection for both the inmates and the institution." Aproper chain of
custody was established. 342 Md. at29-30. Admission atthe administrative proceeding was also approved
by the Court under the "silent witness" method ofauthentication ofphotograph and videotape evidence,
which does not require the testimony ofawitness.96 The Court referred tothe ability touse the concepts in
Maryland Rule 5-406 pertaining to habit and routine practice and Rule 5-803(b)(6) concerning business
records to have these records introduced."The "silentwitness" theory of admissibility authenticates a

photograph as a "mute" or"silent" independent photographic witness because the photograph speaks with
its own probative effect." 342 Md. at 21.

(3) d. Illegally obtained evidence.

The exclusionary rule applicable to illegally obtained evidence ina criminal proceeding is not
generally applicable toadministrative proceedings. The Court ofAppeals has stated: ". . . [A]s a matter
ofMaryland administrative law, we are unwilling tohold that such evidence is always admissible."
Police seized narcotics andrelated paraphernalia illegally from citycorrectional officers (without

probable cause and without a warrant). That evidence was sought tobe introduced in an employee
discharge proceeding. Such "evidence is inadmissible in civil administrative discharge proceedings where
the defendant establishes that thepolice were improperly motivated to illegally seize evidence to benefit

civil proceedings" The evidence, when properly challenged is inadmissible upon a finding ofbad faith. .
98

95 "We are called upon inthe instant case todetermine whether a videotape may be admissible inevidence inan administrative
hearing even though no witness testifies that what is depicted on the videotape isafair and accurate representation ofwhat it

purports to show. For the following reasons, we answer in the affirmative and hold that the videotape was properly admitted into
evidence." Cole, 342 Md. at 17. The introduction ofvideotapes as evidence was discussed bythe Court in great detail. 342 Md.
at 20-30.

96 26 U. Bait. L. Rev. 98, Annual Review of Maryland Law (1996) reviewed this case.

97 Sheets v. City ofBaltimore, 315 Md. 208, 214-15, 553 A 2d 1281 (1989).

98 Sheetz, 315 Md. at215-217. The Court remanded the case for a proper determination onthe issue ofbad faith. The court listed
(not an exclusive list) some factors tobe considered in ascertaining the motivation behind an improper search and seizure:
1. whether, atthetime ofthe illegal search, the police were aware ofthe potential effect of using such evidence indevil
proceedings,

2. whether theseverity oftheconsequences ofa civil proceedings roughly paralleled or exceeded that ofthecriminal
proceedings,
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(3) e. Additional Evidence:
Sometimes a court is able to consider additional evidence not submitted to the agency. In most

instances, the reviewing court is going to be limited to the record produced before the Agency."
Significant Case Decisions

Judicial review usually means a reviewoftheproceedings before the agency
Does the statutesay that other evidence may be considered?

o

Fromberg v. Insurance Commissioner, 87Md. App. 236, 243-44, 589 A. 2d 544 (1991) saw the Court
considering the insurance article. The insurance code (then Article 48, section 40(4)) provided that the trial
court hearing thematter denovo should base its decision onthe agency record "together with such
additional evidence as maybe offered by any party to the appeal," it waserrorfor thetrialjudgenotto
allow the introduction of a California study regarding the future incidence of accidents based on a history

ofpast accidents where the insurer was attempting to deny renewal toan insured ofan automobile liability
policy. The final decision is tobe made by the Insurance Commissioner. Aremand tothe Commissioner is
to be made if the trial court determines that the additional evidence might change the decision. The Court
stated:

Although the trial court isnot permitted tosubstitute its judgment for that ofthe administrative
agency, where, as here, additional evidence is tobe submitted that might have an impact on the
decision ofthe administrative agency, the trialcourtis constrained to "consider the evidence

contained inthetranscript, exhibits, and documents therein filed bytheCommissioner, together
withsuchadditional evidence as may be offered by anyparty to the appeal." Md.Ann.Code art.
48A, §40(4) (1986). Upon considering the California Study together with the other evidence of
record, thetrial court must affirm theCommissioner unless it finds that "the substantial rights of

the petitioned ] may have been prejudiced," see Md.Ann.Code art. 48A, §40(5) (1986), for any of
the reasonsset forth in Article48A, section 40(5),supra. Accordingly, Fromberg is entitledto a

further hearing, wherein the court will consider the California Study along with the other evidence
presented inthe record. Should the trial court find that the Commissioner's "findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions," see Md.Ann.Code art. 48A, §40(5) (1986), thatmay have prejudiced
the petitioner might have been different ifthe "additional evidence" had been before the
Commissioner, then thetrialcourt should remand. It must not substitute itsjudgment forthe
expertise ofthe Commissioner. Muhlv. Magan, 313 Md. at479, 545 A.2d 1321.
87 Md. App. at 249.
Look at that statute?

What is theagency to consider when making a determination?
What evidence is thejudge to consideronjudicial review?

o

The record before the Maryland Insurance Administration consisted ofthe ALJ's findings, exceptions,
notice, documentary evidence and transcript inMehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 55, 806 A. 2d662

(2002). Inthis case, MIA reserved to itself the right tomake the final decision inthe case. Under MAPA
§10-218(9), exceptions are a part oftherecord that isbefore the agency inmaking its final determination.
Nothing inthe statute orcorresponding regulations precluded a party from offering new evidence in
support ofthe party's exceptions. Evidence offered in exceptions may become, unless properly rejected by
the agency, a part oftheadministrative record, subject tothe final administrative decision maker's ruling on
whether to admit and consider such evidence. 371 Md. at 60-62.

3.

whether a reasonable officer would have believed the search to be a proper one,

4. whether there was an agreement between the police and another party to pursue the investigation which led tothe
5.

improperlyobtained evidence, and
whether the police had a special interestin the case.

Citations here to authority here mean muchis to be read and considered in applying these factors.
99 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 59-60, 806A. 2d 662(2002).
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(3) f. Judicial Determination.

Is an agency ableto relyon a circuit court judge's finding ofthe guiltof a State employee in a
nonjury, criminal case fortelephone misuse as evidence when determining whether to discipline the
employee. It alldepends as to whether theconviction is admissible, ". . .[T]he distinction between
judicial and administrative proceedings iscritical. ... [A] judgment of conviction, under Maryland's

law ofevidence . . . could not be used in a subsequent civil case to prove the underlying facts.1 °
"Although that 'which is inadmissible in ajudicial proceeding is not perse inadmissible in an
administrative proceeding,' thatwhich is admitted inanadministrative proceeding must have sufficient

reliability and probative value to satisfy procedural due process."101
Significant Case Decisions

o InPowell v. MarylandAviation, 336 Md. 210,219,647 A. 2d 437 (1994), the Court held that guilty finding
in a criminal case in which misconduct of a stateemployee was chargedcould be used as evidence of
misconduct in an administrative termination proceeding. Operative on the issue of admissibility is SG §10-

213. The ALJ erred ingiving conclusive effect tothe guilty finding. 336 Md. at219. The distinction

between judicial and administrative proceedings is critical. Id. Telephone misuse was the event atissue.
Due process considerations attend the introduction ofthe court decision and its consideration by the ALJ.
(3) g. Polygraph Evidence:

Legislative intent directs that polygraph evidence be excluded in administrative proceedings. This
evidence is deemed not trustworthy by Maryland appellate courts.
Significant CaseDecisions
Inherently unreliable

o In Dept. ofPublic Safety v. Scruggs, 79 Md. App. 312, 321, 556 A. 2d 736 (1989), the Court addressed a
case involving the termination ofemployment for acorrectional officer, who was alleged to have sexual
relations with three female inmates, it was argued that polygraph evidence should be allowed because the
technical rules of evidence were notapplicable to administrative proceedings. Objection was made to the

use ofpolygraph evidence taken from inmates to the effect they were truthful in saying that the sexual

relations hadoccurred. Id., at 316.102

The Maryland judiciary's distrust ofpolygraph evidence is well documented. Because oftheir
"unreliability," Maryland courts exclude any evidence ofpolygraph tests, orevidence based on
them, even ifthe parties stipulate to the admissibility ofthe test results. Even an unsolicited
reference by a complaining witness to the fact that he or she took apolygraph test has been found
to be prejudicial error, despite the judge's instruction to the jury to disregard, when the crucial

issue at trial was the credibility of that witness.
79 Md. App. at 321-22.

Reviewing SG §10-208(c), the Court noted that "incompetent" evidence was to be excluded from
introduction during an administrative proceeding. "The question which arises, then, is whether we consider

polygraph evidence so unreliable as to deem it 'incompetent.'" Id., at 322-23. Areview ofprior appellate

court decisions concerning polygraph evidence and the decision that this evidence did not meet the 'general
100 Powell v. Maryland Aviation, 336Md. 210, 219, 647 A. 2d437 (1994).

101 Powell, 336 Md. at 220 citing: "Maryland Dep't ofHuman Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 595, 565 A.2d
1015, 1025 (1989), cert, denied sub nom. Cassilly v. Maryland Dep't ofHuman Resources, 494 U.S. 1067, 110 S.Ct. 1784, 108
L. Ed. 2d 786 (1990); see also A.Rochvarg, Hearsay in State Administrative Hearings: The Maryland Experience and

Suggestions for Change, 21 U. Bait. L. Rev. 1,3 (1991). Powell does not contend that the circuit judge's guilty finding is so

lacking in probative value that its use offends due process, so long as that use isnot conclusive."
102 Astothe examiner who submitted aproposed decision for consideration bythe Agency: "He further stated 'it isimprobably
that the three inmates could have entirely fabricated their story ofMs. Scruggs' having one act of intercourse with each ofthree,

then coordinated their story with Mr. Scruggs' schedule and carried the story through so as to outwit the polygraph." Scruggs, 79
Md. App. at 217.
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acceptance' standard of reliability, meant it wasnot to be introduced in the administrative proceeding. 79
Md. App. at 324.

(3) h. Relevancy.

If evidence is not relevant, it has no place be considered by an administrative agency. To that effect
SG §10-213(d)(2) statesthat irrelevant evidence may be excluded. As with court proceedings, the
Maryland Rules of Evidence, though not binding in administrative proceedings, givea good view ofthe
law regarding what evidence is irrelevant and what is not.
Rule 5-401. Definition of "relevant evidence".

"Relevantevidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existenceof any fact that is of

consequence to the determination ofthe action more probable orless probable than itwould bewithout the
evidence.

Rule 5-402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.

Except as otherwise provided byconstitutions, statutes, orthese rules, orbydecisional law not inconsistent
withtheserules, all relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.

The Maryland rules of evidence say that evidence that isnot relevant is "notadmissible." SG §10213(d)(2) ispermissive instating that irrelevant evidence "may' beexcluded. Whatever play one wants
tomake with language itseems evident that irrelevant evidence does not form the basis ofany decision
that is required to be made and therefore must beexcluded.

There isthat "balancing" testto be done by trial courts even when evidence is relevant. Prejudice is
more often addressed to a jury casethan a casebefore a trained trier of fact.
Rule 5-403. Exclusion of relevant evidenceon grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded ifits probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger ofunfair prejudice, confusion ofthe issues, or misleading the jury, orby considerations ofundue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Still, it isto be noted that SG 10-213(d)(4) allows an agency to exclude evidence that is"unduly
repetitious."

Significant Case Decisions

What if thepatients of thephysician do not want an inquiry into their confidential matters?
o

Dr. Solomon contended in Solomon v. Board ofMedicine, 155 Md. App. 687, 705-06, 845 A. 2d 47 (2004)
thattheALJabused her discretion in denying Dr. Solomon's request to calla number of witnesses to testify
onherbehalf, namely ina physician disciplinary proceeding. She wanted to call 9 patients whose medical
records the Board had subpoenaed; a retired Administrative Law Judge, John Appel; and a dentist, Michael

Baylin. She proffered that the 19 patients would testify "that they do not wish their confidential medical
records be turned overto the Board"; Mr. Appel would opine as an expert thatthe lawdid not require Dr.
Solomon to comply with the December 2nd subpoena because itwas overbroad and therefore invalid; and

Dr. Baylin would testify that hehad not been punished for failing to comply with a medical records
subpoena, which the Board ofDental Examiners had issued during an investigation ofhim. The Court
stated:

AnALJ ispermitted to exclude evidence that is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, orunduly
repetitious. Md. Code (1984,1999 Repl. Vol.), §10-213(d) ofthe State Government Article. We
do not disturb such rulings absent anabuse ofthe ALJ's discretion. See Maryland State Police v.
Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 557, 625 A.2d 914 (1993) (stating that "as long asanadministrative
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agency's exercise of discretion does not violate regulations, statutes, common lawprinciples, due
process and other constitutional requirements, it is ordinarily unreviewable by the courts").
In this case, the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in excluding the testimony ofthe 19 patients,

Mr. Appel, and Dr. Baylin. The proffered testimony of these witnesses simplywas not relevant to
the issues before the ALJ—whether Dr. Solomon failed to cooperate with an investigation by the

Board, and whether she exercised unprofessional conduct in the practice ofmedicine.103
The Consumer Protection Division said we did thefollowing things wrong

We want to admit affidavitsfrom 80 customers which to tellyou how wellwe treated them
Relevant? Irrelevant?

o

T-Up, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, 145 Md. App. 27, 801 A. 2d 173 (2002) saw anallegation that
it was error for the ALJ not to admit affidavits from eighty of a Company's customers which stated these

customers had favorable experiences withthe Company's products and its employees. 145 Md. at 66-67.
The Division foundfalse advertising of twoproducts soldby the Company as cures or treatments for
cancer, AIDES, andHIV. 145 Md. at 35. The A1J said theaffidavits didnot meetthe initial testof
relevance. "The ruling was correct because the affidavits do not show support for appellants'

representations that meets the Standard. Even though itwas within the discretion ofthe ALJ toadmit the
affidavits intothe record, the decision to require strictrelevancy was not an abuse of discretion on the facts

here. The fact thateighty consumers were satisfied with the products does notnecessarily mean that the

products were effective." 145 Md. at67.104
(3) i. Telephone Testimony and Video Conferencing
Issues of both the introduction oftelephone and video evidence and the conduct of hearings before an

agency via telephone or video evidence can arise. SG §10-211 addressed the subject ofhearings
conducted by electronic means. The main issue with this address is going tofocus on the ability ofthe

trier offact to eye ball the witnesses and make credibility determinations.105 SG §10-211 addresses this
issue.

SG §10-211. Hearings conducted by electronic means.

(a) Permitted.- Inaccordance with subsection (b) ofthis section, a hearing may beconducted by

telephone, video conferencing, or other electronic means.
(b) Objections.-

(1) For good cause, a party may object to the holding ofa hearing by telephone, video conferencing, or

other electronic means.

(2) Ifa party establishes good cause in opposition tothe holding ofa hearing by telephone orother
similar audio electronic means, thehearing shall beheld in person or by video conferencing or other similar
audiovisual electronic means.

(3) Ifa party establishes good cause in opposition to the holding ofahearing by video conferencing or
other similar audiovisual electronic means, the hearing shall be conducted in person.
[1993,ch.59,§l;1996,ch.96.]

103 Solomon v. Board ofMedicine, 155 Md. App. 687, 705-06, 845 A. 2d 47 (2004). "As for Dr. Solomon's patients, this Court
has made clear that patients have no veto power over subpoenas issued by the Board in the course ofinvestigating aphysician."
155 Md. App. at 705.

104 An FTC case was cited, analogy was made to Rule 5-701 and further analysis was made bytheCourt insupport ofits
decision. T-Up, 145 Md. App. at 68-70.
105 There is a circuit court rule governing the taking of depositions by telephone;
Rule 2-418. Deposition - By telephone.

The parties may stipulate inwriting, orthe court on motion may order, that a deposition be taken by telephone. The
officer before whom the deposition istaken may administer the oath bytelephone. Forthepurpose ofthese rules, a
deposition taken bytelephone istaken atthe place where the deponent answers the questions.

Although the rule does not so state, there isgoing to be adifficulty encountered whenever a litigant generates the ability or
inability ofthe trier offeet tojudge the credibility ofawitness by anything other than aface tofact confrontation. With
depositions, not taken tobeintroduced into testimony, the issue isfact finding, not credibility.
110

COMAR 28.02.01.17 also addresses this issue:

COMAR 28.02.01.17 Conduct of Hearings.
B. Telephone Hearings.

(1) If a party does not object and establishgood cause for the objection, the judge may conduct all or
part ofthe hearing by telephone or othersimilar audio electronic means, if each participant in the hearing
has an opportunity to participate in and hear the entire proceeding.
(2) If a party establishes good cause in opposition to the holding of a hearing by telephone or other
similar audio electronic means, the hearing shall be held in person or by video conferencing or other similar
audiovisual electronic means.

(3)All substantive andprocedural rights apply to telephone hearings, subject onlyto the limitations of
the physical arrangement.

(4) Documentary Evidence. For a telephone hearing, documentary evidence to be offered shallbe
mailed by the proponent to all parties and the Office at least5 daysbefore the hearing.

(5) Default. Fora telephone hearing, the following may beconsidered a failure to appear and grounds
for default, if the conditions exist for morethan 15minutes afterthe scheduled time ofthe hearing:
(a) Failure to answer the telephone;
(b) Failure to free the telephone for a hearing; or

(c) Failure to be ready to proceed withthe hearing as scheduled.
C. Video Hearings.

(1) If a party does notobject and establish good cause for the objection, thejudge may conduct allor
part ofa hearing by video orother similar audiovisual electronic means, if each participant inthe hearing
hasan opportunity to participate in, hear, andseethe entire proceeding.

(2) Ifa party establishes good cause inopposition tothe holding ofa hearing by video orother similar
audiovisual electronic means, the hearing shall be held in person.

(3) All substantive and procedural rights apply tovideo hearings, subject only tothe limitations ofthe
physical arrangement.

(4) Default. For a video hearing, the following may be considered a failure to appear and grounds for
default, if the conditions exist for more than 15 minutes after the scheduled time ofthe hearing:
(a) Failure to be presentin the designated video hearing room; or
(b) Failure to be ready to proceed with thehearing as scheduled.

Circuit Court proceedings very often involve videotape testimony. This isespecially sowith expert testimony.
See: Rule 2-416. Deposition - Videotape and audiotape.

Significant Case Decisions

Objection to the telephoneconferencehearing

o An applicant for a day care license has no right to present evidence by telephone atthe hearing todetermine
whether that license shouldbe awarded. Dept. ofHuman Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175,20203, 652 A. 2d 1183 (1995). The Court stated:

We agree that theALJ properly excluded Morrison's telephone testimony. Attheadministrative
hearing, Ms. Thompson sought to introduce Morrison's telephone testimony and CCA objected. 11
According to COMAR 28.02.01.17(b)(1), which governs theuse of telephonic testimony in
administrative hearings, "the judge may, with consent ofthe parties, conduct all or partofthe
hearing by telephone." (Emphasis added). See also, S.G. § 10-211 (1993 Repl. Vol., 1994
Cum.Supp.). Because the agency objected tothe presentation of Morrison's testimony by
telephone, the ALJ was without authority toadmit it. On remand, however, ifMs. Morrison

appears, orifthere isno objection to her testimony by telephone, her testimony would not be
inadmissible merely because it pertains to thequestion ofthe occurrence ofthe child abuse.
103 Md. App. at 202-03.

Ill

Afair and accuraterepresentation of. . .

o Videotape was admissible even though nowitness testified that what was depicted onthevideotape is"a
fair and accurate representation ofwhat it purports to show" in a hearing terminating theemployment of a
correctional officer inDept. ofPublic Safety v. Cole, 342 Md 12, 17, 672 A. 2d 1115 (1996). Chain of
custody was notan issue. Departure from the requirement of an accurate representation witness, theCourt
said the evidence was admissible under the "silent witness" theory of admissibility:

The"silentwitness" theory of admissibility authenticates a photograph as a "mute" or "silent"

independent photographic witness because the photograph speaks with its own probative effect.106

We do note that a foundation is adequate, at leastfor an administrative hearing, if there are
sufficient indiciaof reliability so thatthe trier of fact can "reasonably inferthat the subject matter

iswhat its proponent claims."107
. . . Galley testified at thehearing that cell extractions are ordinarily videotaped at the
institution. . . routinely labeled with the date andtime ofthe extraction andthe names ofthe
inmate and officers involved ... keptin anindividual envelope and . . . stored in a security vault
. ., andit [was] not disputed that Officer Cole was depicted in the videotape. . . . [T]his
evidence is sufficient to prove in anadministrative hearing thatthe videotape was properly made

inconformity with the routine practice oftheprison and thus, supports the trustworthiness, and
reliability ofthe videotape.108
If this authentication process looks to the reader asa business record, thatlook is a wise one. The Court
also said admission was proper under that evidence theory. 342 Md. at27-30. The Court reviewed indetail
the theory ofthe"silent witness" theory citing treatise authority and case law from other jurisdictions. 342
Md. at 21-26. It stated: "We declineto adopt any rigid, fixed foundational requirements necessaryto

authenticate photograph evidence under the 'silent witness' theory." Id. Inthis case, the possibility of
tampering was said to be remote. Id.

(3) j. The Requirement of an Oath

Hundreds ofyears of both English and American law dictate that to beadmissible and trustworthy
testimony must be presented under oath. COMAR 28.02.01.08 authorizes an ALJ to "administer oaths
and affirmations."

Significant Case Decisions
Statements under oath do not evidence make

o

At issue in Heard v. Foxhire Associates, LLC, 145 Md. App. 695, 806 A. 2d 348 (2002)was whetherthe
evidence was sufficient to sustain the decision ofthe Board of Appeals of Washington County. Statements

by an attorney are not evidence. Sufficiency was questioned because the Board's decision granting a
special exception to extend the entrance toa retail shopping center owned by Foxshire through a
subdivided residential lot, alsoowned by Foxshire, adjacent to the shopping center wasbased on trial
counsel's narrative. Evidence produced may bepresented bycounsel. 145 Md. App. at 704-07. Asto the

application ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct, there exists a distinction between a "trial" and a
"hearing." 145 Md. App. at707. "Itisimperative that evidence given before an adjudicatory body be under
oath, whether from an attorney or layperson, a lay witness or an expert witness." Id. Discounting the
Board'sreliance on the "evidence" presented by Foxshire's counsel in opening statement means the

evidence in support ofthe special exception did not exist. 145 Md. App. at 708-09.109

106 Cole, 342 Md. at21. TheCourt reviewed in detail the theory citing treatise authority and case law from other jurisdictions.

342 Md! at 21-26.

107 Cole, 342Md. at26.The Court said: "We decline to adopt any rigid, fixed foundational requirements necessary to
authenticate photograph evidenceunder the 'silent witness'theory."
108 Cole, 342 Md. at 27. The possibility of tampering was saidto be remote.

109 TheCourt commented onthe waythe oath can be administered during a zoning hearing. Nothing beats individual swearing
and identity ofthe witnesson therecord. Heard, 145 Md. App. at709.
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(4) The Right to Present Evidence and Cross-Examine

Fundamental to due process is the rightof an individual to have a meaningful hearing. To that extent both
the constitution of Maryland and the United States provide for a hearing. That hearing must be
meaningful.

SG §10-213. Evidencein section(f) delineates the scopeof evidence to be allowed in an
administrative proceeding:
SG §10-213. Evidence.

(f) Scope of evidence.- On a genuine issue in a contested case, eachparty is entitled to:
(1) call witnesses;
(2) offer evidence, including rebuttal evidence;

(3) cross-examine any witness that another party or the agency calls; and
(4) present summation and argument.

(g) Documentary evidence.- Thepresiding officer may receive documentary evidence:
(1) in the form of copies or excerpts; or
(2) by incorporation by reference.

Hearings before anALJ include COMAR 28.02.01.18. Evidence. That section provides that evidence is
to be admitted in accord with SG §10-213.

(5) Privileges

Privileges granted by the Legislature orotherwise recognized by law must be recognized inadministrative
proceedings. SG §10-213(e) specifically states: "the presiding officer shall apply a privilege that law
recognizes."

As to what privileges are recognized byMaryland law, the case ofPorter Hayden v. Bullinger, 350
Md. 452,713 A.2d 962 (1998) states that a party may not obtain information that is privileged. The
Court does a good job of listing various privileges that may be available and asserted:
Under thegeneral discovery rule, a party may obtain discovery of information that is relevant and not
privileged. Privileges prohibiting or limiting the introduction ofevidence are created bythe United States
Constitution, the Maryland Constitution, statutes, and common law. The Fifth Amendment ofthe United
StatesConstitution and Article22 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rightsprotect againstcompulsory selfincrimination. Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 682, 637 A.2d 117, 128, cert, denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S. Ct.
109,130L. Ed.2d 56 (1994); Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 535, 560A.2d 1108, 1111 (1989); Lodowski v.

State, 307 Md. 233, 246-47, 513 A.2d 299, 306-07, cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1086, 106 S. Ct. 1469, 89L. Ed.
2d 725 (1986). There are also numerous Maryland statutory privileges. See Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl.
Vol., 1997 Supp.), § 9-105 ofthe Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ)(confidential marital
communications privilege); CJ § 9-106 (spousal privilege); CJ § 9-107 (privilege against selfincrimination); CJ § 9-108 (attorney-client privilege); CJ § 9-109 (patient-psychotherapist privilege); CJ
§ 9-109.1 (client-psychiatric mentalhealth nursingspecialist privilege); CJ § 9-110 (client-accountant
privilege); CJ § 9-111 (priest-penitent privilege); CJ § 9-112 (newspaper person-news source

privileged); and CJ § 9-121 (social worker-client privilege). Certain common-law rules also prevent the
discovery oruse attrial of certain matters. Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 562,414 A.2d 914, 924
(1980) ( "The executive privilege concept has been considered partofthe common law of evidence.").
Respondents have asserted no privilege pertaining to theamounts ofthe settlement agreements they
negotiatedwith other potentiallyresponsible parties.
Bullinger, 350 Md. at 461-62. [Emphasis by bold]

As to what else is or is not privileged, Tax Returns weresaid not to be privileged inAshton v.

Cheme Contracting Corp., 102 Md. App. 87, 648 A.2d 1067 (1994) (claimant inWorker's Compensation
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case required to furnish state/federal, returns (joint with hiswife) that are relevant to claim, as are postinjury wages to the issue of actual incapacity inoccupational disease cases) Id., at 94, 99. Judge Alpert
does an exhaustive review ofthe tax return privilege issue.

(6) Agency Expertise

Throughout Maryland case lawthere arereferences to the fact thatjudicial review must include the fact
that there has to be deference to agency expertise in a particular area. In addition SG §10-213 takes
special notice of expertise that may exist with an agency.
SG §10-213. Evidence.
(h) Officialnotice offacts.-

(1)The agency or the Office may takeofficial notice of a factthat is:
(i) judicially noticeable; or

(ii)general, technical, or scientific and within the specialized knowledge ofthe agency.
(2) Before taking official notice of a fact, thepresiding officer:

(i) before orduring the hearing, by reference in a preliminary report, orotherwise, shall notify each
party; and

(ii)shall giveeachparty an opportunity to contest the fact,

(i) Evaluation.- The agency orthe Office may use its experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge in the evaluation of evidence.

(7) Representation at the Hearing

In Chapter 5. D. Representation ofPersons before OAH, there are provisions for who, in addition to an
attorney, may represent an individual at an agency proceeding held before OAH. Throughout the
Maryland Annotated Code, there are various references to the right ofan individual to be represented by
an attorney. For example: BR §9-312(e) concerned with the licensing ofLandscape architects specifically
states "the individual may be represented atthe hearing by counsel;" AG §2-311 addresses the procedure
to be utilized in disciplinary proceedings against Veterinarians and specifically states in (b) that a licensee
has the right to be represented by counsel before the Board; and HO §8-317(d) provides that "the person
may be represented at the hearing by counsel" at adisciplinary proceeding before the Board ofNursing.
Even without specific statutory authority, itis difficult to imagine an agency having the right to deny
the request ofan individual to be represented by counsel at an administrative proceeding. SG §10-206.1
addresses the issue:

SG §10-206.1. Legal practice.
(a) Practice before agency.- An agency may not:

(1) grant the right topractice law toan individual who is not authorized topractice law;
(2) interfere with the right ofa lawyer topractice before an agency orthe Office; or

(3) prohibit any party from being advised or represented at the party's own expense by an attorney or, if

permitted by law, other representative.

(b) Publiclyprovided legal services.- Subsection (a) ofthis section may not be interpreted to require the

State to furnish publicly provided legal services in any proceeding under this subtitle.
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(8) The Burden of Proof

"The standard of proofin a contested case shall bethepreponderance of evidence unless the standard of
clearand convincing evidence is imposed on the agency by regulation, statute, or constitution." See: SG
10-217110
SG §10-217. Proof.

Thestandard of proofin a contested caseshall be the preponderance of evidence unless the standard of
clearand convincing evidence is imposed on the agency by regulation, statute, or constitution.

As to the standard ofthe burden of proofto be applied in administrative proceedings, the Court of

Appeals did an extensive review ofthe subject in 2002 settling on the holding, that inthe absence ofa
legislative orregulatory enactment tothe contrary, the standard in State and County administrative

proceedings is probably going to be by a"preponderance ofthe evidence."111

In 2001, the Court of Special Appeals thoroughly reviewed burden of proof in administrative

proceedings inan LEORB case. "An administrative case isa civil case and, as such, the standard ofproof
isgenerally the preponderance ofthe evidence." That is, unless the constitution, a statute ora regulation
makes the standard of clear and convincing evidence applicable. ". . . [I]n some instances, proofof a

case byclear and convincing evidence may bemore appropriate "because ofthe seriousness ofthe
allegations."112 Even when charges fit within the "fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct" category, an

administrative agency is not required to apply aclear and convincing test.113 Addressing due process
concerns, the Court stated that it is in reality, an administrative proceeding thatis being conducted by law

persons.114 The conclusion: "We decline torequire police hearing boards to apply different standards of
proof indifferent cases depending upon the charges that are brought against an officer."
The Court of Special Appeals reviewed theconcept of due process in the form of what burden of
proof should be applicable inadministrative proceedings alleging theft and dishonesty against a police
officer in 2001. This was an LEORB case.1

Prior decisions "indicate that identificationofthe specific

dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
thatwillbe affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedure used, and the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
110 Bernstein v. RealEstate Commission, 221 Md. 221, 156A. 2d 657 (1959) was the first caseto interpret the MAPA which was
enacted in 1957. The Court stated: "With respect to the weightofthe evidence, it is true of course, that a mere surmise or

conjecture that iswas sufficient would notbeenough. The comparative degree of proof bywhich a case must beestablished is
the same in anadministrative as in a civiljudicial proceeding, i.e., a preponderance ofthe evidence is necessary, but proof
beyond areasonable doubt is notrequired. 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, Section 132." 221 Md. at232.
111 Coleman v. Anne Arundel Police, 369 Md. 108, 139, 797 A. 2d 770 (2002). Judge Harrell did an extensive review ofthe

applicable standards ofproof in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. 369 Md. at 127-41.
"2 Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dept., 136 Md. App. 419, 446, 766A. 2d 169 (2001) ( a police Board disciplinary
case) citing cases. A clear and convincing standard is applied incivil proceedings inwhich fraud, dishonesty orcriminal conduct
is alleged, butthat does notautomatically extend to administrative proceedings. Case law from other states was reviewed. 136
Md. App. at 447.

113 Coleman, 136 Md. App. at447-48, particularly discussing Meyers v. Montgomery County Police, 96Md. App.668, 626 A. 2d
1010 (1993).

114 Coleman, 136 Md. App. at448-49. InMeyers v. Montgomery County Police, 96 Md. App. 668, 626 A. 2d 1010 (1993) and
other cases, prior appellate opinions "indicate that identification ofthe specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and the probative value, if any, of additional orsubstitute
procedural safeguards; and finally theGovernment's interest, including the function involved and thefiscal and administrative
burdens thatthe additional or substitute procedural requirement wouldentail. Coleman, 136Md. App. at 448. The Coleman
Court addressed each of these factors in light ofthe theft and fraud charges brought. 136 Md. App. at 448-51.

115 Coleman, 136Md. App. at452.
116 Coleman v. AnneArundelCountyPolice Dept, 136 Md. App. 419, 766 A. 2d 169 (2001).
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safeguards; and finally theGovernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."117
Significant Case Decisions
There is no 100% certainty factor

o

Board ofCounty Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 837 A. 2d 1059 (2003) reversed
determining that it could not be 100% certain that real property to be developed wassafe from explosives
and thus the property was notto be developed. "The 100% certainty standard wasarbitrary because it is
impossible to demonstrated, based ona 100% certainty requirement, that any parcel of land is completely
safe. Therefore, by applying an incorrect standard, the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious." Id.,
at 33.118 The Board's determination constituted an errorof law and the agency decision is owed no

deference. A remand was ordered. 154 Md. App. at34.119
Application ofthe clear and convincing standard
o Everettv. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 513 A.2d 882 (1986) held that the clearand convincing

standard was applied in an administrative adjudication before the Maryland Public Service Commission.
TheCommission's proceedings were expressly are exempt from the contested case provisions ofthe State
APA. Coleman v. AnneArundel Police, 369 Md. 108, 124,797 A. 2d 770 (2002). This case was overruled

in 2002 withthe Court of Appeals stating that thecontours of general state administrative law principles
had evolved withthe Legislative pronouncement in favor of a preponderance standard. Coleman, 369 Md.
at 135. Because there was no legislative orregulatory enactment to the contrary, the preponderance test
applied to LEORB proceedings. Coleman, 369 Md. App. at 139.
Preponderance In disciplinary proceeding

o Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Dep't, 96 Md. App. 668, 626 A.2d 1010 (1993) held that the
preponderance ofthe evidence standard was determined to apply inan administrative disciplinary
proceeding brought by alocal police department under the LEOBR, where the police officer was charged
with excessive use of force in making an on duty arrest.

Termination ofemployment by a preponderance ofthe evidence standard

o

Applying a standard of by a preponderance ofthe evidence inan administrative proceeding terminating a
police officer through a finding of guilt ontheft counts and the loss of more than one million dollars in
actuarially calculated retirement benefits was notaviolation of due process inColeman v. Anne Arundel
Police, 369Md. 108,142,797 A. 2d 770 (2002). The Court discussed burdens of proofin civil litigation.
"The function of a standard of proof, asthatconcept is embodies in the Due Process Clause ... is to
'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence out societythinks he shouldhave in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Coleman, 369 Md. at 143 citing
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,423 (1979). Balancing private vs. public interests, and assuming the
officer properly demonstrated a liberty interest, the preponderance standard along withother procedures
afforded under LEORB"adequately protect anofficer against anerroneous deprivation ofhis orher due
process rights." 369 Md. at 149.

117 Coleman, 136 Md. App. at448. The Coleman Court addressed each of these factors in lightofthe theftand fraud charges
brought. 136 Md. App. at448-51. "We decline to require police hearing boards to apply different standards of proof in different
cases depending uponthe charges that are brought against anofficer." 136Md. App. at 452.
118 "The correct standard is whetherth evidence supports a finding of unreasonable risk and, if so, whether it couldbe
ameliorated." Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. at 33.
119 A remand was in order in this case. "Nevertheless, when and administrative agency renders a decision based on incorrect

legal standards, butthere exists some evidence, 'however minimal, that could beconsidered appropriately under the correct
standard, the case should be remanded so the agency can reconsider the evidence using the correct standard." Southern
Resources, 154 Md. App. at 34.
120 Coleman v. Anne Arundel Police, 369 Md. 108, 124, 797 A. 2d 770 (2002).
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Whatwill thefuture bring?

o

Zeigler argued that the charges against himfor filing a false statement wereakinto charges of fraud which
should require proofby clearand convincing evidence. These arguments werenot madebefore the circuit
court or the Court of Special Appeals. Ordinarily, the Courtof Appealswill consideronly an issuethat has
been raisedin the petitionfor certiorari or any cross-petition to preserve the issuefor review and that was
not done in this case. Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 562-63, 626 A. 2d 914(1993)

(9) Subpoenas

Many administrative agencies provide for the issuance bytheAgency of a subpoena fordocuments and
other matters. It is important to first notethat there is no absolute right, as there is with trial court
proceedings, to have a subpoena issued. Constitutional due process requires the right to a hearing and an
opportunity to beheard, and case law says that means the hearing must be meaningful. When and under
what circumstances does the right to have one subpoenaed to testify becomea part ofthe due process
requirements of a hearing.
A. Agency and Other Authority

As an example of Agency authorityto issue subpoenas, there is:

1. Authority ofthe AttorneyGeneral in consumer protection enforcement matters:
CL §13-405. Subpoena power.

(a) Authority ofAttorney General.- In thecourse of any examination, investigation, or hearing
conducted by him, the Attorney General may subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, examine an
individualunder oath, and compel production of records,books, papers, contracts, and other
documents.

(b) Information inadmissible incriminalproceeding.- Information obtained under thissection is
not admissible in a later criminalproceeding againstthe person who provides the evidence.
[An. Code 1957, art. 83, § 22; 1975,ch. 49, § 3.]

2. HO Title 18 deals with disciplinary action against psychologists.
HO §18-315. Same - Hearings.
(e) Subpoenas; oaths.-

(1) Over the signature of an officer or the administrator ofthe Board,the Boardmay issue
subpoenas and administer oaths in connection with any investigation underthis title and any
hearings or proceedings before the Board.

(2) The Boardshall issue subpoenas on behalfof the individual if the individual:
(i) Requests that the Board do so; and

(ii) States under oath thatthe testimony or evidence soughtis necessary to the individual's
defense.

(3) If, withoutlawful excuse, an individual disobeys a subpoena from the Boardor an orderby
the Board to take an oath, testify, or answera question, on petition ofthe Board, a court of
competent jurisdictionmay compel compliance with the subpoena.
[An. Code 1957, art. 43, § 636; 1981, ch. 8, § 2; 1983, ch.563; 1990, ch.6, § 11; 1993, ch. 13; 1999, ch. 112.]

3. LE §4-106 is concerned with the powersof mediation service and boards.
LE §4-106. General powers of Mediation Service and boards.

(a) Ingeneral.- Tothe same extent as a court ofthe State in a civilcase, the Mediation Service
or a board may:
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(1) conduct an investigation;
(2) hold hearings;
(3) administer oaths; and

(4) issue a subpoena for the attendanceof a witness to testify or the production of books,
papers, and other documents.
(b) Enforcement ofsubpoena.-

(1) If a person fails to complywith a subpoenaissued under this section, on petition ofthe
Mediation Service or board, a circuit court may compel compliance with the subpoena.

(2) A board shall petition the circuit court for the county where the board is meeting.
[An. Code 1957, art. 89, § 11; 1991, ch. 8, § 2.]

In addition, proceedings before OAH are subjectto a subpoena:

SG §9-1605(c) andCOMAR 28.02.01.08 address states the authority of an ALJto issue subpoenas:
COMAR 28.02.01.08 Powers and Duties of Judges.

B.Ajudge has thepower to regulate the course ofthe hearing and theconduct ofthe parties and
authorized representatives, including the power to:

(2) Issue subpoenas for witnesses and the production of evidence;
SG §9-1605. Administrative law judges.

(c) Powers generally.- In any contested case conducted byan administrative law judge, the
administrative law judge may:

(1) authorizethe issuanceof subpoenas for witnesses. . .

B. General Principles

The Court ofAppeals has set forth a three part test for determining the validity ofa subpoena issued by an
administrative agency. To determine the validity ofa subpoena, a reviewing court asks whether:
1. the inquiry is authorized by statute;
2. the informationsought is relevant to the inquiry; and

3. the information sought is relevant tothe inquiry.121
Agency enforcement of itssubpoena authority isthrough the circuit court.
Significant Case Decisions

The subpoena of these records would violate theprivacy rights of my patients
o InSolomon v. Board ofMedicine, 155 Md. App. 687,692. 845 A. 2d 47 (2004), the Board of Physicians
issued a issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding Dr. Solomon to produce the medical records of 19 of

her patients. She refused to comply the grounds that she was not under investigation bythe Board for
misconduct, the subpoena was overbroad, and hercompliance with the subpoena would violate her
patients' privacy rights. 155 Md. App. at692. The Court cited HG 4-306(b)(2) which provides for
permitted disclosures ofmedical records "to health professional licensing and disciplinary boards, in
accordance with a subpoena for medical records for the purpose of an investigation regarding:. .
licensure, certification, or discipline of a health care provider. . ." 155 Md. App. at 698. Thesubpoena
121 Solomon v. Board ofMedicine, 155 Md. App. 687, 699. 845 A. 2d47(2004) citing Banach v. State ofMaryland Comm'n on
Human Relations, 277 Md. 502, 356A.2d 242 (1976); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327U.S. 186,208, 90 L. Ed. 614,

66 S. Ct. 494 (1946); and Scheckv. Maryland Sec. Comm'r, 101 Md. App. 390, 393, 646 A.2d 1092, cert, denied, 337 Md. 43
(1994).
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was not overbroad as the Board had an interest in reviewing Dr. Solomon's patients' records for s sampling

to obtaininformation regarding the qualityof medicalcare Dr. Solomon provided, includingdiagnostic and
treatment information. Review ofthe records would also elicit information about Dr. Solomon's coding and

billing practices. Limiting the Board's examination to whether an "informed consent" form was included in
the patients' files, as Dr. Solomon suggests, wouldnot provide the information necessary to assist the Board
in determining if Dr. Solomon is rendering appropriate medical care. 155 Md. App. at 701.
There is no physician-patient privilege that would prohibit the subpoenaof these records by the Board

for investigatory purposes. 155 Md. App. at 702.122
Does a news reporter have a privilege not to testify at an administrativehearing?

o

Quashing an administrative subpoena for the appearance of a newsreporter to verify statements of a police
officer at a police disciplinary hearing was error andnot protected by privilege. PrinceGeorge'sCounty v.
Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 584, 822 A. 2d 537 (2003). ". . [NJeither the FirstAmendment northe

Maryland Shield Law entitles [reporters] to refuse to testify at [an] administrative hearing." Id.123
Allegingthe ALJ improperly denied a request to issue a subpoena
o In Forman v. MVA, 332 Md. 201, 630 A. 2d 753 (1993) a licensee claimed that the ALJ improperly denied

her request to subpoena a police officer ina license suspension hearing. The Court said that whether the
ALJ was correct depended onwhy the ALJ rejected therequest. A remand was in order because the Court
did not know why the ALJ did what he did. The Courtstated:

... We can saythat when faced witha licensee's proffer and subpoena request, an ALJ has three
distinct choices: (1) accept the proffer's contents astrue, and indicate this acceptance; (2) reach no
conclusion regarding thetruth ofthe proffer (essentially suspending judgment), and issue the

subpoena; or (3) reject the proffer and subpoena request entirely, and provide avalid explanation
ofthe rejection. This third option enables the ALJto dispose of frivolous orotherwise improper
subpoena requests. We emphasize that the ALJmay only avoid issuing the subpoena when he or
she explicitly accepts the proffer orrejects the proffer and provides abasis for this rejection.
The MAPA subpoena power (SG §12-103(c)) is permissive ("may"). The decision whether ornotto

issue asubpoena is "governed bythe general evidentiary standards set out inthe Administrative Procedure
Act" An MVA hearing "shall be conducted inaccordance with therules of evidence in §§10-208 and 10209ofthe State Government Article [the Administrative Procedure Act]")" By SG §10-2-8 irrelevant and

incompetent evidence may be excluded. Forman, 332 Md. at 222. In Addition COMAR 11.11.03.07
dealing withMVA hearings addresses subpoena hearings by providing:
COMAR 11.11.03.07. Request for Subpoenas.

C. A request may be refused if thetestimony orevidence to be offered:
(1) Is immaterial, irrelevant, or undulyrepetitious; or
(2) Doesnot pertain to a genuine issue in the contested case."

If it is determined that a subpoena should notissue, a proffer of testimony is required for the court to
determine onjudicial review whether the decision was correct. 332 Md. at223.
122 Solomon, 155 Md. App. at702. HG §4-306(b). . . lists those situations inwhich ahealth care provider "shall disclose a
medical record without the authorization of a person ininterest." (Emphasis in original) Other cases including that of Dr. K v.

State Board ofPhysician Quality Assurance, 98 Md. App. 103, 632 A. 2d 453 (1993) cert denied, 513 U.S. 817 (1994). Id., at
702-73. ". . . [T]here isno testimonial physician-patient privilege in Maryland outside ofthe mental health field." Solomon,
155 Md. App. at 703-04. Therefore, no physician-patient privilege precluded Dr. Solomon from turning over records to the
Board. Solomon, 155 Md. App. at 705.

123 Disciplinary proceedings were brought against Officer lot for astatement attributed tohim inthe Washington Post tothe

effect thathe would have shot someonehad he been on the scene. Id., at 584. First Amendment law was reviewed and found not

applicable as newspaper reporters have no better testimonial privilege than other citizens. The law was examined in depth.
Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 587-99. "Officer Lott has aright to cross-examine witnesses who testify against him." 150 Md. App. at
597. There isaMaryland Shield Law which changed the common law of no privilege afforded newsmen. 150 Md. App. at 600.
Court ordered disclosure isa part of that law when there isasignificant legal issue and the information could not beotherwise
obtained. 150 Md. App. at 602. Remand was required for the trial court tomake adetermination ofwhether the witness was
compellable. 150 Md. App. at 603.
124 The Forman Court stated:
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(10) Postponements

The one conducting a contested case hearing is often requested to postpone thathearing. When that
hearing is conducted beforean ALJ, there is a COMAR provision:
COMAR 28.02.01.08 Powers and Duties of Judges.

B.Ajudge has the power to regulate the course ofthe hearing and the conduct ofthe parties
and authorized representatives, including the power to:
(7) Grant a continuance or postponement;

No matter who conducts the hearing, any consideration of whether to grant a postponement has to be

recognized as involving due process rights toa fair hearing and the opportunity to be heard.
Significant Case Decisions

Is there anything to indicate he was unable to attend thehearing?
o In Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dept., 136 Md. App.419, 766 A. 2d 169(2001) therewas a
contention that Mr. Coleman wasnot competent to attend a police officer disciplinary hearing. A due

process violation was alleged. While the appellant was on the Family and Medical Leave Act due to mental
illness, 136 Md. App. at428, there was nothing in the record to indicate hewas notable to attend the
hearing. No motions were filed on the grounds ofcompetency, and the issue ofcompetency and need for a
further continuance had not been raised until after he had testified. 136 Md. App. at 435. The abilityto

defend at an administrative hearing "is akin to competency to stand trial," which requires thata defendant
must exhibit both the "present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding - and ... a rational aswell asa factual understanding ofthe proceedings against him." 136

Md. App. at436. Later testimony by Mr. Coleman indicated "that he was able to comprehend fully what
was going on and torespond appropriately to questions that were asked ofhim by both the prosecutor and
his own attorney. In short, there was nothing to give the Board any indication that appellant was not
competent such that his competency should have been questioned sua sponte." 136 Md. App. at436-37.

(11) Closing and Summation

SG §10-206 (MAPA) enables OAH to govern procedures and practice for contested cases. Agencies may
also adopt regulations to govern procedures under the MAPA. COMAR 28.02.01.17A.(4) states that ina
hearing before OAH, a party is entitled to make opening andclosing statements.

Should the ALJ decide notto accept a licensee's proffered testimony astrue, then failure to grant licensee's subpoena

request may bean abuse of discretion when the proffered testimony (1) does not fall within the categories of excludable
evidence found in COMAR andthe Code and (2)the ALJ provides no valid reasons why the proffer wasrejected. In
Forman's case, the evidence proffered metboththestatutory and regulatory standards and there wasno other apparent

reason to reject theproffer. The proffered evidence directly "pertain[ed] to agenuine issue inthecontested case,"
COMAR 11.11.03.07C(2), namely, whether Forman was properly and fully advised ofthe administrative sanctions to
beimposed for refusing the test. Further, our earlier discussion should make clear that evidence pertaining tonegation
ofthe advice of rights orinducement to refuse thealcohol concentration testis neither incompetent, irrelevant,
immaterial, nor unduly repetitious. See Md.Code (1984,1993 Repl.Vol.), State Government Art., §10-208(c) and
COMAR 11.11.03.07C(2). In fact, theofficer's advice to thelicensee is specifically established, by statute, asa
necessary issue to bedecided atthe hearing. As § 16-205.1(f)(7)® states: "At ahearing ... the only issues shall be...

(3) [w]hether the police officer requested atest after the person was fully advised ofthe administrative sanctions that
shall beimposed
" (Emphasis added). Thus, if the ALT did not accept the proffer as tothe officer's advice of rights,
he should haveissued the subpoena to require the detaining officer to testify atthe hearing.

Forman, 332 Md. at 223-24.
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Even without a statute or a rule, it seem unlikelythat one would be denied the right to give a closing
argument before the trier of fact.

G. Recusal
l.OAH

Disqualification of an ALJ is required "in which personal bias or other reasons render thejudge unable
to provide an impartial hearing and decision, orwhen anappearance of impropriety may reasonably be
inferred from thefacts."125 Any party may move for disqualification. A motion for disqualification must

be made "promptly" "upon discovering facts that establish grounds for disqualification."126
Substitution of an ALJ may be made if, for anyreason, a judge "is unable to continue presiding over

a pending hearing, or issue a proposed orfinal decision after the conclusion ofthe hearing" tothe extent
allowed by law. "The substitute may use theexisting record and conduct fiirther proceedings as are
necessary and proper."127
Significant Case Decisions
Personal involvement?

o

Case law relating to motions forrecusal in litigation other than thatinvolving administrative agencies can

give direction as tothe general application ofthe doctrine. See South Easton v. Easton, 387 Md. 468, 876
A. 2d 58(2005) (judge need not recuse himself from case concerning theclosing of a public street and
conveying a roadbed to a private hospital toallow new emergency room facility tobebuilt on the basis that
ruling could adversely affect medical care tohis wife, who was seriously ill- good review ofthe law and
difference between personal and judicial conduct-judge asked for specific examples of his impermissible
judicial conduct and answers given meant that conduct did not arise tothe level ofharassment. 387 Md. at
499-501.

Some ABC's ofrecusal

o

Dr. Regan filed a motion to recuse two Board members because he stated he intended to call them as
witnesses, thatthey were personally biased against him, and thatthey were personally involved in matters
asto with there were disputed evidentiary facts. Also he alleged thattwo Board members would benefit
economically from a decision adverse to him because their chiropractic practices were in the same

geographic area as Dr. Regan's practice and this fact created atleast an appearance ofimpropriety. That
motion was denied by the Board. Regan v. Board ofChiropractic, 120 Md. App. 494, 504-06, 707 A.2d
891 (1998) ajf'd 355 Md. 397 (1999)

On appeal the Court stated that there isa presumption inMaryland that ajudge is impartial and that
judge normally has a wide range ofdiscretion indetermining whether to recuse himself/herself from
hearings. Reference was made to the Maryland Code ofJudicial Conduct (Rule 16-813) and the Court
pointed out that rule 5-605 provides that ajudge presiding attrial may not testify as a witness atthat trial.
It was also noted that OAH requires disqualification when there is an appearance of impropriety which may
bereasonably inferred. COMAR 28.02.01.08. Regan v. Board ofChiropractic, 120 Md. App. 494, 511, 707
A. 2d 891 (1998) aff'd 355 Md. 397 (1999)

125 COMAR 28.02.01.08 C. The regulation states that"personal bias shall be presumed undercircumstances set forth in Canon
3D ofthe Code of Conduct for Judicial Conduct for Administrative Law Judges ofthe Office of Administrative Hearings."

126 Id. In Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 512, 707 A. 2d891 (1998), the Court stated:
With respect tothe OAH, an administrative law judge (ALJ) must conduct a full, fair, and impartial hearing. COMAR
28.02.01.08(A)(1). An ALJmust withdraw from aproceeding when "personal bias orother reasons render thejudge
unable toprovide an impartial hearing and decision, or when an appearance of impropriety may reasonably beinferred
from the facts." COMAR28.02.01.08(C)(1)(a). This provision isrelevant by analogy to the case before us because the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applies to ALJs andthe Board with relativelyequal force.
127 Id. Facts are sometimes determined on the base of demeanor based credibility.
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In this case there was no evidenceof bias and the generalities argued by Dr. Regan were not a sufficient

basis for disqualification of a Board member. Regan v. Board ofChiropractic, 120 Md. App. 494, 514,707
A. 2d 891 (1998) ajf'd 355 Md. 397 (1999) The Court ofAppeals affirmed citing theconcession at oral
argument b Dr. Regan that there was no showing ofactual bias, and referencing both COMAR 28.02.01.08
and theMaryland Code of Judicial Conduct in discussing the appearance of impropriety standard. Regan II,
355 Md. at 409-410. In addition the Court cited other case law regarding the proper standard to be applied

indetermining whether there is an"appearance of impropriety." One Board member didphone Dr. Regan
regarding a newspaper advertisement stating that Dr. Regan should include his own name inthe
advertisement. The Court stated the fact this Board membersat in judgment did "not rise to the level of an

appearance ofimpropriety." Regan v. State Board ofChiropractic, 355 Md. 397,412, 735 A. 2d 991
(1999).Case law demonstrated court rulings on the standard ofthe appearance of impropriety:
1. "Simply because an administrator may have some earlier knowledge ofa case does not mean that
heorshe isprecluded from rendering a fair decision after all ofthe evidence has been presented in
an evidentiary hearing."

2. "The mere recitation by anagency official ofthe underlying facts thatare alleged to support the

charges inquestion does not inherently manifest bias on the part ofthe agency official, soasto
preclude such official from rendering a fair decision after all the evidence has been brought out
through the adversial process."

3. "The issuance of press releases announcing charges bythe agency thatwill ultimately decide the
case does not violate due process guarantees."

4. "Anadministrative agency is sometimes required to act as both prosecutor and judge, and ithas
never been held that such procedure denies constitutional right."

5. " .. .[A] judge isnot necessarily disqualified for having earlier expressed anopinion as to a case."
355 Md. at 412-13.

The Court ofAppeals stated itdid not "believe that a reasonable person, knowing and understanding
all the relevant facts wouldbelieve that Dr. Lewis wasprejudiced because ofthe alleged seduction plot."

355 Md. at412. That plot did not involve any conduct on the part ofDr. Lewis; court are reluctant toallow

litigants to utilize motions for recusal to "judge shop;" and "Parties cannot be allowed to create the basis
for recusal by their own deliberate actions." 355 Md. at 414

2. Generally

Whether the individual(s) presiding other a hearing are members of a Board or agency or anALJ, there
sometimes arises a situation whererecusal is requested or required. It is APALegislative policy that

those persons involved in contested cases shall be treated "in a fair and unbiased manner in their efforts to
resolve disputes in administrative proceedings."128 Judicial review includes the right to reverse or modify
a decision "if any substantial right. . . may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or
decision is . . . unconstitutional.. .exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction ofthe final decision

maker .. .results from an unlawful procedure .. .is affected byany other error of law .. .isunsupported by

competent, material, and substantial evidence in light ofthe entire record as submitted... oris arbitrary or
capricious."129 That means going into a proceeding there isthe right to ask the trier to recuse
himselfTherself if objective reasons exist to make that request.
There are no definitions in the APA for the relevant terms of fair, unbiased, unlawful procedure

found in sections 10-201 and 10-222(h). The Court of Special Appeals has statedthat appropriate

analogies can be drawn from the Maryland Rules ofProcedure and case law.130 Rule 16-813, Canon 3(C)
states that ajudge should "notparticipate ina proceeding inwhich the judge's impartiality might
reasonably bequestioned, including butnot limited to instances where: . . . thejudge has a personal bias
orprejudice concerning a party, orpersonal knowledge ofdisputed evidentiary facts concerning the

128 SG §10-201.
129SG§10-222(h).
130 Board ofPharmacy v. Spencer, 150 Md. App. 138, 151, 819 A.2d383 (2003).
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proceeding;

"131 "The alleged bias and prejudice tobe disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial

source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than whatthe judge learned from his

participation in the case."132
"Courts haverecognized thatthere is a strong presumption thatjudges are impartial and will refrain
from presiding over a matter when appropriate." It is a presumption which can be overcome if "the

aggrieved party proves the existence ofactual bias."134 Statements ofgeneralities without specific
instances of improper conduct are not sufficient.135 "[I]t is essential that the judicial process not only
operate fairly and but also appear to operate fairly

[C]ourts have determined that recusal is

mandated when a trial judge reasonably appears to hold a bias or prejudice against the moving party."

The test isan objective one.136
Recusal was required when: (1) two members ofthe Board of Pharmacy allowed personal knowledge

ofdisputed evidentiary facts into the decision and order ofthe Board,137 (2) the Board reviewed
documents prepared by its attorney prior tothe introduction of evidence during the hearing, and aBoard
member called the attorney for Ms. Spencer a liar during thehearing. A Board member calling the

attorney for Ms. Spencer aliar during the hearing. There was an "unacceptable appearance of
impropriety."138
Two Board members were notrequired to disqualify themselves from a hearing on disciplinary

charges against Dr. Regan before the Board ofChiropractic.139 One Board member was alleged to have
been "personally involved in the events resulting in the filing ofadvertising charges," and the other Board
member was part of an alleged scheme byDr. Regan to compromise this Board member by engineering a
scheme to sexually compromise him by involvement with a woman patient.

131 Spencer, 150 Md. App.at 152.

132 Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 511, 707 A. 2d 891 (1998).
133 Id., (citations omitted)
134 Regan, 120 Md. App. at 152. (citations omitted)
135 Regan, 120 Md. App. at513-14.
136 Regan. The Court stated:

The test to be applied isan objective one which assumes that areasonable person knows and understands all the
relevant facts
Like all legal issues, judges determine appearance of impropriety - not bywhat astraw poll ofthe

only partly informed man-in-the-street would show -but by examining the record facts and the law, and then deciding

whether areasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge. (. . . "whether a
reasonable member ofthepublic knowing all the circumstances would be led tothe conclusion that the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
Id. (citations omitted)

137 Board ofPharmacy v. Spencer, 150 Md. App. 138, 153, 819 A.2d 383 (2003). "In and ofitself, the participation by aBoard

member inboth the settlement negotiations and the following hearing, does not pose aproblem. (. . . "administrative decision
makers do not automatically become biased merely because they have become familiar with the facts ofaproceeding through the
performance of their administrative duties").
138 Spencer, 150 Md. App.at 153-54. The Court stated:

In the instant case, areasonable member ofthe public knowing all the relevant facts would conclude that appellant's

impartiality was questionable. The hearing started out poorly when appellee's counsel arrived and "caught" the

members ofthe Board reviewing documents not inevidence before the hearing started. In addition, itwas inappropriate
for the Board toconsider anything itlearned during the unsuccessful settlement negotiations, when issuing its Final

Opinion and Order. Ofmuch more concern to this Court, however, is the statement by Ms. Hawkins to appellee's

counsel. Once the hearing deteriorated tothe point where amember ofthereviewing tribunal called the attorney for

appellee a"bold faced liar," the appearance ofimpartiality and fairness ofthe whole proceeding vanished.

150 Md. App. at 155.

139 Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 707 A.2d 891 (1998).
140 Regan, 120 Md. App. at506.
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Significant Case Decisions

Claim ofbias *preemptory challenge?
o In Coleman v. AnneArundel County Police Dept., 136 Md. App. 419, 766 A. 2d 169 (2001), a presiding
Board member was asked to recuse himself because the alleged offender had the right to a peremptory

challenge, and that the memberwas alleged to be biased againsthim having filed a prior complaint against
Officer Coleman. 136 Md. App. at 437. Record proceedings were examined in detail. 137 Md. App. at
437-39. Maryland strongly presumes thatjudgesare impartial. Any rightto a peremptory challenge had
not been timelyraised. The Board member did not initially recall filing charges; he indicated his concerns
in the pastwere unrelated to an integrity determination; andthe priorinvestigation hadbeenresolved to the
Board member's satisfaction. The Board member's questioning the behavior of Officer Coleman some

years earlier did not automatically disqualify him from the sitting on the Board in this case. 136 Md. App.
at 439-40.

The appearance ofimpropriety?

o

Anissue in Gigeous v. ECI, 363 Md. 481, 769 A. 2d 912 (2001) was whether the ALJ improperly denied
Petitioner's request to review a personnel file of a prior ALJ to determine whether nayimpropriety existed
with regard to ALJ taking a position against Gigeous ina prior hearing. 363 Md. at 506. It was argued that
impartiality is questioned with ALJ McCloud favored positions taken bytheagency where he later became
employed. 363 Md. at 509. The Court said that assuming thesituation could be said to have an appearance
of impropriety, Gigeous essentially obtained the relief he sought. The question was moot. ALJ Seaton

independently reviewed ALJ McCloud's rulings, and overruled him on one point tothe advantage ofthe
Petitioner on a burden of proof shift issue. 363 Md. at 510.

Exhaustion ofadministrativeremedies on the bias Issue

o

In PSC v. Schisler, 389 Md.27, 882 A. 2d 849 (2005), Wilson claimed thatthe PSCtermination of her
violated her due process rights by failing to provide an impartial agency adjudicator forher posttermination administrative appeal. 389 Md. at 38 The circuit court agreed but the Court of Appeals
reversed. Chairman Schisler, the individual who terminated Wilson, wasthe head of her principal unitand
the one under the statutory scheme who would ordinarily hear herappeal. She argued hewas biased against
herandthatthefailure to supply herwith an impartial trier for herappeal denied her a fundamental

constitutional right citing Article 24ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court said it would not
reach this question because it concluded that Wilson failed to invoke and exhaust her statutory remedies

provided to a management service at-will employee ofthe PSC who is terminated for reasons other than
misconduct. 389 Md. at 88-89.

Inthis case, [SPP] §11-113 provided a specific statutory administrative appeal process forcertain

categories of State employees, ofwhich Wilson was one. Although Wilson apparently submitted an
administrative appeal pursuant to §1-113 following her initial termination, she failed to do sowith
respect toher re-termination, instead opting to file an unsuccessful motion tohold the Commission in
contempt in the action inthe Circuit Court arising from the initial termination. We find that, before
Wilson could seek a judicial forum to resolve the disputes she seeks to raise with herre-termination,
she was required to file and prosecute toa final administrative decision an administrative appeal under
§11-113.141
389 Md. at 90

Not having filed that appeal, the doctrine ofexhaustion ofadministrative remedies applied and the
allegation was dismissed. 389 Md. at 93-94

Unconstitutional bias was alleged by Wilson. There is a constitutional exception to theexhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine. In this case, Wilson did not attackthe constitutionality of SPP §11-113, but

rather as applied to hersituation. Additionally, there was no record ofwhat the specifics ofWilson's allegations
of unconstitutionalbias were. 389 Md. at 91-92 "Furthermore,the Chairman's responses were not flippant,

141 Simply stated, the Court did not know what the Commission and Chairman Schisler would do had judicial review been
requested. Effort to file the appeal was minimal, she could have succeeded on appeal or Schisler may have concluded authority
should be delegated to another individual. Wilson, 389 Md. at 91-92.
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frivolous, or facetious on their fact." Citing Spencer, the Court saidtherewas no factual predicate for specific
personal bias or per se requirement of recusal. 389 Md. at 93

H. Disposition

Dismissal of a case "may" occur if the request for a hearing does notcontain anyof this information and

"shall" occur ifthe request does not contain the address ofthe person requesting the hearing.142 An
alternative to dismissal for a failure to include required information is the right of OAHto return the

hearing request with a request for resubmission with all required items. However, any resubmission
"does not extend the time within which the initial pleading is required to be filed."143

Disposition is best discussed with a recitation ofthe applicable sections from the MAPA and before
OAH:

(1). There can be a dismissal for a failure to attend or participate:
COMAR 28.02.01.20 Failure to Attend or Participate in a Hearing, Conference, or Other
Proceeding; Default.

A. If, after receiving proper notice, a party fails to attend or participate in a prehearing conference,

hearing, orother stage ofa proceeding, the judge may proceed in that party's absence ormay, in accordance
with the hearing authority delegated by the agency, issue a final orproposed default order against the
defaulting party.
B. Final Default Orders.

(1) On motion filed within 30 days after the date ofa final default order, the judge may, for good cause,
vacate ormodify the final default order and set the case in for further proceedings as appropriate.
(2) If a motion is denied, the final default order is effective.

C. Proposed Default Orders. Aproposed default order is reviewable inaccordance with the delegating
agency's regulations governing review of proposed decisions.

(2). The Decision made is either a proposed decision or a final decision:
"Whenthe OAH hears a contested case, it is directed by statute to "prepare proposedfindings of fact,
conclusions of law, or orders in accordance withthe agency's delegation under §10-205." APA § 10-

220(a). The agency then takes action on the proposed decision within sixty days. APA § 10-220(c)(l). If
the OAH "conducted the hearing andthe agency's proposed decision includes any changes, modifications,
or amendments tothe [OAH's] proposed findings, conclusions, or orders, [itsorder shall] contain an

explanation ofthereasons for each change, modification, oramendment." APA § 10-220(d)(4)."
"When [the agency] delegates the hearing responsibility toan ALJ, the ALJ becomes an extension of
[the agency]. Any responsibilities not expressly given the ALT remain with [the agency] and, unless
statutorily proscribed, [the agency] reserves the right toreview any aspect of anALJ decision." When
the ALJ files a proposed decision, theagency, the parties may file exceptions to the ALJ's proposed
order. The parties may then file exceptions tothe ALJ's proposed order. COMAR § 31.02.02.10. The

agency then makes the final decision.145

142 COMAR 28.02.01.04 C.
143 COMAR 28.02.01.04 D.

144 Berkshire Life v. Maryland Insurance Administration, 142 Md. App. 628, 645, 791 A. 2d942 (2002).
145 Berkshire Life v. Maryland Insurance Administration, 142 Md. App.628, 791 A. 2d 942 (2002).
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SG §10-220. Proposed decisions and orders.

(a) Preparation.- If theOffice conducts a hearing under this subtitle, theOffice shall prepare proposed
findings offact, conclusions of law, ororders inaccordance with the agency's delegation under § 10-205 of
this subtitle.

(b) Submission.- TheOffice shall send itsproposed findings, conclusions, or orders:
(1) to the parties and the agency directly; or

(2) iftheagency's delegation under § 10-205 ofthis subtitle requires, to theagency for distribution by
the agency to the parties.
(c) Review and issuance.-

(1) Within 60 days after receipt ofthe Office's proposed findings, conclusions, ororder under subsection
(b) (2) of this section, the agency shall:
(i) review the Office's proposed findings, conclusions, or order;

(ii) issue the proposed decision, which may include the Office's proposed findings, conclusions, or
order with or without modification; and

(iii) send the proposed decision and a copy ofthe Office' proposed findings, conclusions, ororder to
the parties.

(2) The time limit specified in paragraph (1) ofthis subsection may be extended by the agency head,

board, or commissionwith written notice to the parties.

(d) Form and contents.- Aproposed decision ororder, including proposed decisions ororders issued for

contested case hearings subject to this subtitle butnotconducted by the Office, shall:
(1) be in writing or stated on the record;

(2) contain separate findings of fact andconclusions of law;

(3) include anexplanation ofprocedures and time limits for filing exceptions; and
(4) ifthe Office conducted the hearing and the agency's proposed decision includes any changes,
modifications, or amendments to theOffice's proposed findings, conclusions, or orders, contain an
explanation ofthe reasons foreach change, modification, or amendment.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-221. Final decisions and orders.

(a) Form.- A final decision ororder in a contested case that isadverse to a party shall be inwriting or

stated on the record.

(b) Contents.-

(1) Afinal decision ororder ina contested case, including a remand ofa proposed decision, shall
contain separate statements of:
(i) the findings of fact;
(ii) the conclusions of law; and
(iii) the order.

(2) A written statement of appeal rights shall beincluded with thedecision.

(3) Ifthe findings offact are stated in statutory language, the final decision shall state concisely and
explicitly the factsthat supportthe findings.

(4) If, in accordance with regulations, a party submitted proposed findings offact, the final decision

shall state a ruling on each proposed finding.

(c) Distribution.- The final decision maker promptly shall deliver ormail a copy ofthe final decision or

order to:

(1) each party; or

(2) the party's attorney of record.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §254; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1995, ch. 3, § 1.]
COMAR 28.02.01.22 Decision or Proposed Decision.

A. Ajudge shall prepare a decision orproposed decision in accordance with the agency's delegation or
pertinent law.
B. Proposed Decision.

(1) Ifthe judge is not the final decision maker, the judge shall submit the proposed decision to the final

decision maker with a copy to each party, unless otherwise provided by law orthe agency's delegation.

126

(2)When permitted by law, an adversely affected party may file exceptions to theproposed decision in
accordance with the delegating agency's regulations or as otherwise provided by law.

C.Final Decision. Except as otherwise provided by law, when thejudge is the final decision maker, the
decision is the final decision for purposes of judicial review.

(3). There is a provision for a reconsideration and revision (at least before OAH)
COMAR 28.02.01.28 Reconsideration and Revision.

A.Except as provided in § B(2) ofthis regulation, a decision may be revised or reconsidered only bythe
judge who rendered the decision forwhich reconsideration orrevision is requested.
B. Revisory Power.

(1) On motion of any party filed at any time, the judge may exercise revisory power and control over a
final decision in the eventof fraud, mistake, or irregularity in the samemannerthat the courts may exercise
revisory power under Maryland Rule 2-535(b).

(2) On the initiative ofthe judge oron the motion ofany party, ajudge may correct a clerical mistake in
a final decision at any time in thesame manner asthe courts exercise revisory power under Maryland Rule
2-535(d).

C. Reconsideration. When thejudgeis the final decision maker, thejudgewhorendered the decision may
revise or reconsiderthe decisionto the sameextentas permittedby law if the agency renderedthe final
decision.

D. A request for revision orreconsideration does not automatically stay the action ortoll the time for
filing an appeal.

E. Proposed decisions maynot be revised or reconsidered by thejudge.

(4). The Necessity to Resolve Issues

It is important and "necessary that administrative agencies resolve all significant conflicts inthe evidence
andthen chronicle, in the record, full, complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law." "At
a minimum, onemustbe able to discern from the record the facts found, the lawapplied, andthe

relationship between the two."146 From the Court ofAppeals: "We must know what a decision means

before the duty becomes ours to say whether itis right or wrong."147
Significant Case Decisions
A reversal and remand because the ALJ did not reach that decision

o

Forman asserted at an MVA hearing that the policeman who arrested her in connection with a DWI stop

neglected to give herthewarnings contained inan DR-15 MVA form and also induced herto refuse the
alcohol concentration test, "thereby affecting her ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision about
whether to take or refuse the test." Formanv. MVA, 332 Md. 201,221, 630 A. 2d 753 (1993). "... [A]

detaining officer's negation of previously and properly given advice of rights canviolate a licensee's due

process rights."148 Because the ALJ never decided this issue orexplained his decision, the Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 332 Md. at 221-22.

146 Forman v. MVA, 332 Md. 201,221,630 A. 2d 753 (1993) quoting State Comm 'n onHuman Relations v. Malakoff, 273 Md.
214, 229, 329 A. 2d 8 (1974).

147 Forman, 332 Md. at221 , quoting United Steelworkers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679, 472A.2d62,69 (1984)

(quoting United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. &P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511, 55 S. Ct. 462, 467, 79L. Ed. 1023, 1032 (1935)).
148 Forman, 332 Md. at 212 citingHare v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 326Md. 296,306,604 A. 2d 914 (1992).
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I. TheMaryland Administrative Procedure Act. Subtitle 2. Contested Cases. StateGovernment (SG)
Allsections should be prefixed by SGto indicate they appear in the State Government Article ofthe Annotated
Code of Mary land

§10-201. Declaration of policy.
§10-202. Definitions.
§10-203. Scope of subtitle.

§10-204. Political subdivisions and instrumentalities.
§10-205.Delegation of hearing authority.
§10-206. Procedural regulations.
§10-206.1. Legal practice.
§10-207.Notice of agency action.
§10-208.Notice of hearing.
§10-209. Notice mailed to address of licensee.
§10-210. Dispositions.
§10-211. Hearings conducted by electronicmeans.
§10-212. Open hearings.
§10-212.1. Interpreters.
§10-213. Evidence.

§10-214. Consideration of other evidence.
§10-215. Transcriptionof proceedings.
§10-216. Exceptions.
§10-217. Proof.

§10-218. Contents of record.
§10-219. Ex parte communications.
§10-220. Proposeddecisions and orders.
§10-221. Final decisions and orders.
§10-222. Judicial review.
§10-222.1. Administrative orders.
§10-223. Appeals to Courtof Special Appeals.

§10-224. Litigation expenses for small businesses and nonprofit organizations.
§10-225. Suspension of provisions.
§10-226. Licenses - Specialprovisions.

SG §10-201. Declaration of policy.
The purpose of this subtitle is to:

(1) ensure the right ofall persons to be treated in afair and unbiased manner in their efforts to resolve disputes in

administrative proceedings governed by this subtitle; and
(2)promote prompt, effective, and efficient government.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-202. Definitions.

(a) In general- Inthis subtitle the following words have the meanings indicated.
(b) Agency.- "Agency" means:

(1) anofficer orunit ofthe State government authorized by law to adjudicate contested cases; or
(2) a unit that:

(i) is created by general law;

(ii) operates in at least2 counties; and
(iii) is authorized by lawto adjudicate contested cases.
(c) Agency head.- "Agency head" means:

(1) an individual orgroup ofindividuals in whom the ultimate legal authority ofan agency is vested by any

provision of law; or
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(2) the secretary ofthe State department that isresponsible for State programs thatareadministered bythe
Montgomery County Department of Healthand Human Services.
(d) Contestedcase.-

(1) "Contested case"means a proceeding before an agency to determine:

(i)a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person thatis required by statute or constitution to be
determined only after an opportunity for an agencyhearing; or

(ii) thegrant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or amendment of a license that is required bystatute or
constitutionto be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing.

(2) "Contested case" does notinclude a proceeding before anagency involving anagency hearing required only
by regulation unless the regulation expressly, orby clear implication, requires the hearing tobeheld inaccordance
with this subtitle.

(e) License.- "License" means all or anypart of permission that:
(1) is required by law to be obtained from an agency;
(2) is not requiredonly for revenue purposes; and
(3) is in any form, including:
(i) an approval;
(ii) a certificate;
(iii) a charter;
(iv) a permit; or
(v) a registration.

(6) Office- "Office" means the Office of Administrative Hearings.

(g) Presiding officer.- "Presiding officer" means the board, commission, agency head, administrative law judge,

or other authorized person conducting an administrative proceeding under this subtitle.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §§ 244,250A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1996, ch. 476, ch. 476; 2004, ch. 25, §6.]
SG §10-203. Scope of subtitle.

(a) General exclusions.- This subtitledoes not apply to:

(1) the Legislative Branch ofthe State government oran agency ofthe Legislative Branch;
(2) theJudicial Branch ofthe State government or an agency ofthe Judicial Branch;
(3) the following agencies ofthe Executive Branch ofthe State government:
(i) the Governor;

(ii) the Department of Assessments and Taxation;

(iii) theInsurance Administration except as specifically provided intheInsurance Article;
(iv) the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund;

(v) the Maryland Parole Commission ofthe Department ofPublic Safety andCorrectional Services;
(vi) the Public Service Commission;
(vii) the Maryland Tax Court;
(viii) the State Workers' CompensationCommission;
(ix) the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund; or

(x) the Patuxent Institution Board of Review, when acting on a parolerequest;
(4) an officer or unitnot part of a principal department of State government that:
(i) is created by or pursuant to the Maryland Constitution or general or local law;
(ii) operates in only 1 county; and

(iii) is subject to thecontrol of a local government or is funded wholly or partly from local funds;
(5) unemployment insurance claim determinations, tax determinations, and appeals in theDepartment ofLabor,
Licensing, and Regulation except as specifically provided inSubtitle 5 of Title 8 ofthe Labor and Employment
Article; or

(6) any other entity otherwise expressly exemptedby statute.

(b) Applicability to property tax assessment appeals boards and correction ofdeath certificates.- This subtitle
does apply to:

(1) the propertytax assessment appeals boards; and

(2) asto requests for correction of certificates ofdeath under § 5-310 (d) (2) ofthe Health-General Article, the
office ofthe Chief Medical Examiner.

(c) Public hearings.- A public hearing required orprovided for bystatute or regulation before an agency takes a
particular action isnot anagency hearing under § 10-202 (d) ofthis subtitle unless the statute orregulation:
(1)expressly requires thatthe public hearing be held in accordance with this subtitle; or
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(2) expressly requires that any judicial review oftheagency determination following the public hearing be
conducted in accordance with this subtitle.

(d) Contested cases arisingfrom State program administered by Montgomery County Department ofHealth and
Human Services.-

(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and(3)of this subsection, this subtitle does apply to a contested case that arises
from a State program administered by theMontgomery County Department of Health andHuman Services in the
same manner as the subtitle applies to a county health department or local department of socialservices.
(2)Forpurposes of this subtitle, the Office ofthe Attorney General, after consultation with the County Attorney
for Montgomery County, shall determine ifthe Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
administers a State program.

(3) This subsection isnotintended to extend orlimit the authority ofthe Montgomery County Department of
Health andHuman Services to administer State programs in the manner of a county health department or local
department of social services.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §244; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1986, ch. 567; 1987, ch. 311, § 1; 1989, ch. 5, § 1; 1990, ch. 71, §3; 1991, ch. 21, §3; 1992,
ch.547; 1993, ch. 59,§ 1; 1994, ch.536, § 1; 1995, ch. 120, § 19; 1996, ch. 476; 1997, ch. 16; ch.70, §4.]

SG §10-204. Politicalsubdivisions and instrumentalities.

Apolitical subdivision ofthe State oran instrumentality ofa political subdivision isentitled, tothe same extent as
other legal entities, tobe an interested person, party, orpetitioner in amatter under this subtitle, including an appeal.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 256A; 1984, ch.284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-205. Delegation of hearing authority.
(a) Towhom delegated; limitation.-

(1) Except as provided inparagraph (2) ofthis subsection, a board, commission, oragency head authorized to

conduct a contested case hearing shall:
(i) conduct the hearing; or

(ii) delegate the authority to conduct the contested case hearing to:
1. the Office; or

2. with the prior written approval ofthe Chief Administrative Law Judge, a person notemployed bythe
Office.

(2) Ahearing held inaccordance with §4-608(f) or § 5-610(f) oftheBusiness Occupations and Professions
Article may not be delegated to the Office.

(3) With the written approval ofthe Chief Administrative Law Judge, a class ofcontested case hearings may be
delegated as provided in paragraph (l)(ii)2 of this subsection.

(4) This subsection isnotintended to restrict the right ofan individual, expressly authorized bya statute ineffect
on October 1,1993, to conduct a contested case hearing.

(b) Scope ofauthority delegated.- Anagency may delegate to the Office the authority to issue:
(1) proposedor final findings of fact;
(2) proposedor final conclusions of law;
(3) proposed or final findings of fact and conclusions of law;

(4)proposed or final orders or orders underArticle 49Bofthe Code; or
(5) the final administrative decision of an agency in a contested case.
(c) Procedure upon receipt ofhearing request- Promptly after receipt of a request for a contested case hearing, an
agency shall:

(1)notify theparties thatthe authorized agency head, board, or commission shall conduct thehearing;
(2) transmit therequest to the Office so thattheOffice shall conduct thehearing in accordance with theagency's
delegation; or

(3)request written approval from the ChiefAdministrative Law Judge to appoint a person not employed bythe
Office to conduct the hearing.
(d) Delegation final; exception.-

(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2) of thissubsection, an agency's delegation andtransmittal of all or partof
a contested case to the Office is final.

(2)If anagency hasadopted regulations specifying thecriteria and procedures for the revocation of a delegation
of a contested case, delegation of authority to hear all or partof a contested casemay be revoked, by the agency
head, board, or commission, in accordance withthe agency's regulations, at any time priorto the earlierof:
(i) the issuance of a ruling on a substantive issue; or
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(ii) the taking of oral testimony from the first witness,
(e) Duties ofthe Office.(1) The Office shall:
(i) conduct the hearing; and

(ii) except asprovided in paragraph (2)of this subsection or asotherwise required by law, within 90days after
thecompletion ofthe hearing, complete theprocedure authorized inthe agency's delegation to the Office.
(2) The time limit specified inparagraph (l)(ii) ofthis subsection may be extended with thewritten approval of
the Chief Administrative Law Judge.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41,§251A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1991, ch. 181; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 2005, ch. 392.]

SG §10-206. Procedural regulations.
(a) Adoption by Office; conflict.-

(1) The Office shall adopt regulations to govern the procedures and practice inallcontested cases delegated to
the Office and conducted under this subtitle.

(2) Unless a federal orState law requires that a federal orState procedure shall be observed, the regulations
adopted under paragraph (1) ofthis subsection shall take precedence inthe event of a conflict.
(b) Adoption by agencies.- Each agency may adopt regulations togovern procedures under this subtitle and
practice before the agency in contested cases.

(c) Expedited hearings.- Regulations adopted under this section may include procedures and criteria for
requesting and conducting expeditedhearings.

(d) Prehearingprocedures.- Each agency and the Office may adopt regulations that:
(1) provide for prehearing conferences in contested cases; or
(2) set otherappropriate prehearing procedures in contested cases.

(e) Explanatory materials.- To assist the public in understanding the procedures followed by an agency orthe
Office incontested cases, an agency or theOffice may develop and distribute supplemental explanatory materials,
including the related forms that the agency orOffice requires and instructions for completing the forms.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §§ 245,251A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1992, ch. 547; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536, §§ 1,2.]
SG §10-206.1. Legal practice.
(a) Practice before agency.- An agency may not:

(1) grant theright to practice law to an individual who isnotauthorized to practice law;
(2)interfere with the right of a lawyer to practice before anagency orthe Office; or

(3) prohibit any party from being advised orrepresented atthe party's own expense by an attorney or, ifpermitted
by law, other representative.

(b) Publiclyprovided legal services.- Subsection (a) ofthis section may not be interpreted to require the State to
furnish publicly provided legal services in any proceeding under this subtitle.
[1994, ch. 536, §1.]

SG §10-207. Notice of agency action.

(a) In general- Anagency shall give reasonable notice ofthe agency's action.
(b) Contents ofnotice.- The notice shall:
(1) state concisely and simply:
(i) the facts that are asserted; or

(ii) ifthe facts cannot be stated in detail when the notice isgiven, theissues that are involved;
(2) state the pertinent statutory and regulatory sections under which the agency istaking its action;
(3) state the sanction proposed or thepotential penalty, ifany, asa result ofthe agency's action;
(4) unless a hearing isautomatically scheduled, state that the recipient ofnotice ofan agency's action may have
an opportunity to requesta hearing, including:
(i) what, if anything, a personmust do to receive a hearing; and
(ii) all relevant time requirements; and

(5) state the direct consequences, sanction, potential penalty, if any, orremedy ofthe recipient's failure to
exercise in a timely manner the opportunity for a hearing or to appear for a scheduled hearing.

(c) Consolidation ofnotices.- The notice ofagency action under this section may beconsolidated with the notice
of hearingrequired under § 10-208 of this subtitle.
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(d) Publication in Register.- For purposes of this section, publication in the Maryland Register does not constitute
reasonable notice to a party.
[An. Code 1957,art. 41, § 251; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1989, ch. 239; 1993,ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-208. Notice of hearing.

(a) Ingeneral- An agency or the Office shall give all parties in a contested case reasonable written notice ofthe
hearing.
(b) Contents ofnotice.- The notice shall state:
(1) the date, time, place, and nature ofthe hearing;

(2) the right to call witnesses and submit documents or other evidenceunder § 10-213 (f) of this subtitle;
(3) any applicable right to requestsubpoenas for witnesses and evidence and specify the costs, if any, associated
with such a request;

(4)thata copy ofthe hearing procedure is available on request and specify the costs associated withsucha
request;

(5) any right or restriction pertaining to representation;

(6) that failure to appear for the scheduled hearing may result inanadverse action against theparty; and
(7) that, unless otherwise prohibited bylaw, the parties may agree to theevidence and waive their right to appear
at the hearing.

(c) Consolidation ofnotices.- The notice ofhearing may be consolidated with the notice ofagency action required

under § 10-207 of this subtitle.

(d) Publication in Register.- For purposes ofthis subtitle, publication in the Maryland Register does not constitute

reasonable notice to a party.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-209. Notice mailed to address of licensee.

(a) In general- Where a licensing statute provides for service other than by regular mail, notice under this subtitle
may be sent by regular mail tothe address ofrecord ofa person holding a license issued by the agency if:
(1) the person isrequired bylaw to advise the agency ofthe address; and

(2) the agency has been unsuccessful in giving notice in the manner otherwise provided by the licensing statute.
(b) Hearing.- Upon a showing that the person neither knew nor had reasonable opportunity to know ofthe fact of
service, a person served by regular mail under subsection (a) ofthis section shall begranted a hearing.
(c) Reasonable opportunity to know ofservice.- Aperson holding a license shall be deemed to have had a
reasonable opportunity to know ofthe fact of service if:

(1) the person is required by law to notify the agency ofachange ofaddress within a specified period oftime;

(2) theperson failed to notify the agency in accordance with the law;
(3) the agency ortheOffice mailed thenotice tothe address ofrecord; and
(4) the agency did nothave actual notice ofthechange ofaddress prior to service.
[1993, ch. 59, §1; 1994,ch. 141.]

SG §10-210. Dispositions.

Unless otherwise precluded by law, an agency orthe Office may dispose of a contested case by:
(1) stipulation;
(2) settlement;
(3) consent order;
(4) default;
(5) withdrawal;
(6) summary disposition; or
(7) dismissal.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, § 251A; 1984, ch.284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-211. Hearings conducted by electronic means.

(a) Permitted.- In accordance with subsection (b) ofthis section, ahearing may be conducted by telephone, video

conferencing, or other electronic means.
(b) Objections.-

(1) For good cause, a party may object tothe holding ofa hearing by telephone, video conferencing, orother

electronic means.
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(2) If a party establishes good cause in opposition to the holding of a hearing by telephone or other similar audio
electronic means, the hearing shallbe held in person or by video conferencing or othersimilar audiovisual electronic
means.

(3)If a party establishes good cause in opposition to theholding of a hearing by video conferencing or other
similar audiovisual electronic means, the hearing shall be conducted in person.
[1993,ch.59,§l;1996,ch.96.]

SG. §10-212. Open hearings.

(a) In general- Except as otherwise provided bylaw, a contested case hearing conducted bytheOffice shall be
open to the public.

(b) Subtitle 5 not applicable.- Hearings conducted by theOffice arenot subject to Subtitle 5 of thistitle.
[I993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-212.1. Interpreters.
(a) Ingeneral-

(1) In a contested case, a party or witness may apply to the agency fortheappointment of a qualified interpreter
to assist that party orwitness, if theparty orwitness is deaf or, because of a hearing impediment, cannot readily
understand or communicate the spoken English language.

(2)On application ofthe party or witness the agency shall appoint a qualified interpreter.

(3) Inselecting a qualified interpreter for appointment, the agency may consult the directory of interpreters for
manual communication or oral interpretation to assist deafpersons that is maintained by the courts ofthe State.
(b) Compensation.-

(1) Aninterpreter appointed under this section shall beallowed the compensation thatthe agency considers
reasonable.

(2)Subject to paragraph (3)of thissubsection, thecompensation shall be paidby the agency.
(3) Iftheagency has theauthority to taxfor services and expenses as a part ofthe costs of a case, theagency may
taxtheamount paid to an interpreter as a part of these services and expenses in accordance with thefederal
Americans with Disabilities Act.
[An. Code 1957,art.30, § 1; 1997, ch. 31, § 1.]

SG §10-213. Evidence.
(a) In general.-

(1) Each party in a contested case shall offer allofthe evidence thattheparty wishes to have made partofthe
record.

(2)If theagency hasanyevidence thatthe agency wishes to usein adjudicating the contested case, the agency
shall make the evidence part ofthe record.

(b) Probative evidence.- The presiding officer may admit probative evidence thatreasonable andprudent
individuals commonly acceptin the conduct of theiraffairs andgiveprobative effectto that evidence.
(c) Hearsay.- Evidence may notbe excluded solely onthe basis that it is hearsay.
(d) Exclusions.- The presidingofficer may exclude evidence that is:
(1) incompetent;
(2) irrelevant;
(3) immaterial; or
(4) unduly repetitious.

(e) Rules ofprivilege.- The presiding officer shallapply a privilege that law recognizes.
(f) Scope of evidence.- On a genuine issue in a contested case, each party is entitled to:
(1) call witnesses;
(2) offer evidence, including rebuttal evidence;

(3) cross-examine any witness that another party or the agency calls; and
(4) present summation and argument.

(g) Documentary evidence.- The presidingofficermay receive documentary evidence:
(1) in the form of copies or excerpts; or
(2) by incorporation by reference,
(h) Official notice offacts.(1) The agency or the Office may take official notice of a fact that is:
(i) judicially noticeable; or
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(ii) general, technical, or scientific and withinthe specialized knowledge ofthe agency.
(2) Before taking official notice of a fact, the presiding officer:

(i) before or during the hearing, by reference in a preliminary report, or otherwise, shall notifyeach party; and
(ii) shall give each party an opportunity to contest the fact,

(i) Evaluation.- The agency or the Office may use its experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge in the evaluation of evidence.
[An. Code 1957,art. 41, § 252; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993,ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-214. Consideration of other evidence.

(a) Findings based onevidence ofrecord.- Findings of fact must be based exclusively on the evidence of record in
the contested case proceeding and on matters officially noticed in that proceeding.

(b) Regulations, rulings, etc., binding.- In a contested case, theOffice is bound by any agency regulation,
declaratory ruling, prior adjudication, or other settled, preexisting policy, to thesame extent as the agency is or
would have been bound if it were hearing the case.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-215.Transcription of proceedings.

Allor partof proceedings in a contested case shall betranscribed if any party:
(1) requeststhe transcription; and
(2) pays any required costs.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §252A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59

SG §10-216. Exceptions.

(a) Notice ofproposed decision; consideration ofexceptions.-

(1) In the case ofa single decision maker, ifthe final decision maker in a contested case has not personally
presided over the hearing, the final decision may not be made until each party is given notice ofthe proposed
decision in accordance with § 10-220 of this subtitle and an opportunity to:

(i)file exceptions with the agency to theproposed decision; and

(ii) present argument to the final decision maker that the proposed decision should be affirmed, reversed, or

remanded.

(2) In the case ofa decision-making body, ifamajority ofthe officials who are tomake a final decision in a
contested case have not personally presided over the hearing, the officials may not make the final decision until each
party is given notice ofthe proposed decision in accordance with § 10-220 ofthis subtitle and an opportunity to:
(i)file exceptions to the proposed decision with theagency; and

(ii) present argument to a majority oftheofficials who are tomake the final decision.

(3) Ifaparty files exceptions orpresents argument under paragraph (1) or (2) ofthis subsection, the official or
officials who are to make the final decision shall:

(i) personally consider each part ofthe record that aparty cites in its exceptions or arguments before making a

final decision; and

(ii) except as otherwise provided by law or by agreement ofthe parties, make the final decision within 90 days

after theexceptions arefiled or the argument is presented, whichever is later.

(b) Changes to proposed decision.- The final decision shall identify any changes, modifications, oramendments to

the proposed decision and thereasons for the changes, modifications, oramendments.
[1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1995, ch.3, § 1;2003,ch. 391.]

SG §10-217. Proof.

The standard ofproof ina contested case shall be the preponderance ofevidence unless the standard ofclear and
convincing evidence is imposed ontheagency byregulation, statute, or constitution.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-218. Contents of record.

The presiding officerhearing a contested case shall make a record thatincludes:
(1) all motions and pleadings;

(2) all documentary evidence that the agency or Office receives;

(3) a statement of each fact of which theagency orOffice has taken official notice;
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(4) any staff memorandum submitted to an individual who is involved in the decision making process ofthe
contested case byan official or employee oftheagency who isnot authorized to participate inthe decision making
process;

(5) each question;
(6) each offer of proof;

(7) eachobjection and the ruling on the objection;
(8) eachfinding of fact or conclusion of lawproposed by:
(i) a party; or

(ii) the presiding officer;

(9) each exception to a finding or conclusion proposed bya presiding officer; and

(10) each intermediate proposed and final ruling by orfor the agency, including each report oropinion issued in
connection with the ruling.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §252A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-219. Ex parte communications.
(a) Restrictions.-

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) ofthis subsection, a presiding officer may not communicate exparte
directly orindirectly regarding the merits ofany issue inthe case, while the case ispending, with:
(i) anypartyto the case or the party'srepresentative or attorney; or
(ii)anyperson whopresided at a previous stage ofthe case.

(2) An agency head, board, or commission presiding over acontested case may communicate with members of
an advisory staff of, or any counsel for, the agency, board, or commission who otherwise does not participate in the
contested case.

(b) Communicationsprior to hearing.- If, before hearing a contested case, a person receives an ex parte
communication ofatype that would violate subsection (a) ofthis section ifreceived while conducting ahearing, the

person, promptly after commencing the hearing, shall disclose the communication in the manner prescribed in
subsection (c) of this section.

(c) Disclosure.- An individual who is involved in the decision making process and who is personally aware ofan

ex parte communication shall:
(1) give notice to all parties;
(2) include in the record ofthe contested case:
(i) eachwritten communication received;

(ii) a memorandum that states the substance ofeach oral communication received;
(iii)eachwritten response to a communication; and

(iv) a memorandum that states the substance ofeach oral response tothe communication; and
(3)send to each party a copy ofeach communication, memorandum, andresponse.

(d) Rebuttal- Aparty may rebut an ex parte communication ifthe party requests the opportunity to rebut within
10 days after notice ofthe communication.
(e) Remedialaction

al) To eliminate the effect ofan ex parte communication that is made in violation ofthis section, the presiding
officer or, ifthe presiding officer isa multimember body, the individual board orcommission member, may:
(i) withdraw from the proceeding; or
(ii) terminate the proceeding without prejudice.

(2) An order toterminate the proceeding without prejudice shall state the last date bywhich a party may
reinstitute the proceeding.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §254A; 1984, ch.284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-220. Proposed decisions and orders.

(a) Preparation.- Ifthe Office conducts a hearing under this subtitle, the Office shall prepare proposed findings of

fact, conclusions of law, or orders in accordance with theagency's delegation under § 10-205 of thissubtitle.
(b) Submission.- The Office shall send itsproposed findings, conclusions, or orders:
(1) to the parties and the agency directly; or

(2) ifthe agency's delegation under § 10-205 ofthis subtitle requires, tothe agency for distribution bythe agency
to the parties.
(c) Review and issuance.-
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(1) Within 60 days after receipt ofthe Office's proposed findings, conclusions, or order under subsection (b) (2)
of this section, the agency shall:

(i) review the Office's proposedfindings, conclusions, or order;

(ii) issue the proposed decision, which may include the Office's proposed findings, conclusions, ororder with or
without modification; and

(iii) send the proposed decision and a copy ofthe Office's proposed findings, conclusions, or order tothe
parties.

(2) The time limit specified inparagraph (1) ofthis subsection may beextended bythe agency head, board, or
commission with written notice to the parties.

(d) Form and contents.- Aproposed decision ororder, including proposed decisions ororders issued for contested

case hearings subject to this subtitle but not conducted by the Office, shall:
(1) be in writing or stated on the record;
(2) contain separate findings of fact and conclusions of law;

(3) include anexplanation ofprocedures and time limits for filing exceptions; and
(4) ifthe Office conducted the hearing and the agency's proposed decision includes any changes, modifications,
oramendments tothe Office's proposed findings, conclusions, ororders, contain anexplanation ofthe reasons for
each change, modification, or amendment.
[1993,ch.59,§l.]

SG §10-221. Final decisions and orders.

(a) Form.- Afinal decision ororder in a contested case that is adverse toa party shall be in writing orstated on the

record.

(b) Contents.-

(1) Afinal decision ororder ina contested case, including a remand ofa proposed decision, shall contain

separate statements of:
(i) the findings of fact;
(ii) the conclusions of law; and
(iii) the order.

(2) A written statement of appeal rights shall be included with thedecision.

(3) Ifthe findings offact are stated in statutory language, the final decision shall state concisely and explicitly the
facts that support the findings.

(4) If, inaccordance with regulations, a party submitted proposed findings offact, the final decision shall state a

ruling on each proposed finding.

(c) Distribution.- The final decision maker promptly shall deliver ormail a copy ofthe final decision ororder to:
(1) each party; or

(2) the party's attorney of record.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §254; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1995, ch. 3, § 1.]

SG §10-222. Judicial review.
(a) Review offinal decision.-

(1) Except as provided insubsection (b) ofthis section, a party who isaggrieved bythe final decision ina
contested case is entitled to judicialreview ofthe decision as provided in this section.

(2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested case tothe Office, isentitled tojudicial review
of a decision asprovided in this section if theagency was a party before the agency or theOffice.

(b) Review ofinterlocutory order.- Where the presiding officer has final decision-making authority, a person in a
contested case who is aggrieved by an interlocutory order is entitled to judicial review if:

(1) the party would qualify under this section for judicial review ofany related final decision;
(2) the interlocutory order:
(i) determines rights and liabilities; and

(ii) has immediatelegal consequences; and

(3)postponement ofjudicial review would result in irreparable harm.

(c) Jurisdiction and venue.- Unless otherwise required by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed with
the circuit courtfor the county whereany partyresides or has a principal placeof business.
(d) Parties.-

(1) The court may permit any other interested person to intervene ina proceeding under this section.
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(2) Ifthe agency has delegated tothe Office the authority to issue the final administrative decision pursuant to §
10-205 (a) (3) ofthis subtitle, and there are 2 ormore other parties with adverse interests remaining inthe case, the
agency may decline toparticipate inthe judicial review. An agency that declines toparticipate shall inform the court
in its initial response.
(e) Stay ofenforcement.-

(1) The filing ofa petition for judicial review does not automatically stay the enforcement ofthe final decision.
(2) Except asotherwise provided by law, the final decision maker may grant orthe reviewing court may order a
stay oftheenforcement ofthe final decision onterms that the final decision maker or court considers proper.
(f) Additional evidencebeforeagency.-

(1) Judicial review ofdisputed issues offact shall be confined tothe record for judicial review supplemented by

additional evidence taken pursuant to this section.

(2) The court may order the presiding officer totake additional evidence on terms that the court considers proper
if:

(i)before the hearing date in court, a party applies for leave to offer additional evidence; and
(ii) the court is satisfied that:
1. the evidence is material; and

2.there were good reasons for the failure to offer the evidence inthe proceeding before the presiding
officer.

(3) On the basis oftheadditional evidence, the final decision maker may modify the findings and decision.
(4) The final decision maker shall file with the reviewing court, aspart ofthe record:
(i) the additional evidence; and
(ii) any modifications ofthe findings or decision.
(g) Proceeding.-

(1)The court shall conduct a proceeding under this section without a jury.

(2) Aparty may offer testimony on alleged irregularities in procedure before the presiding officer that do not
appear on the record.
(3) On request, the court shall:
(i) hear oral argument; and
(ii) receive written briefs.

(h) Decision.- In a proceeding under this section, the courtmay:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or

(3) reverse or modify thedecision if any substantial right ofthe petitioner may have been prejudiced because a
finding, conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;

(ii) exceeds the statutory authority orjurisdiction ofthe final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;

(v) isunsupported bycompetent, material, and substantial evidence inlight ofthe entire record assubmitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
[An. Code art41, §255; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536, § 1,2005, ch. 25, §§ 12,13.]

SG §10-222.1. Administrative orders.

(a) Enforcement- Aparty to a contested case may timely seek civil enforcement ofanadministrative order by
filing a petition for civilenforcement in an appropriate circuit court.

(b) Jurisdiction and venue.- Unless otherwise required by statute, a party shall file a petition for civil enforcement
of an administrative order in the circuit court for the county where any party resides or has a principalplace of
business.

(c) Parties - Defendants.- In an action seeking civil enforcement of anadministrative order a party shall name, as
a defendant, each alleged violator against whom the party seeks to obtain civil enforcement.

(d) Same - Plaintiffs.- A party may file an action forcivil enforcement of an administrative order if another party
is in violation ofthe administrative order.

(e) Remedies.- A party in anaction for civil enforcement ofan administrative order may request, and a court may
grant, one or more ofthe following forms of relief:
(1) declaratory relief;

(2) temporaryor permanent injunctive relief;
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(3) a writ of mandamus; or

(4) any other civil remedy provided by law.
[2000, ch. 377.]

SG §10-223. Appeals to Court of Special Appeals.
(a) Scope ofsection.- This section does not applyto:

(1) a case that arises under Title 16 ofthe Transportation Article unless a right to appeal tothe Court of Special
Appeals is specifically provided; or

(2) a final judgment on actions ofthe Inmate Grievance Office.
(b) Rightofappeal-

(1) Aparty who isaggrieved by a final judgment ofa circuit court under this subtitle may appeal tothe Court of

Special Appeals inthemanner that law provides for appeal ofcivil cases.
(2) An agency that was a party inthe circuit court may appeal under paragraph (1) ofthis subsection.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §256; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536, § 1.]

SG §10-224. Litigation expenses for smallbusinesses and nonprofit organizations.
(a) Definitions.-

(1)In thissection, the following words have themeanings indicated.

(2) "Business" means a trade, professional activity, orother business that isconducted for profit.
(3) "Nonprofit organization" means an organization that is exempt oreligible for exemption from taxation under
§ 501 (c) (3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
(b) Scope ofsection.- This section appliesonlyto:
(1) an agency operating statewide;

(2) a business that, onthedate when the contested case orcivil action isinitiated:
(i) is independently owned and operated; and

(ii) has less than 50 employees, including, ifa corporation owns 50% ormore ofthe stock ofthe business, each
employee ofthe corporation; and
(3) a nonprofit organization.

(c) Reimbursement authorized.- Subject tothe limitations in this section, an agency orcourt may award toa
business ornonprofit organization reimbursement for expenses that the business ornonprofit organization
reasonably incurs in connection witha contested case or civil action that:

(1) isinitiated against the business ornonprofit organization by an agency as part ofan administrative or
regulatory function;

(2) is initiated without substantial justification or in badfaith; and
(3) does not result in:

(i)anadjudication, stipulation, or acceptance of liability ofthe business ornonprofit organization;
(ii) a determination ofnoncompliance, violation, infringement, deficiency, orbreach onthe part ofthebusiness
or nonprofit organization; or

(iii) a settlement agreement under which the business ornonprofit organization agrees to take corrective action
or to pay a monetary sum.

(d) Claim required in contestedcase.-

(1) To qualify for anaward under this section when the agency has initiated a contested case, the business or
nonprofit organization must make a claim to theagency before taking any appeal.
(2) The agency shall act on the claim.
(e) Amount-

(1) An award under this section may include:
(i) the expensesincurred in the contested case;
(ii) court costs;

(iii) counsel fees; and
(iv) the fees ofnecessary witnesses.

(2) An awardunder this section may not exceed $10,000.

(3) The court may reduce or deny an award to the extent thatthe conduct ofthe business or nonprofit
organization during the proceedings unreasonably delayed theresolution ofthe matter in controversy.
(f) Source ofaward.- An award under this section shall bepaid as provided in the State budget.
(g) Appeals.-
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(1) If theagency denies an award under this section, the business or nonprofit organization may appeal, as
provided in this subtitle.

(2) An agency may appealan award that a courtmakes underthis section.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §§244,255A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1;1986, ch. 256; 1988, ch. 110, § 1;1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

SG §10-225. Suspension of provisions.

(a) In general- Upon a finding bythe Governor that there is an imminent threat within a time certain of a loss or
denial of federal fundsto the State becauseofthe operation of any sectionof this subtitle or of Title 9, Subtitle 16 of
this article, the Governor by executive ordermay suspend the applicability of part or all of this subtitle or of Title9,
Subtitle 16 of this article to a specific class of contested cases.

(b) Duration.- A suspension under this section is effective only so long as, andto the extent, necessary to avoid a
denial or loss of federal funds to the State.

(c) Contents oforder.- The executive order shall explain the basis for theGovernor's finding and state the period
of time during which the suspension is to be effective.

(d) Termination.- The Governor shall declare thetermination of a suspension when it is no longer necessary to
preventthe loss or denial of federal funds.
(e) Publication of order.- An executive orderissued under thissection shallbe:
(1) presentedto the Legislative Policy Committee; and

(2)published in theMaryland Register pursuant to § 7-206 (a) (2)(viii) of this article.
[1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994,ch. 141; 1996,ch. 10, § 1.]

SG §10-226. Licenses - Special provisions.
(a) Definitions.-

(1) In this section the following wordshavethe meanings indicated.
(2) "License" means all or any part of permission that:
(i) is required by law to be obtained from a unit;
(ii) is not required only for revenue purposes; and
(iii) is in any form, including:
1. an approval;
2. a certificate;
3. a charter;

4. a permit; or
5. a registration.

(3) "Unit"means an officer or unit that is authorizedby law to:
(i) adopt regulations subject to Subtitle 1 of this title; or
(ii) adjudicate contested cases under this subtitle.

(b) Renewal and expiration.- If, at least 2 calendar weeks before a license expires, the licensee makes sufficient
application for renewal ofthe license, the license does not expire until:
(1) the unit takes final action on the application; and
(2) either:

(i) the time for seeking judicial review ofthe action expires; or
(ii) any judicial stay ofthe unit's final action expires.
(c) Revocation ofsuspension.-

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a unitmaynot revoke or suspend a license unless the
unit first gives the licensee:

(i) written notice ofthe facts that warrant suspensionor revocation; and
(ii) an opportunity to be heard.
(2) A unit may order summarily the suspension of a license if the unit:
(i) finds that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requiresemergency action; and
(ii) promptly gives the licensee:

1. written notice ofthe suspension, the finding, and the reasons that support the finding; and
2. an opportunity to be heard.
[1993, ch. 59, §1; 1995, ch. 538.]
Cross references. See Revision of subtitle and Editor's notes under § 10-201 of this article.
Section check through supplementup to date through 12/6/06 check.
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SUBTITLE 02. RULES OF PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 01. RULES OF PROCEDURE

COMAR 28.02.01.01 Scope.
COMAR 28.02.01.02 Definitions.

COMAR 28.02.01.03
COMAR 28.02.01.04
COMAR 28.02.01.05
COMAR 28.02.01.06

Initial Pleading; Commencement of Case.
Transmittal of Request for Hearing.
Notice of Hearing.
Expedited Hearings.

COMAR 28.02.01.07 Venue.

COMAR 28.02.01.08 Powers and Duties of Judges.

COMAR 28.02.01.09 Appearance of Parties at Hearings; Representation.
COMAR 28.02.01.10 Discovery.
COMAR 28.02.01.11 Subpoenas.
COMAR 28.02.01.12 Intervention.

COMAR 28.02.01.13 Prehearing Conferences.
COMAR 28.02.01.14 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).
COMAR 28.02.01.15 Stipulations and Affidavits.
COMAR 28.02.01.16 Motions.

COMAR 28.02.01.17 Conduct of Hearings.
COMAR 28.02.01.18 Evidence.

COMAR 28.02.01.19 Appointment of Interpreter.

COMAR 28.02.01.20 Failure to Attendor Participate in a Hearing, Conference, or OtherProceeding; Default.
COMAR 28.02.01.21 Proceedings Open to the Public.
COMAR 28.02.01.22 Decision or Proposed Decision.
COMAR 28.02.01.23 the Record.
COMAR 28.02.01.24 Service.

COMAR 28.02.01.25
COMAR 28.02.01.26
COMAR 28.02.01.27
COMAR 28.02.01.28

Postponements.
Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution.
Cases Remanded to the Office.
Reconsideration and Revision.

NOTES:

Authority: State Government Article, §§ 9-1604(a)(8) and (b)(i)(v), and 10-206(a), Annotated Code ofMaryland

COMAR 28.02.01.01 Scope.

A. Applicability. This chapter applies to all hearings before the Office ofAdministrative Hearings.
B. This chapter shall be construed to ensure the fair and expeditious determination of every action.
C. Subject to § D of this regulation, this chapter supplements the procedures required bylaw.
D.Unless federal or State law requires thata federal or State procedure shall be observed, this chapter takes
precedence in the event of conflict.
COMAR 28.02.01.02 Definitions.

A. In this chapter, the following termshavethe meanings indicated.
B. Terms Defined.

(1) "Administrative law judge" or"judge" means an individual appointed by the Chief Administrative Law Judge
under State Government Article, § 9-1604, Annotated Code of Maryland, or designated by the ChiefAdministrative
Law Judge under State Government Article, § 9-1607, Annotated Code of Maryland.
(2) "Agency" means:

(a) Any unit ofgovernment whose action gives rise toa contested case hearing under State Government Article,

Title 10, Subtitle 2, Annotated Code of Maryland; or
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(b)Any other unitof government or private entity having a proceeding before the Office of Administrative
Hearings to which theChiefAdministrative Law Judge may assign ajudge pursuant to State Government Article, §
9-1604(b), Annotated Code of Maryland.

(3)"Authorized representative" means an attorney or,when permitted by applicable law, a person designated by
a party to represent the party.
(4) Docket Entry.

(a) "Docket entry" means the filing of a pleading by a party, a request for a hearing date, or the scheduling of a
proceeding.

(b) "Docket entry" does not include the entryor withdrawal of appearance of counsel, case statusreports, or
other inquiries.

(5) "Filed" means, unless otherwise indicated inthis chapter, theearlier of when the document is postmarked or
received at the Office and,whenrequired, served on the other parties to a proceeding or an administrative lawjudge.
(6) "Final decision maker" means the person or entity authorized by law or delegation to render thefinal decision
in a contested case or other proceeding before the Office.

(7) "Initial pleading" means a notice of agency action, anappeal of anagency action, or any other request fora
hearing by a person.

(8) "Law" means State andfederal constitutions, statutes, regulations, and relevant case law.
(9) "Office" means the Office of Administrative Hearings.

(10) "Party" means a person or agency named or admitted to participate in a case before theOffice.
(11) "Person" means anindividual, representative, corporation, orother entity, including a public ornonprofit
corporation, or an agency or instrumentality of federal, State, or local government.
(12) "Proposed decision" means the document issued by an administrative law judge inaccordance with law or

an agency's delegation, when final decision-making authority has not been vested in the Office, and includes
recommended decisions and provisional orders.
COMAR 28.02.01.03 Initial Pleading; Commencement of Case.

A. Unless otherwise provided for bylaw, the Office acquires jurisdiction over a matter when an initial pleading is
filed with the Office by:

(1)An agency, pursuant to law or a delegation of authority; or

(2) A person when directed by anagency pursuant to law ora delegation of authority.
B. Timeliness. An initialpleading is timely when it is filed:
(1) Within the time periodspecified by relevant law; or

(2) Ifno time period isspecified, within 30 days ofthe date ofthenotice ofcontested action.
C. Computation ofTime. Time shall be computed in accordance with Article 1, §36, Annotated Code of
Maryland.

D. Ahearing request isconsidered filed on the earlier ofthe date the request, along with any fees, documents, or

otherinformation required by law, is postmarked or received by the:
(1) Office, if requiredto be filed with the Office; or
(2) Agency, if requiredto be filed with the agency.
COMAR 28.02.01.04 Transmittal of Request for Hearing.
A. Initiation. A hearing may be initiated:

(1) On transmittal forms provided bythe Office and accompanied bycopies ofallpertinent documents;
(2) On forms provided by the agency; or
(3) In any other manner permitted by law.

B. A hearing request shallinclude and be accompanied by the following:
(1) The name ofthe person requesting the hearing;
(2) Themailing address ofthe person requesting the hearing;

(3) The notice ofagency action orthe name ofthe person oragency against whom the hearing request has been

filed; and

(4)Any fees, documents, or otherinformation required by law.
C. Dismissal.

(1) Except for the required dismissal under §C(2) ofthis regulation, a case may bedismissed ifan initial

pleading is received without an item required by § B ofthis regulation.

141

(2) If a hearing request is received without the addressofthe person requesting the hearing, the case shall be
dismissed.

D. Unless a case is dismissed pursuant to § C of this regulation, a hearing request received without an item

required by § B of thisregulation maybe returned to the person requesting the hearing for resubmission with all of
therequired items. Return ofthe initial pleading under this section does not extend the time within which the initial
pleading is required to be filed.
COMAR 28.02.01.05 Notice of Hearing.

A. Reasonable written notice ofthe hearing shall be provided to the parties.
B. A hearing notice provided by the Office shall contain:

(1) The date, time, place, and nature ofthe hearing;

(2) A statement ofthe right to present witnesses and documents, or other evidence, and theright to cross-examine
any witness that another party calls under State Government Article, § 10-213(f), Annotated Code ofMaryland, if
applicable;

(3) Astatement oftheright to request subpoenas for witnesses and evidence, and specifying the costs, if any,

associated with the request;

(4) A statement that a copy ofthe hearing procedures isavailable on request and specifying the costs, ifany,
associated with the request;

(5)A statement of anyrightor restrictions pertaining to representation;

(6) Astatement that failure to appear for the scheduled hearing may result inan adverse action against that party;
and

(7) Astatement that, unless otherwise prohibited by law, the parties may agree to the evidence and may waive

their right to appear at the hearing.
COMAR 28.02.01.06 Expedited Hearings.

A. A motion for an expedited hearing may be filed by any party.
B. The motion shall set forth the reasons for expediting the hearing.

C. All parties shall be notified promptly ofthe decision onthe motion.

D. Ifthe motion for expedited hearing is granted, the judge shall render the proposed orfinal decision within 30

days after the close ofthe record, unless the parties agree to alonger period or ashorter period is prescribed by law.
COMAR 28.02.01.07 Venue.

Hearings shall be conducted atthe site designated by the Office in accordance with applicable law.
COMAR 28.02.01.08 Powers and Duties of Judges.

A. A judge shall:

(1) Conduct a full, fair, and impartial hearing;

(2) Take action to avoid unnecessary delay inthe disposition ofthe proceedings;
(3) Maintain order; and

(4) Modify orwaive, reasonably, any time periods established bythis chapter.

B. Ajudge has the power to regulate the course ofthe hearing and the conduct ofthe parties and authorized
representatives, includingthe power to:
(1) Administer oaths and affirmations;

(2) Issue subpoenas for witnesses andthe production of evidence;
(3) Rule upon offers of proofandreceive relevant and material evidence;
(4)Consider andruleupon motions in accordance with this chapter;

(5) Examine witnesses and call witnesses as necessary to insure a full and complete record;
(6) Limit unduly repetitious testimony and reasonably limit the time for presentations;
(7) Grant a continuance or postponement;

(8) Request parties to submit legal memoranda, proposed findings offact, and conclusions of law;
(9) Make proposed orfinal decisions and take any other appropriate action authorized bylaw;

(10) Issue orders as are necessary to secure procedural simplicity and administrative fairness, and to eliminate

unjustifiableexpense and delay;

(11) Conduct the hearing in a manner suited to ascertain the facts and safeguard the rights ofthe parties to the

hearing; and

(12) Impose appropriate sanctions for failure to abide by this chapter orany lawful order ofthe judge.
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C. Disqualification; Substitution of Judges.
(1) Conditions.

(a) Ajudge shall withdraw from participation inany proceeding inwhich personal bias or other reasons render
the judge unable to provide an impartial hearing and decision, orwhen anappearance of impropriety may
reasonably be inferred from the facts.

(b) Forpurposes of this section, personal bias shall bepresumed under circumstances setforth inCanon 3Dof
the Code of Judicial Conduct for Administrative Law Judges ofthe Office of Administrative Hearings.

(2) Motion for Disqualification. A party shall move promptly for disqualification ofajudge upon discovering
facts that establish grounds for disqualification.
(3) Substitution of Judges.

(a) If, for any reason, ajudge isunable tocontinue presiding over a pending hearing, orissue a proposed orfinal
decision after theconclusion ofthe hearing, to the extent allowed by law, another judgemay be assigned to conclude
the hearing process and render a proposed or final decision.

(b) The substitute may use the existing record and conduct further proceedings asare necessary and proper.
COMAR 28.02.01.09 Appearance of Parties at Hearings; Representation.
A. A partymayrepresent himselfor herself.

B. Aparty may be represented by an attorney authorized to practice law in Maryland, or, when authorized by law,

appearthrougha representative who is not an attorney.
C. Power of Attorney.

(1) An employee ofa business entity who isrepresenting that business entity in accordance with State
Government Article, § 9-1607.1, Annotated Code ofMaryland, shall provide theOffice with a power of attorney.

(2) The Office shall accept any properly executed power ofattorney meeting the requirements ofState
Government Article, § 9-1607.1, Annotated Code of Maryland.
(3) TheOffice may provide a form for a power of attorney.

(4)A power of attorney required by thisregulation may be:
(a) Kept on file with the Office;

(b) Provided tothe judge atthe outset ofa hearing in which the power ofattorney isrequired; or
(c) Inthe discretion ofthe judge, provided tothe judge atany time before the close oftherecord.
D. A party's representative shall enter therepresentative's appearance with theOffice.
E. Aparty's representative ofrecord shall be copied on all notices, pleadings, and other correspondence.
COMAR 28.02.01.10 Discovery.

A. By written request filed not later than 30 days before the scheduled hearing, a party may require any other party
to produce within 15 days, for inspection or copying, any file, memorandum, correspondence, document, object, or
tangible thing:

(1) Relevant to the subjectmatter ofthe case; and
(2) Not privileged.

B. Unless provided by law orbyagreement oftheparties, no other discovery procedure may berequired.
C. Copies.

(1) Copies ofrequested documents and records shall be made atthe expense oftheparty making the request.
(2) The charge for copies ofrequested documents and records may be waived by the custodian ofthedocuments

in accordance with StateGovernment Article, § 10-611 et seq., Annotated Codeof Maryland, or otherapplicable
law.

COMAR28.02.01.il Subpoenas.

A. Issuance of Subpoenas. Onrequest of a party, oratthe direction ofajudge, theOffice may issue subpoenas

requiring the attendance and testimony ofwitnesses and the production atthe hearing ofany tangible items in the
possession or underthe controlofthe witness.
B. Requests.

(1)A request for a subpoena shall be made, in writing, to the Office.

(2) To the extent practicable, subpoena requests shall be filed at least 10 days before the hearing.
(3) A request for a subpoena shall specifythe:

(a)Name andfull address ofthe person to be subpoenaed; and
(b) Name, full address, and telephone number ofthe party requesting thesubpoena.
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(4)A subpoena that requests the of tangible items, books, papers, or other documents shall describe those items
with particularity.
C. Service of Subpoenas.
(1) Subpoenas may be served by:

(a)Personal delivery by an individual 18years old or older who is not a party to the proceeding;
(b) Certified mail to the person at the address specified in the subpoena request; or
(c) If mailed by the Office, by regular mail.

(2) Unless the subpoena request specifies otherwise, the subpoena shall bemailed bythe Office asprovided in §
C(l) of this regulation.

(3) The subpoena may not beenforced pursuant to State Government Article, § 9-1605(d)(2), Annotated Code of

Maryland, absent proofof service by certified mail or personal delivery.

(4) Costs ofcertified mailing orpersonal delivery ofsubpoenas are the responsibility oftheperson requesting
service.

(5) Proof ofservice ofsubpoenas by certified mail orpersonal delivery isthe responsibility oftheperson
requesting the subpoenas.
D. Return of service shall be made as follows:

(1) When service isby certified mail, bythe filing ofthe original return receipt; and

(2) When service is by personal delivery, by the filing ofan affidavit, signed by the person who made service,

containing:

(a) The name ofthe person served,

(b)The date on which the person wasserved,
(c) The particularplace of service,and

(d) Astatement that the affiant is 18 years old orolder and not a party tothe proceeding.

E. Objections to Subpoenas. Aperson may object to asubpoena by filing amotion to quash or for other relief.
F. Enforcement ofSubpoenas. Ifa person fails to comply with a properly served subpoena, atthe request ofa

judge, the Office may apply to the appropriate circuit court for an order to show cause why aperson should not be
committed to jail for refusalto comply with a subpoena.
COMAR 28.02.01.12 Intervention.

A. Upon motion filed not later than 15 days before the earlier ofthe prehearing conference or the hearing date, a

person may be permitted tointervene in an action when the person has standing and:
(1)Has anunconditional right to intervene as a matter of law; or
(2) Claims an interest relating to the subject matter ofthehearing that is:
(a) Adversely affected, and

(b)Not adequately represented by existing parties.

B. The motion shall state the grounds for the motion, accompanied by a statement setting forth the claim or
defense for which intervention is sought.
C. Order of Intervention.

(1) The judge shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication ofthe rights

ofthe original parties.

(2) As soon as practicable, the judge shall issue an order denying orallowing intervention.
(3) In an order allowing intervention, the judge may place conditions upon the intervener's participation in the

proceedings.
D. Appeal.

(1) Ifthe judge is not the final decision maker, the denial ofamotion to intervene may be appealed to the final

decision maker in accordance with the agency's regulations.

(2) When the judge is the final decision maker, aparty or other affected person may seek review ofthe denial of

a motion to intervene in accordance with law.

(3) In the discretion ofthe judge, a request for further review ofthe denial ofamotion to intervene may stay the

proceedings.
COMAR 28.02.01.13 Prehearing Conferences.

A. When appropriate, the judge may hold a prehearing conference to resolve matters preliminary to the hearing.
B. The judge may require the parties tosubmit information before the prehearing conference.
C. Aprehearing conference may be convened to address the following matters:
(1) Issuance of subpoenas;
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(2) Factual and legal issues;
(3) Stipulations;
(4) Requests for official notice;

(5) Identification and exchange of documentary evidence;
(6) Admissibility of evidence;
(7) Identification and qualification of witnesses;
(8) Motions;
(9) Discovery disputes;
(10) Order of presentation;
(11) Scheduling;

(12) Alternate dispute resolution; and

(13)Anyothermatters that will promote the orderly andprompt conduct ofthe hearing.

D. Conduct. Except as otherwise indicated inthis chapter, atthe discretion of thejudge, all or partof a prehearing
conference may be recorded.
E. Prehearing Orders.

(1) Unless otherwise stated inthis chapter, when a prehearing conference has been held, a prehearing order shall
be issued by the judge.

(2) The prehearing order shall setforth the actions taken orto betaken with regard to any matter addressed atthe
prehearing conference.

(3) Ifa prehearing conference isnot held, the judge may issue a prehearing order to regulate the conduct ofthe

proceedings.

(4) The prehearing order shallbe a part ofthe caserecord.
COMAR 28.02.01.14 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

A. For purposes ofthis regulation, "alternative dispute resolution (ADR)" means the process ofresolving matters
pending before the Office through a settlement conference, neutral case evaluation, neutral fact finding, other
nonadversarial dispute resolution process, or combination of those processes.
B. If allparties agree, an ADR proceeding may be scheduled by the Office.

C. An individual who presides at anADR proceeding may not bethe judge attheprehearing conference, hearing
on the merits, or other stage ofthe proceedings.
D. Confidentiality of ADR Proceedings.

(1)ADR proceedings are confidential andare closed to thepublic.

(2) Discussions inanADR proceeding may not bemade a part ofthecase record in any subsequent proceeding.
(3)ADR proceedings maynot be recorded electronically or in anyothermanner.

(4) Ajudge orother individual who conducts an ADR proceeding may not becalled totestify, participate in
discovery, orotherwise provide information inany subsequent proceeding related to the ADR proceeding.
COMAR 28.02.01.15 Stipulations and Affidavits.
A. Stipulations.

(1) The parties may, in accordance with law, agree to any substantive or procedural matter.
(2)A stipulation maybe filed in writing or entered ontherecord at the hearing.
(3) Thejudge may requireadditional development of stipulated matters.
B. Affidavits. A judge may admit an affidavit as evidence.
COMAR 28.02.01.16 Motions.

A.Unless otherwise provided by this chapter, this regulation pertains to all motions filed with the Office.
B. Unless otherwise provided by this chapter:

(1)A party maymove for appropriate reliefbefore or during a hearing;
(2) A partyshallsubmitall motions in writing or orally at a hearing;
(3) Written motions shall:

(a) Be filed as far in advance ofthe hearing as is practicable,
(b) State conciselythe questionto be determined, and
(c) Be accompanied by any necessary supporting documentation;
(4) An answer to a writtenmotion shall be filed on the earlierof:
(a) 15 days after the date the motion was filed, or
(b) The date ofthe hearing;
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(5) Upon notice to all parties, thejudge may schedule a conference to consider a written motion;
(6)Thejudgemay issuea written decision on a motion or state the decision on the record;
(7)If a ruling ona motion is notstated onthe record, the ruling shall be included in thejudge's proposed or final
decision;

(8)Thefiling or pendency of a motion does not alter or extend any time limitotherwise established by this
chapter.

C. Motion to Dismiss. Upon motion, thejudgemay issue a proposed or final decision dismissing an initial
pleading which fails to statea claimfor which reliefmay be granted.
D. Motion for Summary Decision.

(1)A partymaymovefor summary decision on anyappropriate issue in the case.
(2)Ajudgemaygranta proposed or final summary decision if thejudge finds that:
(a) There is no genuine issue of material fact; and
(b) A party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
E. Motion for Judgment.

(1) Aparty may move for judgment on any orall ofthe issues in any action atthe close oftheevidence offered
by an opposing party. The moving party shall state with particularity all reasons that the motion should be granted.
Objection to the motion for judgment is not necessary. Aparty does not waive the right tomake the motion by
introducing evidence during the presentation of an opposing party's case.

(2) When a party moves for judgment atthe close ofthe evidence offered by an opposing party, the judge may:
(a)Proceed to determine thefacts andto render judgment against an opposing party; or
(b) Decline to render judgment untilthe close of all evidence.

(3) Aparty who moves for judgment atthe close ofthe evidence offered by an opposing party may offer
evidence ifthe motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do soand tothe same extent asifthe
motionhad not been made. In so doing, the party withdraws the motion.
Significant case decisions

Collateral estoppel to avoid relitigation ofan Issue

o "The Maryland Insurance Administration ('MIA') revoked Allan J. Culver's Insurance producer's license."
Culver v. Insurance Commissioner, 175 Md. App. 645, 647, 931 A. 2d 537 (2007). "Anyone selling

insurance inMaryland must be licensed asaninsurance producer bythe MIA." 175 Md. App. at 648.
Culver was disbarred from thepractice of law inMaryland effective May 13, 2007. When the MIA revoked
Culver's insurance producer's license heasked for a contested hearing and theMIA moved for summary

disposition ofthe matter. 175 Md. App. at649. One ofthe grounds for revocation ofa license in INS. §10126 (a)(13) "has otherwise shown a lack oftrustworthiness or incompetence to actas an insurance
producer." 175 Md. App. at651. Collateral estoppels was discussed by the Court with a focus on
offensive nonmutual collateral estoppels. 175 Md. App. at 654-55. "A summary decisions, such as the one
inthis case, isauthorized byCOMAR 28.02.01.16D. The evidence that appellant desired toput forth would
have constituted nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the findings made inthedisbarment actions. As
stated above, principles of collateral estoppels barred appellant from relitigating those issues. Because

appellant could not challenge the findings made in the disbarment actions, there were no material facts at
issue. Therefore, hiscase was disposed ofappropriately bysummary decision." 175 Md. App. at 659. The
MIA didnot exceed its statutory authority by revoking Culver's license on the basis of "attorney
misconductor the sanction of disbarment." BR §9A310 is applicableto the denial of a license in
Maryland. 175 Md. App. at 659-61.

COMAR 28.02.01.17 Conduct of Hearings.

A. On a genuine issue in a contested case, each party is entitled to:
(1) Call witnesses;
(2) Offer evidence;

(3) Cross-examine any witness who testifies; and
(4) Make opening and closing statements.
B. Telephone Hearings.
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(1) If a party does not objectand establish good cause for the objection, the judge may conductall or part ofthe
hearing by telephone or other similaraudio electronic means, if each participant in the hearinghas an opportunity to
participate in and hear the entire proceeding.

(2) If a partyestablishes good cause in opposition to the holding of a hearingby telephone or other similar audio
electronic means, the hearing shall be held in person or by video conferencing or other similar audiovisualelectronic
means.

(3) All substantive and procedural rights apply to telephone hearings, subject only to the limitations ofthe
physical arrangement.

(4) Documentary Evidence. For a telephone hearing, documentary evidence to be offered shallbe mailed by the
proponent to all parties and the Office at least5 days before the hearing.
(5) Default. Fora telephone hearing, thefollowing may be considered a failure to appear andgrounds fordefault,
if the conditions exist for more than 15 minutes after the scheduled time ofthe hearing:

(a) Failure to answer the telephone;
(b) Failure to free the telephone for a hearing; or

(c) Failure to be ready to proceed withthe hearing as scheduled.
C. Video Hearings.

(1) If a party does notobject and establish good cause for the objection, the judge may conduct allorpart of a
hearing by video orother similar audiovisual electronic means, ifeach participant inthe hearing has anopportunity
to participate in, hear, and see the entire proceeding.

(2) If a party establishes good cause in opposition to the holding of a hearing by video or other similar
audiovisual electronic means, the hearing shall be held in person.

(3) All substantive and procedural rights apply to video hearings, subject only to the limitations ofthephysical
arrangement.

(4) Default. For a video hearing, the following may be considered a failure toappear and grounds for default, if
the conditions exist for more than 15 minutes after the scheduled time ofthe hearing:

(a) Failure to be present in the designated videohearing room; or
(b) Failure to be readyto proceedwiththe hearing as scheduled.
D. Order of Proceedings.

(1) A case shall be called to order by the judge.

(2)The judge shall explain briefly thepurpose andnature ofthe hearing.
(3) Thejudge may allowthe partiesto presentpreliminary matters.
(4) Thejudge shallstatethe order of presentation ofthe evidence.
(5) Witnesses shallbe sworn or put underaffirmation to tellthe truth.
E. Waivers.

(1) Waiver of Right to Appear at the Hearing.

(a) A party may waive theright to appear personally atthe hearing unless prohibited bylaw.
(b) A waivershallbe in writingand filedwiththe Office.

(c) Aparty may withdraw a waiver bywritten notice filed not later than 5 days before the scheduled hearing.
(d) When a party has filed a waiver permitted by law, the failure of a party to appear personally orby
representative may not result in a finding of default.

(2) Waiver ofHearing. A hearing before ajudge isnot necessary ifall parties agree to the admission ofthe
evidence and waive their right to appear.
COMAR 28.02.01.18 Evidence.

A. Evidence shall be admitted in accordance with State Government Article, § 10-213, Annotated Code of
Maryland, and other pertinent law.

B. The judge may admit evidence that reasonable and prudent individuals commonly accept inthe conduct oftheir
affairs, and give probative effect to that evidence.
C. Evidence may not be excludedsolely on the basisthat it is hearsay.
D. Exclusion of Witnesses.

(1) Upon request by a party, thejudge shall exclude witnesses other than parties from the hearing room, except
when testifying.

(2) Aparty, representative, witness, orspectator may not disclose toa witness excluded under this section the
nature, substance, orpurpose of testimony, exhibits, orother evidence introduced during that witness's absence.

(3) Aparty that isnot an individual may designate an employee orofficer as its representative toremain inthe
hearing room, eventhough the employee or officer maybe a witness.
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(4) An expertwitness who is to render an opinion basedon testimony given at the hearingmay remainduring the
testimony.

(5) Thejudge may excludethe testimony of a witness who receives information in violationof this section, or
take other appropriate action.
E. Prefiled Testimony.

(1) In the discretion of the judge, testimony may be receivedin written form.
(2) The testimony shall be filed not later than 10 days before the hearing.
F. Official Notice.

(1) The judge may take official notice of a fact that is:
(a) Judicially noticeable; or
(b) General, technical, or scientific and within the specialized knowledge ofthe agency.
(2) Beforetaking officialnotice of a fact, the judge shall:

(a) Notify each party before or during thehearing, byreference ina preliminary report, or otherwise; and
(b) Giveeach party an opportunity to contestthe fact.
COMAR 28.02.01.19 Appointment of Interpreter.

A. Ifa party orwitness cannot readily hear, speak, orunderstand the spoken orwritten English language, the judge
shall arrange for a qualified interpreter to provide assistance during thehearing.
B. An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation that the interpreter will accurately translate.
COMAR 28.02.01.20 Failure to Attend or Participate in a Hearing, Conference, or Other Proceeding;
Default.

A. If, after receiving proper notice, a party fails toattend orparticipate ina prehearing conference, hearing, or

other stage ofaproceeding, the judge may proceed in that party's absence or may, in accordance with the hearing
authority delegated by the agency, issue a final orproposed default order against the defaulting party.
B. Final Default Orders.

(1) On motion filed within 30days after the date ofa final default order, the judge may, for good cause, vacate or
modify the final default order and setthe case infor further proceedings asappropriate.
(2)If a motion is denied, the final default orderis effective.

C. Proposed Default Orders. Aproposed default order isreviewable in accordance with the delegating agency's
regulations governing review of proposed decisions.
COMAR 28.02.01.21 Proceedings Open to the Public.

A. Unless otherwise prohibited by law, allproceedings before the Office are open to the public.

B. Unless otherwise provided by law, documents, notices, and records in the possession ofthe Office as a result of
a contested case proceeding may be inspected and copied by any person as provided inState Government Article, §
10-611 etseq., Annotated Code ofMaryland, and regulations adopted bythe Office under that Act.
C. The judge may:

(1) Remove individuals whose conduct impedes the orderly progress ofthehearing; and
(2) Restrict attendance because ofthe physical limitations ofthe hearing room.

D. Audio recording equipment, cameras, orother electronic orphotographic equipment shall be excluded from the
hearing room when required by law orifthe judge determines that the use ofthis equipment may impede the orderly
progress ofthe hearing or otherwise interfere with thehearing process.
COMAR 28.02.01.22 Decision or Proposed Decision.

A. Ajudge shall prepare a decision orproposed decision in accordance with the agency's delegation orpertinent
law.

B. Proposed Decision.

(1) Ifthe judge isnot the final decision maker, the judge shall submit the proposed decision tothe final decision

maker with a copy to eachparty, unless otherwise provided by law or the agency's delegation.

(2) When permitted bylaw, anadversely affected party may file exceptions to the proposed decision in
accordance with the delegating agency's regulations or as otherwise provided by law.

C. Final Decision. Except as otherwise provided by law, when the judge isthe final decision maker, the decision is
the final decision for purposes ofjudicial review.
COMAR 28.02.01.23 The Record.
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A. The Office shall prepare an official case record of each hearing.
B. The record shall include:

(1) All pleadings, motions, responses, proposed orders, memoranda, including proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and requests filed by the parties;
(2) All hearing notices;

(3) All documentary and other tangible evidencereceivedor considered;
(4) A statement of each fact officially noticed;
(5) All offers of proof and objections;
(6) All rulings, orders, and decisions, proposed or final;
(7) Matters placed on the record in connection withex parte communication;

(8) The recording ofthe hearing, and of any prehearing proceeding, and any transcript ofthe recording prepared
by a court reporting service; and
(9) Any other item required by law.
COMAR 28.02.01.24 Service.

A. A copy ofany pleading, motion, response, correspondence, orother paper filed inany proceeding shall be
served promptly on all other parties to the proceeding.

B. Unless otherwise required by law, service ofpleadings, correspondence, and allother documents shall bemade
by personal deliveryor by regular mail.
C. Proof of Service.

(1) Every pleading, motion, response, correspondence, orother paper filed with the Office shall contain orbe
accompanied by a certificate of service.
(2)Thecertificate of service shallbe signed andshall contain the:
(a) Date of service;
(b) Manner of service;

(c) Name of each person served; and
(d) Addressat which each person was served.
COMAR 28.02.01.25 Postponements.

A. Arequest for postponement shall be considered only ifthe party requesting the postponement establishes good

cause for the postponement.

B. Except as provided in §Dofthis regulation, a request for postponement shall be made inwriting and filed not
less than 5 days before the scheduled hearing.
C. Documentation ofthe reasons for the postponement maybe required from the party makingthe request.
D. Emergency Request for Postponement.

(1) For purposes ofthis section, "emergency" means a sudden, unforeseen occurrence requiring immediate
attention which arises within 5 days ofthe hearing.

(2)In an emergency, a request for postponement may be made by telephone.

E. When practicable, all parties toa proceeding shall be contacted before a ruling on a postponement request is
made.

COMAR 28.02.01.26 Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution.

A. Unless otherwise required by law, a case pending before the Office may notbeheld inabeyance orplaced on
inactive status.

B. Atthe expiration of6 months from the last docket entry, a case issubject to dismissal, onrequest ofa party ora
judge's owninitiative, for lackof prosecution.

C. Ifdismissal is initiated by ajudge orrequested by a party, the judge shall send notice to all parties that a final or

proposed dismissal for lack ofprosecution will be entered after the expiration of30 days from the date ofthe notice
unless a motion is filed under § D of this regulation.

D. Onmotion filed within 30 daysafterthe date ofthe notice, thejudge,for good cause shown, maydefer
issuance ofthe final or proposed order of dismissal forthe period and ontheterms thejudgeconsiders proper.
E. Entry of Order.

(1) Ifa motion is not filed within 30 days orifa motion isfiled and denied, the judge shall issue an order or
proposed order ofdismissal within 30 days after the time for filing the motion has expired.
(2) Ifa motion is filed and good cause isshown for deferral ofthe dismissal, the judge shall issue an order
deferring dismissal and specifying the period andtheterms ofthe deferral.
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COMAR 28.02.01.27 Cases Remanded to the Office.

A. A case remanded to the Office by a court or an agencyfor further proceedings is considered filed with the
Office on the earlier of:

(1) When the court's or agency's order is received by the Office; or
(2) When a party files with the Office a signed copy ofthe remand order.
B. Unless the remand order specifies otherwise, the Office shall promptly schedule further proceedings as

necessary and issuea decision in accordance with State Government Article, § 10-205(e), Annotated Codeof
Maryland.
COMAR 28.02.01.28 Reconsideration and Revision.

A.Except as provided in § B(2) of this regulation, a decision may berevised or reconsidered only bythejudge
who rendered the decision for which reconsideration or revision is requested.
B. Revisory Power.

(1) On motion of any party filed at any time, the judge may exercise revisory power and control over a final
decision in the event of fraud, mistake, or irregularity in the samemannerthat the courtsmay exercise revisory
powerunder Maryland Rule 2-535(b).

(2) On the initiative of thejudge or onthemotion of any party, ajudge may correct a clerical mistake in a final
decision at any time inthesame manner asthe courts exercise revisory power under Maryland Rule 2-535(d).
C.Reconsideration. When thejudge is thefinal decision maker, thejudgewho rendered the decision may revise or
reconsider the decision to the same extentas permitted by lawif the agency rendered the final decision.

D. Arequest for revision orreconsideration does not automatically stay the action ortoll the time for filing an
appeal.

E. Proposed decisions maynot be revised or reconsidered by thejudge.
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When an agency does not follow its own regulations, that does not necessarily mean that an agency
decision will be reversed and its decision invalidated.
•

The Accardi doctrine

•
•
•

The exceptions
Fundamental constitutionally mandated procedures

•
•
•

Burden of proof to show substantial prejudice
Affecting individual rights, obligations, and benefits
No per se violation
Internal procedures

Sections to this Chapter 7 are:

A. When an Agency Does not Follow its Rules and Regulations
B. The Doctrine and its Exceptions- Legislative Intent
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A. When an Agency Does not Follow its Rules and Regulations

What happens when an administrative agency decision is attacked because the agency did notfollow its
own procedures andregulations? The"Accardi Doctrine" is applicable to administrative hearings in
Maryland:1 "It is well established that rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative agency
cannotbe waived, suspended or disregarded in a particular case as long as such rules and regulations
remain in force.. "2

"The 6Accardi Doctrine,' . .. traces its roots to the Supreme Court decision of United States ex rel

Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 3A1 U.S. 260, 74 S. Ct. 499, 98 L. Ed. 681 (1954), [and] has been recognized in

federal and some state jurisdictions.3 When an agency does not follow its own rules, there isgoing to be
an examination ofthe rule violated and an initial question of whether the rule implicated some
1Pollock v. Patuxent Institution BoardofReview, 374 Md. 463,468, 823 A. 2d 626 (2003). There are many Maryland appellate
courtcases addressing the issue of when andunderwhat circumstances an administrative agency's failure to follow its own rules
will invalidateits decision. Pollock (2003) is the most exhaustive in its treatment ofthe subject. This decision is Pollock III.
There were issues of chain of custody addressedin Pollockv. Patuxent Institution Board ofReview, 358 Md. 656, 751 A. 2d 496
(2000), Pollock I, andon remand there is a Court of Special Appeals opinion, Pollock v. Patuxent Institution Boardof Review,
146 Md. App. 54, 806 A.2d 388 (2002), Pollock II.

In PollockIII, Judge Cathelldoes an exhaustive review of federal and stateappellate opinions interpreting Accardiand its
exception.

2Pollock, 374 Md. at 485-86 citing Transportation Authority v. King, 369 Md. 274, 282, 799 A. 2d 1246(2003). See also:
Danaherv. Dept. ofLabor, 148 Md. App. 139, 175, 811 A. 2d 359 (2002).
3Pollock, 374 Md. at 481. In Accardi, the Attorney General ofthe United States sent an unlawful communication to the Boardof

Immigration Appeals listing Accardi as an"unsavory character" to be deported, in disregard ofthe applicable procedures ofthe
Board of Immigration Appeals. 374 Md. at 481-82.
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fundamental constitutional mandated procedure. ". . . [W]hen the Accardi doctrine, with its exceptions,

isapplicable, a complainant must also show prejudice to have the agency action invalidated."4
The practical aspects of Accardi demonstrate the problems that administrative law judges, circuit

court judges and the Court ofSpecial Appeals grappled with, atleast until Pollock settled many matters.5
Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission6 addressed a rule ofthe Department ofCorrections
that a hearing on an alleged infraction against an inmate had to be held within 72 hours, except in
exceptional circumstances. That time limit was not met because ofthe volumeof cases the institution was

required to hear.7 While stating that Accardi did not apply to an agency's departure from procedural rules
adopted forthe orderly transaction of agency business, the Court found the Division's rule was not
intended to govern internal procedures, but instead was adopted to confer important procedural benefits
on inmates. Thus: " is well established that rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative agency

cannot be waived, suspended or disregarded n a particular case as longas suchrules and regulations
remain in force."8 The Court held the rule was mandatory. It said that it did not base its decision on a due

process violation but onthe"judicially-evolved rule ofadministrative law and not on due process
grounds."9 The fact that the rule was mandatory made compliance a necessity. Inthis case, a showing of
prejudice was not something that was discussed as being determinative and/or a burden on either party.

In 1980, the Court ofSpecial Appeals determined in Board ofEduc. Of A. A. County v. Barbano10
that "Guidelines for the Evaluation of Probationary Teachers" were best interpreted by the Boardof

Education ("aunique branch of government given peculiarly autonomous powers among which isthe
authority to explain the true intent and meaning ofnot only the rules, regulations and bylaws adopted by
the Board, but the very provisions legislatively authorizing the powers and duties, etc. oftheBoard
itself.").11 In this case dismissal ofa probationary teacher was not accomplished in conformity with the
State guidelines.

While the State Board of Education policy manual was formulated to assess the competence of

probational teachers (entitled "Guidelines for the Evaluation ofProbationary Teachers") did confer some
procedural benefit on ateacher, its primary purpose was "to bestow upon students education by teachers
ofunquestionable competency." Thus, the Board's own opinion that the guidelines were intended to
provide adegree ofuniformity in guiding the divergent county boards in negotiating annually such
procedures with the union-like representative ofteachers controlled, and the rules were not meant to
confer procedural benefits upon individual probationary teachers. The application ofAccardi was
reversed. The failure of the localBoard of Education to adequately follow the provisions of the

Guidelines did not come within the ambit ofAccardi because ofthe principal purpose ofthe policy.12 The
lesson ofBarbano, then, was that the primary purpose ofan internal policy directive determines whether
Accardi applies.

4Pollock, 374 Md. at 481-82, 501.

5Most ofthe analysis from this Hopkins case to the King case over the next couple ofpages ofthis book isthe result ofanalysis
by former Administrative Law Judge Guy J. Avery. Judge Avery lived through all ofthis and has produced an analysis that
deserves reproduction here, consideration along with the analysis ofthe Pollock decision. The author ofthis book is indebted to
Judge Avery for his inputandexpertise.

6Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, 40 Md. App.329, 391 A.2d 1213 (1978).
7Hopkins, 40 Md. App. at 333. The Court was not impressed that the case load or institutional backlog was exceptional or
justification for a violation ofthe rule. Id.

8Hopkins, 40 Md. App. at 335 citing 2Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law, Sec. 350; 1Cooper, State Administrative Law, pp. 26667 (1965 Edition); K. Davis, Administrative Law ofthe 70's Section 5-03-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Hopkins Court stated: "We
are not convinced thatthe one day's delay herewas a denial of due process." Id.
9Hopkins, 40 Md. App. at337.

10 Board ofEduc. OfA.A. Co. v. Barbano, 45 Md.App. 27,411 A.2d 124 (1980).
11 Barbano, 45 Md. App. at 42.
12 Barbano, 45 Md. App. at 44.
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In the 1986 case ofBoard ofEducation ofBaltimore County v Ballard,13 the Board failed to follow
its own rule (requiring further evaluations ofteachers with unsatisfactory performance) in dismissing a
librarian. The Court held that Board Policy 4100 spoke in unambiguous, mandatory language "which
makes clear that its purpose is to confer 'important procedural benefits and safeguards' upon tenured
teachers." A reading ofthe education code lent support to the contention that the policy and procedures

were to confer important procedural rights on the individual.14 Not aware that the State Board had
adopted orconstrued the policy in a manner other than whatwas evidentby its plain language, the policy
was required to be followed. The written policy violated substantial rights ofthe librarian and her
termination was invalid.15

1993 saw the Court of Special Appeals turning to the "purpose" in an evaluationof policy
violations. In Boardof School Comm 'rs ofBaltimore Cityv. James andDavis(consolidated cases) , the
Court citedwith approval the Board's finding thata violation of dismissal procedures were
inconsequential, given the primary purpose ofthe policy. Both teachers received year-end evaluations for
88-89 and 89-90 thatthey needed improvement, butthere was no compliance withthe rule that tenured

teachers being evaluated be observed by nonschool-based staffand that theteacher be accorded

preobservation and postobservation conferences.17 The Court adopted the Board's statement:
. . . It found the failure to have a formal evaluation by a non-school-based observer

during the 1988-89 year was nota"fatal error" because the"primary purpose" ofthe
Baltimore City evaluation procedures isto"improve instruction and to encourage growth
in professional ability and responsibility onthe part ofthe staff and " notto confer

procedural benefits."18
While the State Board's authority in interpretation is not unlimited, Board interpretation is given

great weight. Accardi requires that administrative agencies generally follow their own rules, and if they
do not, the resulting agency action is invalid with there being no showing of prejudice by the complaining
party.19 The Accardi rule is not limitless because an agency failure to follow mere "internal administrative
procedures" does not require reversal of an agency's action unless the complaining party can show
substantial prejudice.20 In this case, there was no past history indicating an intent not to confer procedural
benefits. "The State Board specifically found that the purpose ofthe Procedures was to improve
instruction and professional ability and not to confer procedural benefits." The Court stated: ". . .[I]n
view ofthe State Board'sbroad visitatorial power and clear expertise in this area, when, as here, a local

board's procedure involves or implicates the administration of public school policy, the State Board's

interpretation as to the purpose ofthat procedure is entitled to deference."21 Thus, the agency

determination (State Board) was correct in finding that the procedural violation did notautomatically
mandate reversal ofthe decision to terminate the teachers.

One mustwonder, then, why such protections are included in the policyat all. In James, for

example, termination of ateacher required an evaluation by aqualified person who was not connected
with the school. Such an evaluation was not done. The benefit to the teacher would have been that he or

she could have been reasonably sure that the termination decision did not arise out of personal animus by
13 Board ofEducation ofBaltimore County v Ballard, 67 Md.App. 235, 507 A.2d 192 (1986).
14 Ballard, 67 Md. App. at243.
15 Ballard, 67 Md. App. at244.
16 Board ofSchool Comm 'rs ofBaltimore City v. James and Davis, 96Md.App. 401, 625 A.2d 361 (1993).
17 Jamesand Davis, 96 Md. App. at 419-10.

18 James and Davis, 96Md. App.at413. TheCourt said it was well established that the State Board is"vested with thelast word
onmatters of educational policy and administration of public education inMaryland" and that this"doctrine dates back more
than 100 years."James and Davis, 96 Md. App. at 417.
19 James and Davis, 96 Md. App. at 421.
20 James and Davis, 96 Md. App. at 421-22.
21 James and Davis, 96 Md. App. at 423.
22 James andDavis, 96 Md. App. at 425.
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the principal or others in the school who were part ofthe process. While such a finding may be said to be
unlikely, the teacher was entitled, nevertheless, to a completely objective evaluation.
However, in Kohli v. Looc, Inc. 103 Md.App. 694, 654 A2d 927, cert, granted 342 Md. 588,678 A.2d

1047 (1996) and order rev'd on other grounds, 347 Md. 258, 701 A.2d 92 (1997) the Court of Special
Appeals, Harrell, J., held that the Human Relations Comm'n had limited it's Appeal Board's authority to
reverse the administrative lawjudge's decision to those situations where it finds the administrative law
judge's conclusions to be unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence orotherwise
arbitrary orcapricious. In Looc, Inc., the Appeals Board failed to meetthis standard, and its decision,
disagreeing with that ofthe administrative law judge, was reversed, in part and remanded on other

grounds. There was no "primary purpose" analysis, the Board simply did not follow its own rules and
procedures and did not meet the required review standard. The Human Relations Commission imposed
that standard, which essentially is the same as areviewing court's standard, on the Appeal Board. It was

under no obligation to do so, butonce done it had to meet the standard for itsdecision to beupheld. The
decision in Looc reinvigorated the principle that an agency's failure to follow itsownrules implicates
Accardi.

Throughout this time, there were arguments that an agency's violation of its own policy was adenial
of an individual's rights, warranting dismissal ofthe "charge," whether or not the individual could show
"substantial prejudice" because ofthe violation.(5a//arc/, for example). This was known as the per se
view. The other interpretation ofAccardi was that aviolation of policy was irrelevant unless itaffected

individual rights and obligations or conferred important procedural benefits. If so, then petitioner still had
to show that the violation caused substantial prejudice.

One ofthe problems ofthe latter approach was that "substantial prejudice" was undefined. Another
concerned the "purpose" interpretation.. In the school cases, for example, all policy, regulations and
statutes are adopted, to one degree or another, primarily tobenefit the educational process. Thus, any
procedural benefit for the employee, especially if found in arule meant only to assure "the orderly
transaction of business," could easily be classified as collateral. With more formidable issues, such as a
teacher's termination, violation ofthe procedural rights ofthe teacher were subsumed to the greater

purpose ofassuring good educational outcomes. The most important exception to Accardi, in fact, was
that itdid not apply to policy adopted for the orderly transaction ofbusiness. But the orderly transaction
of business might well have an impact on people, especially in a school setting. Nevertheless, the
"purpose" argument was widely accepted. The "purpose" rationale ofcases like Barbano had to be
viewed with some skepticism.

This ambiguous state of affairs concerning agency actions was remedied bytwo cases heard bythe
Court of Appeals in 2002 and 2003. The first case was Maryland Transportation Authority v. King, 369
Md. 274,799 A.2d 1246 (2002). Although Judge Eldridge commented that King was the first Accardi
case to come before the Court, he noted that, to some extent, "a similar doctrine is reflected in Maryland
administrative law." (FN: King, 369 Md. at286, 799 A.2d at 1252) The Court also noted that the

Supreme Court had held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's failure to exercise strict compliance
with its own rules "did not render void its order" because there was substantial compliance and "the

absence of strict compliance did not prejudice other carriers who objected tothe application." (FN: 374
Md. 463,487, footnote 13, citing American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 90
S.Ct. 1288,25 L.Ed.2d 547 (1970). The alleged procedural violation was held not to implicate Accardi,
because the appellant could not show that hewas prejudiced by theviolation.

The following year, Pollock v. Patuxent Institution Board ofReview, 31A Md. 463, 823 A.2d 626
(2003) extensively reviewed applicable case law, and modified the position that it felt the Court of
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Special Appealshad employed in Accardi. Because the case, once and for all, has settled Maryland's
application ofAccardi, we quote the relevant language in full::
Consistent with our own APA in respect to the agencies to which it applies, we adopt for
other administrative agencies, the Accardi doctrine as we modify it and hold that an

agency ofthe government generally must observerules, regulations or procedures which
it has established and under certain circumstances when it fails to do so, its actions will

be vacated and the matter remanded. This adoption is consistent with Maryland's body of
administrative law, which generally holds that an agency should not violate its own rules
and regulations.

In so holdingwe nonetheless notethat not every violation of internal procedural
policy adopted by an agency will invoke theAccardi doctrine. Whether the Accardi
doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law that, asthe Court of Special Appeals
has opined, requires the courts to scrutinize the agency rule or regulation at issue to
determine if it implicates Accardi because it "affects individual rights and obligations" or
whether it confers "important procedural benefits" or, conversely, whether Accardi is not
implicated because the rule orregulation falls within theambit ofthe exception which
does notrequire strict agency compliance with internal "procedural rules adopted for the
orderly transaction of agency business," i.e., nottriggering theAccardi doctrine.
Additionally, we adopt the exception to theAccardi doctrine which provides thatthe
doctrine does not apply to an agency's departure from purely procedural rules thatdo not
invade fundamental constitutional rights or are not mandated by statute, but are adopted
primarily for the orderly transaction of agency business.
To this extent we adopt the application and rationale ofthe Court of Special Appeals
in its previous applications of the Accardi. We reject, however, the Court of Special
Appeals' holdings where that court has indicated that there can be aper se violation ofthe
doctrine in situations where it may be applicable, regardless of whether the complainant
involved was prejudiced by the failure ofthe agency to follow its procedures or
regulations.

Where the Accardi doctrine is applicable, we are in accord with the line of cases

arising from the Supreme Court and other jurisdictions which have held that prejudice to
the complainant is necessary before the courts vacate agency action. In the instances
where anagency violates a rule orregulation subject to the Accardi doctrine, i.e., even a
rule orregulation that "affects individual rights and obligations" oraffords "important
procedural benefits upon individuals," the complainant nevertheless must still show that
prejudice to him orher (or it)resulted from the violation in order for the agency decision
to be struck down. In other instances where an exception to Accardi applies and where an

agency fails to follow its"internal administrative procedures," if the complainant can
nonetheless show prejudice to a substantial right due to the violation ofthe rule or
regulation by the agency, then theagency decision maybe invalidated pursuant to the
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. In either case, prejudice must be shown.
In summary, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals' holding that PID 110-18, the
Patuxent directive violated in the casesubjudice implicates the Accardi doctrine, but also

implicates theAccardi exception for the reasons stated herein and thereasons indicated in
the intermediate appellate court's opinion in the case in this appeal. PID 110-18 merely

provides for the orderly transaction of Patuxent business of collecting and handling urine
specimens. The provisions atissue here implicate no fundamental constitutional rights
and are not imposed on the agency by statute.

Moreover, we reject petitioner's contentions that he suffered prejudice in the way the
sample was handled and, by the Board's consideration ofthe positive urinalysis sample
whichwas submitted by him. He signed the specimen document. He wrote the correct
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inmate number on it; he affixed the evidence tape on the top of the jar. It was his urine
sample. In the instant case, Patuxent staff were generally following PID 110-18, but
committed purely technical infractions[.]
374 Md. 463 at 503-04, 823 A.2d 626 at 650, 651.

B. The Doctrine and its Exceptions - Legislative Intent

". . . [Tjhere is a principal exception to the doctrine, which provides that the [Accardi] doctrine is not
applicable to 'an agency's departure from procedural rules adopted forthe orderly transaction of agency
business.'"23 Some rulesare not intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon
individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion. The issue is whether the violation causes

substantial prejudice.24 Maryland has not adopted aper se invalidation ofagency action rule even when a
fundamental constitutional right is involved.25 Claimants must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the
violation ofa regulation or rule to have the agency action invalidated inMaryland. The Court ofAppeals
has adopted this rule asbeing "in line with Maryland public policy concerns asexpressed by the

Legislature in the APA for agencies that come under the APA's aegis."26 ". . . [N]ot every violation of

internal procedural policy adopted by an agency will involve the Accardi doctrine. Whether the Accardi
doctrine applies ina given case isa question oflaw. . . . [This] requires the courts to scrutinize the
agency rule or regulation atissue to determine ifitimplicates Accardi because it 'affects individual rights
or obligations' orwhether itconfers 'important procedural benefits' or, conversely, whether Accardi is
not implicated because the rule orregulation falls within the ambit ofthe exception which does not

require strict agency compliance with internal 'procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of
agency business. . . ." ". . . [T]he doctrine does not apply to an agency's departure from purely
procedural rules that do not invade fundamental constitutional rights or are not mandated by statute, but

are adopted primarily for the orderly transaction of agency business."27 There is no "per se violation of

thedoctrine in situations where it may beapplicable regardless ofwhether the complainant involved was

prejudiced by the failure ofthe agency to follow its procedures or regulations."28

23 Pollock, 374 Md. at 483.

24 Id. There isnolack of authority applying Accardi and itsexception. Pollock cited cases setforth inTransportation Authority

v. King, 369 Md. 274, 799 A.2d 1246 (2002): Board ofPhysician v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 206-207,725 A.2d 1027,1036-1037
(1999,) (violations not compromising the accused's opportunity for afull and fair hearing on the charges, or which were not raised
during the administrative proceedings); Department ofPub. Safety &Correctional Servs. v. Howard, 339 Md. 357, 369-370, 663
A.2d 74, 80 (1995) (investigation not completed within the time set forth in aregulation showed no prejudice) Ward v. Dept. of
Public Safety, 339 Md. 343, 353, 663 A.2d 66, 71 (1995) (employee suspension vacated as not authorized bythe agency's
regulation); Heft v. Md. Racing Commission, 323 Md. 257, 265, 592 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1991) and Resetar v. State Board of
Education, 284 Md. 537, 550, 399 A.2d225, 232, cert, denied, 444 U.S. 838, 100 S. Ct. 74, 62 L. Ed. 2d49(1979). Pollock 374
Md.at488.

Supreme Court cases subsequent toAccardi are set forth in the opinion. Pollock, 374 Md. at 489-95.
The Pollock Court pointed tonumerous Court of Special Appeals opinions recognizing or applying the Accardi doctrine

were cited. Pollock, 374 Md. at 487-88.

25 Pollock, 374 Md. at 495. Some are heard tosay this isamistake. Under the premise that fundamental constitutional rights
should be easily recognized and too easily discarded if there isnot apenalty to pay, controversy exists. Id., at 495-96.
26 Id. The Court cited federal and other cases to this effect. Pollock, 374 Md. at 496-500.

27/>o//ocJfc,374Md.at503.

28 Pollock, 374 Md. at503-04. Pollock's extensive review of case law ended with the Court's conclusion in summary form:

. [A]n agency ofthegovernment generally must observe rules, regulations or procedures which ithas established and

undercertain circumstances when it failsto do so, its actions will be vacated andthe matter remanded.. . .

. [N]ot every violation ofinternal procedural policy adopted byan agency will invoke the Accardi doctrine. Whether
the Accardi doctrine applies inagiven case isaquestion oflaw that. . . requires the courts to scrutinize the agency rule or
regulation at issue to determine if itimplicates Accardi because it"affects individual rights and obligations" or whether it
confers "important procedural benefits" or, conversely, whether Accardi is not implicated because the rule or regulation falls
within the ambit ofthe exception which does not require strict agency compliance with internal "procedural rules adopted
for the orderly transaction of agency business," i.e., nottriggering theAccardi doctrine.
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"The APA governs administrative procedures and is a legislative statement of policy setting forth
statutory requirements for agencies to which it applies and what prohibitions exist for suchagencies in the
carrying out oftheirbusiness." SG §10-222 providing for judicial review of agency decisions states that
"courts may reverse ormodify the decision ofthe administrative agency ifboth a substantial rightofthe
petitioner has been violated and the petitioner 'may have been prejudiced' by thatdeparture from the
prescribed procedure.. . ." Incorporating the legislative policy statement, the"APA basically provides
that if a coveredagency's departure from requirements affects fundamental rights and prejudices a

petitioner, its action is subject to be reversed or modified by the courts."29
Sometimes "mandamus or other traditional actions may lie to enforce administrative compliance with

procedural requirements or duties.30
Significant Case Decisions

Raise the issue before the agency or lose that right on appeal

o Argument on appeal by Dr. Finucan that his due process rights were not safeguarded bythe Board of
Physicians because of a failure to allow him toconfront acomplaining witness was not addressed in
Finucan v. Board ofPhysicians, 380 Md. 577, 846 A. 2d377 (2004). This was notan issue raised before
theagency and could notbe brought for the first time onappeal. 380 Md. at589.

The boardcannot summarily dispose of a casewhere it hasnoprocedures inplace to do that

o Summary disposition bythe Board ofContract appeals in Engineering Mgt. v. State Highway, 375 Md.
211, 825 A. 2d966 (2003) was reversed. The Board violated procedures set forth inits statute because it
did not adopt rules allowing asummary disposition procedure. 375 Md. at 232-32. Thus, the agency action
was unlawfiil and required reversal. 375 Md. at 236.

King's argument that when the Authority did not in fact immediately terminate him, it lose the right to terminate
him

o The Maryland Transportation Authority did not violate Accardi when itfirst investigated allegations of
misconduct byan employee before terminating him in MTA v. King, 369 Md. 274,799 A. 2d 1246

[T]he doctrine does not apply toan agency's departure from purely procedural rules that do not invade
fundamental constitutional rights orare not mandated by statute, but are adopted primarily for the orderly transaction of
agency business.

[There isno] per seviolation ofthe doctrine in situations where itmay be applicable, regardless ofwhether the
complainant involved was prejudiced by the failure ofthe agency tofollow its procedures orregulations.
[Prejudice tothe complainant isnecessary before the courts vacate agency action. Inthe instances where anagency
violates a rule orregulation subject tothe Accardi doctrine, i.e., even a rule orregulation that "affects individual rights and
obligations" or affords "important procedural benefits upon individuals," the complainant nevertheless must still show that
prejudice to him orher (or it) resulted from the violation in order for the agency decision to be struck down. In other
instances where an exception toAccardi applies and where an agency fails tofollow its"internal administrative procedures,"
ifthe complainant can nonetheless show prejudice to asubstantial right due tothe violation ofthe rule orregulation by the
agency, then the agency

decision may be invalidated pursuant to the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. In either case, prejudice must be

shown.
374 Md. at 503-04.

29 Pollock v. Patuxent Institution Board ofReview, 374 Md. 463, 469 FN3, 823 A. 2d626 (2003) citing A. Rochvarg, Maryland
Administrative Law 131 (2001). See: Accardi Comes toMaryland by Jack L.B. Gohn, p.3CDaily Record of2/8/03. An
administrative agency must follow its own rules.

30 Pollock citing Transportation Authority v. King, 369 Md. 274, 799 A.2d 1246 (2002) Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. ofSup'rs
Election, 345 Md. 477, 496-500, 693 A.2d 757, 767-769 (1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1053, 118 S. Ct. 702, 139 L. Ed. 2d 645
(1998), and cases there cited; Md-Nat'l Cap. P. &P. Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 17, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986)."
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(2002).31 "According to King, allowing him to remain in his job 'spanning a period overa year' from the
time of his alleged misconduct violated the 'immediate termination' language" ofthe agency rule and was
thus, an unlawful termination. 369 Md. at 287. The Court deferred to agency interpretation ofthe
regulation. "Allegations of serious misconduct or someevidence of serious possible misconductby an
employee may cometo the Authority's attention, but there may be a substantial questionconcerning the
truth ofthe allegations or whetherthe misconduct actually occurred. While not required it may be fairerto
the employee for him or her to remain on thejob while the allegations of evidence are being investigated."
369Md.at289-90.32
A mandamus action to say the Board had no authority to issue a summary determination
The agency violated its own procedure

o

When the Medical Advisory Boardand the Disability Review Boardofthe PrinceGeorge's County Police

Department Pension Plan ruled thatCorporal Steven Kerpelman's hypertension didnotconstitute a
qualifying disability, hebrought a mandamus action. Kerpelman v. Disability Review, 155 Md. App. 513,
515-16, 843 A. 2d 877(2004) TheCourt examined the Police Pension Plan. The language ofthe plan
specifically required the Medical Advisory Board toprovide a written opinion to the Disability Review
Board. The Disability Review board isthen required to render an opinion of disability. "This finding is a
prerequisite for a claimant to request a hearing." The Board's interpretation allowing itto make summary
determinations of disability without written findings andwithout offering a rightto appeal was incorrect

under the language oftheplan. 155 Md. App. at522-27. The Court ruled that the Medical Advisory Board
"failed to issue a written opinion concerning Kerpelman's alleged disability to the Disability Review
Board. In so doing,the Agency violated "its ownrules of procedure."

Deference to an agency interpretation of Its own rules andregulations
Not conclusive *just some deference

o Though deference istobegiven toan agency interpretation ofits own rules and regulations, that agency
interpretation isnot conclusive. Smith v. State, 140 Md. App. 445,455, 780 A. 2d 1199 (2001). This case
involved diminution credits duea prison inmate. The Court did not agree withthe DOC thatthere wasa

conflict between an interpretation ofthe regulation and the statute. 140 Md. App. at 457. "The DOC isnow
obligated tohonor and follow the regulation as itiswritten." The mis-calculation ofcredits inthis case
required a remand and further proceeding. 140 Md. App. at 463.

31 This opinion isquoted extensively in Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439,455-58, 800 A. 2d 768 (2002). This case involved ihe
granting ofatowing license in Baltimore County. Baltimore County should not have granted the permit based on the sole
criterion that applicant was African-American, as this was not a criteria to be considered in determining the need for additional
towing service. Itwas a longstanding practice to use defined criteria. There was aproper basic needs standard in operation.
Granting the license meant that Mr. Freeman [The Chief ofthe Department ofPermits and Development Management], deviated
from regulations. He could not determine "need" other than based on established criteria. He could not define "need" in another
contest.

The Court said that the "Board ofAppeals was legally correct toconclude that the DPM, using race alone asthe sole needed
criterion, should not have granted appellant's towing license application and that its action was arbitrary and capricious" Id., at

461. An improper departure from past consistent practice occurred with the decision to apply a"single, newly-created standard"
for this license application. "Such a departure from past consistent interpretation and practice isa matter better addressed either
bya legislative entity, or bytheadoption of a regulation." 369 Md. at 458.

32 In this 2002 opinion Judge Eldridge reviewed Supreme Court opinions relying on Accardi. King, 369 Md. at285. Court of
Special Appeals opinions on the issue were cited. 369 Md. at 285-86. SG §10.222(h)(iii) allows reversal for an agency failure to
follow the law. 369 Md. at 286. Judge Eldridge commented:

Moreover, numerous opinions ofthis Court have involved the review ofagency action to determine ifthe agency
complied with its regulations and required procedures. (An agency's violations ofprocedures which do not

"compromise the accused's opportunity for afull and fair hearing on the charges," orwhich were not raised during the
administrative proceedings, furnish no basis toinvalidate the agency's decision); (The failure ofan agency tocomplete
an investigation within the time set forth in a regulation did "not reflect any prejudice ... that was caused by the delay,"
andtherefore the administrative decision wasaffirmed); (Where the suspension of an employee was not authorized by

the agency's regulation, the suspension was vacated); Heft v. Inaddition, we have recognized that, under some
circumstances, mandamus or other traditional actions may lie to enforce administrative compliance with procedural
requirements or duties.
369 Md. at 286-87. (citations omitted)
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Claiming a violation ofdue process
Peer review process
When is an irregularity material

A failure to object means the right is waived
o Board ofPhysician QualityAssurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188,725 A. 2d 1027(1999) saw the Court
commenting that the disciplining of physicians in Maryland is governed by the Medical Practices Act (HO

Title 14), COMAR 10.32.02, et. seq., anda Peer Review Handbook for Maryland adopted jointly by the
Boardand the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland in 1989. Dr. Levitsky claimed a violation of
due process because the peerreview process that occurred prior to filing charges against him "was not
conductedin strictcompliance with procedural requirements." That peer review processis to determine
whether there is "reasonable cause to charge [a] physician with a failure to meet appropriate standards of
care." 353 Md. at 192. Some handbook procedures were not followed. However, there was no requirement
that "each member ofthe medical review committee to review each and every record of each and every

patient when ithas selected amedical review team for that purpose."33 353 Md. App. at 203-04. HO §14405(g) states "thehearing of charges may notbe stayed orchallenged by any procedural defects alleged to
have occurred prior to the filing of charges." Irregulatories "are ordinarily immaterial and maynot be
challenged." 353 Md. at204-05. That peer review process did not determine guilt but"onlywhether there
is a sufficientbasis for the filing of charges, there wasnot a compromise to the rightto a full hearing or a

proper challenge to jurisdiction. 353 Md. at206,208. In any event, the failure of Dr. Levitsky to object
meant the right to object was waived. 353 Md. at 206-07.
There werepromotional procedures in place
LEORB

The right to respond to allegations against you

o

In an action by a police officer grieving the failure to promote him, the Court reviewed thevalidity ofthe
Montgomery County Police Department's promotional procedures in Anastasi v. Montgomery County, 123
Md. App. 472,484-88, 719 A. 2d980 (1998). LEORB was invoked. The Officer alleged that his rights
under Montgomery County Administrative Procedure were violated because hewas not allowed torespond
to memos inhis employment file expressing reservations about his candidacy for promotion. 123 Md. App.
at490. Reviewing the procedure, the Court determined that it affected "individual rights and obligations,
and confers important procedural benefits upon employees of Montgomery County." 123 Md. App. at 493.
Accardi was triggered. Not having been given the opportunity to see or respond to memos inthe file meant
officer Anastasi's rights were violated. Remand was ordered to allow the Officer to respond to thememos
inthe file. 123 Md. App. at497.34 The positive urinalysis drug test result introduced ina petitioner's parole
revocation hearing was notrequired to beexcluded because Patuxent Institution did notstrictly comply
withits owndirective setting forth technical collection and documentation procedures for urinalysis

samples. "What occurred constituted atechnical mistake which did not substantially prejudice petitioner."
Pollock v. Patuxent Institution BoardofReview, 374 Md. 463, 468, 823 A. 2d 626(2003). A guard wrote

the wrong inmate number on the specimen paperwork, but petitioner signed it and wrote his correct number
on the paper. Anastasi, 123 Md. App. at 501. Evidence supported the chain of custody finding, and that the
specimen was petitioners. 123 Md. App. at 503.
Sexual harassment charged
The at-will employee

A statutory responsibility to investigate * that responsibility violated?

o Danaher v. Dept. ofLabor, 148 Md. App. 139,155, 811 A. 2d359 (2002) saw theCourt reversing and
remanding acase involving termination of aMaryland State employee under a sexual harassment policy.
Even though theemployee was an "at-will" employee, the State did notcomply with its statutory
responsibility to investigate alleged misconduct, meet with the employee, consider any mitigating
33 The circuit court relied onaprior Maryland Court of Special Appeals decision in Young v. Board ofPhysicians, 111 Md. App.
721, 684 A. 2d 17 (1996) stating that theHandbook was not merely an internal document and that thesanctions for non
compliance in notdoing an individual review of all files atissue. Levitsky, 353 Md. at202.
34 Officer Anastasi had asked the Court to order his promotion to Lieutenant. The Court stated this wasnot its function, and that

decision was best lefttothe Department with the Court toreview the decision made if judicial review was requested. Anastasi,
123 Md. App. at 497.
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circumstances, and then to"determine appropriate disciplinary action, if any, tobeimposed."35 SPP §11106.148 Md. App. at 166,176. SPP §11-106 "does not detail how the Employerwas to conductthe
required investigation." Nevertheless, using a dictionary definition, the inquiry hadto be careful or

systematic and adhere tobasic principles of fairness. 148 Md. App. at 169. 6 Termination ofaState
employee with prejudice means that the employee maynotbe employed with the State in anycapacity for
three years. 148 Md. App. at 176.

35 Evidently, the appellant did not mention Accardi when appealing the termination. The Court of Special Appeals said the
doctrine was relevant otthedisposition ofthe case where the State did not follow either thestatutory directive orCOMAR
regulations in properly investigating the matter prior to termination ofthe employee. Danahar, 148 Md. App. at 174-175.
36 In this case there was nomeeting with the employee giving him ameaningful opportunity torespond. Nor was the veracity of
the allegations checked. Danahar, 148 Md. App. at 170 A number ofdisciplinary options are available tothe employer, 148
Md. App. at 171, but before determining which ofthose options toexercise, the Department of Labor had tosatisfy the statutory
requirements "byconducting an investigation and considering mitigating circumstances." 148 Md. App. at 176.
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Standing before an administrative agency is different than standing before a circuitcourtonjudicial
reviewof an administrative agency decision. The benchmark for analyzing a standing dispute is the case

of Sugarloafv. Department ofEnvironment, 344 Md. 271, 292, 686 A.2d 605, 616 (1996), must reading
for etiology and analysis by anyone involved in a standingdispute.
Sections within this Chapter 8 are:

A. Standing before the agency
B. Standing before the Court
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A. Standing before the agency

There is a liberal standard under Maryland law for a party to have status in an administrative hearing.1
"The requirements for administrative standing under Maryland law are not very strict. Absent a statute or
a reasonable regulation specifying criteria for administrative standing, one may become a party to an
administrative proceeding rather easily." As least this is so with administrative proceedings where
community and individual interest is high, such as is seenwith zoning, developmentand certificate of
need proceedings. One present at a hearing before a Boardof Appeals, who testifies as a witness and
makes statements or arguments as to why amendments to zoning regulations should not be approved, has

standing.2 "... [T]he format for proceedings before administrative agencies is intentionally designed to
be informal soasto encourage citizen participation . . ."3
". . . [T]he threshold for establishing oneself as a party before an administrative agency is indeed
low." Presence "at the hearing and testimony in favor of an asserted position is sufficient" Appearance
and testimony at the hearing are not required. It has been held to be sufficient that the hearing examiner
1Sugarloafv. Department ofEnvironment, 344Md. 271, 292, 686 A.2d605, 616 (1996).
2Sugarloafv. Department ofEnvironment, 344Md. 271, 285-86, 686 A.2d605, 616 (1996) cited the decision of Judge J. Dudley
Diggsin the caseof Morris v. HowardRes. & Dev. Corp., 278 Md. 417, 423, 365 A.2d 34, 37 (1976) holdingthat a particular
individual was properly a party to an administrative hearing:

"He was presentat the hearingbefore the Board, testified as a witness and made statements or argumentsas to why the
amendments to the zoning regulations should not be approved. This is far greaterparticipationthan that previously
determined sufficient to establish one as a party before an administrative agency. See, e.g., Baxter v. Montgomery
County, 248 Md. Ill, 113, 235 A.2d 536 (1967) (per curiam) (submitting name in writing as aprotestant); Bryniarski
v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143, 230 A.2d 289, 293-94 (1967) (testifying before agency); Hertelendy v.
Montgomery Cty., 245 Md. 554, 567, 226 A.2d 672, 680 (1967) (submitting into evidence letter of protest);DuBay v.
Crane, 240 Md. 180, 184, 213 A.2d 487, 489 (1965) (identifying self on agency record as a party to proceedings);
Brashears v. Lindenbaum, 189 Md. 619, 628, 56 A.2d 844, 849 (1948) (same). . . .

3Sugarloaf 344Md. at 286-86. "[A]bsent a reasonable agency orother regulation providing for a more formal method of
becoming a party, anyone clearly identifying himself to the agency for the record as having an interest in the outcome ofthe
matter being considered by that agency, thereby becomes a party to the proceedings." Id.
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considered oneto be a party, or thatthe appellant's name was submitted to the agency as onewho would

be aggrieved by an adverse decision.4 "[M]ere presence atan administrative proceeding, without active

participation, is sufficient to establish oneself as a party to the proceeding."5
B. Standing before the Court

"Fora person or entity to maintain an action under theAdministrative Procedure Act forjudicial review
of an administrative decision, the person or entity "mustboth be a 'party1 to the administrative

proceedings and be 'aggrieved' bythe final decision ofthe agency. While theterm "aggrieved" isnot
defined in the Administrative Procedure Act, [the Court of Appeals has held] that the statutory

requirement that a party be '"aggrieved1 mirrors general common law standing principles applicable to

judicial review ofadministrative decisions."7 Accordingly, in order to be "aggrieved" for purposes of
judicial review, a person ordinarily must have an interest '"such that he is personally and specifically

affected in a way different from ... the public generally.'"8 This means that "the [administrative] decision
must notonly affect a matter in which the protestant has a specific interest or property right buthis
interest therein must be suchthat he is personally andspecially affected in a way different from ... the

public generally".9
Ajudicial standing issue should be adjudicated bythe circuit court by filing a motion or other

pleading to dismiss the petition. Testimony may be needed to determine the dispute.10 When the issue of
standing ofan appellant to seek judicial review israised in the court in which review of anadministrative
action is asked, the Court of Appeals has approved the practice of trialjudges in permitting testimony on
the point to betaken before them. Additional testimony isnot taken onthemerits ofthe substantive issue,

but of"determining whether the appellants have the requisite standing to have those issues resolved."11 It
is the trial court's function to determine whether a person is aggrieved.

Whether there has been an invasion of one's legal interest goes to the merits of a dispute. "The

question ofstanding isdifferent. It concerns ... the question whether the interest sought tobe protected
by the complainant is arguably within some zone ofinterests to be protected or regulated bythe statute or
constitutional guarantee inquestion." Thus, when considering whether one has standing, thefocus is on
the party seeking to get his complaint before a court and not on the issues he wishes tohave adjudicated.
"Incases involving challenges to administrative land use decisions, there is a distinction between standing
in court to obtain review ofthe governmental action and the merits ofthe challenger's position."
Evidencethere would be an increase in traffic in an area may be sufficient to give contiguous landowners

4Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at287 citing Maryland-Nat 7v. Smith, 333 Md. 3, 10, 633 A. 2d855 (1993) citing cases.
5Handley v. Ocean Downs, 151 Md. App. 615, 628, 827 A. 2d961 (2003).

6Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at287-88 citing Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, supra, 327 Md. at611, 612 A.2d at 248. See § 10222(a)(1) ofthe State Government Article ;Bailey v. Dep't ofPublic Safety, 333 Md. 397, 405, 635 A.2d 432, 436 (1994);
Maryland-Nat'l v. Smith, supra, 333 Md. at 11, 633 A.2d at 859 ("Establishing the [plaintiffs] status as aparty tothe proceedings
before the Board of Appeals completes only halfof the required analysis; the [plaintiff] must also be aggrieved by theBoard's
decision in order to have standing").

7Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 288 citing Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, supra, 327 Md. at 611 n.9, 612 A.2d at 248-249 n.9;
Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146, 230 A.2d289,294-295 (1967).
8Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at288 citing Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, supra, 327 Md. at611 n.9, 612 A.2d at 248-249 n.9,

quoting Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., supra, 247 Md. at 144, 230 A.2d at 294. See Maryland-Nat'l v. Smith, supra, 333 Md. at
11, 633 A.2d at 859; Abramson v. Montgomery County, 328 Md. 721, 733, 616 A.2d 894, 900 (1992); DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md.
180,185, 213 A.2d 487, 489-490 (1965).

9Sugarloaf 344Md. at288.
10 Dorsey v. Bethel, A.M.E., 375 Md. 59,71, 825 A. 2d 388(2003).
11 Sugarloaf, 344Md. at292.

12 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at295 citing Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and other cases.
13 Sugarloaf, 344Md. at294.
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standing tochallenge the grant of aspecial exception to build an apartment hotel.14 Evidence that a
facility discharging toxins into the airthat may subject a nearby property owner to greater emissionsthan
the general publicmeans that property ownerhasthe requisite standing to contest issuance of a permitto
construct the facility. These determinations are independent of outcome ofthe administrative proceeding

on the underlying issues oftraffic conditions and the acceptable limits ofemissions.15 "In actions for
judicial review of administrative land use decisions 'an adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner
is deemed primafacie ... a person aggrieved. The person challenging the fact of aggrievement hasthe
burden of denying such damage in his answer to the petition for [judicial review] and of coming forward

with evidence to establish that the petitioner is not, in fact, aggrieved."16
The Legislature "may enact legislation affecting a person's standing to bring atype of action in court

or prescribing criteria for standing to bring such an action." With "respect to the allocation of functions
between administrative agencies and thejudiciary, the determination of whether a person has standing to
maintain an action in court is exclusively a judicial function."

Where there existsa party having standing to bring an action, the court "shall not ordinarily inquire

as to whether another party on the same side also has standing."18
"In actions for judicial review of administrative land use decisions, 'an adjoining, confronting or
nearby property owner is deemed, primafacie . . . aperson aggrieved. The person challenging the fact
of aggrievement has the burden of denying such damage in his answer tothe petition for [judicial review]

and ofcoming forward with evidence to establish that the petitioner is not, in fact, aggrieved."19

"Incases involving government-issued permits allowing activity which causes theemission of toxic
substances into the air, the concept of 'nearby' property owners who are presumptively aggrieved may
well include persons in a greater geographical range than in atypical zoning matter.'
Significant Case Decisions

What the Legislature said; what the Legislature should have said; What the Legislature meant bywhat it said
when it said what it said

o

Another standing issue was before the Court inGosain v. County Conucil ofPrince George's County, 420
Md. 197,22 A. 3d 825 (2011) where two individuals who operated service stations sought to maintain an
action for judicial review of a final administrative decision bythe Prince George's County Council, acting
as the District Council, to challenge the approval of a detailed site plan for a parcel of commercial property

inPrince George's County. The individuals were not aggrieved. They were also stockholders and
employees of corporate entities which owned businesses and therefore separate from those corporate
entities. It was the corporate entity which paid taxes in Prince George's County - nottheindividual

14 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at294.

15 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 295. The Court said standing cannot be based on adecision that one would not suffer legally cognizable

harm. This would put an unreasonable burden on complainant. 344 Md. at 296. That is putting the cart before the horse.

16 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297-98 citing cases stating that one who owns any property located within sight or sound ofthe subject
property, within the same subdivision, in close proximity to the reclassified land, etc. have been said to have standing. Id., at 298.
17 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 290. (citations omitted) The Court reviewed prior decisions. 344 Md. at 290-292.

18 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297. In this case, one party had standing so itwas unnecessary to determine whether any ofthe other

plaintiffs alsohad standing. 344 Md. at 297.

19 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. At297. The Court reviewed cases. 344 Md. at 297-98 discussing concepts of property within sight or

sound ofthe subject property; proximity of homes within the same subdivision; close proximity, etc.
20 Sugarloaf, 344Md. at299.
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petitioners. Therefore, the individuals had noright to standing to contest the agency proceeding. 420 Md. at
210-211.

The standing issuedepended uponthe correct interpretation of Article 28, § 8-106(e) whichstatutory
sectioncontrolled the judicial reviewprocess from a Prince George's CountyDistrict Councildecision. 420
Md. at 204-05. Legislative history dictated the result that statutory authority granting the rightto judicial
review to "any personor taxpayer in Prince George's County," which could literally be construed to mean
any transient or individual passing through the County, would produce an absurd, illogical or incompatible
with common sense. Prior to 1965 the statute, in pertinent part, gave the right to judicial review to a person
"aggrieved." 420 Md. at 205.

"The term"aggrieved" as a basisfor standing to bringan action is used in numerous statutes, is alsoa
Maryland common law standard, andhas been defined andapplied in many opinions by thisCourt." 420
Md. at 206. The Court traced the wordingofthe statutegrantingauthorityto contest agency action and the

changes in the statutory wording over theyears (set outintheopinion). "... [T] seems clear from the
statutory wording andlegislative history that the General Assembly contemplated a broad category of
persons orentities having standing. The Amendment to § 8-106(c) over the years had the effect of

expanding the class ofpersons orentities having standing. On the other hand, aspreviously discussed, it
would be unreasonable to givethe phrase itsbroadest literal meaning." "Traditionally, standing to
challenge in court governmental decisions regarding the use of land has been based onthechallenger's

having some type of interest inreal property in the area. Under § 8-106(e), of course, thepertinent area is
all of Prince George's County. Moreover, the 1994 amendment to § 8-106(e) granted standing to
associations "representing property owners affected bya final district council decision," indicating thatan
interestin property was the basis for standing." 420 Md. at 209.
Consequently, in ourview, a reasonable interpretation of "any person ... in Prince George's County"

means a person or entity having some type ofinterest inreal property in Prince George's County. This
would include a person residing in Prince George's County or owning a residence in the County,
regardless ofwhether it is the person's domicile. Itwould include businesses or other entities owning
or leasing real estate in Prince George's County.

Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that "any...taxpayer in Prince George's County" means any

person or entity which pays property taxes to Prince George's County. See Superior Outdoor Signs v.
Eller Media Company, 150 Md. App. 479, 505, 822 A.2d 478, 493 (2003), where the Court of Special
Appeals pointed out that a statute granting standing to "any taxpayer" ina particular jurisdiction would
literally include "payers not only ofproperty taxes, but ofany kind oftax - sales, income," etc., but that
thestatute "must be interpreted in itscontext" which was land useregulation. Thecourt held, therefore,
that the statutemeant propertytaxes paid to the particular jurisdiction.

Both petitioner Gosain and petitioner Chaudhry lacked standing under ourinterpretation ofArticle
28, § 8-106(e), to maintain this judicial review action. They neither resided or had a property interest in
a residence in Prince George's County, norowned or leased any realproperty inthe County, norpaid
property taxes to the County. The two corporations, Sona Auto Care, Inc., and MNA, LLC, owned the
two service station properties andthe businesses. The corporations, not the petitioners, paidproperty
taxesto PrinceGeorge's County. Neither corporation, however, was a party to this litigation.
420 Md. at 210.

An appellate courtmay raise the standing issueon itsown initiative
Look at the statutoryauthorityfor some direction as to who has standing
o Parties in the circuit courtaggrieved by a final judgment of a circuit courtwereentitled to appeal to the

Court of Special Appeals inDorsey v. Bethel, A.M.E., 375 Md. 59, 68, 825 A.2d 388 (2003). The Court
cited Art. 25A §5(U) gives that authority following appeal to a circuit courtfrom a decision of a county
Board ofAppeals. 375 Md. at68. "When. . . aggrieved parties inthe trial court are entitled to appeal and
prosecute a timely, proper appeal to the Court ofSpecial appeals, their alleged lack ofstanding to have
institutedthe action in the trial court furnishes no groundfor dismissalofthe appeal." 375 Md. at 69.

"Under some circumstances, an appellate court may consider a standing issue even though it was notraised
in the trial court. Sometimes an issue described as a 'standing' issue may relate to the jurisdiction ofthe

appellate court, such as whether the 'case-or-controversy requirement' ismet, and such an issue may
always be noticed by the appellate court." 375 Md. at70. The Court said the intermediate court should not
have raised the issue of standing inthis case where the only issue litigated inthecircuit court was the
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finality ofthe administrative decision, andthe parties dismissed had signedthe notice for appeal and the

issue had notbeen attacked bythe other party. 375 Md. at70-71.21
Thejudiciary determines standing disputes relating to the right to be in court
o The "question of standing to maintain a judicialreview action [is] a matterto be resolvedexclusively by
the courts." An administrativeagency has no authority to determinewhether standing exists on judicial

review. Sugarloafv. Department ofEnvironment, 344 Md. 271,291-92, 686 A.2d 605, 616 (1996).22 This
case was concerned with the Maryland Department ofthe Environment's decision to issue two permits
which authorized the construction of a solid waste incinerator near Sugarloaf Mountain in Dickerson,

Maryland. The agency delegated authority to OAH to conduct a hearing on whether a permit to construct
should be issued and whether a refuse disposal permitshould be issued. 344 Md. at 280-81. The ALJ

concluded thattheplaintiffs lacked standing under NR 1-508, et. seq. or common lawprinciples or under

SG 10-222(a) tochallenge the Department's decision to issue permits.23 344 Md. at281. The merits ofthe

controversy are not to be blurred with the issue ofwhether standing exists. 344 Md. at 293.24 When

government issued permits allow the emission oftoxic substances into the air, the concept of"nearby"
properties owners who are presumptively aggrieved "may well include persons ina greater geographical
range than in a typical zoning matter." 344 Md. at298. Inthis case an adjacent farmer only 2,000 feet away
from the incinerator had standing. 344 Md. at298-99.25
Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., supra, 247 Md. 137, 145, 230 A.2d 289 held that when "[a] person
whose property is far removed from the subject property" faces a challenge in court to his standing, and
therefore attempts to establish incourt that he isaggrieved by anadministrative zoning decision, hemay
rely on "evidence" before the agency, as well as evidence before the court, to show "that his personal or

property rights are specially and adversely affected by the [administrative] action" The issue ofstanding is
"determined by the courts on acase by case basis."26 This case was concerned with the administrative grant
ofa special exception permitting the construction and operation ofan apartment hotel. Evidence
"indicating that there would be an increase in traffic in the area because oftheapartment hotel was
sufficient togive landowners, who were 'continuous orclose in proximity' tothe proposed hotel, standing
tochallenge incourt the grant ofa special exception. Such persons would have standing even ifitwere
ultimately determined that the increase in traffic was not so great as torequire denial ofthe special
exception."27
Adjacent property owners had standing to argue the case in the circuit court. 344 Md. at298-99.
Evidence at the administrative hearing demonstrated that much higher levels of toxic substances would fall

21 "In light ofthese circumstances the individual plaintiffs had primafacie standing to seek judicial review, and any dispute
concerning their standing should have been raised and litigated in the Circuit Court, not the Court ofSpecial Appeals. Bethel, 375
Md. atat71.

22 "The Court ofSpecial Appeals, therefore, erred in holding that any deference could be given to the administrative decision
concerning plaintiffs' standing to maintain an action for judicial review." Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 293. The Court stated: "The
decisions below appear toreflect some confusion between standing to be aparty atthe administrative level and standing to
maintain ajudicial review action in the circuit court, as well as confusion over the appropriate roles ofan administrative agency
and a reviewing court withregard to each typeof standing." 344 Md. at 285.

23 "The ALJ, however, did infact render findings and conclusions with respect tothe plaintiffs' standing, holding that the

plaintiffs would not be "aggrieved" by the issuance ofthe permits and lhat, therefore, they did not "have standing to challenge the
administrative decisions." The ALJ purported toapply the case law dealing with standing incourt tomaintain ajudicial review
action. Ifthe ALJ's findings and conclusions concerning the plaintiffs' standing were intended to relate toadministrative standing,

the ALJ clearly applied an erroneous standard. Moreover, as pointed out previously, the plaintiffs were in fact properly accorded
administrative standing. The plaintiffs' status atthe administrative hearing was simply a non-issue." Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at289.
24 The Court said itrejected the "argument that the plaintiffs lack standing because, in the respondents' view, the likely fallout of
toxic substances upon their properties will be acceptable under government air quality standards." Id., at297. "In cases involving
challenges toadministrative land use decisions, there isadistinction between standing in court toobtain review ofthe
governmental action and the merits ofthechallengers position." Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at294.
25 Evidence at the administrative demonstrated thatmuch higher levels oftoxic substances would fall onthe adjacent farm than

on other nearby property owners. Even ifitturned out that the level ofpollutants falling on nearby property may be "acceptable"
and thus the issuance ofthepermits would be justified, this did not mean that standing did not exist. Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at30001.

26 Sugarloafv. Department ofEnvironment, 344 Md. 271, 291, 686 A.2d 605, 616 (1996).

27 Sugarloaf, 344Md. at 295.
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on the Buchanans' farm and on other nearby property owners than would fall on properties further away
from the site. 344 Md. at 300.

ho is an "aggrieved" individual?
Initiation ofa dispute by the appellate court

o

Ginn v. Farley,43 Md. App. 229,236,403 A. 2d. 858 (1979) saw the Court stating that though not raised
by the trial judge, the Court said it had no hesitancy in holding that Ms. Gin was not an aggrievedparty
withinthe meaning of MarylandLaw. ". . . [S]hewas not properly before the circuitcourt; and she should
not have been heard." 43 Md. App. at 232. Transcription ofthe proceeding showed Ms. Gin stating she
was not an aggrievedparty and was just representing the neighborhood and the property is within the
neighborhood complex." 43 Md. App. at 231.

Lookat the statuteto see ifthere is any indication was to whoaggrieved individuals are going to be
o The Cambridge City Code provided that"persons jointly or severally aggrieved by anydecision ofthe

board of Appeals, or any taxpayer . . . ofthe municipality" have standing to seek judicial review of a
zoning decision inHandley v. Ocean Downs, 151 Md. App. 615, 628-29, 827 A. 2d 961 (2003). The Court
notedthat Article 66B, section4.08 governs zoning appeals. The Courtof Appeals has interpreted the

language to evidence a legislative intent to give a taxpayer standing to appeal notwithstanding lack of
aggrievement. 151 Md. App. at 629. Rule 7-202(c) requires a petitioner to state where heorshe was a
party tothe agency proceeding when filing for judicial review. "Ifthe petitioner was not a party, the
petitioner shall state the basis ofthepetitioner's standing to seek judicial review." 151 Md. App. at629.
School board decisions

o

In Patterson Parkv. Teachers Union, 399 Md. 174, 923 A. 2d 60 (2007), the Court discussedstanding

prerequisites where waivers sought from State law and regulations were sought so as toallow Charter
Schools to hire withoutthe restriction of a collective bargaining agreement. That meant"the potential for a

competing labor pool within those public charter schools" "[B]ecause the waivers had the potential of
limiting the scope ofthe Unions' bargaining unit" that meant that the Unions "possessed a sufficient
interest intheproceedings to satisfy standing requirements and the State Board erred bynotgiving proper
notice or opportunity to be heard inthewaiver proceedings." 399Md. at 208.
The Court also stated:

We had theopportunity to explore standing prerequisites specifically with regard to decisions
issued bythe State Board ofEducation inBaltimore Teachers Union. [Baltimore Teachers Union
v. Maryland State Board ofEducation, 379 Md. at 192, 840 A.2d at 728.] In thatcase, the State
Boardof Education enacted regulations forthe reconstitution of schools that consistently failto

meet theprescribed student performance standards. Part ofthe reconstitution plan enabled the
State Board to delegate control andmanagement overpublic schools to third parties. Pursuant to

these new regulations, theState Board and the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners
entered into a five-year contract with a company, Edison Schools, Inc., under which Edison was to
assume operation and management ofthree Baltimore City public schools, serving as "the
employer of allemployees hired for the ... schools" with "the power to hire, assign, discipline,
anddismiss all personnel hired at theschools." Id. at 197, 840 A.2dat 731. TheBaltimore
Teachers Union, American Federation of Teachers, Local 340, and the AFL-CIO filed a complaint

challenging the reconstitution regulations and the Edison contract to which the State Board and the
City Board responded byfiling a motion todismiss for lack of standing. The circuit court ruled
that the Unions had standing, andwe affirmed, underscoring that the Unions, as the exclusive
collective bargaining agent fortheemployees ofthe Baltimore City Public School System,

possessed "statutory rights and fiduciary duties tonegotiate for, and to act in the best interests of,
the public school employees." Id. at 199, 840 A.2d at732. We further explicated that, byremoving
three public schools from the Unions' charge, the Edison contract not only interjected a competing
labor pool with the Unions' bargaining unit, but also reduced the size and scope ofthe Union's
bargaining unit. Id. Thus, we held that the Unions had standing to challenge the reconstitution.
399 Md. at 207-208.
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". . . [A]n administrative agency or official is not empowered to render a declaratory judgmentwith

respect to the constitutionality of astatute."1 The MAPA requires an agency to make findings of law and
contains no exception for constitutional issues.2 Therefore, most claims during the course of an
administrative hearing that a statute is either unconstitutional as applied or unconstitutional on its face, are
going to be resolved in the agency action.
A court will not decide a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-

constitutional ground.3 The same istrue as to administrative agency decisions.
An agency lack ofauthority "to issue a declaratory judgment orruling on the constitutionality of a
statute does not mean that an administrative agencyor official, in the course of rendering a decision in a

matter falling within the agency's jurisdiction, mustignore applicable law simplybecause the source of
that law isthe state or federal constitution."4 Agencies, "likejudges, the Governor, members ofthe
General Assembly, and others elected or appointed to "any office of profit or trust," must take anoath to
"support the Constitution" of Maryland and to "execute [his orher] office ... according to the
Constitution ... of this State
" Article I, Section 9,ofthe Constitution of Maryland."5 "Moreover,
overthe past fifty years, when many statutes have provided for quasi-judicial administrative proceedings
to resolvethe innumerable controversies and problems associated with our modern age, [the Court of

Appeals] has consistently takenthe position that constitutional issues, including the constitutionality of
applying particular statutes, can and often must be raised and initially decided in the statutorily prescribed

administrative proceedings.6
1Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable Life, 339 Md. 596,615-16, 664 A. 2d 862 (1995), referencing Maryland's Declaratory
Judgment Act, C.J. §3-404. This 1995decisionwrittenby Judge John C. Eldridge ofthe Courtof Appeals of Maryland is "the"
definitive case ofthe when, where, how and what of agency consideration of constitutional issues.

2Equitable Life, 339Md. at616referencing former Art.48A §40(4) ofthe Insurance law and S.G. §10-222(h). Case law is cited
and analyzed in the opinion. 339 Md. at 617-23."The issue arose when the Insurance Commissioner statedthat he was not
authorized 'to declare" a statute constitutional." 339 Md. at 515. The circuit court disagreed with the Insurance Commissioner's
conclusion that he had the authority to rule on the constitutionality of a statute. 338 Md. at 611.

In Equitable Life, it was time for the Courtof Appealsto make a summary holding on the ability of an agency to ruleon the
issue of constitutionality. The issue was whether differentials in certain insurance rates and underwriting based on gender
equalitywere constitutional. As important as the issue was, the Court's analysisboiled down to the only live controversy
involving insurance rates, Equitable Life, 339 Md. at626, anda conclusion thatthe statutory sections cited did not involve setting
rates or life insurance. 339 Md. at 626-635. Judicial review being limited to the issues or grounds dealt with by the agency, a
remand was ordered. 339 Md. at 634.

3Piscatelli v. Liquor Commissioners, 378 Md. 623, 630837A. 2d 931 (2003). FNNo. 4 on page 630 citescases to this effect.
4Equitable Life, 339Md. at 616..
5Equitable Life, 339Md. at617citing "Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1Cranch 137, 180, 2 L. Ed. 60, 74 (1803) (public
official's taking a prescribed oath to discharge his duties "agreeably to the constitution" requires that the official apply the
Constitution, and not a statute, when the two are in conflict). The Insurance Commissioner in the present case was obligated to
apply the relevant law, and the relevant law does not exclude Article 46 ofthe Maryland Declarationof Rights."

6Equitable Life, 339 Md. at 617. The Court cited and gave examples considering prior Maryland case law. 339 Md. at617-621.
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The Maryland Court of Appeals has recognized a"'constitutional exception" to the normal rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies even as to constitutional issues. Where the
constitutionality of a statute on its face is challenged, and where there exists a recognized declaratory
judgment orequitable remedy, we have held that the challenger ordinarily need not invoke and exhaust
his administrative remedy."7 "The 'constitutional exception1. . . alluded permits ajudicial determination
without administrative exhaustion when there is a direct attack upon the power or authority (including

whether it was validly enacted) ofthe legislative bodyto adopt the legislation from which reliefis
sought."8 "The 'constitutional exception' recognized inthese cases does notmean that the
constitutionality of a statute as a whole cannot be raised and initially decided in the statutorily prescribed
administrative proceedings. Instead, under the language inthe above-cited opinions, by-passing an initial
administrative resolution ofthe constitutional issue is an option which the challenger may or may not
choose. The modern cases make it clear that the constitutionality of a statute as a whole can be initially

decided inthe administrative proceedings."9
"The modern cases make it clear that the constitutionality of a statute as a whole can be initially

decided in the administrative proceedings."10 "Moreover, under circumstances where there exists no
declaratory judgment or equitable remedy, and where the only avenue for reliefis the statutorily
prescribed administrative and judicial review proceedings, aconstitutional challenge to a statute, whether

on its face or as applied, must be initially litigated in the administrative proceeding."11
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated that"[U]nder circumstances where there exists no
declaratory judgment or equitable remedy, and where the only avenue for relief is the statutorily

prescribed administrative and judicial proceedings, a constitutional challenge to a statute, whether on its

face or as applied, must be initially litigated in the administrative proceeding."12 ". . . [Wjhere a
constitutional challenge to a statute, regardless of its nature, is intertwined with the need to consider
evidence and render findings of fact, and where the legislature has created an administrative proceeding
for such purpose, [The Court of Appeals] has regularly taken the position thatthe mattershould be

initially resolved in the administrative proceeding."13
Significant Case Decisions
A constitutional issue not labeled or considered as such?

o

MVA reciprocity considerations took the front seat to a constitutional attack in a 2 Judge dissent
interpretation of T. §16-103.1 which states thatthe Maryland MVA "may not issuea driver's license to an
individual... (d)uring any period for which the individual's license to drive is revoked, suspended,
refused, or canceled in this or any other state,unless the individual is eligible for a restricted license under
§ 16-111(e) of this subtitle..." in Alvezv. MVA, 402 Md. 727, 729, 939 A. 2d 139(2008). Alvez is a
citizen of Mexico and not in the USA legally. The problem in the view ofthe dissent was: "... Alvez, now
a resident of Maryland, will always be ineligibleto obtain a driver's license in Maryland because of New

Jersey's policy of refusing a driver's license to a person whose 'continued presencein the united States is
[unauthorized under Federal Law." The 2 Judge dissent said that the New Jersey policy was contraryto
Maryland Public Policy, 402 Md. at 739 was a violation of Maryland's constitution (equal protection
7Equitable Life, 339 Md. at621.
8Equitable Life, 339Md. at622.
9Equitable Life, 339Md. at622.
10 Equitable Life, 339Md. at 622.
11 Equitable Life, 339Md. at 623.
12 Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable Life, 339 Md. 596,623,664A. 2d 862(1995). See case review26 U. Bait. L. Rev. 135,
Annual Review of Maryland Law (1996).

13 Equitable Life, 339Md. at 623 citing cases.
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provisions of Article 24 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights): "Making a Maryland resident's eligibility
for a Maryland driver's license depend upon which state or province wasthe person'sprevious residence
certainly appears to lack any rational basis. Moreover, thegrounds of refusal in the other state or province
could be utterly arbitrary or discriminatory." 402Md. at 744. Priorcase lawandthe plain wording ofthe
statutewas dispositive ofthe decision by the majority. 402 Md. at 729.
Substantive due process rights denied?

o

In Thomas v. Dept. ofLabor, 170 Md. App. 650, 908 A. 2d 99 (2006) two school bus drivers, who were
employees ofthe Baltimore County Department of Education claimed that L.E. §8-909(c) violated the Due
Process Clause ofthe fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights in denying them

unemployment benefits during academic school years "because it discriminates between those school bus
drivers employed by county boards of education andthose employed by private contractors." 170 Md. App.
at 668.14 ". . . L.E. 8-909 was enacted to exclude those individuals employed by educational institutions
and with a reasonable assurance of continued employment from eligibility for unemployment benefits

during regularly scheduled periods of unemployment. Congress had concluded that, because those
employed by educational institutions know of scheduled breaks in employment theyshould be prepared for
the breaks that regularly occur in their chosen employment and should prepare for them. The statute is

rationally related to achieving its objective." 170 Md. app. at 669-70.15 "Although privately employed bus
drivers may notbe subject to exclusion provisions of L.E. §8-909, any perceived inequitable treatment of
privately employed andpublicly employed school bus drivers is a matter for the legislature to address. 170
Md.App. at 671.

Ask: What authority is granted to the agencyunderthe constitution and laws ofMaryland?
o As a home rule subdivision, Baltimore City had the authority,by the Maryland Constitution, Article XI-A,
and Art. 25A, to enact local zoning laws and lawsfor the sale and disposition of food of every kind. Article
66B (Land Use) §2.01, et. Seq. expressly grants zoning authority to the Mayorand City of Baltimore.
Piscatelli v. Liquor Commissioners, 378 Md. 623, 635-36, 837 A. 2d 931 (2003). The regulation of
alcoholic beverages is not withinthe express powers granted to Article XI-A home rulejurisdictions. The
Maryland Legislature has preempted this areawhich is regulated by Art. 2B ofthe Maryland Code. 378

Md. at 636.16 Piscatelli argued thattheBoard of Liquor Commissioners of Baltimore City could not
prohibit himfrom serving alcoholic beverages between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. because Article 2B §11-365(d)
had a specific provision that establishments providing any form of entertainment between 2 a.m. and 6 p.m.
on any day where alcoholic beverages are consumed shall registerwith the fire departmentand the
Department of Housing and Community Development and comply with all laws. 378 Md. at 631. The
Court said this section does not contain an authorization for a licensee to operate or provide entertainment
between those hours. 378 Md. at 632. Also, this enactment was not violative ofthe constitutional provision

prohibiting a liquor board authority from enacting general laws reserved to a homerule subdivision under

Article 25A ofthe Maryland Code. 378 Md. at640.17
14 Judge Kenney wrote for the Court describing equal protection arguments andthe application of suspect
classifications and strict scrutiny, etc. Thomas, 170 Md. App. at 668. No "sensitive classification" was found in this
case and therefore a rational basis standard was applied. Constitutional attacks have occurred against state
unemployment law classifications:
("Where a state's unemployment insurance compensation statute neither involves a discernable fundamental
interestnor affects any protected class with particularity, the relatively relaxed 'rational basis' standard
should be applied in determiningwhether the statuteviolatesthe Equal Protection Clause.")
170 Md. App. at 669 (citations omitted)

15 Courts in otherjurisdictions had reached the same or similar conclusions. Thomas, 170Md. App. at 670-71.
16 "Ratherthan providing broad generalguidelines, the General Assembly has chosen to closelycontrol by statuteeventhe more
detailed aspects ofthe alcoholic beverages industry." Equitable Life, 339 Md. at 623.

17 The Courtthen discussed Piscatelli's argument that the liquor board's enactment violatedThe FirstAmendment and the Equal
Protection Clause ofthe U.S. Constitution by improperly singling out liquor license establishments that provided life
entertainment and/or dancing by requiring those establishments to close when alcohol cannot be sold but allowing certain
restaurants, pharmaciesand hotels to remain open. Live entertainment did not appear to be protected by the First Amendment.
Time, place and manner restrictions, as discussed in PackShack v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55, 832 A. 2d 170 (2003), were not
an issue as Article 2B did not relate to the number of establishments, but only concerned the hours of operation. Piscatelli, 378

169

No authorization for an agency to declare a statute unconstitutional
But:

o

The Insurance Commissioner was not authorized "to declare" a statute unconstitutional in Insurance

Commissioner v. Equitable Life, 339 Md. 596, 615, 664A. 2d 862(1995). That did not mean that the
Commissioner, in the course of rendering a decision in a matter falling within the agency's jurisdiction,

mustignore applicable lawsimply because the source of that law is the state or federal constitution. 339
Md. at 616. Jurisdiction in the MarylandInsurance Commissioner to enforce the insurance laws through
administrative action and the MAPA requirementthat agencies render conclusions of law in contested
casescontain no exception for constitutional issues. Therefore, the circuit court erred in determining that
the Insurance Commissioner lacked authority to decide whether portions ofthe Insurance Code were
unconstitutional. 339 Md. at 624. The Insurance Commissioner held that portions ofthe insurance code

authorizing differentials in certain insurance rates andunderwriting basedon genderif actuarially justified,
are unenforceable in light of Article 46 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights (ERA). The circuit court had
reversed that decision. 339 Md. at 600-01.

This 1995 Equitable Life Courtof Appeals decision is encompassing. From that decision is taken the following
significant casedecisions pointing up, in a clinical setting, the application ofthe principles:
•

In Hoffman v. City ofBaltimore, 197 Md. 294, 305-306, 79 A.2d 367, 372 (1951), a property owner
contended that the application of a zoning statute to his property was unconstitutional and that, for this
reason, he was entitled to an exception. This Court noted the view expressed in some earlier cases that an
administrative agencycannot pass upon the constitutionality of a statuteand then held that the zoningboard
could grant an exception "by holding the ordinance pro tanto invalid," and its ruling on the constitutional
issue would be fully subject to judicial review.

•

In Baltimorev. Seabolt, 210 Md. 199, 123 A.2d 207 (1956), property owners again contended that the

application of a zoningstatuteto their property would be unconstitutional. Instead of invoking and
exhausting the statutorily prescribed administrative and judicial review remedy, the property owners
broughta declaratory judgment action. The trial courtrendered a declaratory judgmentthat "the Zoning
Ordinance resulted in a taking ofthe appellees' property without compensation" and that it was not
necessary for the property owners to invoke and exhaustthe administrative procedure "where a
constitutional question was involved." This Court, however, reversed, ordered that the declaratory

judgmentactionbe dismissed, and heldthat the property owners were requiredto have the constitutional
issue resolved in the statutorily prescribed administrative and judicial review proceedings. The Court
repeatedthe statement from the Hoffman case that the administrative agency, if it agreed with the property
owners' constitutional argument, was authorized to grant '"exceptions by holding the ordinance pro tanto
invalid."'

•

A similar case was Poe v. Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303,216 A.2d 707 (1966), where the property owners,

contending that the application of a zoning statute to their property was unconstitutional, brought a
declaratory judgment action without having exhausted their administrative remedy. They argued "that they
had no effective remedy before the Board [of Municipal and Zoning Appeals], because the Board is an
administrative agency, not a court, and only a court can decide a question of constitutional law." This
Court, in affirming the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint, flatly rejected the
argument that the Board could not initially decide the constitutional issue. In an opinion by Judge
Oppenheimer, the Court stated:
"It is particularly within the expertise of an administrative body such as the Board to marshal and
sift the evidence presented in a hearing ... and to make an administrative finding as to whether,
on the evidence, the application ofthe ordinance to the property involved deprives the owner of
any reasonable use of it. Such a finding is subject to court review on the question of
constitutionality, as a matter of law."

Md. at 641-43. Social or economic legislation means the states have wide latitude under the Equal Protection Clause. No
unreasonable basis was seen through the Art. 2B limitation that was enacted. 378 Md. at 643-45.
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Sapero v. M. &C. C, 235 Md. 1,3,200 A.2d 74, 76(1964) saw the Court stating: "we think the Board ...
[was] justified in concluding that a denial ofthe variance would not amount to a taking in the
constitutional sense".

Frankelv. City ofBaltimore, 223 Md. 97, 101, 103-104, 162 A.2d447, 449, 451 (1960) was a casewhere
the Court stated that the administrative agencyerred by not holding ordinance unconstitutional as applied.
There was a constitutional challenge to a tax statute on its face in PotomacElec. Power v. P. G. County,
298 Md. 185, 468 A.2d 325 (1983). The Court statedthat becausethe tax had been paid, the exclusive
remedywas the statutorilymandated administrative refund proceeding.
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Judicial review of quasi-legislative functions (adoption of regulations) is differentfromjudicial review of

quasi-judicial functions1 (dispute resolution through contested case). Maryland Court Rules, Title 7,
Chapter 200 deals with Judicial Reviewof Administrative Agency Decisions. CJ §12-301, et. seq.
contains the statutory grants of a right to appeal from circuit courtjudicial review and exceptions. "A
reviewing court may reverse the decision of [an agency] if such decision results from unlawful procedure

or some other error or law."2 ". . . [T]he procedure followed in administrative agencies usually is notas
formal and strict as that ofthe courts."3 A court review of an agency decision means the application of
separate standards for questions of fact (the substantial evidence test) and questions of law (a de novo
review).4
Within this Chapter 10 are the following sections:

A. When an Appeal (Judicial Review) May be Taken
(1). Statutory Authorization
(2). The Writ of Mandamus
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179

B. The 700 Rules
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(1). To Secure Review
(2). The Agency Responsibility to Send Notice
(3). Time Limitations
(4). Response to Petition
(5). Preliminary Motions
(6). Stays
(7). The Record
(a). What the Record Shall Include
(b). Stipulation
(8). Memorandum
(9). Hearing
(10). Additional Evidence
(11). Disposition
(12). Appellate Court Review

182
184
185
186
187
187
188
189
189
190
192
192
192
193

1These materials primarily focus on agency review by a circuit court. If the circuit court decision is appealed to 361 Rowe
Boulevard, the same review is performed as occurs at the circuit court level. Dept. ofPublic Safety v. PHP, 151 Md.App. 182,
824 A. 2d 986) (2003). ("Thus, whether the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review is of no consequence if our own
review satisfies us that the [Board's] decision was proper.") 151 Md. App. at 194.

2Travers v. Baltimore CityPolice Department, 115 Md. App. 395, 408, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997).
3Travers, 115 Md. App. at408.
4Montgomery County v. JAMSA, 153 Md. App.346, 352-53, 836 A. 2d 745 (2003).
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C. The Scope of Review
(1). In General
(2). Venue
(3). Parties
(4). A cookbook methodology - a three part address
(5). IssuesNot Beforethe Agency
(6). Review ofthe Agency Factual Determinations (the substantial evidence test)
(7). Review of Agency Legal Determinations
(8). Was the agency decisionarbitrary and capricious
(9). Disposition
(10). Expertise of the Agency
(11). Agency Must State Basis of Decision
(12). Complete Record

193
193
197
197
197
197
199
206
218
222
223
223
228

Underthe separation of powers requirement, it is not the properfunction of an administrative
officialto decide whether a plaintiff has standingto maintain an action in court. That is the prerogativeof
the court5

". . . [W]hen a court remands a proceedingto an administrative agency, the matter reverts to the
process ofthe agency, and there is nothing further for the courtto do. Such an order is an appealable final
order because it terminates the judicial proceeding and denies the parties means of further prosecutingor

defending their rights in the judicial proceeding."6
Whenever a circuit court "directly reviews the action, or inaction, of any administrative agency,

governmental body, or official in the executive or legislative branches of government, including local
government, the court is exercising originaljurisdiction and not appellatejurisdiction." To constitutethe
exercise of appellatejurisdiction there must be a priorjudicial final order. In a "technical, constitutional
meaning ofthe term, a circuit court never exercises 'appellatejurisdiction' when it directly reviews the
decision of an administrative agency or local government body." Thus, there is Judicial Review of an

administrative decision when permitted by law.7
1000 Friends ofMaryland v. Ehrlich, 170 Md. App. 538, 907 A. 2d 865 (2006) challenged the
approval by the Board of Public Works of funding for an expansion of Maryland Route 32 in Howard
County (via declaratory judgment, request for injunctive relief and request for mandamus). The circuit
court granted the State's motion to dismiss the complaint and the Court affirmed. Detailing the "Smart
Growth" (State may not provide funding for a growth-related project if the project is not located within a
priority funding area) legislation enacted in 1997 and the approval process under the "extraordinary
circumstances " exception under the statute. (SFP §5-7B-05(a)) The circuit court determined that the
Comptroller had properly delegated his authority to vote for the project and that it "found no additional
requirement in the statute for the Board of Public Works to make any [factual] findings prior to voting on
an exception." 170 Md. App. at 545. SFP §5-7B-10(a) specifically states the "Smart Growth" legislation
does not create a private cause of action and that precluded the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
claims. 170 Md. App. at 548. When the Board acts to approve funding based on the "extraordinary
circumstances" exception, "'the Board shall approve by a majority vote that' the project satisfies the
statutory requirements. There is no express requirement that formal findings of fact supporting its
determination be made and presented." 170 Md. App. at 549. When approving funding, the Board is
performing a "quasi-legislative" function, such as promulgation of a regulation or approving a budget and
5SugarloafCitizens' Association v. Department oftheEnvironment, 344Md. 271, 289-90, 686 A.2d 605 (1996).
6Board ofPhysician Quality assurance v. Levitsky, 353Md. 188, 200-201, 725 A. 2d 1027 (1999) citing priorMaryland cases.
7Dvorak et. al v. AA County ethics Commission, 400 Md. 446, 452-53, 929 A. 2d 185 (2007).
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is not performing a "quasi-judicial" function requiring reasons to bestated. 170 Md. App. at 550. The
claim for Mandamus falls as the Board met, heard statements, determined the "extraordinary

circumstances" requirement had been met andthusthe statute was satisfied. 170Md. App. at 549-550.
A. When an Appeal (Judicial Review) May be Taken.
(1). Statutory authorization

Title 12 ofthe Courts and Judicial ProceedingsArticle deals with appeals, certiorari and certification of

questions of law. There is a definitions section (Subtitle 1), a section pertaining to review of cases
docketed in the Court of Special Appeals (Subtitle 2) and a section pertaining to a review of decisions of

trial courts and general jurisdiction (Subtitle 3).8
CJ §12-301. Right of appeal from final judgments - Generally.

Except as provided in §12-302 of this subtitle, a party mayappeal from a finaljudgmententered in a civil
or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal existsfrom a finaljudgment entered by a court in the
exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particularcase the right of appeal is
expressly deniedby law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution
of sentencehas been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiffwho has accepted a remittitur may cross-appeal
from the final judgment.
[An. Code 1957, art. 5, §§ 1-3,5, 6, 8, 12, 13,19; 1973, 1stSp.Sess., ch.2, § 1; 1989, ch. 584; 1990, ch. 428; 1991, ch. 240.]

CJ §12-302. Same - Exceptions.

(a) District Court, administrative agency, or local legislative body.- Unless a right to appeal is expressly
granted by law, §12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgmentof a court entered or made in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision ofthe DistrictCourt, an administrative agency,
or a local legislative body.
[An. Code 1957, art. 5, §§ 1, 14; 1973, 1stSp.Sess., ch.2, § 1; 1976, ch.49, § 1; 1982, ch.493; 1983, ch. 295; 1984, ch. 255; 1989,

ch. 5, § 1; chs. 573, 584*, 806; 1991, ch. 240; 2001, ch. 35; 2002, ch. 213, §6; 2003, ch. 141; 2004, chs. 25,461,462.]

In Boardv. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938), the Court of Appeals stated " . . . [Ajbsent
specific statutory authority, an administrative agency exercising a quasi-judicial function usually is not

entitled to appeal from a circuit court judgment reversing the agency's decision."10 The years following
that decision saw the Court making it "clear that the McKinney doctrine does not apply to all agencies or

to all adjudicative administrative proceedings."11 ". . . [U]nder the general statutory authorizations for
appeal, agencies are entitled to appeal from adverse circuit court judgments where the functions ofthe
agencies '"are so identified with the execution of some definite public policy as the representative ofthe

8There is also contained in Title 12the following subtitles:
Subtitle 4. Review of Decisions of District Court.

Subtitle 5. Review of Decisions of Orphans' Courts.
Subtitle 6. Certification of Questions of Law.
Subtitle 7. Practice on Appeal.

Maryland Rule 7-201 lists a number of Code provisionswhich authorize appeals to, and reviews by, a circuit court from
administrative agencies.

9The remainder of this statutedealswith appeals from contempt findings, criminal cases, in banc review, a plea of guilty,
sentencing review panels, and a revocation of probation.

10 Maryland Racing Commission v. Castrenze, 335 Md. 284, 293, 643 A. 2d412(1994).
11 Maryland Racing, 335 Md. at 294. (citations omitted)
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State, thattheir participation in litigation affecting their decisions is regarded by the Legislature as

essential tothe adequate protection ofthe State's interests.'"12
There are any number of Maryland code provisions which authorize judicial review of administrative
proceedings, some of which areset forth inannotations to Rule 7-201. What Rule 7-201 states isthatthe
Maryland Rules apply to review an agency order where it is authorized by statute. In stating the
procedures to be followed when appealing an administrative decision to the circuit court, the Rules do not
create a right ofappeal.13 Maryland law holds that without specific statutory authorization to a circuit

court and/or an appellate court, no appeal will generally lie.14 "Although atan early period the common
lawrecognized the availability of write of errorunder some circumstances, questions of appealability

have today become entirely governed by statutes."15 In a typical statutory judicial review action, CJ §13302(a) precludes an appeal wherethere is no specific statutory authorization for that appeal.
Statutory provisions governingthe right to appeal are sometimes extensive. For examplethe
Maryland Insurance Administration appeal rights are governed by Ins. §2-215. What may be appealed (a),
who may appeal (b), venue for the appellate case (c), a time limitfor filing the appeal (d), the caption for
appeal papers (e),the right ofthe circuit courtto grant a stay(f), the contents ofthe record on appeal (g),
and the authority ofthe court to affirm, remand, or reverse and for what reasons (h) are all included
within this statutory provision. Costs may be assessed (i) and a further appeal may be had to the Courtof
Special Appeals (j). Some provisions forjudicial review are fairly simple suchas BO §2-210 allowing an
appeal from the State Board of Accountants which provides: "Anyperson aggrieved by a final decision of
the Board in a contested case, as defined in § 10-202 ofthe State Government Article, may take an appeal
as allowed in §§ 10-222 and 10-223 ofthe State Government Article." For others, there is an
intermediate step as with AG §2-405 allowing an appeal from a decision by the Secretary of Agriculture
to a Board of Review and thereafter providing for judicial review.
Significant Case Decisions

The right to have Judicial Review

o

Always essential to know is the statutory authority for the decision of an agency and therefore the envelope
within which the agency has the authority to act and one feeling aggrieved has the right to file for judicial
review. In CityCouncilofPrince George's County v. Billings, 420 Md. 84, 21 A.3d 1065 (2011), the
Court stated the legislative procedure in Prince George's County, Maryland where the right to challenge
agency zoning decisions is governed by the Maryland Regional District Act (Art. 28, §7-101, et. seq.),

12 Maryland Racing, 335 Md. at294citing Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304Md. 731, 743, 501 A.2d 48 (1986)
quoting McKinney, 174 Md. at 561.
Given that the Racing Commission formulates policy in addition to its adjudicatory function (it has broad authority to
promulgate regulations governing horse racingand betting), it had standingto maintain an appeal despite the fact no statutory
authority specifically conferred that right. Maryland Racing,335 Md. at 294-95. A circuit court judge had determined that the
Commission failed to give propernotice and an opportunity to be heard priorto suspension, 335 Md. at 291. The Court of
Appeals disagreed. 335 Md. at 300.

13 Urbana Civic Ass'n v. Urbana Mobile Village, 260 Md. 458, 462-63. 272A. 2d 628 (1971).
14 Urbana Civic, 260 Md. at460-61. The Court noted that Frederick County was neither a charter nora codecounty provided
with home rule. With home rule, it could have created a county board of appeals capable of reviewing the planning commission's
disapproval ofthe subdivision plat in question here." 260 Md. at 462.

15 Prince George's County v. Baretta, 358Md. 166, 173, 747 A. 2d647 (2002). The Court pointed to Gisriel v. Ocean City
Elections Board, 345 Md. at 485, 693 A.2d at 761 for its summarization of Maryland law concerning the appealability of

judgments. Unless there is a right to appeal from the circuit court to the Court of Special Appeals by state statute of local law,
the Court of Special Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. 358 Md. at 174. This Court also reviewed the general
right to appeal statutes and exceptions. 358 Md. at 177-81. There is some discussion, not applicable to this case, as to whether the
ability to pursue a declaratory judgment action or mandamus action, would give an avenue to appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals. 358 Md. at 182-83.
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zoning power is mostly delegated to the Prince George's County District Council which Council by
ordinance may adoptand amend the text of a zoning ordinance, adoptand amendmapsto regulate the size
of lots, yards, courts and otheropen places (Art. 28 §8-101, et. seq.). The Prince George'sCounty Board of
Zoning Appeals may extend or continue nonconforming uses andgrant special exceptions andvariances.
(Art. 28 §8-110, et. seq.)

In Billings, the Courtwas calledupon to determine whether the District Council may, on its own
initiative "elect to review" certain local land use decisions when an administrative appeals board withdraws

an election to review, the result of which is an agency decision not to decide. 420 Md. at 88. The Court
held that Citizens are eligible to seek review of Councildecisions and that the District Council may not
withdraw its election to review a local zoning decision. 420 Md. at 90.

361 Rowe Boulevard to litigant: "We do not see a statute giving you the right to be here"
o In PSC v. Schisler, 389 Md. 27, 882 A. 2d 849 (2005) the Court noted in FN 39 at page 89 that neither the
PublicUtilities CompaniesArticle nor the StatePersonnel and PensionsArticle authorizeda petitionfor

judicial review ofthe Public Service Commission's final decision to terminate an at-will employee ofthe
PSC. The Court said that Wilson, undoubtedly aware of this, filed a circuit court complaint and sought

judicialscrutiny ofthe Commission's actions through alternative legal vehicles when she pled for a
declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, common law certiorari, and injunctive relief. That Court said:
"... [H]owever, skillful pleading may not avoid application ofthe doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies," which precluded relief to Wilson in this case. Wilson, 389 Md. at 89.
Look at the statute/ordinance and see what it says, if anything, about an appeal

o

Kant v. Montgomery County, 365 Md. 269, 778 A. 2d 384 (2001) held that the decision by the Montgomery
County Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs was able to be appealed to both the CircuitCourtfor

Montgomery County and the Court ofSpecial Appeals. 365 Md. at278-79.16 At issue was whether the
Court of SpecialAppeals had jurisdictionto hear the case.CJ § 12-301 generally provides for an appeal
from a circuit court determination. "The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court n
the exercise of original, special, limited, statutoryjurisdiction, unless in a particular case, the right of appeal
is expressly denied by law." The Montgomery County Charter, section 2A-2 discusses appealability of
administrative decisions. 365 Md. at 275-76. A Commission decision is subject to the County's

Administrative Procedure Act." 365 Md. at 276. Section 2A-11 ofthe Code provided for an appeal from a
circuit court determination: "Any party to the proceeding in the circuit court may appeal from such decision

to the appellate courts of Marylandpursuantto applicable provisions ofthe Maryland Rules of Procedure."
365 Md. at 277.

What this case teaches in holding that an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals was allowed is that
there is no substitute for a detailed examination of Maryland Law beginning with CJ and following through
to an examination of local government authority and to the Charter ofthe local government. 365 Md. at
277-78.

Local government adjudicatory decisions
Ascertain the extent ofa right to appeal
o Murrellv. Mayor & City Council, 376 Md. 170, 190, 829 A. 2d 548 (2003) stated:

Because the impact of [CJ] §12-302(a) is chiefly upon actions for judicial review of local
government adjudicatory administrative decisions, the right to appeal a circuit court's decision in
these judicial review actions is primarily dependent upon local laws. Some subdivisions, such as
Montgomery County, broadly authorize appeals to the Court of Special Appeals from circuit court
judgments reviewing local administrative adjudicatory decisions. Other subdivisions, such as
Prince George's County, do not broadly authorize such appeals. Thus, the right to an appeal in a
large group of cases is dependent upon a person's geographical situation.

16 The Commission ordereda refund to Ms. Wetherell of her entire security deposit, plus interest; orderedthe Landlord to pay her
$4,502 for a 15% refund ofthe reduced value for her leasehold during the defective tenancy, $1,000 in attorney's fees, and $982
in relocation costs. Kant, 358 Md., at 271. When the circuit court affirmed the Commission finding, an appeal was entered to the
Court of Special Appeals. 358 Md. at 272.

177

Where do you see the provision allowing this appeal?

o

The Court of Appeals reviewed the right under a charter county to enact a statute which provides thata
county administrative agency, upon a finding of employment discrimination, may in addition to other relief,
award money damages 'for humiliation and embarrassment' up to $100,000" in Prince George's County v.
Baretta, 358 Md. 166, 167,747 A. 2d 647 (2002). The review was precludedbecausethe circuitcourt

judgment was notappealable. Section 2-197(c) ofthe Prince George's County Code authorized an
"appeal" (i.e. judicial review) from theHuman Relations Commission to the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County. "There is no provision of Prince George's County law, however, authorizing inthis type
of case an appeal from the CircuitCourtto the Courtof Special Appeals." 358 Md. at 174.
Whether an appeal Is allowed

The extent ofthe appeal allowed (circuit court; appellate court?)
A decision on the law is for the court

o

Disability benefits were the focus of attention in Marsheck v. Board ofTrustees, 358 Md. 393, 749 A. 2d
774 (2000). The hearing examiner dismissed the request for special disability benefits because the
Petitioner failed to file her application timely. Discussion as to when an injury occurs was beforethe
Court. Remedial legislation which governs retirement benefits "mustbe construed liberally in favor of
injured employees in order to effectuate the legislation's remedial purpose." 358 Md. at 403. The doctrine
of substantial compliance was inapplicable to thiscase. 358Md. at 416. ". . . [S]he was required to file her
application with Respondent on 13 February 1997. It is clear that she did not. Respondent received
Petitioner's application on 18 February 1997, five days after it was due. Petitioner has no cited us to, nor
have be discovered, any part of Article22 as it applies to the fire and police retirementsystem that grants
an exception to the five yearstatute of limitations . . . We maynot craftone for herjudicially."358 Md.
at 416.17 While the agency decision is presumed to be correct, andreview is limited to determining if
substantial evidence supported the decision, andordinarily deference is accorded to the decision ofthe
agency, thiscase presented a legal issue, namely themeaning ofthe term "injury" as used in the code and
whether "injury"meantthe pointat which a police officer becomes permanently disabled. That legal
decision was for the Court. 358 Md. at 402.

It is notfor the circuit court to determine whetheran appellatecourt has jurisdiction
o In Carroll County v. Love Craft, 384 Md. 23, 862 A. 2d 404 (2004), a circuit court erroneously struck a
notice to appealto the Court of Special Appeals. The circuitcourt has some authority under the appellate
rules to strike an appeal but those reasons are entirely collateralto the merits ofthe appeal, such as an
untimely filing, failure to provide the record, etc. A circuit courtmay not dismiss an appeal because it

believes the appellate court has no jurisdiction. Carroll County, 384 Md. at42.18
The Anne Arundel Code gave no right to appeal

o

A class action lawsuit alleged that between 1988and 1996Anne Arundel County mishandled and
unlawfully used the developmental impact fees it collected and Dvorak(Chief Administrative Officerof
the Countyfrom 1994 to 1997)and Scheibe (a former County Attorney)participated in the law suit on
behalf of the Plaintiffs. Dvorak, et. al. v. AA County Ethics Commission, 400 Md. 446, 929 A. 2d 185
(2007) involved the appeal of an administrative agencyfinding subsequently filed against Dvorak and
Scheibeallegingthey had violatedArticle9 §5-105 ofthe Anne Arundel Code, "a provision ofthe Public
EthicsLaw prohibiting 'former Countyemployees from representing or assisting a party in a matter, if the
former employeehad informationnot generally available to the public." The Ethics Commission found

that the allegations were well founded.19 When the Circuit court affirmed the Commission and the Court of
Appeals determined there was no right for judicial review beyond the circuit court.
17 Onejudgedissented on a statutory interpretation basis saying thattheresult wastoo harsh and the majority'sconstruction
posed an illogical or unreasonable result. Marsheck, 358 Md. at 417.

18 Compounding the errorwasthe fact that Carroll County failed to appeal the erroneous dismissal. Carroll County, 384Md. at
42. Examining the appellate rules that were applicable and the term "jurisdiction, Though the circuit court erred, it had
fundamental jurisdiction."If the county desired to challenge the CircuitCourt's order... it was required to note an appeal. When
it failed to do so within the 30 days allowed, the order became final; the appeal was dismissed. Thus, when we issued a writ of
certiorari on May 14,2004 in Appeal No. 1376,that appeal was no longerpending in the Court of Special Appeals. There is
nothing for us to review." Carroll County, 384 Md. at 45-46.

19 Theprimary focus onjudicial review wasthatthe Commission lacked jurisdiction overthem. Dvorak, 400Md. at 449.
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"Appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally authorized, is determined entirely by statute, and
therefore a right of appeal must be legislatively granted. In other words, an examination ofthe
relevant Maryland Code provisions and the legislativeenactments ofthe subject local

governmental body is necessary to determine whether, in a given case, there is a rightof appeal or
judicialreview form the final decision of an administrative agency. The right to appellate review
prescribed by the Maryland Code, is delineated in Maryland code is delineated in §§12-301 and
12-302 ofthe Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
400 Md. at. 450-51. (citations omitted)

A broad right to generallyappeal statedby §12-301 is limitedsignificantly by §12-302 which provides
that "unless a right of appeal is expressly grantedby law, §12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final
judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of
the District Court, an administrative agency, or a local legislative body." 400 Md. at 451. The ethics law
gave the circuit court the right to reviewthe administrative holding. At issue was whether there was any
right to ask the appellate courts of Maryland to further reviewthe matter. The holding: "There being no
provision of Anne Arundel County lawthat confers a rightof appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in this
kind of acase and the appellants having failed to raise any question concerning the circuit court's
jurisdiction to "sit in reviw of sucha judgment, the Commission's motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.
400 Md. at 457.

(2). The Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus may be issued under limited circumstances. Legislatures cannot divest courts ofthe

inherent power they possess to review and correct actions by an administrative agency.20 Because State
agencies and political subdivision are creatures ofthe State, they have no fundamental rights and no right
to question the constitutionality ofthe actsof theirsuperior and creator. "... [T]he purpose of a
traditional common law mandamus action is 'to compel... public officials or administrative agencies to

perform their function, or perform some particular [non-discretionary] duty imposed upon them.'"21
Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of discretion by an agency. There are cases

recognizing an exception to this principle where public officials or agencies engage in "arbitrary abuses
of discretion."22 These casesall involve claims of personal rights or property rights ofprivate individuals
or entities. It is doubtful that these cases, and the principle they set forth, have any application to an
action for mandamus by one state government agency against another state government official or

agency."23
Sometimes "mandamus or other traditional actions may lie to enforce administrative compliance with

procedural requirements orduties.24
"In the absence of a statutory provision for an appeal from a determination of an administrative

agency, judicial review may be obtainedthrough an action for a writ of mandamus." Courts issue a writ of
mandamus "'to prevent disorder, from a failure of justice, where the law has established no specific

remedy, and where injustice and good government there ought to be one.'"25 ". . . [T]he Court of
Appeals [has] explainedthat the common law writ of mandamus is an original action and not an appeal...
. It "is a summary remedy, for the want of a specific one, where there would otherwise be a failure of
justice. It is based upon reasons of justice and public policy, to preserve peace, order and good
20 Boardof Education v. Secretary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 43-44, 562 A. 2d 700 (1989) citing a prior case.
21 Murrell v. Mayor & City Council, 376 Md. 170, 193, 829A. 2d 548 (2003).
22 Board v. Secretary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 47, 562A. 2d 700(1989).
23 Board v. Secretary ofPersonnel, 317 Md. at47.
24 Pollock citing Transportation Authority v. King, 369 Md. 274, 799 A.2d 1246 (2002) Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Sup'rs
Election, 345 Md. 477, 496-500, 693 A.2d 757, 767-769 (1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1053, 118 S. Ct. 702, 139 L. Ed. 2d 645
(1998), and casesthere cited; Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 17, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986)."

25 Kerpelman v. Disability Review, 155 Md. app. 513, 528, 843 A. 2d 877 (2004).
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government." The "Maryland Constitution is silent regarding appellate courtpower to issue a writ of
mandamus, but [a court] "may utilize the writsof mandamus ... as an aid to appellate jurisdiction^]" "If
the use of a writ is 'necessary to enable ... [the Court] to exercise appellatejurisdiction it is in aid of that

jurisdiction.1" Theexercise of a court's authority to issue an extraordinary writ may bejustified by the
potential irreparable harm to the moving party and by the need to maintain the integrity ofthe legal
system."26
The Courtof Special Appeals set forth a two-pronged test in 2004 for determining ifjudicial review
through a writof mandamus is proper. "Judicial review is properly sought through a writ of mandamus
"where there [is] no statutory provision for hearing or review and where public officials [are] alleged to
have abused the discretionary powers reposed in them." Thus, prior to granting a writ of mandamus to
review discretionary acts, there must be both a lack of an available procedure for obtaining review and an

allegation that the action complained ofis illegal, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."27
. . . [A] writ of mandamus . . . may issue "'"to prevent disorder, from a failure ofjustice,
where the law has established no specific remedy, and where injustice and good government

there ought to be one.'" "The plaintiff seeking a writof mandamus must demonstrate that a public
official has a plain duty to perform certain acts,that the plaintiffhas a plain right to have those
actsperformed, and that no otheradequate remedy exists by which plaintiffs rights can be
vindicated."

1000 Friends ofMaryland v. Ehrlich, 170 Md. App. 538, 548-49, 907 A. 2d 865 (2006) (citations
omitted)

Significant Case Decisions
Appeal vs.judicial review

o

Murrell v. Mayor & City Council, 376Md. 170, 829 A. 2d 548(2003) addressed the issue of whether a
circuit courtjudgment upholding an administrative decision to razecertain buildings wasappealable to the
Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals said no andthe Court of Appeals saidyes. CJ
§12-302(a) was the focus of discussion. Though that section limited appeals from a circuit court review of

agency action, itdid not preclude appeals that were essentially common law mandamus actions.28 Section
§12-302(a) "creates an exception to thegeneral appeals statutory actions in the circuit courts seeking

judicial review ofadjudicatory administrative decisions."29 Actually, what comes to a circuit court from a
final decision by an agency is not an appeal butrather a request forjudicial review. Section 12-301 does
not authorize an appeal from a circuit court judgment andanyrightto appeal "in sucha casemustbe found
in some other statute." Otherwise, the right to appeal does not exist. 376 Md. at 184-85. Section 123.7of
the Building Code limited appeal rights to the circuit courtfor Baltimore City. 376 Md. at 185-86.
Historically, the rule limiting appeals evolved from the Court'sholding that there should be no right of
appeal where it didnot exist at common law. Mandamus actions arecommon law actions. 376Md. at 192.
The majority ofthe Court determined that thefailure ofthe Department of Housing to perform several nondiscretionary mandatory duties by failing to giverequired notices, failure to render findings of fact and

26 Kerpelman v. Disability Review, 155 Md. app. 513, 528,529, 843 A. 2d 877 (2004) quoting Cicala v. Disability Review Bd. For
Prince George's County, 288 Md. 254,259-60, 418 A.2d 205 (1980); In re Petition for Writ ofProhibition, 312Md. 280,307,
539 A.2d 664 (1988); and Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 707-08, 752 A.2d 200 (2000).

27 Kerpelman v. Disability Review, 155 Md. app. 513, 528, 843 A. 2d 877(2004) citing Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 146,
680 A.2d 1040 (1996).

28 The Court reviewed the BuildingCode sections applicable. Murrell, 376 Md. at 172-75. The underlying facts were set forth.
376 Md. at 175-182.

29 CJ §12-301 is the general appeals statute. The Court reviewed the history ofthe statute. Murrell, 376 Md. at 186-190. "Because
the impact of §12-302(a) is chiefly uponactions for judicial review of local government adjudicatory administrative decisions,
the right to appeal a circuit court's decision in these judicial review actions is primarily dependent upon local laws." 376Md. at
190.
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conclusion of law after a hearing and failure to make an adequate record ofthe hearing meant that

mandamus was proper. 376 Md. at 196-197.30
"... [T]he purpose of a traditionalcommon law mandamus action is 'to compel... public officials or
administrative agencies to perform their function, or perform some particular [non-discretionary] duty
imposedupon them.'" Murrell v. Mayor & City Council, 376 Md. 170, 193, 829 A. 2d 548 (2003). In
Gisrielv. Ocean CityElectionsBoard, 345 Md. 477, 693 A. 2d 757, no appeal was provided by the Ocean
City Charter authorizingappeals to the Court of Special Appeals from a circuit court's judicial review of an
administrative decision. Nonetheless, the appellate court had jurisdiction over an action, whatever it was
called, in the nature of mandamus. In this case, the Court determined that the Board had a "nondiscretionary duty to delete from the Ocean City registered voter list the names of unqualified voters before
determining the percentage of voters who had signed" a petition to place z recent zoning ordinance on the

ballet for the next election, and whether the 20% voter requirements was met. 376 Md. at 192-193.31
Non-ministerial acts

Could the dispute be addressed elsewhere
timeliness

o

The Board of Education of Prince George's County in Boardv. Secretary ofPersonnel, 317 Md. 34, 562 A.

2d 700 (1989) sought a writ of mandamus alleging that stateagencies acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and
unreasonably in not granting the Board's request for a contested case hearing regarding an auditof social
security payments made on behalfof government employees. While agreeing that mandamus ordinarily
will not lie to control the exercise of discretion, the Board relied on cases recognizing an exception to this

principle where public officials or agencies engage in"arbitrary abuses of discretion pointing to language in
State Dep't ofA. & Tax. v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 398, 380 A.2d 28, 36 (1977); Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd. v.
Gould, supra, 273 Md. at 500-501, 331 A.2d at65; and State Health Dep't v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 523,
209 A.2d 555, 561 (1965) ("While as a general rulemandamus is not properto review non-ministerial acts
ofpublic officials or agencies, this Court has recognized that such will lie to remedy arbitrary abuses of
discretion"). The Board asserts thatthe Secretary ofPersonnel's refusal to issue a declaratory ruling inthis
case was an arbitrary abuse of discretion, and thus mandamus will lie. 317 Md. at 47. While the Court said
it was doubtful that mandamus relief would lie between one government agency and another, it said there
was no abuse of discretion. The request for a declaratory ruling was not timely, and a pending action
existed before the Department of budget andFiscal Planning where the issue couldhave beenraised. 317
Md. at 48.

An employment dispute
What authority did the ALJ have?

o

Wilson v. Simms, 380 Md. 206, 844 A. 2d 412 (2004) was a mandamus action arising out of an employment

dispute between GailWilson andthe Department of Public Safety andCorrectional Services. Wilson
brought a mandamus action to enforce an administrative order for herreinstatement andto provide herwith
back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits although the administrative orderomitted reference to
these benefits. The Court concluded that a mandamus action was not proper in this situation. Id., at 209.

30 Two judges dissented. "Theuse of a mandamus action to review administrative decisions was always intended to be limited,
especially when statutory judicial review exists." Murrell, 376 Md. at 201 ."Local legislative bodies have provided forappeal
from the circuit Court in some instances, but not in others. If there is some perceived deficiency, it is easily correctable by

legislation. It should notbecorrected bythis Court's creative, but unwarranted, stretching ofthe common law mandamus action.
Perhaps this is a hard case, in thesense thatthecircuit Court made a mistake, butweshould notallow thatto make bad law,
which is precisely what the Court is doing." 376 Md. at 202.
31 The Murrell Court continued:

"Consequently, the principle embodied in §12-302(a) hasno application to common lawactions. Both before andafter
the enactmentof §12-302(a), this Court has regularly exercised appellatejurisdiction in mandamusactions against
administrative agenciesand officials. See, e.g., Goodwich v. Nolan, supra, 343 Md. 130, 680 A.2d 1040; Board v.
Secretary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 45-49, 562 A.2d700, 705-707 ; Tablerv. Medical Mut Liab. Ins., 301 Md. 189,
202-203, 482 A.2d 873, 880 (1984) ; Bovey v. Exec. Dir., Health Claims, 292 Md. 640, 441 A.2d 333 (1982); Md Act.
For Foster Child, v. State, 279 Md. 133, 138-139, 367 A.2d 491, 494 (1977); State'sAttyv. City ofBalto., 274 Md.

597, 608, 337 A.2d 92, 99 (1975); State HealthDep't v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 522-524, 209 A.2d 555, 560-562(1965)
; Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 49 A.2d 75 (1946); Heapsv. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945); Hechtv.
Crook, 184 Md. 271, 40 A.2d 673 (1945); Walter v. Montgomery County, 180 Md. 498, 25 A.2d 682 (1942).
376 Md. at 194.
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The Court discussed the history and nature ofthe Writ of Mandamus. 380 Md. at 217-224. Mandamus
should issue only in those cases where anotheradequate remedy does not exist and where "clear and
undisputable" rights are at stake. A Writ will not lie if the petitioner's right is unclear or issues only at the
discretion of a decision maker." 380 Md. at 223. While the ALJ order conferred the right to reinstatement,
nothing was said about back pay, etc. 380 Md. at 224. No legal authority provided that reinstatement
necessarily includes back pay, accrued leave, and/or retirementbenefits. The Court reviewed the applicable
law. 380 Md. at 224-228. Mandamus failed because Wilson had no clear right to the remedies she sought.
380 Md., at 229.
Catch 22 in administrative law

o

The Court of Appeals concludedthat Corporal Steven Kerpelman's appeal to the circuit court througha
motion for writ of mandamus was procedurally correct in Kerpelman v. DisabilityReview, 155 Md. app.
513, 528, 843 A. 2d 877 (2004). The Medical Advisory Board ofthe Prince George's Police Department
had not communicated a finding that Kerpelman did not have a qualifying disability by a written opinion as

required by the statute, which written opinion generated the rightto appeal. "Kerpelman found himselfin
"the ultimate 'Catch-22.'" He could not advance his application due to the MAB's determination, nor could

he appeal that determination. Thus, the two prongs ofthe test forjudicial action through writ of mandamus
were met." 155 Md. App. at 529.

B. The 700 Rules.

Chapter 200 of Title 7 ofthe Maryland Rules of Procedure deals with Judicial Review of Administrative

Agency Decisions. These rules are applicable to agency decisions:32 (1) "where review is authorized by
statute;" and (2) wherethere is a "final determination ofthe trustees if the Client Protection Fundofthe
Barof Maryland." Appeals from agencies ofthe State and its political subdivisions are governed by these
rules.33

There is a question of whether, when, and under whatcircumstances an appeal may be taken from an
administrative agencywhere no appeal is provided by the statute or ordinance or where the statute or
ordinance states that no appeal is allowed. See Section A (2) Mandamus, supra.
Chapter 200. Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions.
7-201.
7-202.
7-203.
7-204.

General provisions.
Method of securing review.
Time for filing action.
Response to petition.

7-205. Stays.
7-206. Record.
7-207. Memoranda.

7-208. Hearing.
7-209. Disposition.
7-210. Return of agency record.

Once review is sought of an agency decision, there are requirements on the part ofthe petitioner,the
clerk ofthe circuit court and the agency whose decision is sought to be reviewed.
(1). To secure review
Rule 7-202 addresses the method of securing review. A person seeking judicial review shall file a petition

forjudicial review within 30 days afterthe latest of: (1) "the dateofthe order or action of which review is
32 Administrative agency is definedby Rule 7-201(b) to mean "any agency, board, department, district, commission, authority,
commissioner, official,the MarylandTax Court, or other unit ofthe State of of a political subdivision ofthe State and the Client
Protection Fund ofthe Bar of Maryland."
33 Rule 7-201.
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sought"; or (2) "the datethe administrative agency sentnoticeofthe order or action to the petitioner, if
notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner"; (3) or"the date the petitioner received notice of

the agency's order or action, if notice was required by law to be received bythe petitioner."34
"If one party files a timely petition, any other person may file a petition within ten days afterthe date
the agency mailed notice ofthe filing ofthe first petition," or within the period within whichthe first

party filed, whichever is later.35

A form petition for judicial review iscontained within the rule.36 "The petition shall:
1.
2.
3.
4.

request judicial review,
identify the order or action of which review is sought,
state whether the petitionerwas a partyto the agency proceeding, and
shall state the basis ofthe petitioner's standingto seek judicial review if petitioner was not a party
to the agency proceeding.

No other allegations are necessary."37 If the appeal is from adecision by the Workers' Compensation
Commission, "the petitioner shall attach to the petition a certificate that copies ofthe petition were served
. . .by first class mail on the Commission and each other party of record in the proceeding before the
Commission."38

Part ofthe requirement of what is needed to secure review is for the petitioner to "deliverto the clerk
a copyofthe petition for the agency whose decision is sought to be reviewed." It is then the
responsibility ofthe "clerk [to] promptly mail acopy ofthe petition to the agency, informing the agency

ofthe date the petition was filed and the civil action number assigned to the action for judicial review."39

Rule 7-201. General provisions.

(a) Applicability.- The rules in this Chapter govern actions for judicial review of (1) an order oraction of
an administrative agency, where judicial review is authorized by statute, and (2) a final determination ofthe
trustees ofthe Client Protection Fund ofthe Bar of Maryland.

(b) Definition.- As used in this Chapter, "administrative agency" means any agency, board, department,
district, commission, authority, commissioner, official, the Maryland Tax Court, or other unit ofthe State

or of a political subdivision ofthe State andthe Client Protection Fund ofthe Bar of Maryland.
Rule 7-202. Method of securing review.

(a) Bypetition.- A person seeking judicial review under this chapter shall file a petition for judicial
review in a circuit court authorized to provide the review.
(b) Caption.- The Petition shall be captioned as follows:

34 Rule 7-201 & Rule 7-203.

35 Rule7-203(b).
36 Rule7-202(a)(b).
37 Rule 7-202(c). "If judicial reviewof a decision of th eworkers' Compensation Commission is sought, the petitioner shall attach
to the petition a certificatethat copies ofthe petition were served pursuant to subsection (d)(2)" of Rule 7-202.

38 Rule7-202(c)&(d)(2).
39Rule7-202(d)(l).
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In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Petition of Bryson Underwood, Inc.

*

2176 Newton Place

*

Severn, Maryland 23412
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

Case No:
*

762 Rowe Boulevard

Annapolis, Maryland 21401

*

IN THE CASE OF

*

Secretary v. Bryson Underwood, Inc.
Agency Case no: 2006-32
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

(c) Contents ofpetition.- The petition shall request judicial review, identify the order or action of which
review is sought, and state whether the petitioner was a partyto the agency proceeding. If the petitioner
was not a party, the petition shall state the basis ofthe petitioner's standing to seekjudicial review. No other
allegations are necessary. Ifjudicial review of a decision ofthe Workers' Compensation Commission is

sought, the petitioner shall attach to thepetition a certificate thatcopies ofthe petition were served pursuant
to subsection (d) (2) of this Rule.

Committee Note. The petition is in the nature of a notice of appeal. The grounds forjudicial review,
required by former Rule B2 e to be stated inthe petition, are now to be setforth in thememorandum filed
pursuant to Rule 7-207.
(d) Copies;filing; mailing.-

(1)Notice to agency.- Uponfiling the petition, thepetitioner shall deliver to the clerk a copy ofthe

petition for the agency whose decision issought to bereviewed. The clerk shall promptly mail a copy of
thepetition to the agency, informing theagency ofthe date thepetition was filed and the civil action
number assigned to the action for judicial review.

(2) Service by petitioner in workers' compensation cases.- Upon filing a petition forjudicialreview of a
decision ofthe Workers' Compensation Commission, the petitioner shall serve a copy ofthe petition by
first class mail on the Commissionand each other party of record in the proceeding before the Commission,
committee Note. This subsection is requiredby Code, Labor and EmploymentArticle, § 9-737. It does not
relievethe clerk from the obligationunder subsection (d) (1) of this Rule to mail a copy ofthe petitionto
the agency or the agency from the obligation under subsection (d) (3) of this Ruleto givewritten notice to
all parties to the agency proceeding.

(3) By agency to parties.- Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the agency, uponreceiving the copy of
the petition from the clerk, shallgivewritten notice promptly by ordinary mail to all parties to the agency
proceeding that:

(A) a petition for judicialreview has beenfiled, the dateofthe filing, the nameofthe court, and the
civil action number; and

(B) a party wishingto oppose the petition mustfile a response within 30 days after the date the
agency's notice was mailed unless the court shortens or extendsthe time.
(e) Certificate ofcompliance-Within five days after mailing, the agency shall file with the clerk a
certificateof compliance with section (d) of this Rule, showingthe date the agency's notice was mailed and
the names and addresses ofthe persons to whom it was mailed. Failure to file the certificate of compliance
does not affect the validity ofthe agency's notice.
[Amended Nov. 21, 1995, effective Dec. 1,1995;Dec. 16,1999,effective Jan. 1,2000.]

(2). The agency responsibility to send notice
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Upon receiving notice hasthe responsibility to "give written notice promptly" by ordinary mail to all
parties to the agency proceeding thatthe petition for judicial review has been filed, the date of filing, the
name ofthe court and the civil action number. Any opposition to the petition must be by way of response
filed within 30 days after the date ofthe agency's notice. A "certificate of compliance" as to the

performance ofthe agency's responsibility shall be filed by the agency.40
(3). Time Limitations

Rule 7-203 governs the time within which a petition forjudicial review must be filed. For the most part, a
petition "shall"be filed within 30 days ofthe latest ofthe date ofthe orderor action of which review is
sought or the date the administrative agency sent notice ofthe order or action to the petitioner, if notice

was required to be sent tothe petitioner.41 This general rule controls unless another Rule ofcourt ora

statute provides for another date or time limitation within which apetition must be filed.42
"If one party files a timely petition, any other person may file a petition within ten days after the date
the agency mailed notice ofthe filing ofthe first petition or within the period" set by Rule 7-203,
whichever is later.43

Note thatMaryland Rule 1-204 governs thefiling of a motion to shorten or extend time requirements.
There is a time limitation for transmitting the agency record to the clerk ofthe circuit court.

Rule 7-206(c)&(d) governs this procedure. Thefailure to adhere to time limits andtheresponsibility to
havetimelimitsextendedcan and will resultin dismissal ofthe actionpertaining to the transmission of
the agency record: It is to be noted:

o The agency "shall" transmit to theclerk ofthe circuit court the original or a certified copy ofthe
record of its proceedings within 60 days after the agency receives the first petition forjudicial
review.

o Eitherthe agency or a party may file a motion to shorten or extend this time,
o It is the responsibility ofthe petitioner to keep abreast of this time limitation,
o

"The action shall be dismissed if the record has not been transmitted within the time prescribed

unless the court finds that the inability to transmitthe record was caused by the act or omission of
the agency, a stenographer, or a person other than the moving party."
Rule 7-203. Time for filing action.

(a) Generally.- Except as otherwise provided inthis Rule or by statute, a petition forjudicial review shall
be filed within 30 days after the latest of:

(1) the date ofthe order or action of which review is sought;

(2) the datethe administrative agency sentnotice ofthe orderor action to the petitioner, if notice was
required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or
Cross References. See Code, Labor and Employment Article, § 9-726governingjudicial review of a decisionofthe
Workers' Compensation Commission in a casein which a rehearing request has been filed.

(3)thedate the petitioner received notice ofthe agency's order or action, if notice was required by law to be
received by the petitioner.

(b) Petition byother party.- If one party files a timely petition, any other personmay file a petition
within ten days afterthe datethe agency mailed notice ofthe filing ofthe firstpetition, or within the period
set forth in section (a), whichever is later.
[Amended Oct. 31,2002, effective Jan. 1,2003.]

Committee note. The provisionsof former RuleB4 concerning the shorteningand extending of time are not carried
forward. The time for initiating an action for judicial review is in the nature of a statute of limitations, which must be

40 Rule 7-202(3).
41 Rule7-203(a).
42Rule7-203(a).
43 Rule7-203(b).
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specifically raised eitherby preliminary motion under Rule 7-204 or in the answering memorandum filed pursuant to
Rule 7-207.

Significant case decisions
When read with the insurance code

o

Timeliness of a filing for petition for judicial review was the issue before the Court in Centre v. J.T. W.,391
Md. 71, 916 A. 2d 235 (2007). Rule 7-203 provides that the time for filing a petition for judicial review is
within 30 days after the latest ofthe date ofthe order or action," "the date the . .. agency sent notice of
the order or action," or "the date the petitioner received notice ofthe agency's order or action." All of this

is "except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute." Judicial review of an MIA (Maryland
Insurance Administration] decision in this case was from an ALJ decision relating to compensation due an

insured under a homeowner's policy for damage to personal property destroyed by a tornado.44 The
holding: "We hold that the plain language ofthe pertinent statutesprovides that, in the context ofthe
relevant sections ofthe Insurance Article, the 30-day filing period for a petition for judicial review of an
administrative decision under §§ 2-204(c) [Orders and Notices, Service] and 2-215(d)(i)) [Judicial Review,

Filingpetitionfor Judicial Review] begins when the order resulting from a relevant administrative hearing
is mailed" 397 Md. at 73. While Judge Cathell for the Court said this decision was a construction of the

plain language ofthe statutes. The position of J.T.W., thathehaduntil he actually received the notice, had
some basis. Consideringwhat it meansto "serve" a notice or order as defined by Black's Law dictionary,

prior case law construction, and practicality45 dictated the Court's holding. Considering the fact that §2215(d)(i) doesnot provide for personal service or service by certified mail and that §2-204(c) defines
"service" as meremailing meant: "If the Legislature hadwanted "service" in the context of Title2 ofthe
Insurance Article to requireactualreceipt of an orderbyan affected party it wouldhave so provided." 397
Md. at 88.46

An extensionoftime In the administrative proceeding?

o

Procedure is important in all administrative law appeals and nowhere more important than in liquor license
contests where Article 2B §16-101 (e)(3) providesthat a decision by the Board of Liquor License
Commissioners "shall be affirmed, modified, or reversed by the court within 90 days after the record has

beenfiled in the court by the local licensing board." A contest overwhether an extension of thistime had
been granted by the circuit court beyond the 90 day period, andthe effect of an extension not having
requested and granted was discussed in Woodfield v. West River Improvement, 395 Md. 377,384-84, 910
A. 2d 452 (2006). Discussing the impracticability of sometimes setting a hearing,the Court determined

that the extension had been properly granted in this case. Woodfield, 395 Md. 385, 3914
(4). Response to petition

A response may be filed by anyone person entitled by law to be a partywho wishes to participate as a
party. Rule 7-204 governs this procedure. No allegations are necessary other thanthe response shall
44 Actually, there were two petitions forjudicial review, thefirst bythe insured against the insurer for the manner in which it
handled his claims and secondly, an allegation thatthe insurer had failed to comply with a settlement agreement between the
parties. J.T. W., 397 Md. at 74.

45 "Additionally, holding that service required thereceipt ofthe order could lead to unreasonable or illogical results, i.e.,service
might never be able to be accomplished. Forexample, if the individual to whom an order wasmailed happened to be outofthe
country forseveral months or hears he or shewould notbedeemed to have been served because they hadnotactually received
the order. . . [W]eavoid such unreasonable and illogical construction of statutes." J.T.W., 397 Md. at 86.
46 Thus, the CircuitCourt order dismissingthe petitionfor judicial reviewas untimelyfiled was upheld.J.T. W., 397 Md. at 88.
The Court said that when the COSA reversed the Circuit Court that Court did not determine the effect of §2-204(c) defining

"service" on the interpretation of §2-215(d)(1) and the intermediate appellate courtdetermination that it was implicitin §2215(d)(1) that receiptby the petitioner was required was not a legally correctpositioa J.T. W., 397 Md. at 76-77.
47 Discussing Art. 2B §16-1201(e) and its statutory demand that a judicial decision be madewithin90 days and whether that
requirement was a directory or mandatory (andthestatutory history ofthe section), the Court saidthat it wasclearthatthe
Legislature "did not intend for non-compliance with the now-90-day period to produce any automatic result." Woodfield, 395
Md. at 390-91.
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"state the intent to participate in the action for judicial review."48 "A response shall be filed within 30
days afterthe datethe agency mails notice ofthe filing ofthe petition unless the court shortens or extends
the time. The response need be served only on the petitioner, and shall be served in the mannerprescribed

by Rule 1-321.49
Rule 7-204. Response to petition.

(a) Who mayfile; contents.- Any person, including the agency, who is entitled by law to be a party and
who wishes to participate as a party shall file a responseto the petition. The response shall state the intent
to participate in the action for judicial review. No other allegations are necessary.
(b) Preliminary motion.- A person may file with the response a preliminary motion addressed to
standing, venue, timeliness of filing, or any other matterthat would defeat a petitioner's right to judicial
review. Except for venue, failure to file a preliminary motion does not constitute waiver of an issue. A
preliminary motion shall be served upon the petitionerand the agency.
Committee Note. The filing of a preliminary motion does not result in an automatic extension ofthe time to
transmit the record. The agency or party seeking the extension must file a motion under Rule 7-206 (d).
(c) Timefor filing response; service- A response shall be filed within 30 days after the date the agency
mails notice ofthe filing ofthe petition unless the court shortens or extends the time. The response need be
served only on the petitioner, and shall be served in the manner prescribed by Rule 1-321. [Service of
pleadings and papers other than original pleadings]

Significant case decisions
Opposition as a latefiled response?
o One ofthe issues in Dep't PublicSafety v. Neal, 160 Md. App. 496, 864 A. 2d 287 (2004), certdenied, 386
Md. 181 (2005) had to do with a claim by the State that Neal had not filed a response to the petition for
judicial review filed by the State to contest an ALJ decision and therefore she was not a property party to
the case on appeal. 160 Md. App. at 508. Looking at Marylandrule 7-204 "Response to Petition," the
Court said that when the circuit court treated NeaPs opposition to the Department's motion to stay as a late-

filed responseto the petition by a person entitled to be a party, 160 Md. App. at 509, the circuit court
exercised its discretion to extend the deadline for Neal to file a response to the petition retroactively. Neal

also could present oral argument to the circuitcourt even though she did not file an opposing memoranda
as Rule 7-707(d) permits the court to allow that argument. 160 Md. App. at 510.

(5). Preliminary motions

"A person may file withthe response a preliminary motion addressed to standing, venue, timeliness of
filing, or any other matter that would defeat a petitioner'sright to judicial review. Except for venue,
failure to file a preliminary motion does not constitute waiver of an issue. A preliminary motion shall be

served upon the petitioner and the agency.'50 Parties seeking an extension ofa specified time limit must
file a motion under rule 7-206(d)

(6). Stays

"The filing of a petition does not stay the order or action ofthe administrative agency. Upon motion and
after hearing, the court may grant a stay, unless prohibited by law, upon the conditions as to bond or

otherwise thatthecourt considers proper."51 There is no automatic stay ofthe enforcement of a final
decision by an agency. "Except as otherwise provided by law, the final decision maker may grant or the

48 Rule 7-204(a).
49 Rule 7-204(c).
50 Rule7-204(b).
51 Rule 7-205.
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reviewing court may order a stay ofthe enforcement ofthe final decision on terms thatthe final decision

maker orcourt considers proper."52
An example of a situation where a stay may not be granted is the statutory provision found in LE §9741 where it is providedthat an appeal from a decision ofthe Worker's Compensation Commission is not

a stay of its order.53
Rule 7-205. Stays.

The filing of a petition does not stay the order oraction ofthe administrative agency. Upon motion and
after hearing,the court may grant a stay, unless prohibited by law, upon the conditions as to bond or
otherwise that the court considers proper.
Cross references. Title 1, Chapter 400; Code, Labor and Employment Article, § 9-741.
Committee note. This Rule does not affect any power an agency may have to stay its own order pending judicial
review.

Significant Case Decisions
A stay Is not an Injunction
A supersedes bond?

o

Berkshire Life v. Maryland Insurance Administration, 142 Md. App. 628, 791 A. 2d 942 (2002) involved
the denial of coverage on a disability policydespite proofthatmedical problems existed that the individual
wastotallydisabled. A stay and/or the denial of a stay is not an injunction. The trial judge denied a motion
to stay the payment of benefits ordered by the Administration. On appeal it was argued thatit wasa denial
of due process andan abuse of discretion for the trial court not to grant a stay. The issue was moot because
under Rule 8-422(a) Berkshire filed a supersedes bond ("an appellant may stay the enforcement of a civil
judgment, other than for injunctive relief from which anappeal is taken by filing a supersedes bond"). The
court stated: "An orderby the Insurance Commissioner is not automatically stayed by operation of law
when a petition forjudicial reviewis filed." Ins. §2-215(f) provides the circuit court is to determine
whether the filing operates as a stay. 142 Md. App. at 641.

(7). The Record

The agency shall transmit the original or acertified copy ofthe agency record to the circuit court.54 Rule
7-206 governs this procedure. Generally, this must be done within 60 days afterthe agency receives the
first petition forjudicial review. The circuitcourtmay "shorten or extend" this time. It is then the

responsibility ofthe clerk to notify the parties ofthe date that the record was filed.55 "Upon the filing of
the record, the clerk [ofthe circuit court] shall notify the parties ofthe date that the record was filed."56
The administrative record closes for the receipt of evidence in a contested case under where the

agency reserves final decision-making authority from exceptions before an ALJ only upon receipt of all
transcripts, documents, information, and materials thatwere before the final decision maker at the time of
52SG§10-222(e).
53 Gleneagles v. Hanks, 156 Md. App. 543, 847 A. 2d 520 (2004) refers to this provision asa"no stay" provision which has been
interpreted by the Courtof Appeals. 156Md. App. at 552. This Court heldthatthe "no stay" provisioncouldnot be circumvented
by application to the circuitcourt for injunctiverelief undera circuit court's plenary poweras limitations was an issue in a claim
for benefits due to an occupational disease. 156 Md. App. at 556.

54 Hahn v. Gabeler, 156Md. App. 213, 846 A. 2d 462 (2004). "The procedures on appeal from a decision ofthe Woker's
Compensation Commission are governed by LE §9-700 et. seq." 156 Md. at 218. Referring to Rule 7-206, the initial transfer of
the record on appeal is the obligation ofthe agency. That should also applyto supplemental orders tdhat are the subjectof review
pending an appeal. 156 Md. at 221.

55 Rule7-206(c)(d)(e).
56 Rule7-206(e).
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his or her decision.57 In this case the "entire" administrative record consists of all materials and

information the agency had before it at the time it reached its final decision and an "administrative agency
has broad discretion to consider evidence submitted after the close of an evidentiary hearing as long as

there is compliance with procedural due process."58
(a). What the recordshall include:

1. The transcript of testimony ofthe proceedings before the agency. "If the testimony has been
recorded but not transcribed before the filing ofthe petition for judicial review, the first

petitioner, if required by the agency and unless otherwise ordered by the courtor provided by
law, shall pay the expense of transcription, which shall be taxed as costs and may be apportioned

asprovided in Rule 2-603.59
A petitioner who pays the cost of transcription shallfile with the agency a certification of

costs, and the agency shall include the certification in the record."60
2. All exhibits andotherpapers(including the agency opinion) filed in the agency proceeding. The
parties may agree or the court may order portions ofthe agency record to be omitted 61

The first petitioner, if required by the agency and unless otherwise ordered by the court or provided
by law, shall paythe expense of transcription, which shall be taxed as costs and may be apportioned as
provided by Rule 2-603.

(2). Stipulation:

"If the parties agreethat the questions presented by the action forjudicial review can be determined
without an examination ofthe entire record, they may sign and, upon approval by the agency, file a

statementshowinghow the questions arose and were decided and setting forth only those facts or
allegations that are essential to a decision ofthe questions. The parties are strongly encouragedto agree to
such a statement. The statement, any exhibits to it, the agency's order of which review is sought, and any

opinion ofthe agency shall constitute the record in the action for judicial review."62
Rule 7-206. Record.

(a) Contents; expense oftranscript.- The record shall includethe transcript of testimony and all exhibits
and other papers filed in the agency proceeding, exceptthose papers the parties agree or the court directs
may be omitted by written stipulationor order included in the record. If the testimony has been recorded
but not transcribed before the filing ofthe petition for judicial review, the first petitioner, if required by the
agency and unless otherwise ordered by the court or provided by law, shall pay the expense of
transcription, which shall be taxed as costs and may be apportioned as provided in Rule 2-603. A petitioner
who pays the cost of transcription shall file with the agency a certification of costs, and the agency shall
include the certification in the record.

(b) Statement in lieu ofrecord.- If the parties agree that the questions presented by the action for judicial
review can be determined without an examination ofthe entire record, they may sign and, upon approval by
the agency, file a statement showing how the questions arose and were decided and setting forth only those
facts or allegations that are essential to a decision ofthe questions. The parties are strongly encouraged to

57 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 60, 806 A. 2d 662(2002).
58 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40,60, 806 A. 2d662 (2002).
59 Maryland Rule2-603 pertains to civil litigation in a circuit court. It contains the procedure for the allowance and allocation of
costs, and assessment of costs by the clerk and/or the court.

60 Rule7-206(a).
61 Rule7-206(a).
62 Rule 7-206(b).
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agree to such a statement. The statement, any exhibits to it,the agency's order of which review is sought,
andanyopinion ofthe agency shall constitute the record in the action forjudicialreview.
(c) Timefor transmitting.- Except as otherwise provided by this Rule, the agency shall transmit to the
clerk ofthe circuit court the original or a certified copy ofthe record of its proceedingswithin 60 days after
the agency receives the first petition for judicial review.

(d) Shortening or extending the time.- Upon motion by the agency or any party,the courtmay shorten or
extend the time for transmittal ofthe record. The court may extend the time for no more than an additional

60 days. The actionshallbe dismissed if the record has not been transmitted within the time prescribed
unless the court finds that the inability to transmit the record was caused by the act or omission ofthe
agency, a stenographer, or a person other than the movingparty.

(e) Duty of clerk.- Upon the filing ofthe record, the clerk shall notify the parties ofthe datethatthe
record was filed.

[Amended Oct. 31,2002, effective Jan. 1,2003.]

Committee note. Code, Article 2B, § 175 (e) (3) provides that the decision of a local liquor board shall be affirmed,
modified, or reversedby the court within90days afterthe record has been filed, unlessthe time is "extended by the
court for good cause."

Significant case decisions
The record is the record

o

The Courtof Appeals in Woodfleldv. West River Improvement, 395 Md. 377,910A. 2d452 (2006)
reviewed the decision ofthe Board of License Commissioner of Anne Arundel County that Charles

Bassforddid not have an interest in the liquor license. "Additional documentaryevidence, casting further
suspicion that Bassford was involved in the formation of companies that operated both existing restaurants
operating with a liquorlicense and in Appolis Produce, was offered in the CircuitCourtbut rejected. Those
documents could have been offered to the Board but were not. They are not, therefore, in evidence and may

not be relied upon in determining the validity ofthe Board's decision. The Court must deal with the record
as it is, not as it could have been, and on the record we have, we cannot conclude that the Board was clearly
erroneous in its finding regarding Bassford." Woodfield, 395 Md. at 392

(8). Memoranda.

The rule provides for a memorandum to be filed by the petitioner, an answering memorandum to be filed,
and a reply to the answering memorandum may also be filed.
There is a time limit within which a memorandum must befiled.

o

o

It "shall" be filed by the petitioner within 30 days after the clerk sends notice ofthe filing ofthe
record, except for judicial review of a decision ofthe Workers' Compensation Commission where
the review is de novo.63
This time limit may be shortened or extended by stipulation ofthe parties providing the "first
memorandum and any answering memorandum are filed at least 30 days, and any reply
memorandum is filed at least ten days, before the scheduled hearing" or as otherwise ordered by

the trial court pursuant to Rule 1-204.64
While there is no specific chronology or form stated within the rule, it only makes sense that the
petitioner set forth what the Rule requires the memorandum to contain in the order provided by the rule.
Judge focus on the issues earmarked for consideration. Memoranda which contain a fact recitation before
the question is earmarked constitute a nuisance and are not in accord with how most appellate court
63 A Committee Note states: "Memoranda are required in an action forjudicial review ofthe amount of an attorney'sfee in a
Worker's Compensation case, because the review is on the record ofthe Worker's Compensation Commission." Mitchellv.
GoodyearService Store, 306 Md. 27 (1986) is cited.

64Rule7-207(c).

190

opinions address issues. It is nocoincidence that most appellate court opinions earmark the issue for the
reader. Memoranda should do the same. In fact, mostjudges will agree that if the first paragraph ofthe
memorandum does not concisely capsulate and identify the essentialsofthe dispute, legally and factually,
it is not written the way it should have been written.

By Rule 7-707, the memorandum shallset forth:
•

Questions presented

•

Statement of facts

•
•

Argument
Citations of authority

•
•

References to pages ofthe record
Exhibits relied upon

•

"[S]ettingforth a concise statement ofthe questions presented for review, a statement of facts
material to those questions, and argument on each question, including citations of authority and

references to pages oftherecord and exhibits relied on."65
Dismissal may be orderedby the court if a petitioner failsto file a memorandum within the time
prescribed if the court"dingsthat a failure to file or the lastfiling caused prejudice to the moving party."
A person who has filed a response to the petition forjudicial review, but"whofails tofile ananswering
memorandum withinthe time prescribed . . . may not present argumentexcept with permission ofthe
court."66
Rule 7-207. Memoranda.

(a) Generally.- Within 30 days after the clerk sendsnotice ofthe filing ofthe record, a petitionershall
file a memorandum setting forth a concise statement ofthe questions presented for review, a statement of
facts material to those questions, and argument on each question, including citations of authority and
references to pages ofthe record and exhibits reliedon. Within 30 days after service ofthe memorandum,

any personwho has filed a response, including the agency whenentitled by lawto be a party to the action,
may file an answering memorandum in similar form. The petitioner may file a reply memorandum within
15 days after service of an answeringmemorandum. Except with the permission ofthe court, a
memorandum shall not exceed 35 pages. In an action involving more than one petitioner or responding

party, any petitioner or responding party mayadopt by reference any part ofthe memorandum of another.
(b) When notrequired.- Memorandaare not required in an action for judicial review of a decision ofthe
Workers' Compensation Commission where the review is de novo.
Committee Note. Memoranda are required in an action for judicial review ofthe amount of an attorney's
fee in a Worker's Compensation case, because the review is on the record ofthe Worker's Compensation
Commission. See Mitchell v. Goodyear Service Store, 306 Md. 27 (1986).
(c) Modification oftime requirements.- The time for filing a memorandum may be shortened or extended
by (1) stipulation ofthe parties filed with the clerk so long as the first memorandum and any answering
memorandum are filed at least 30 days, and any reply memorandum is filed at least ten days, before the
scheduled hearing, or (2) order ofthe court entered pursuant to Rule 1-204.
(d) Sanctionsfor latefiling ofmemoranda.- If a petitioner fails to file a memorandum within the time
prescribed by this Rule, the court may dismiss the action if it finds that the failure to file or the late filing
caused prejudice to the moving party. A person who has filed a response but who fails to file an answering
memorandum within the time prescribed by this Rule may not present argument except with the permission
ofthe court.

[Amended Dec. 10, 1996, effective July 1, 1997.]

Cross references. Gaetano v. Calvert County, 310 Md. 121 (1987).
Committee note. The Committee intends that all issues and allegations of error be raised in the memoranda, and that

ordinarily an issue not raised in a memorandum should not be entertained at argument. The Committee does not intend

65 Rule7-207(a).
66 Rule7-207(d).
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to preclude a person who has filed a preliminarymotion, but not an answering memorandum, from arguing the issues
raised in the preliminary motion.

Significant Case Decisions

Be specific in argument
It is not the responsibility ofthe appellate court to construct the argument
It Is the appellant's responsibility to. . .
o In Changing Point v. Maryland HealthResources, 87 Md. app. 150; 589 A. 2d 502 (1991), Changing Point
argued that a number of documents and testimony constituted hearsay evidence admitted by the
Commission in violation of Kade v. Charles H. HickeySchool, 80 Md. App. 721, 566 A.2d 148 (1989).
The Court said: "Changing Point has been less than helpful, however, in identifying the evidence it
finds objectionable and in explaining how that evidence violates Kade. In its brief, Changing Point
discusses only two pieces of evidence. One was a cover letter by Herbert Goldman, Esq., which was
attached to a number of documents that the Commission ordered Mountain Manor to produce. The other
was the testimony of Dr. Fishman's counsel in North Carolina who testified without producing his files.

Changing Point also points to its "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of RenewedMotion Concerning
the Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence" as furtherexamples of hearsay admitted in violation of Kade. This
memorandum refers to certain pages ofthe testimony of Charles Nabit, several exhibits, and the "hearsay
testimonyof Mary Roby and Charles Nabit on January 25, 1990." This memorandum, like Changing
Point's brief on this appeal, fails to explain how this evidenceconstitutes hearsay." 87 Md. App. at 169170. "It is neither our responsibility nor inclination to investigate and construct an argumenton behalfof

an appellant. Therefore, we will confine our analysis to that evidence specifically discussed in Changing
Point's brief." 87 Md. App. at 170.

(9). Hearing.

A hearing shall be held unless it is waived in writing by the parties. Though the rules say the hearing
"shall be no later than 90 days from the date the record was filed" this is not possible in most cases,
considering the court's docket.
Rule 7-208. Hearing.

(a) Generally.- Unlessa hearing is waived in writing by the parties, the court shall hold a hearing.
(b) Scheduling.- Upon the filing ofthe record pursuant to Rule 7-206, a date shall be set for the hearing
on the merits. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or required by law, the hearing shall be no earlier than
90 days from the date the record was filed.

(c) Additional evidence.- Additional evidence in support of or against the agency's decision is not
allowed unless permitted by law.
[Amended Nov. 8,2005, effective Jan. 1,2006.]

Cross references. Where a right to a jury trial exists, see Rule 2-325 (d). See Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md.
471 (1995) concerning the availability of prehearing discovery.

(10). Additional Evidence.

"Additionalevidence in support of or against the agency's decision is not allowed unless permitted by
law."68

(11). Disposition.

"Unless otherwise provided by law, the court may dismissthe action for judicial review or may affirm,
reverse, or modify the agency's order or action, remand the action to the agency for further proceedings,
67 Rule 7-207(a)(b).
68 Rule7-208(c).
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oran appropriate combination oftheabove."69 Whatever action is taken, it iscontemplated that the
circuit courtjudge should give reasons for whatever action is taken. Rule 2-522 pertainsto a contested
court trial and states that a judge shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a brief statement ofthe
reasons for the decision and the basis of determining any damages. Judicial review of an agency decision
is not a court trial, and this rule does not apply. Trial judges and attorneys are well aware that review of a
circuit court decision by an appellate court means a review ofthe same issues on the same record and that
too often means a circuit court judge will not file an opinion or give reasons for a decision made.

"After the time for seeking appellate review has expired, if no appellate review has been sought, the
clerk shall return the record ofthe agency proceeding to the agency. If appellate review has been sought,
the clerk, unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court, shall return the record ofthe agency

proceedings to the agency upon conclusion ofthe appellate review."70
Rule 7-209. Disposition.

Unlessotherwise provided by law, the court may dismiss the action for judicial review or may affirm,
reverse, or modify the agency's order or action, remand the action to the agency for further proceedings, or
an appropriate combination ofthe above.
Rule 7-210. Return of agency record.

After the time for seeking appellate review has expired, if no appellate review has been sought, the clerk
shall return the record ofthe agency proceeding to the agency. If appellate review has been sought, the
clerk, unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court, shall return the record ofthe agency proceedings to
the agency upon the conclusion ofthe appellate review.

Significant Case Decision
No remand authorized in liquor board cases
o Does a court have authority to remand a case to an agency for further proceedings. Most ofthe statutory

schemesproviding authority for judicial reviewto courts give that authority. However, with liquor boards,
the result is different as there is no statutory authority in Article 2B allowing a remand. It is an up or down
decision on judicial review. Thanner Enterprises v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 414 Md. 265, 282, 995 A.
2d 257 (2010).

(12). Appellate Court Review.

Where provided by rule, an appeal from a circuit court decision may be appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. The clerk "shall return the record ofthe agency proceedings to the agency upon
the conclusion ofthe appellate review" when no appeal is taken or upon the conclusion of appellate
review.71

C. The Scope of Review.
(1). In General.
The first decision to reach the Court of Appeals interpreting the MAPA caused that Court to comment:
"While it appears that the scope ofjudicial review by a trial court ofthe findings, inferences, conclusions

and decisions of administrative agencies under the statute has been broadened to some extent, it is clear
that the statute did not intend that the court should substitute its judgment for the expertise of those
69 Rule 7-209.
70 Rule 7-210.
71 Rule 7-210.
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persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken."72 Just what this
agency expertise andthe extent of anyagency expertise is a matter of continuing debate among
practitioners butthe subject has not received as much appellate court analysis as it should.
The scope ofjudicial reviewfrom county administrative proceedings is sometimes notthat well
defined. For example, "no statute expressly establishes the scope ofjudicial review of an administrative

proceeding initiated by a county police department pursuant to the LEOBR."73 Generally, the scope is the
same as that applicable to administrative appeals. That means judicial review is narrow and limited to
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative recordto support agency findings

and conclusions.74 In reviewing the agency decision, a court "presumes thatthe decision made by an
administrative body is prima facie correct."75
Review of administrative agencies generally fits into three categories:
1. Judicial Review ofthe fact finding by the agency;
2. the agency interpretation ofthe law; and,
3. and whether the agency decision is arbitrary and capricious.

When there is appellate court review, an appellate court reviews the "agency's decision applying the
same statutory standards as used by the precluding reviewingcourt [i.e. trial court to COSA or CA;

COSA to CA]"76 Fora State agency, SG 10-222 governs judicial review. The appellate court revaluates

the decision oftheagency, not the decision ofthecircuit court.77
SG §10-222. Judicial review.
(a) Review offinal decision.-

(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of thissection, a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in
a contested case is entitled to judicial review ofthe decision as provided in this section.
(2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested case to the Office, is entitled to
judicial review of a decision as providedin this section if the agency was a party before the agencyor the
Office.

(b) Review ofinterlocutory order.- Where the presiding officer has final decision-making authority, a
person in a contested case who is aggrieved by an interlocutory order is entitled to judicial review if:
(1) the party would qualify under this section for judicial review of any related final decision;
(2) the interlocutory order:
(i) determines rights and liabilities; and
(ii) has immediate legal consequences; and

(3) postponement of judicial review would result in irreparable harm.
(c) Jurisdiction andvenue.- Unless otherwise required by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be
filed with the circuit court for the county where any party resides or has a principal place of business.
(d) Parties.72 Bernstein v. Real Estate Commission, 221 Md. 221, 230, 156 A. 2d 657 (1959). (footnote and citations omitted) In Board of
County Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 837 A. 2d 1059 (2003) the court quoted prior case lasto the effect: "It
is a clearly established rule in the law of zoning that a court may not substituteits judgment for that ofthe Zoning Board." 154
Md. App.at 24.

73 Coleman v. Anne Arundel Police, 369 Md. 108, 121, 797 A. 2d 770 (2002).
74Co/ema«,369Md.atl21.
75 Marsheck v. Boardof Trustees, 358 Md. 393,402,749 A. 2d 774(2000).
76 Thus, in Solomon v. Boardof Medicine, 155 Md. App. 687,705-06, 845 A. 2d 47 (2004), the Courtsaidit madeno difference
whether the trial court applied the correct standard for review. "We, therefore, do not evaluate the findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by the circuit court; instead 'we review the administrative decision itself" 155 Md. App. at 697.

77 Gigeous v. ECI, 363 Md. 481, 495-95, 769 A.2d912 (2001). The Court of Appeals stated in Spencer v. Board ofPharmacy,
380 Md. 515, 524, 846 A. 2d 341 (2004): "When this court sits in review of an administrative agency decision, we reevaluate the
decision ofthe agency under the same statutory standardsas would the circuit court; we do not employ those standardsto
reevaluate the decision ofthe circuit or intermediate appellate court." Thus, it makes no difference whether or not the trial judge
applied the correct standard of review."
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(1) The court may permit any other interested personto intervene in a proceeding under this section.
(2) If the agency has delegated to the Officethe authority to issue the final administrativedecision
pursuant to § 10-205 (a) (3) of this subtitle, and there are 2 or more other partieswith adverse interests
remaining in the case, the agencymay decline to participate in the judicial review. An agencythat declines
to participate shall inform the court in its initial response.
(e) Stay ofenforcement.-

(1) The filing of a petition for judicial reviewdoes not automatically stay the enforcementofthe final
decision.

(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, the final decision maker may grant or the reviewing court may
order a stay ofthe enforcement ofthe final decision on terms that the final decision maker or court
considers proper.
(f) Additional evidence before agency.-

(1) Judicial review of disputed issues of fact shall be confined to the record for judicial review
supplemented by additional evidence taken pursuant to this section.
(2) The court may order the presiding officer to take additional evidence on terms that the court
considers proper if:
(i) before the hearing date in court, a party applies for leave to offer additional evidence; and
(ii) the court is satisfied that:
1. the evidence is material; and

2. there were good reasons for the failure to offer the evidence in the proceeding before the
presiding officer.
(3) On the basis ofthe additional evidence, the final decisionmaker may modify the findings and
decision.

(4) The final decision maker shall file with the reviewing court, as part ofthe record:
(i) the additional evidence; and
(ii) any modifications ofthe findings or decision.
(g) Proceeding.(1) The court shall conduct a proceeding under this section without a jury.

(2) A partymay offer testimony on alleged irregularities in procedure beforethe presiding officer that
do not appear on the record.
(3) On request, the court shall:
(i) hear oral argument; and
(ii) receive written briefs.
(h) Decision.- In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or

(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right ofthe petitionermay have been prejudiced
because a finding, conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction ofthe final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;

(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light ofthe entire record as
submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
[An. Code art 41, § 255; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1; 1994, ch. 536,§ 1,2005, ch. 25, §§ 12, 13.]

In the State system, the review must be of a "final" decision. Interlocutoryjudicial appeals may be
taken by a party subjectto a final decision if the interlocutory order: (1) determines rights and liabilities;
(2) has immediate legal consequences; and (3) postponement ofjudicial review would result in irreparable
harm.78

!SG§10-222(a)(b).
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Significant Case Decisions

InChristopher v. Dept. ofHealth, 381 Md. 188, 849 A. 2d 46 (2004), appellant contended that the
Department "erred as a matter of law" because "its interpretation of COMAR 07.03.17.431(3) and
COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6) was arbitrary and capricious" as it penalized her "for exercising her legal right to

appeal her disability determination." Statutory standards allowing reviewing courts to reverse ormodify
agency decisions are different depending upon theagency's action. If "the Department "erred as amatter of
law," the question is not whether the Department abused its discretion by acting "arbitrarily and
capriciously," but whether the agency interpreted and applied the law correctly." 381 Md. at 197. There is

acookbook methodology approach of sorts tobe followed on appeal.79
1. When the agencymakes a fact determination, the issueon appeal is whetherthe decision is supported

by substantial evidence. 381 Md. at 198.80
2. "Determining whether an agency's 'conclusions of law' are correct is always, on judicial review,the
court's prerogative, although [the court is to] ordinarily respect the agency's expertise andgive weight
to its interpretation of a statute that it administers. Of course, even though an agency's interpretation of
a statute is often persuasive, 'the reviewing courtmust apply the law as it understands it to be.'
Nevertheless, 'an administrative agency's interpretation and application ofthe statute which the agency

administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight byreviewing courts.'" 381 Md. at 199.81
3. "... [The] court appliesthe arbitrary and capricious standard when it reviews an agency's
discretionary functions. . . . [W]hen an agency acts in its discretionary capacity, it is taking actions
that are specificto its mandate andexpertise and, unlikeconclusions of law or findings of fact, have a
non-judicial nature. For this reason, [a court owes] 'a higher level of deference to functions

specifically committed to the agency's discretion. 'As long as anadministrative agency's exercise of
discretion does not violate regulations, statutes, common law principles, due process and other
constitutional requirements, it is ordinarily unreviewable by the courts.' Courts thus generally only

intervene when an agency exercises its discretion 'arbitrarily' or 'capriciously.' 381 Md. at 199.82
The liquor board has Its own rules

o

Art. 2B, § 16-101(e)(1) sets forth the standard to be applied in judicial review actions from liquorboard
decisions. Though articulated differently, the statutory standard is consistent with the more general law
regarding the review of administrative agency decisions:
"[T]he action ofthe local licensingboardshall be presumed by the court to be properand to
best serve the public interest. The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner to show that the
decision complained of was againstthe public interest and that the local licensing board's
discretion in rendering its decision was not honestly and fairly exercised, or that such decision was
arbitrary, or procuredby fraud, or unsupported by any substantial evidence, or was unreasonable,
or that such decision was beyond the powers ofthe local licensing board, and was illegal."

79 The six standards of review provided in SG 10-222(h)(3) ofthe MAPA may be grouped intothree categories: (1) findings of
fact; (2) conclusions of law; or (3) discretionary action. Christopher, 381 Md. At 198.
SG §10-222. Judicial review.
(h) Decision.- In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding,
conclusion, or decision:

(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction ofthe final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light ofthe entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.

80SG§10-222(h)(v)
81SG§10-222(h)(i)-(iv).
82SG§10-222(h)(vi).
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Compare Maryland Code, § 10-222(h) ofthe State Government Article, setting forth the standard
forjudicialreview under the State Administrative Procedures Act, andsee United Parcel v.
People's Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226,230 (1994) (court's role injudicial review of
administrative agency decision "limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the
record as a whole to supportthe agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the
administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.").
Woodfield, 395 Md. at 392-93.

(2). Venue

"Unlessotherwise required by statute, a petition forjudicial reviewshall be filed with the circuitcourt

for the county where any party resides or has a principle place ofbusiness."83
(3). Parties

The appeal may be taken by a party who is "aggrieved," and in order for an agency to take an appeal,
thatagency musthave beena party to the proceeding. TheCourt may permitany "other interested person

to intervene in a proceeding." An agency may decline to participate injudicial review.84
While proper parties must be properly noted on the appeal, the designation of parties on the papers to
initiate the appeal is not conclusive

85

(4). A cookbook methodology - a three part test

A 2001 decision by the Court of Special Appeals stated that a reviewing court analysis of final agency
action should be considered in three parts:

1. Determining whetherthe agency recognized and applied the correct principles of law governing
the case,

2. If so, then examine the agency's factual findings recognize "it is the agency's province to resolve
conflicting evidence, and, where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it
is for the agency to draw the inference," and

3. Finally, to examine whether the agency properly applied the law to the facts, realizing: (a) this is
a judgment process involvinga mixed question of law and fact with great deference to be
accorded to the agency; and (b) the test on appeal is "whether . . . a reasoning mind could
reasonably have reached the conclusion reached by the [agency], consistent with a proper

application ofthe [controlling legal principles].86
(5). Issues Not Before the Agency.

83SG§10-222(c).
84 SG §10-222 (b)(d). "An agencythat declines to participate shall informthe courtin its initial response."
85 Prince George's County v. Sunrise Development, 330Md. 297, 315, 623 A. 2d 1296 (1993). Sunrise Development moved to
dismiss the appeal which caused the court to state: "Sunrise's argument is void of merit, althoughnot of chutzpah." What
happenedis that when Sunrise petitioned for circuit courtjudiciasl review ofthe decision by the Board of Appeals, it captioned
the papers to note the boardas its adversary. It was on this basisthat a dismissal was sought by Sunrisethough the true adverse
party, Prince George's County, did appear. 330 Md. at 315.

86 Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dept., 136 Md. App. 419, 430-31, 766 A. 2d 169(2001) citingcases. See also: Board
ofCounty Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 23-24, 837 A. 2d 1059 (2003) to the same effect.
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"[judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to the issues or grounds dealt withby the
administrative agency."87 Under Maryland law, a party is bound by the theory the party pursues before the
administrative body, and the failure to present an argument precludes it from being heard by the
reviewing court. "Moreover, a reviewing court is restricted to the record made before the administrative
agency, and isconfined to [deciding] whether, based upon the record, a reasoning mind reasonably could
have reached the factual conclusion reached bythe agency."88
Significant Case Decisions

Generally judicial review is confined to Issues raised at the administrative hearing
Exception: when thepreservation ofthe issuebecomes an integral and unavoidable component on appeal
o No objection to the admissibility of a preliminary breadth test wasmade in a license suspension hearing
before an ALJ in MVA v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 125, 887 A. 2d 1042 (2005) and with admissibility ofthe

testraised on appeal, an question waswhether the issue had been preserved. T. §16-205.2 permits police
officers to administer a preliminary breath test licensees stopped on suspicion of DUI and provides thattest
is to be used as a guide andmay not be used asevidence by the State in any courtaction. In this case the
testresult showed a bloodalcohol concentration of 0.16. 390 Md. at 122.89 Generally, issues not raised

during an administrative proceeding may not be raised during judicial review.90
There is an exceptionto this general rule and thatoccurs when the preservation ofthe issuebecomes an

integral and unavoidable component ofaproperly raised issue on appeal.91 That exception was applicable
in this case becausethe trialjudge, in reversing the ALJ, specifically statedthat this preliminary test
evidence shouldnot have been admitted into evidence. 390 Md. at 131.92
Not allowed to argue contention on appeal that was not made by the Board
o The determination of setbacks for parkingandthe rights ofthe holder of a ground lease was an issue in

Capital Commercial v. Montgomery County, 158 Md. App. 88, 102, 854 A. 2d 283 (2004). The appellant
could not argue on appeal a contention not made beforethe Board, namely that that by approving a Plan,
the Boardwould be violating a code sectionwhich provided: "This chapter shallnot be deemed to interfere
with or abrogate or annul or otherwise affect in any manner whatsoeverany ordinances, rules, regulations

or easements, covenants or other agreements between parties[.]" 158 Md. App. at 102.93
That Issue was not raised before the PSC

o

"... [T]he question of whether the PSC has any authority to validate and enforce provisions in an
agreement that are prohibitedunder Maryland contract law by an anti-assignment clause was never
presented to or decided by either the PSC orthe Circuit Court. It was never raised in the Court of Special

87 Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable Life, 339 Md. 596,634,664 A. 2d 862(1995) citing cases.
88 Patrick v. Dept. ofPublic Safety, 156 Md. App. 423, 433, 847 A. 2d 450(2004). (inmate couldnot argue protected liberty
interest on appeal when argumentbefore agency was basedon due process argument of his classification for transfer purposes)
156 Md. App. at 433-34.

89 Ingreat detail, theCourt reviewed the advice of rights provisions ofthe Maryland Code and the laws concerning the useof
alcohol concentration tests and the effects of a failure to take a test on the right and responsibility ofthe MVA to suspend a
license. Weller, 390 Md. 123-25.

90 The Weller Court citedDelmarva Power& Light Company v. Public Service Commission, 370 Md. 1,32, 803 A. 2d 260
(2002) (cannot deprive the agency of an opportunity to considerthe matter); and Brodie v. MVA, 367 Md. 1, 3-4, 785 A. 2d 747
(2001) (general statement ofthe law) Weller, 390 Md. 129-130.

91 The Weller Court cited Engineering Management Services v. SHA, 375 Md. 211, 235, 825 A. 2d 966 (2003)(the grand of
summary disposition by the Contract Board of Appeals depended in part on whether the Board passed regulations to effectuate
that procedure, an issue not raised before the administrative agency) Weller, 390 Md. at 130-131.

92 The Court then stated: "We additionally notethataddressing this issue does not work to the disadvantage ofthe party raising
the issue before us, as the decision ofthe Circuit Court will be reversed and the determination by the agency upheld. Nor does it

prejudice the Respondent in that he was not entitled to raise the issue in the first instance before the Circuit Court." Weller, 390
Md. at 131-32.

93 The Court went on to cite a prior case andholdthat, even if preserved, the issue would fail. Capital Commercial, 158 Md. App.
at 102-03.
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Appeals and should not havebeen determined gratuitously by that court."PSC v. Panda, 375 Md. 185, 205,
825 A. 2d 462 (2003).

The record must show the issue was plainly raised

o

Ordinarily appellate courts will not decide an issue unless the record plainly shows it to have
been raised in or decided by the trial court. Rule 8-131(a). KcKay v. Dept. ofPublicSafety, 150
Md. App. 182, 819 A. 2d 1088 (2003). Following an agreement betweenemployerand
employee on a disciplinary matter, the employer unilaterally rescinded the agreement and
terminated the State employee. The Court of Appeals reversed. As to the proper generation of
the issue on appeal:
To be sure, the wording of appellant's contention differs on appeal from that presented below.
Before this Court, appellant argues that the ALJ's failure to determine the legal effect ofthe
Agreement in light of §1l-108(a)(2), discussed infra, warrants a remand to the ALJ for such a
determination. In the circuit court, appellant argued that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in
finding that §1l-108(a)(2) does not bar the Department from rescinding the Agreement. In both
fora, appellant argues, in effect,that §11-108(a)(2) controlsthis case and precludedthe

Department from rescinding the Agreement it had reached with appellant. We conclude that the
claims are the same; thus, the issue is preserved for our consideration.
150 Md. App. at 192.

Maynot pass on Issuespresentedfor thefirst time onjudicial review
o SG §10-222 providesthat "a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitledto

judicial review ofthe decision." "Thus, it is the final decision ofthe final decision makerat the
administrative level, not that ofthe reviewing court, that is subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the

reviewing court, restrictedto the recordmadebefore the administrative agency, may not pass upon issues
presented to it for the firsttime onjudicial review andthat are not encompassed in the final decision ofthe
administrative agency. Stated differently, an appellate court will review an adjudicatory agency decision
solely on the grounds relied upon by the agency. Because the issue ofthe attorneys1 fees were been
presented to the Circuit Court for the first time and never raised in, or decided by the
Administrative Law Judges, that court erred in awarding them. Dep't ofHealthv. Campbell, 364 Md.
108, 122-24, 771 A. 2d 1051 (2001).

Do notpass upon the constitutionality ofstatutory provisionsnot necessary to decide the issue
o Sections ofthe Insurance Code were considered by the Insurance Commissioner toward a determination of
whether differentials in certain insurance rates and underwriting based on gender, if actuarially justified,
were unconstitutional in light of Maryland's enactment ofthe "E.R.A." in Insurance Commissioner v.
Equitable Life, 339 Md. 596, 664 A. 2d 862 (1995). The Court held that the three sections were
inapplicable to the controversy because they did not involved rate setting or life insurance,the
Commissioner's order was vacated. "Neither an administrative agency nor a court should pass upon the
constitutionality of statutory provisions which are inapplicable to the controversy before the agency or the
court." 339 Md. at 635.

(6). Review ofthe Agency Factual Determinations, {the substantial evidence test)
A court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow. "It is well-settled in
[Maryland] that it is the function of an administrative agency to make factual findings and to draw

inferences from the facts found."94 A reviewing court evaluates the administrative agency's fact finding
results. It does not make an independent, de novo assessment ofthe evidence.95

94 Motor Vehicle Administration v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 280,666 A. 2d 511 (1995).
95 Karwacki, 340 Md. at 280.
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In reviewing a finding of fact made by an administrative agency, as opposed to an agency

interpretation ofthe law, the Court ofAppeals has applied a "substantial evidence" review.96 "Substantial
evidence review of agency factual findings is embodied in [SG] §10-222(h)(3)(v). That provisiongrants a
courtauthority to overrulean agency's factual finding only when the finding is "unsupported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence in light ofthe entire record as submitted." According to this
more deferential standard of review, judicial review of agency factual findings is limited to ascertaining
whether a reasoning mind could have reached the same factual conclusions reached by the agency on the
record before it."97

"A reviewing court shall apply the substantial evidence test to the final decisions of an
administrative agency, but it must not itself make independent findings of fact or substitute its
judgment for that ofthe agency." Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The scope of review is limitedto
whether a reasoning mind could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. In applying
the substantial evidence test, the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of
those personswho constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken. Agency
decisions must be reviewed in the light most favorableto the agency, since decisions of administrative

agencies axe primafacie correctand carrywiththem the presumption of validity. It is the province ofthe
agency to resolve conflicting evidence. Where inconsistent inferences from the same evidence can be

drawn, it isfor the agency to draw the inferences.98
"When a reviewing court examines the mannerin which an agency applied law to facts, which is a
judgmental process involving a mixed question of law and fact, greatdeference must be accorded to the
agency." The court review "entails only an appraisal and evaluation ofthe agency's fact-finding and is not
an independent decision on the evidence."The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency concerning the appropriate inferences to be drawn from the evidence. "On the other hand, a
reviewing court may substitute itsjudgment on lawfor that ofthe agency if the factual findings supported
by substantial evidence are susceptible of but one legal conclusion, and the agency does not so
conclude."99

There are agency decisions that fall within categoriesthat are neither legal conclusions nor factual
findings. These are mixed questions of law and fact or applications of law to facts. "The agency has
correctly stated the law and its fact finding is supported by the record, but the question is whether it has
applied the law to the facts correctly. Whenthe agency decisionbeingjudicially reviewed is a mixed
question of law and fact, the reviewing court appliesthe substantial evidence test, that is, the same
96 Spencer v. Board ofPharmacy, 380Md. 515, 529, 846 A. 2d341 (2004). Bernstein v. Real Estate Commission, 221 Md. 221,
156 A. 2d 657 (1959), the first case to interpret the MAPA enacted by the Acts of 1957, stated:
Generally, when the entire record shows that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by competent,
material and substantial evidence taken before the agency and such de novo evidence, if any, as may be taken by the
court, and such findings and conclusions are not against the weight of such evidence it is the function ofthe court to
affirm the order ofthe agency or remand the case for further proceedings if that be necessary. On the other hand, if the
court should find that the substantial rights of a petitioner for review have been prejudiced, by one or more ofthe
causes s[ecified in §255(g)(l)-(8) [of Art. 41], because of an administrative finding, inference, conclusion or decision,
then it is the function ofthe court to reverse or modify the order.
340 Md. at 230.

97 Spencer, 380 Md at529 citingSee Stansbury v. Jones, 372Md. 172, 182-185, 812 A.2d 312, 318-320 (2002) for itsdiscussion
of substantial evidence review in Maryland. See also: Christopher v. Montgomery County Department ofPublic Health, 381 Md.
188, 198, 849 A. 2d 46 (2004).

98 Gigeous v. ECI, 363 Md. 481, 497, 503, 769A. 2d 912 (2001). Where an administrative agency's conclusions are not
supported by competent and substantial evidence, or where the agency draws impermissible or unreasonable inferences and
conclusions from undisputed evidence, such decisions are due no deference. Board ofCounty Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154
Md. App. 10, 25, 837 A. 2d 1059 (2003).

99 Travers v. Baltimore Police Department, 115 Md. App.395, 420, 693 A. 2d378(1997).
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standard ofreview itwould apply to an agency fact finding."100 Such a case isseen when reviewing a
DSS determination that abuse occurred as opposed to reasonable punishment for the purpose of

determining whether a parent's name would be submitted to a state centralized registry.101
On a State level, SG §10-222(h)(3)(v) [MAPA] states that a "reviewing court may reverse or modify
an agency decision if a substantial right has beenprejudiced because a finding is unsupported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence in light ofthe entire record as submitted.. . ." Underthe
substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court must uphold an agency's determination if it is rationally

supported by the evidence in the record, even if the reviewing court, left to its ownjudgment, might have
reached a different result.102

Itmay be helpful tothe reader toconsider a cookbook methodology tothis process:103
1.

presumption of agency correctness:

Decisions of administrative agencies are primafacie correct and carry with them a
presumption of validity.
2.

inferences

"A reviewing court may, and should, examine any conclusion reached by an agency, to
see whether reasoning minds could reasonably reach that conclusion from facts in the
record before the agency, by direct proof, or by possible inference. If the conclusion
could be so reached, then it is based upon substantial evidence, and the court has no
power to reject that conclusion."
3.

fact finding

"A reviewing court may, and should, examine facts found by an agency, to see if there
was evidence to support each fact found. If there was evidence ofthe fact in the record
before the agency, no matter how conflicting, or how questionable the credibility ofthe
source ofthe evidence, the court has no power to substitute its assessment of credibility
for that made by the agency, and by doing so, reject the fact."
4.

Conclusions

"A reviewing court may, and should, examine any conclusion reached by an agency, to
see whether reasoning minds could reasonably reach that conclusion from facts in the
record before the agency, by direct proof, or by possible inference. If the conclusion
could be so reached, then it is based upon substantial evidence, and the court has no
power to reject that conclusion." ". . . [Agency] may rely on 'its experience, technical

competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence."104
100 Charles County DSS v. Vann, 382Md. 286, 296, 855 A. 2d 313 (2004). The Court cited the following: Pollock v. Patuxent,
374 Md. 463, 469 n.3, 823 A.2d 626, 630 n.3 (2003); Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 837-38, 490 A.2d
1296, 1302-03 (1985); Kohli v. LOOC, Inc., 103 Md.App. 694, 654 A.2d 922 (1995), rev'd in part on other grounds and
remanded, 347 Md. 258, 701 A.2d 92 (1997); Strother v. Board ofEducation, 96 Md.App. 99, 623 A.2d 717 (1993).

101 Vann,3S2Md. at 291, 300.
102 Travers v. Baltimore CityPolice Department, 115 Md. App. 395, 419, 693 A. 2d 378(1997). (citations omitted)

103 Travers, 115 Md. App. at420-21 citing Commissioner, Balto. City Police Dep'tv. Cason, 34 Md. App. 487, 368A. 2d 1067,
cert, denied, 280 Md. 728 (1977). See also: Dept. ofPublic Safety v. PHP, 151 Md.App. 182, 824 A. 2d 986) (2003). ("To
conduct a proper inquiry of an administrative agency's decision, we "'must be able to discern from the record the facts found, the
law applied, and the relationship between the two.'") 151 Md. App. at 194.

104 This last sentence comes from Travers, 115 Md. App.421 citing Bulluck v. Pelham WoodApts., 283 Md. 505, 390A. 2d 1119
(1978) FN No. 6 making reference to SG §10-213(1). "Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few . . .
opinions, a 'court's task on review is not to' 'substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the
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Significant Case Decisions

So many casessettingforth the substantialevidencetest and whatit means

o

One fairly recent case discussing the substantial evidence test is MVA v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 887 A. 2d
1042(2005):

"Ourreview ofthe agency's factual finding entails only an appraisal and evaluation ofthe agency's
factfinding andnot an independent decision on the evidence." When the agency is acting in a fact
finding or quasi-judicial capacity, courts are to review its decision to determine "whether the
contested decision was rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent
manner." "A reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an appellate court, shall apply the substantial
evidence test to the final decisions of an administrative agency ...."

In Boardof Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, {67-69] 729 A.2d 376 (1999),
we closelyexamined an appellate court's role in reviewing an administrative agency's decision, in
particular, the substantial evidence test. Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court, stated that:
"A court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it 'is
limitedto determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the
agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised
upon an erroneousconclusion of law.'

"In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing courtdecides ""whether a reasoning
mind reasonably couldhave reached the factual conclusion the agencyreached."" A reviewing
courtshould defer to the agency's fact-finding anddrawing of inferences if they are supported
by the record. A reviewing court '"must review the agency's decision in the lightmost
favorable to it;... the agency's decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is
the agency's province to resolve conflicting evidence" andto draw inferences from that
evidence.' (final agency decisions 'are primafacie correct and carry with them the presumption
of validity').

"Despite some unfortunate language thathascrept into a few of our opinions, a 'court's task
on review is not to '""substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute
the administrative agency,""" Evenwith regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference
should often be accorded the position ofthe administrative agency. Thus, an administrative
agency's interpretation andapplication ofthe statute which the agency administers should
ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. (The interpretation of a statute by
those officials charged with administering the statuteis ... entitled to weight'). Furthermore,
the expertise ofthe agency in its own field should be respected, (legislative delegations of
authority to administrative agencies will often includethe authorityto make 'significant
discretionary policy determinations'); ('application ofthe State Board of Education's expertise
would clearly be desirable before a court attempts to resolve the' legal issues)."
administrative agency,' 'Even with regard to somelegal issues, a degree of deference shouldoften be accorded the position ofthe
administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency's interpretation and application ofthe statute which the agency administers
should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Furthermore, the expertise ofthe agency in its own field
shouldbe respected, (legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies will often includethe authority to make
'significant discretionary policy determinations'). On the otherhand, when a statutory provisionis entirely clear, with no
ambiguity whatsoever, 'administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight." Banks, 354 Md. at
68-69 (footnote 1 and citations omitted) The last sentence is from FN 2.
All that is required by courts in reviewing a board's determination is that the board's decision be based on fairly debatable
evidence. Ginnv. Farley, 43 Md. App. 229, 403 A. 2d 858 (1979). A variance was requested in orderto construct an office

building"because the structure located on the property violated the existing front and side yard setback requirements." 43 Md.
App. at 233.Testimony by an engineer thatthe granting ofthe variance would notbe detrimental to the health, safetyandgeneral
welfare ofthe locality was sufficient to trigger the "fairly debatable" standard. "It is not the function ofthe courts to retry or
secondguessthe Board." 43 Md. App. at 235-36. What aboutthis? Expertise? What qualifications did this engineer have to
express an opinion? Was the opinionconcerning the structural nature of a building? Was it concerning aesthetics? If concerning
aesthetics, why would there be any expertise better than those who life in the neighborhood? Is the benchmark is "the health,
safety and general welfare ofthe locality" then someone hasto make a decision on this point. Does someone acquire expertiseto
express this opinion?
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390 Md. at 141-42.
We know how the statute reads

Now: how do the facts ofthis case match up

q

Two decisions from the Court of Appealswere fact driven on the issue of whether DNR made a correct
decision that taxpayers were required to pay state excise uponthe purchase of a boat.Schwartz v. DNR, 385
Md. 534, 870 A.2d 168 (2005) md Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. 563 (2005)
"The issue of whether a vessel can be "used principally in this State" if kept here fewer than six months in a

given yearis solely a question of law." Schwartz, 385 Md. at 559. The Court did the math.
If a vessel happens to be used in onlytwo statesthroughouta calendar year, then it is true that the
vessel will not be "principally used" in Maryland unless it spends at least 183 days (approximately
six months) here. But that is not the only situation in which a vessel could be "used most" in
Maryland. A vessel used five months in Maryland, four months in Delaware, and three months in
Virginia would still be "usedmost" in this State. A vessel acquired by its owners midway through
the year - thus not "used" by them in any statepriorto purchase - and then used in Maryland fewer
than six months but longer than in any other state would still be "used most" in this State.
This latter possibility describes precisely the facts subjudice. The vesselwas not used by
appellants priorto June 9, 2000. After adjusting for timespent"heldfor maintenance or repair," it
was used for 110 days in Maryland, fifty-seven days in Georgia, and ten days total in other states.
The Secretary did not err in finding that the vessel was "used principally" in Maryland in the year
2000.

Schwartz, 385 Md. 560. (Thus, the circuit court was reversed and DNR was affirmed, the decision for
holding there was liability for the tax being different thanthat decided by the circuitcourt)
Kushell, 385 Md. was also fact drivenwhere the Court concluded: "The parties agree that at the time

Kushell purchased the Genesis he hadno intention of principally using it in Maryland. Accordingly, he has
no tax liability under § 8- 716(c)(l)(iv) ofthe Natural Resources Article."385 Md. at 581, thereby
reversing the circuit court.
Factual determination: this constitutes conduct "In the practice ofmedicine"

o

Conduct by a physician in sexually harassing co-employees while on duty at a hospitaland in working
areas ofthe hospital is conduct "in the practice of medicine." BoardofPhysician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 77,

729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999).105 The Board of Physician Quality Assurance consists of 15 members, 11 of
whom must be "practicinglicensedphysicians." See, §14-202(a) ofthe Health Occupations Article.
Certainlythe Board has a high degree of expertise in determining what constitutes unprofessional conduct
"in the practice of medicine." The Board is particularly well-qualified to decide, in a hospitalsetting,
whetherspecifiedmisconductby a hospital physician is sufficiently intertwinedwith patient care to
constitute misconduct in the practice of medicine. Deference is to be given by a reviewing court to the

Board's interpretation and application ofthe statute which the Board administers. The Board's
decision in this case was warranted. When a hospital physician, while on duty, in the working areas ofthe

hospital, sexually harasses other hospital employees who are attemptingto perform their jobs, the Board
can justifiably conclude that the physician is guiltyof immoral or unprofessional conduct in the practiceof
medicine. 354 Md. at 76-77.

Judicial review substitution ofopinion for ALJ not allowed

o

Judicial review did not permit a substitution of judicial opinion for that ofthe ALJ that Weller's license
should be suspended for 1 year for a second refiisal to submit to a chemical breadth test, a penalty
permittedby T. §16-205.1 in MVA v. Weller, 390 Md. 115,887 A. 2d 1042 (2005) The MVA delegated

105 The Banks Courtstatedthat "sexual harassment in any context is patently unacceptable" citingAttorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624 A.2d 503, 514 (1993). 354 Md. at 76. The Court has previously examined what was
embraced in the phrase "in the practice of medicine" in McDonnell v. Comm'n on Medical Discipline, 301 Md. 426, 429-430, 483
A.2d 76, 77-78 (1984) where it determined that a physician's attempt to intimidate adverse expert witnesses scheduled to testify
against him in a medical malpractice case was "immoral conduct of a physician in his practice as a physician." The conduct was
held to be "improper and not to be condoned" but "not censurable. Banks, 354 Md. at 69-70.
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final administrative decision making tothe OAH subject toT. §16-205.1.106 The circuit court determined
that the ALJ had not taken into consideration the fact that a prior refusal was 8 years old and that Weller
had to travel in his work as an insurance adjuster. In fact, the ALJ's opinion specifically considered these
facts and determined the license should be suspended for a full year. 390 Md. at 125-28. Applying the
"substantial evidence" test to the judicial review ofthe administrative proceeding, the Court could not
substitute its opinion for that ofthe ALJ who used her discretion "and decided that suspension was the

appropriate sanction in this case." "Thereis substantial evidence in the recordto support this decision. This
was respondent's secondrefusal, he had admitted to drinking six beers before driving, his PBT indicated a
high alcohol levelat the time of his arrest, andthe alcohol treatment reporthe submitted to the ALJfailed
to mentionhis prior drinking an driving incident. It is clear that a 'reasoning mind reasonably could have
reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.'" 390 Md. at 143-45.

Agency: "this"conduct constitutes child abuse
Circuit Court: you are wrong, I know child abuse when I see it
Q: why would agency have more expertise than circuit court
A: it does not

But:for purposesofinterpreting the statuteandfurthering thepurposeofthe statute and as to whatthe
classification means under the statute? Does the agencynot have more expertise in this area?
o Factdependent inquiries neededto be madeby DSS, "using its expertise and scrutinizing the evidence
before it, to determine whether the risk created by" a parent administrating corporal punishment to a child
"satisfied the child abuse statute" in Charles County DSS v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 299, 855 A. 2d 313

(2004).l07 At issue was judicial review of anadministrative determination thatthe parent's conduct
"indicated child abuse." The Court disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals determination that the

parent could not be responsible for indicated child abuse when, in the course of administering corporal
punishment, the parent inadvertently injured hisson. A mixed question of law and factwas presented for
review. "Deferential review over mixed questions of law and fact is appropriate in order for the agency to
fulfill its mandate and exercise its expertise. Administering a child abuse statute is the sort of action for

which the expertise of agencies iswell suited. 108 To discover whether corporal punishment was lawfully
executed, the agency assesses the reasonableness ofthe punishment not only in light ofthe child's
misbehavior and whether it warranted physical punishment, but also in view ofthe surrounding
circumstances in which the punishment took place, including the child's age, size, ability to understand the

punishment, as well as in the instant case, the minor'scapacity to obeythe parent's orderto stand still

while being struck bythe belt."109 The Court ofSpecial Appeals did not apply the proper test and the record

facts substantiated the finding by DSS so that its decision had to be upheld. 382 Md. at299.no
106 In great detail, theCourt reviewed the advice of rights provisions ofthe Maryland Code andthe laws concerning theuseof
alcohol concentration tests and the effects of a failure to take a test on the right and responsibility ofthe MVA to suspend a
license. Weller, 390 Md. 123-25.

107 There could certainly be disagreement among parents as to whether the DSSconclusion that child abuse occurred wascorrect.
A six year old boy had brutally punchedand kicked a teacher in the stomach at a day care center. The child had been in multiple
boutsof fighting with other students. Time outs and corner sittings had resulted only in more clashes. Corporal punishment
administered by the parentswith a belt resultedin the childbeingstruckin the lower back with the bucklecausinga "reddish,
moon-shaped bruise about an inch in height." The child had attempted to avoid punishmentby running away and the injury
occurred in the course ofthe tussle. Vann, 382 Md. at 289.

108 Thereare a numberof circuit court and appellate courtdecisions addressing the issueof an agency determination that abuse
has been found. Terrible cases! The finding of abuse follows a man or woman forever and a number of circuit courtjudges have
seen the finding of fact much differently than the agency. This difference of opinion between circuit court judges and the agency
fact finder is not something that is going to go away anytime soon.

109 The statute(FL §4-501 (b)(2) stated:"Nothingin this subtitle shallbe construed to prohibited reasonable punishment,
includingreasonable corporal punishment, in lightofthe age andcondition ofthe child,from being performed by a parent or
stepparent ofthe child." (emphasis in original). Vann, 282 Md. at 298.
110 Therewas discussion concerning an allegation of there beingtwodefinitions of child abuse in FL §5-701(b) and FL §4501(b), whichthe Court analyzed in detail, Vann, 382 Md. at 300-06, and found not applicableto preclude the DSS decision. "In
sum, there is only one definition of child abuse in the FamilyLaw Article, absent any statutory or legislative indicationthat two
were intended." 382 Md. at 306-07.
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Is "this" a matter offact?
Or. . . Is "this" a legal determination?
Or. . .Is it both?

General statements ofthe law concerning the standardof review of a non-stateagency determination
o Substantial evidence supported the Baltimore County Board of Appeal's finding of fact and conclusions of
law that the Baltimore County Charter §602 (and Code §26-132)did not grant authority to appeal an
administrative order (in the form of a letter) that a proposed development plan constituted a refinement to a
previously approved County Review Group plan. Meadows ofGreenspring v. Foxleigh Enterprises, 133
Md. App. 510, 519,758 A. 2d 611 (2000). "... [T]he question [of] whether a judgment, orderor decree is
final and appealable is not determined by the name or description whichthe court below gives it, but is to
be decided by the appellate court on a consideration ofthe essence of what is done thereby."The decision
did not issue or modify any license, permit, or approval. It only informedthat the proposed plan is a
material change from the previously approved planand that, in orderto be approved, new plansmustbe
submitted for consideration." 133 Md. App. at 518-19. According to the specific terms ofthe Baltimore
County Charterand Code §26-132, the decision made was not a decision or order ofthe zoning
commissioner or the director of zoning administrationand development. No right to appeal that decision to

the Board ofAppeals therefore exists. 133 Md. at518.111
This Court reviewed a circuit court determination by the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County. Not

governed by MAPA, the Courtstated: "Judicial review of an administrative agency's action is narrow. The
circuit court's standard of review is limited to whether or not it is 'in accordance with law.' Art. 25 §5(U).

A reviewing court is confined to determining if there is substantial evidence in the recordto supportthe
agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine whether the agency's decision is premised on an
erroneous conclusion of law. As such, a reviewing court is limited to the findings of fact and conclusions

of law actually made by the agency. An appellate courtmustessentially repeatthe circuitcourt's review of
an agency decision." 133 Md. at 514.
Now: ethics Is an area that requires expertise
In Government, what does expertise say about this man's conduct
Where does the public interest lie?
Don Hyou know who I am?
o In Ethics Commission v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 780 A. 2d 1154 (2001), the Court held that the
Administrator for the Prince George's County Board of supervisors of Elections violated SG §§ 15-501,
15-506 and 15-607 ofthe Public Ethics Law through participation in recruiting, hiring, promoting and

supervising his family members as employees ofthe Board, and by failing to file properlycompleted
financial disclosure statements, as required by law, from 1988 through 1994. (authorizing supplemental
pay authorizations for family) (financialstatementimproperly filled out)
1. "The Public Ethics Law prohibits public officials from participating in matters where either the
public official or the public official's qualifyingrelatives have an interest in the matter." See SG
§15-501. 365 Md. at 450, 451-52.

2.

The Public Ethics Law . . . prohibits State employees . . . from 'intentionally using the prestige
of office or public position for that public official's or employee's private gain or that of another."
365 Md. at 450. See SG §15-506

3.

Antonetti was required to disclose on his annual financial statement, the place of salaries
employment ofthe individual or a member of his immediate family. See SG §10-507. 365 Md. at
457.

The Antonetti Court stated that it had the responsibility to determine whether there was substantial
evidence to for the Ethics Commission's decision to sanction Antonetti for violating the Public Ethics Law.
To do that, the Court had to consider "the factual basis for each of Antonetti's alleged violations ofthe

statute and the application ofthe statutory language to these instances of misconduct." 365 Md. at 451.
Each statutory section was analyzed and the Court concluded through participation in recruiting, hiring,
promoting and supervising his family members as employees ofthe Board, and by failing to file properly
What does the reader think? Does this case belong in a section talking about the substantial evidence test applicable to facts?
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completed financial disclosure statements, as required by law, from 1988 through 1994. (authorizing
supplemental payauthorizations forfamily) (financial statement improperly filled out andnot designating
employment of family)

Thecredibility decision subject to the substantialevidence test?

o

A correctional guard was suspended without pay, pending charges for removal, and ultimately dismissed
from hisjob on 7/15/93 afterbeing charged with criminal offense of possession of CDS in Gigeous v. ECI,
363 Md. 481, 769 A. 2d 912 (2001). "We determine that ALJ Seaton did not abuse her discretion when she
concluded that the officers testified from their independent recollection and that such conclusion was

supported by substantial evidence on the record." 363 Md. at 495. Argument by Gigeous wasthat
testimony of policeofficers should not have been allowed as they testified from expunged records. 363 Md.
at 498.m The ALJ concludedthat testimony givenby an Officerwas based on his independent recollection
and not from expunged records. 363 Md. at 501. A credibility decision was made by the ALJ. 363 Md. at

503. That constituted substantial evidence tosupport her decision. 363 Md. at 506.113
What do these statutes say?

Does theDivision have a rightto look beyond the languageofthe statutes In applying thesefacts?
Factual conclusion subject to substantial evidence test

o

It was properfor the Consumer Protection Division to lookbeneath the form of an alleged leaseback
transaction, to determine that appellants "engaged in small loan transactions in the form of sales-leaseback
transactions" in B & S Marketing v. Consumer Protection Division, 153 Md. App. 130, 162, 835 A. 2d 215

(2003). Rental payments were deemed interest payments and usurious loans were made in violation of
Maryland's Consumer Loan Law. Anyone needing emergency cashwas told all they had to do was put up

a household appliance ascollateral.114 Alleging an error of law, the appellants contended the Division
applied the wrong lawand the wrong legal standard in concluding the transactions were loans. It was
argued thatthe UCC, ratherthanthe"pretended purchase" provisions ofthe Consumer Loan Law should be
applied. 153 Md. App. at 152. Testimony asto how consumers viewed the transaction andtreated it was
part ofthe record and held to be proper. 153 Md. App. at 152-162.

(7). Review ofthe Agency Legal Determinations

"In contrast to findings of fact. . . an agency's interpretation of law is not entitled to deference." When
the question beforethe agency involves interpretation of an ordinance or statute," appellatereview is
more expansiveand the court is not bound by the agency's interpretation. Thus, 'a reviewing court is
under no constraints in reversing an administrative decision which is premised solely upon an erroneous
conclusion of law.'"115
Generally, a court defers to the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with

administering it. ". . . [T]he Court of Appeals [has] explainedthat "the consistent and long-standing
construction given a statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to great deference, as
the agency is likely to have expertise and practicalexperience with the statute's subject matter."
Nevertheless, "an administrative agency's construction ofthe statute is not entitled to deference ... when
it conflicts with the unambiguous statutory language." Further, "when statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight." An
1,2 The Courtsaid it did not addressimportant issuesregarding the expungement statute. ECI, 363 Md. at 488-89.
113 "It is clear that ALJ Seaton did not abuse her discretion in finding Officer Teare's testimony to be credible or err by
determining any facts traceable for testimonial purposes directly to the officer's review of his personal investigative file were
merelycollateral to the issue at hand and did not form in any meaningful way the foundation of ALJ McCloud'sor her decisionin
this case." ECI, 363 Md. at 506.

114 TheCOSA opinion detailed the transactions B &S Marketing, 153 Md. App. at 139-144. There wasno mention thatproperty
could be returned, 153 Md. App. at 143.

1,5 Kerpelman v. Disability Review, 155 Md. app. 513, 520-21, 843 A. 2d877 (2004) citing Bozeman v. Disability Review Bd. of
the Prince George's CountyPolice Pension Plan, 126 Md. App. 1, 4-5, 727 A.2d 384 (1999).
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agency's erroneous interpretation of its regulations must yield to the plain language ofthe statute. "No
custom, however long and generally it has been followed by officials, can nullify the plain meaning and

purpose ofa statute."116 "Furthermore, the expertise ofthe agency in its own field should be
respected.'"117
The general rule as to deference has recently been recited in City Council ofPrince George's County
v. Billings, 420Md. 84, 21 A.3d 1065 (2011) where it was not applicable to the issue before the court.
The Petitioners have also invoked the doctrine that courts give deference to the Council's

interpretation ofthe County Code.No doubt, we give "considerable weight" to an
agency's "interpretation and application" ofthe statute. See, e.g., Board of Physician
Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). We havealso
stated, however, that "when a statutory provision is entirely clear, with no ambiguity
whatsoever, 'administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given

weight.'" Id at 69 n. 2, 759 A.2dat 381 n.2 (quoting Macke Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md.
18, 22-23, 485 A.2d 254, 257 (1984)). On close examination, the Council's belief that it

may withdrawits election to review does not derive from an interpretation of a statutory
passage, but merelythe Council's blanket assertion that it is "free, after its review... to
withdraw[] [its] election to review[.]" This claim defies the statutory procedureand is
entitled to no weight.
420 Md. 107-108.

"A challenge as to a regulatory interpretation is, ofcourse, a legal issue."118 The reviewing court
may always determine whether an administrative agency made an error oflaw.119 ". . . [W]here the facts
before the administrative agency [are] undisputed, the legal conclusion based on those facts has been

treated as an issue of law."120 ". . .[0]rdinarily the court reviewing a final decision of an administrative
agency shall determine (1) the legality ofthe decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence

from the record asa whole to support the decision."121
Significant Case Decisions
What constitutes child abuse?

Forseeabillty ofthe injury or intent to injure?

o

Taylor v. Harford County DSS, 384 Md. 213, 862 A.2d 1026 (2004) was a casewhere DSS found Taylor
responsible for "indicated" child physical abuse asa result of his kicking a footstool that struckhis 12-yearold daughter in the face, injuring her. An ALJ decision upheldDSS as did the circuitcourt. The ALJ did
not consider intent but based the decision under a forseeability analysis from the act of kicking the

1.6 Kerpelman, 151 Md. App. at 521.
1.7 Board ofPhysician v. Banks, 354Md. 59, 68-69, 729 A.2d376 (1999).
118

Kerpelman v. Disability Review, 155 Md. app. 513, 521, 843 A. 2d 877 (2004).
119 Ethics Commission v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 780 A. 2d 1154 (2001) saw that Court stating: ". . . [Reviewing courtsshould
give some degree of deference to the legal conclusions ofthe administrative agency: can administrative agency's interpretation
and application ofthe statutewhich the agency administers shouldordinarily be given considerableweight by reviewing courts.
Nevertheless, we owe no deference to agency conclusions based upon errors of law." 365 Md. at 447.

120 Comptroller v. SYL, 375 Md. 78, 107, 825 A. 2d 399(2003). At least thatwas so in this case wherethere was not a situation
where factors pointed to one conclusion and other factors pointed to a contrary conclusion. The Court said a reviewing court
should accord a degree of deference to the balance struck by the administrative agency as trier of facts. 375 Md. at 105. "These
cases concern the liability for Maryland income taxes of two corporations that do no business in Maryland, and own no tangible

property in Maryland, but aresubsidiaries of parents that do business in Maryland. The dispositive issue is whetherthere is a
sufficient nexus between the State of Maryland and each subsidiary corporation so that the imposition of Maryland income tax
does not violate either the Commerce Clause ofthe United States Constitution, Art. 1, Section 8, cl. 3 , or principles of due
process." 375 Md. at 80.

hl Gigeous v. ECI, 363 Md. 481, 496, 503, 769 A. 2d 912 (2001).
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footstool. The Court"We hold that where an actby a parent or caregiver is injurious to that person's child,

and the injury was unintentional, under Title 5 ofthe Family LawArticle and COMAR07.02.07.12 , the
injurious act should notconstitute "indicated" child physical abuse unless it can be shown to have been
reckless conduct. Accordingly, we vacate and remand to the ALJ for further consideration consistent with
thisopinion." 384 Md. at216. Taylor was entitled to a contested case hearing. 384 Md. at221-22.
The present appeal, as briefed before this Court, is predicated solely upon whether the ALJ, in his
determination as to whether appellant was responsible for indicated child physical abuse, applied
the correct legal standard in reaching his conclusion thatappellant was responsible for the abuse
under the applicable statutes and regulations. It is therefore neither a review ofthe agency's factual
determinations nor can it be said to be a review of a "mixed question of law and fact." It is purely

a legal question. The facts that led to "L" being injured are undisputed. Therefore, we shall
proceedto review the agency's determination de novo.
384 Md. 223.

FL 5-701 defines abuse, and COMAR regulations detail the circumstances under which abuse is
indicated, unsubstantiated, or ruled out as regards inclusion of a name in a central registry. 384 Md. at 223-

27. Considering actions whichconstitute "gross negligence," a"reckless" disregard to human life, and case
law considering those concepts, the Court stated that the ALJ is to consider all facts and circumstances of
the case. 384 Md. at 227-31

Part ofthe blame may lie with the unfortunate wording of COMAR 07.02.07.12C(2)(a)(i) in that
most acts, whether or not they have unintended consequences, are intentional. For instance, if

someone pushes a door open without realizing someone is just on the other side, and then the door
slams that other person in the face, the actof opening the door cannot be said to havebeeneither
accidental or unintentional, although the injurious consequences of that act may have been just
that. Under the ALJ's use of "foreseeability," if an act occursthat results in injury to a child that

injury would be foreseeable because the injury occurred. Another example would be those
instances where drivers have run over other persons as they operated vehicles in reverse. The
foreseeability ofthe drivers's actions would be very relevant in a negligence tort context even
thoughtherewas no intentto injure. However, under the ALJ's analysis, if the driver was a parent

andthe person injured his or herchild, the foreseeability standard of negligence wouldbe
transmogrified into intent to injure the child and the parent would forever be branded a child
abuser. We do not believe that was the intent ofthe Legislature.

We hold that, under the circumstances here present,the intentional act must be shown to have
been either reckless in its nature or deliberately intended to harm the child in order for a finding of
"indicated child abuse" to be made.
384 Md. at 232.

. . . Because the ALJ improperly applied a foreseeability standard to infer intent insteadof
examining appellant's conduct under the correct "reckless" conduct standard, we shall vacate the
ALJ's decision and remand the case to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
384 Md. at 233.

When the agency Interpretation ofthe law Is Incorrect

o

The Court of Appeals concluded thatCorporal Steven Kerpelman's appeal to the circuitcourtthrough a
motion for writ of mandamus was procedurally correctin Kerpelman v. Disability Review, 155 Md. app.
513, 528, 843 A. 2d 877 (2004). The Medical Advisory Board (MAB) ofthe Prince George's Police

Department had not communicated a finding that Kerpelman did not have a qualifying disability by a
written opinion as required by the statute, which written opinion generated the rightto appeal. "Kerpelman
found himself in "the ultimate 'Catch-22.'" He could not advance his application due to the MAB's

determination, nor could he appeal that determination. Thus, the two prongs ofthe test for judicial action
through writ of mandamus were met." 155 Md. App. at 529. The agency interpretation that the Plan
requires MAB to render an opinion only in cases in which it finds that a qualifying disability exists is in
direct conflict with the words ofthe plan ("[t]he [MAB} shall examine all evidence concerning the case . .
. and provide a written opinion to the [DRB]." 155 Md. App. at 526. The Agency interpretation ofthe law
was incorrect. 155 Md. App. at 527.

A reasonable Interpretation ofthe plain language of. . .
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The projected political(money) consequences ofthe Interpretation willhave to awaitanotherday
o Dept. Public Safety v. Palmer, 389 Md. 443, 886 A. 2d 554(2005) is another case addressing the issue of
judicial review of an interpretation of law by an agency. Eastern Correctional Management non-uniformed
positions claimed thata requirement to use personal leave time to undergo searches and related delays

while entering and exiting the Institution was illegal. The Court agreed.122 "The Grievants made plain that
they do not contest the requirement thatthey clear security. They seek to punch in before, andout after,
they have cleared security so thatthey will not be charged personal leave time if they do not arrive attheir
work stations by the startof a shift or if they leave theirwork stations before the end of a shift. In other
words, the issue raised whether the time spent in clearing security is part ofthe Grievants' work time." 389
Md. at 447-48. Upon a consideration of COMAR regulations as to what constitutes "work time," an
examination of what constitutes "work related" time, the Federal Portal to Pay Act (part ofthe Fair Labor
Standards Act. - 29 USC §234), case law in both the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals,
the Court concluded that the agency (i.e. the ALJ decision) was not premised upon an erroneous conclusion
of law. 389 Md. at 453. This was a grievance decision in which the ALJ makes and made the final
decision. The Department filed for judicial review.
The ALJ decision was a reasonable interpretation ofthe plain language of COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(g)

thatthe activity need only be job-related andthe ALJ gave explanations that are reasonable andhardly
arbitrary for concluding thatthe security clearance activity in the instant matterwas job-related. 389 Md.
At 454.123 "The ALJ's conclusion asto the scope of [the regulation] was basedon management's requiring
the security checks, which could not be accomplished offsite and which were a prerequisite to
commencement and completion ofthe day's work." 389 Md. at 455. Interesting is the State's argument
that if the ALJ decision is requiredto stand, this reasoning would mean the State would have to compensate
employees who work in State office buildings from the moment the employees enter the building and begin
to walk to their officer, climb the stairs, or wait for an elevator as these are job related activities.

Interesting is the Court's comment that that is an error for another day. 389 Md. at 455-46.

Interpretation of an agency rule is governed by the same principles that govern interpretation of a
statute.124 There are many, many appellate court decisions dealing withthe issue of statutory

interpretation in general, and the issue ofagency interpretation in particular.125
"Determining whetheran agency's 'conclusions of law' are correct is always, on judicial review, the
court's prerogative." The court ordinarily respects the agency's expertise and "gives weightto its
122 The ALJ ruled in favor ofthe Grievants and the Circuit Court for Somerset County affirmed. Palmer, 389 Md. at 444-45.

123 The Court citedMaryland Aviation v. Noland, 386 Md. 556,571-72, 873 A. 2d 1145 (2005) to the effect:"Even with regard to
some legal issues, a degree of deference shouldoften be accorded the position ofthe administrative agency Thus, an
administrative agency's interpretation andapplication of a statute whichthe agency administers should ordinarily be given
considerable weight by reviewing courts." Palmer, 389 Md. at 451-52, 54.

124 MTA v. King, 369Md. 274, 289, 799 A. 2d 1246 (2002) citing Md. Comm 'n on HumanRelations v. Bethlehem Steel, 295 Md.
586, 592-93, 457 A. 2d 1146 (1983).

There are many rules of construction that have been enunciated by the appellate courtsof Maryland in interpretation of
statutes. One is the doctrine of "ejusdem generis." That doctrine was discussed in Boyle v. Park & Planning, 385 Md. 142, 867
A. 2d 1050 (2005) wherethere was an issue of whetherthe LEOBR was applicable to action against park police officers who had
resigned their positions. The Court noted:
"The doctrine of ejusdemgeneric applies when the following conditions exist: (1) the statute contains an enumeration
by specific words; (2) the members ofthe enumeration suggest a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the
enumeration; (4) a general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually following it; and (5) there is not clearly
manifested an intent that the general term be given a broadermeaning than the doctrine requires."
385 Md. at 156.

125 Statutory interpretation is never easy. Sometimes it is extremely difficult as it was in the caseof Becker v. Anne Arundel
County, 174Md. App. 114,920 A. 2d 1118 (2007) involving variances sought as necessary to constructa home on property in
Pasadena, Maryland where the statutes and regulations ofthe Chesapeke Bay Critical Area Program and local zoning and
development lawsand regulations. Discussing variances andwhat constitutes an"unwarranted hardship," the Courtexplained
two separate amendments ofthe Chesapeake Bay statutes to overturn Court of Appealscase law interpretations andto restore the
definition of unwarranted hardship to mean that "without a variance, an applicant would be denied reasonable and significantuse
ofthe entire parcel or lot for which the variance is requested." 174Md. App. at 132-33. Painstakingly, Judge James Eyler
explained the framework and the effect of Anne Arundel County Code provisions. 174Md. App.at 133-34.
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interpretation ofa statute it administers." ". . .[E]ven though an agency's interpretation of a statute is
often persuasive, 'the reviewing court must apply the law as it understands it to be.'" "Nevertheless, 'an
administrative agency's interpretation and application ofthe statute which the agency administers should

ordinarily be given considerable weight in reviewing courts.'"126 "When an agency makes "conclusions of
law" in a contested case, the court, onjudicial review, decides the correctness ofthe agency's conclusions

and may substitute the court's judgment forthat ofthe agency's." "This established principle of
administrative law is exemplified in [SG] §10-222(h)(3)(i)-(iv), which permits judicial modification or
reversal of agency action that (i) is unconstitutional; (ii)exceeds the agency's jurisdiction; (iii) results

from unlawful procedure; or (iv) is affected by "any other" error oflaw."127 Section 10-222(h)(3)(iv), by
authorizing correction of "any other errorof law," implicitly indicates (a) that courts retain authority to
correct all ("any") errors of law and (b) an understanding that agency errors basedupon the previous three

provisions are also considered to be legal errors ("any other error of/aw")."128 "Even in the case ofan
agency interpreting law, ourjurisprudence has shown a level of deference to an agency's interpretation of
law, provided the agency is interpreting its own regulations, or is interpreting the statute it administers.

Nevertheless, erroneous interpretations oflaw are never binding upon the courts."1
One principal of statutory construction is that in construing a statute, the legislature is aware ofthe
words used in a statute. Therefore in Social Services v. LindaJ., 161 Md. App. 402, 869 A. 2d 404 (2005)

when the Legislature said that an individual found guilty of a criminal charge of abuse or neglect is not
entitled to contested case hearing that includes the receipt of a PBJ. 161 Md. App. at 409.

The Court of Appeals has stated six principal tenetsof statutory interpretation:

[1] The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain and carry outthe real intention of
the Legislature. [2] The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language ofthe
statute itself. [3] In construing a statute, we accord the words their ordinary and natural
signification. [4] If reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause, or
sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless. [5] Similarly, wherever possiblean interpretation
should be given to statutory language which will not lead to absurd consequences. [6] Moreover,
if the statute is part of a general statutory schemeor system, the sections must be read together to

ascertain the true intention ofthe Legislature. (Citations omitted).130

126 Christophner v. Monteomery County Department ofPublic Health, 381 Md. 188, 198, 849 A. 2d 46 (2004). Seealso:
Solomon v. Board ofPhysician QualifyAssurance, 155 Md. App. 687, 696-97, 845 A. 2d 47 (2003). In Changing Point v.
Maryland Health Resources, 87 Md. app. 150; 589 A. 2d 502 (1991), the Courtstated:
Moreover, an agency is best able to discern its intentin promulgating a regulation. Thus, an agency's interpretation of
the meaning and intent of its own regulation is entitled to deference.. .
87 Md.App. at 160.

See also: Spencer v. Board of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 528,846 A. 2d 341 (2004) referencing Tomlinson, The Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act, 56 Md. L. Rev. 196, 215 n. 131 (1997) ("Questions of law encompass the first four grounds listed
in the judicial review provision ofthe APA").

127 Spencer, 380Md. at 528 referencing Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, 56 Md. L. Rev. 196, 215 n. 131
(1997) ("Questions of law encompass the first four grounds listed in the judicial review provision ofthe APA").

128 Spencer, 380Md. at528-29.
129 Id., at529 citing MTA v. King 369Md. 274, 288-89, 799 A.2d 1246, 1254 (2002); Jordan v. Hebbville, 369Md. 439, 450, 800
A.2d 768, 775 (2002); and State Ethics v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428,447, 780 A.2d 1154, 1166 (2001).

130 Engineering Management v. Maryland State Highway Adm., 375 Md. 211, 224-25, 825 A. 2d 966(2003) quoting Mayor and
City ofRockvillev. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 549-50, 814 A.2d 469, 490 (2002) (citing Mazor v. State, Dep't of
Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360-61, 369 A.2d 82, 86-87 (1977). The Court made this statement in a case which involved the
interpretation of statutes and regulations. 365 Md. at 224.
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Otherappellate court statements regarding interpretation of statutes and rules are:
o

"Statutes are to be interpreted in light ofthe goal, aim, or purpose for which they were
enacted."

o

When called upon to interprettwo statutes that involve the same subject matter, have a
common purpose, and form part ofthe same system, a court should read them in pari

materia and construe them harmoniously.131
o

"When a word susceptible of more than one meaning is repeated in the same statute or

sections ofa statute, it is presumed that it is used in the same sense."132
o

". . .[W]hen a part of a statutory scheme, the meaning of a particular statute must be
sought within the context of that entire scheme; it should not be construed in

o

"Statutory scheme[s] [are not interpreted] so as to render any part of it meaningless or
nugatory." The statute should be construed "so as to harmonize all its parts with each

o

"Where a statutory provision is ambiguous and the general purpose for which the

isolation."

other and render them consistent with its general object and scope."

statute was enacted militates in favor of one among the several possible interpretations,

the statute must be given that interpretation which accords with its general purpose."133
o

In statutory construction,the Court may "consider the consequences resulting from one
meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or

o

It is a natural presumption that the Legislature "does not intend to use words in vain or
to leave a part of its enactmentwithoutsense or meaning, but intends that every part of

o

The plain meaning ofthe words rule is not absolute, but there is an elastic approach,
which means that when persuasive evidence exists outside the plain text ofthe statute,

unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense."134

it shall beoperative."135
theCourt will not turn a blind eye to it.136
o

Interpretation of statutory language should be from a 'commonsensical,' rather than a

technical perspective.137
o

The effect on judicial interpretation ofthe fact that the Maryland Legislature may or
may not have acted by passing an enactment or an amendment to a statute may or not

constitute evidence of legislative intent. It all depends.138
Significant Case Decisions

Conflictinglanguage In two different statutes - the legislative Intentascertained
o Sometimes legislation enacted and then amended contains conflicting language that requires statutory
interpretation. That is what was the subject ofthe opinion in David v. St. Mary's County DSS, 198 Md.
App. 173, 16 A. 3d. 991 (2011) where the court determined that a local DSS can investigate a report of
suspected child abuse or neglect when the abuse or neglect is alleged to have happened in Maryland but the

131 Annapolis Market Place L.L.C v. Parker, 369Md. 689, 711-12, 802 A.2d 1029 (2002) citing cases.
132 Annapolis Market Place L.L.C. v. Parker, 369Md. 689, 715, 802 A.2d 1029 (2002).
133 FOP No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 680 A. 2d 1052 (1996). The Court gaveas an example the Worker's Compensation
Statute which should be interpreted "liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its
benevolent purposes. Any ambiguity in the law should be resolved in favor ofthe claimant."

134 Division ofLabor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407,425, 784 A. 2d 534 (2001).
135 Division ofLabor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407,425-26, 784 A. 2d 534(2001).
136 KcKay v. Dept. ofPublic Safety, 150 Md. App. 182, 194, 819 A. 2d 1088 (2003).
137 Annapolis Market Place L.L. C v. Parker, 369Md. 689, 715, 802 A.2d 1029 (2002).
138 For a collection of cases see Potomac Valley Orthopaedic Associates v. Maryland Boardof Physicians, 417 Md. 622, 640-41,
12 A. 3d. 84 (2011).
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child victim lives out of state. This was held to be so despite the provisions of FL § 5-706 which has

specific language authorizing an investigation requires an investigation "afterreceiving a report of
suspected abuse or neglect of a child who lives in this State that is alleged to have occurred in thisstate."
198 Md. App. at 180. The statutory framework, reporting obligations of incidences of abuse, investigation
reports provided for by statute, the 2003 statutory amendments, fiscal and policynotesfrom the legislative
files, and the overall intent ofthe Legislaturefor the protection of children and investigation of child abuse

dictated the result.139 FL §5-703(b) also applies and pertains "to 'suspected abuse or neglect that is alleged
to have occurred in this State," without any qualification as to where the victim lives." 198 Md. App. at
190,201.

Don't read any more requirements into the proofthe statute requires.

o

Statutory interpretation was the focus of attention in MVA v. Loane, 420 Md. 211, 22 A. 22 A. 3d. 833
(2011) withthe Courtstating: "We holdthatthe Statute doesnot require the MVA to proveat the show
cause administrative hearing that the officerstopped Respondent on a highway or private property usedby
the public in general" in support of a proceeding to suspend a license for failure to take a breath test
pursuant to Maryland's implied consent law - DWI arrest. 420 Md. at 231. Citing the statute, noting the
absence of any statutory requirement that proofbe submitted that the attemptto drive was "on a highway or
on any private property," 420 Md. at 219,citing pastcase lawinterpreting the implied consent provision,
the Court noted in aid of interpretation that the Statuteestablishes an administrative process that is
"informal and summary in nature." 420 Md. at 229 "Respondent has not articulated a principled reason for
reading intothe Statute a location limitation, nor canwe fashion one." 420 Md. at 230.

The statute says what the statute says - nothing more required
o From: Thomasv. MVA, 418 Md. 280, 300, 13 A. 3d. 1256 (2011).
"When stopping or detaining an individual an officerhas reasonable grounds to believe is driving
under the influence, the officer is not required to arrest or formally charge that person prior to
offering him or her a chemicalbreath test or advisingthat person of his or her rights pursuantto

the DR-15 Advice of Rights Form140. Furthermore, an officer does not impermissibly confuse a
driver into refusing a chemicalbreath test by simplyfailing to administer a previouslyagreed-

upon preliminary breath test.141 Finally, where the sworn statements of an officer donot conflict

internally, an ALJ is not required to accept the testimony ofthe driver over that ofthe officer.142
Interpretation ofagency regulations can sometimes be the subject ofappellate disagreement
o The political processprobablybeganto finally decide whether a Maryland State employee is entitled to be

paidas "worktime" for the entire time spent driving from home directly to an out-ofregular work place
site, or whetherthe employee's normal commute time to the regular workplace is to be deducted from the
time spent drivingto the out-of-workplace site afterthe decision in Miller v. Comptroller, 398 Md. 272,

920A. 2d 467(2007)143. A majority of 5 against a minority of 2 saw different results in interpreting a

139 SeeCourtcommentary at 198Md. App. 196-97.
140 TheCourtstated: "Our interpretation is guided by the legislative intent to enhance publicsafety with promptremoval of drunk
drivers from the road." 418 Md. at 284. The statute does not say that an individual has to be apprehended or arrested prior to the
officer requesting the driver submit to a chemical test. 418 Md. at 296.

141 The factthat the right to take the preliminary test was laterwithdrawn showed no confusion in this case upon whichthe
licensee could rely in attacking the advice of rights given as being misleading. 418 Md. at 298.

142 Following theholding inMVA v. Karwacki, 340Md. 271, 283, 289, 666 A. 2d 511 (1995), the Court stated thatwhen Thomas
did not issue a subpoena for the presence ofthe police officer at the agency hearing, it left the ALJ with an "all or nothing
choice" to either accept the driver's account or accept the officer's sworn statement. In this case the ALJ chose the statement.
418 Md. at 299.

143 Miller'sjob in the Comptroller's officerequired herto conduct audits at field locations goingdirectly to remote locations from
her home. Miller, 398 Md. App. at 276.
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myriad ofregulations144 addressing the issue. Employee compensation case law discussion of statutes and
regulations was reviewed in considerable detail by the Court. The Courtmajority held that COMAR
17.04.11.02B(l)(j) "does not entitle employees to compensation for all the time spenttraveling between
home and a work site other than their assigned office and that [SPP §12-203(b)] requires a remedy to be

limited to compensation for claims existing within 20 days prior to the initiation ofa grievance.145" 398
Md. at 286. Interpreting the samegroup of regulations, the minority saw the issue differently. No benefit
can be seen to the reader in going into great detail as to the interpretation issue in this case. Suffice it to say
that what is or what is not consistent with the statutory scheme creating an agency and the regulations that
come forth from the agency can be seen differently by judges ofthe same court.

When the true intent cannot be ascertainedform the statutory language alone
Other Indicia oflegislative intent
The structure ofthe statute
How it relates to other laws

Legislative history
General purpose ofthe statute

o

Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 869 A. 2d 822 (2005) denied a driver's license to an individual who had been
revoked both in Illinois and in Florida, the revocation in Florida being a mandatory lifetime revocation

Trans. §16-103.1 required that MVA not issuea dirver's licenseto an individualrevoked in anotherstate.
Gwin claimed this conflicted with Trans. §16-703, a provision ofthe Driver's compact to which Maryland
is a signatory, that section allowing application to be made a year afterthe imposition of a revocation. 385
Md.at465.

While at first blush, this may have seemed to be no more than application ofthe stricter statute to
control, the Court extensively engaged in rules of statutory construction. Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin,
373 Md. 214, 817 A. 2d 229 (2003) was quoted: "'if the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined
from the statutory language alone,' we may lookto other indicia of that intent, including the structure ofthe
statute, how it relates to other laws, its legislative history, its general purpose, and the 'relative rationality
and legal effectof various competing constructions.'" 385 Md. at 463. The Courtstated"it is illogical to

presume thatthe Legislature intended with itsentry as a Compact state to make Maryland a safeharbor for
extraterritorial drivers who have incurred harsh penalties in thei home state for motor vehicle violations."
385 Md. at 464. Maryland's law did not undermine the provisions ofthe Compact. 385 Md. at 465.
Legislative history
Harmonize statutes

General purpose behind the statute
Rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions

o

The Court in KcKay v. Dept. ofPublicSafety, 150Md. App. 182, 819 A. 2d 1088 (2003) stated that in
determining the meaningof a statute, the Courtis permitted to considerthe statute's structure, including its
title and how the statute relates to other laws. It may consider the context in which a statute appears,

including related statutes. The Court is bound to read statutes on the same subject together, and will
harmonize them to the extent possible. The General Assembly is presumed to have intended that all
its enactments operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law. A Court may consider
legislative history, the general purpose behind the statute, and the relative rationality and legal effect
of various competing constructions. The Courtmay considerthe particular problem or problemsthe
144 «rj]he interpretation of an agency rule is governed by thesame principles thatgovern the interpretation of a statute." Miller,
398 Md. at 282-83. The minority said that the majorityfailed to apply the appropriatestandard of review and that it confused

appellate courtjurisprudence. 398 Md. at 289.Theysaidthat regulatory language had to be interpreted according to its "natural
and ordinary meaning" and that the majority did not accordingly interpret the law, 398 Md. at 292, and that "The majority's
conclusion directly contradicts the ordinary and plain language of COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(j). 398 Md. at 294.
145 SPP §12-203(b) does state thata grievance procedure must be initiated by theemployee within a 20 dayperiod following the
occurrence or the employee'sfirst knowledge ofthe occurrence, Miller, 398 Md. at 297, but the minoritysaid that the ALJ or
final decision maker's authority under §12-303 to "grant 'any appropriate remedy' available under Section 12-402(a)" and that
meant that the General Assemly could not have intended remedies under Section 12-402 to be restricted by Section 12-303's
filing requirements." 398 Md. at 297.
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legislature was addressing, and the objectives itsought to obtain. "This enables usto putthe statute in
controversy in its proper context andthereby avoid unreasonable or illogical results thatdefy common
sense." 150 Md. App. at 194. The McKay Court considered two provisions of a statute in determining that
a State employer could not reach a disciplinary agreement with an employee and later rescind that
agreement to terminate himon thebasis of information subsequently obtained. 150 Md. App. at 198.
The statute needs to be Interpreted

Not everybody sees the same result

o

Sometimes statutory interpretation is not verysimple as demonstrated by Toler v. MVA, 373 Md. 214, 817
A. 2d 229 (2003) wherethe majority of 4 sawthings different from a minority of 3. An interpretation of
transportation statutes resulted in a determination that Toler was entitled to accumulate a minimum of 16

points before his driver's license could be suspended.146 373 Md. at216. "With this background and
viewing the relevant parts ofthe statute as a whole, wehold that § 16-405(b) is not limited to professional
drivers for whom driving constitutes their employment but includes as well those licensees who must drive
in orderto perform othersignificant duties of theiremployment. As MVAdoes not contest that Tolerfalls
within that category, we shall reverse thejudgment ofthe Circuit Courtand remandwith directions that it
vacate the order of suspension entered by MVA." 373 Md. at 228. This case emphasizes the sometimes
seen difficulty in interpreting statutes found in Maryland's motor vehicle lawswhichhave been enacted
and reenacted over many years.

The general rules ofstatutory construction
Tofulfill the objectives ofthe legislature
Whatproblems was the legislature addressing
Unreasonable * Illogical * common sense

o

Adamson v. CorrectionalMedical, 339 Md. 238, 753 A. 2d 501 (2000) stated the general rule of statutory
construction.

The principles of statutory construction are not novel. "Every quest to discoverand give effectto
the objectivesofthe legislature beginswith the text ofthe statute." If the legislature's intentions
are evident from the text ofthe statute, our inquiry normally will cease and the plain meaning of
the statute will govern We bear in mind, however,that the plain-meaning rule is elastic, rather
than cast in stone. If persuasive evidence exists outside the plain text ofthe statue, we do not turn
a blind eye to it. We often look to the legislative history, an agency's interpretation ofthe statute,
and other sources for a more complete understanding of what the General Assembly intended
when it enacted particular legislation. In so doing, "we may also consider the particular problem
or problems the legislaturewas addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain." This enables us
to put the statute in controversy in its propercontextand thereby avoid unreasonable or illogical
results that defy common sense.
339 Md. at 251-52.

Declaratory judgment action
A surgical examination ofthe statute

o

Declaratory Judgment may sometimes be the vehicle of choice when an agency denies rights to which one
is entitled. In PSC v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 882 A. 2d 849 (2005) a request for Declaratory Judgment was
filed when Wilson was terminated from her employment with the PSC. She had filed an administrative
appeal contesting her termination pursuant to SPP §11-113. The Commission Chairman concluded that she
was an at-will employee fired "for cause" and therefore not entitled to a statutory pre-termination hearing.
Thereafter, Wilson filed a 10 count complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief including
reinstatement as an employee. 389 Md. at 37. Wilson claimed her termination was illegal because it was by
Chairman Schisler along, without ehe approval, acquiescence, or delegation of authority by at least a

146 "Maryland Code, § 16-401 ofthe Transportation Article , requires the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) to maintain a
point system for the suspension and revocation of drivers' licenses. Petitioner, Christopher Lee Toler, accumulated eight points
within a two-year period. After a hearing, an administrative law judge for MVA suspended his license for 30 days but authorized
the issuance of a restricted license that allowed him to drive for work purposes during the period of suspension. Toler contends
that the MVA and, on judicial review, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, misread the law and that he is entitled to
accumulate a minimum of 16 points before his license can be suspended. He is correct." Toler, 373 Md. at 216.
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majority ofthe full Commission of 5. Statutory interpretation principles were applied andthisrequired an
elaborate and extensive examination ofthe statutory scheme found the State Personnel and Pensions

Article. 389 Md. at 47-52, 53-57.147 TheCourt concluded thatthe Commission as a whole wasthe

"appointing authority" and that Chairman Schisler could not, as an individual, fire Wilson.148
This provision, Wilson argues, indicates that it is the five memberCommission, ratherthanthe
Chairman alone, that is the "individual or ... unit ofgovernment that has the power to make

appointments and terminate employment." § 1-101(b) . We agree. Language appears throughout
the statute authorizing the Commission to "hire" or "appoint" all types of employeesofthe PSC. In
contrast, there is no mention in this statute, nor any other statute we could find, of language that
outlines the Chairman's authority, independentofthe Commission's, to "hire" or "appoint"
employees ofthe PSC. Although PUC § 2-108(d) doesnot discuss specifically the authority ofthe
Commission to terminate employees, PUC § 2-108(d) states that "all personnel ofthe Commission
are subjectto the provisions ofthe State Personnel and Pensions Article." That Articlegoverns the
termination of PSC employees, specificallythose employees in the executive and management
services, and those who are special appointments, all of which "serve[] at the pleasure ofthe
employee's appointingauthority" and "may be terminated from employmentfor any reason, solely
in the discretion ofthe appointing authority." § 11-305 . Because PUC § 2-108(d) constructs a
statutory scheme outlining both the Commission's explicit authority to hire and implicit authority
to terminate employees ofthe PSC, we conclude that the Commission as a whole is the
"appointing authority."
389 Md. at 52.

Due process is always there
Statutory construction ofthe notice requirements

o

The County Commissioners of St. Mary's County virtually conceded their notice of appeal to the Boardof
Appeals was deficient Board of County Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10,837 A. 2d 1059
(2003). "An administrativeproceeding is subjectto the requirements of due process. This includesan
adequate formulation and notice ofthe issues in the case." 154Md. App. at 28. Based on all information
presented, the Board of Appeals proceeded de novoand everyone understood that safety in the
development of land was the contested issuebeingreviewed. 154 Md. App. at 30. The Court reversed
determining that it could not be 100%certainthat real property to be developed was safe from explosives
and thus the property was not to be developed. "The 100%certainty standard was arbitrary because it is
impossibleto demonstrated, based on a 100%certaintyrequirement,that any parcel of land is completely
safe. Therefore, by applying an incorrect standard, the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious." 154

Md. App. at 33.149 The Board's determination constituted anerror of law and theagency decision is owed
nodeference. A remand was ordered. 154 Md. App., at 34.150
Just what does this "or" mean

Legislative history
What does a change in the language ofthe statute mean?
What are the consequences ofinterpreting it this way? How about this way? Well, what about that way?
A presumption that the Legislature does not intend to use words in vain

147 The Wilson Courtdiscussed some ofthe historyof thePSC. 389 Md. at 46-47.
148 "Title 11,subtitle3 ofthe State Personneland Pensions article. . . coversall aspectsof termination and separation of
employmentfor all non-temporary employees in the State Personnel Management System." SPPP §11-305 sets forth the
termination procedures and protections that apply. "The statute states clearly that the termination ofa management service
employee may be effectuated only by the 'appointing authority' of an agency." Wilson, 389 Md. at 47-48.

149 "The correct standard is whether th eevidenc supports a finding of unreasonable risk and, if so, whether it couldbe
ameliorated." Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. at 33.

150 A remand was in order in this case. "Nevertheless, whenand administrative agency rendersa decisionbased on incorrect
legal standards, but there exists some evidence, 'however minimal, that could be considered appropriately under the correct
standard, the case should be remanded so the agency can reconsider the evidence using the correct standard." Southern
Resources, 154 Md. App. at 34.
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o

InDivision ofLabor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407, 784 A. 2d534 (2001), restitution was ordered against a

contractor to 3employees for afailure to pay wages in accord with Maryland's Prevailing Wage Act.151
Underthe statute, if a contractor pays its employees lessthan the prevailing wage, then the contractor or
subcontractor is liable for restitution. At issue was whether the Legislature intended, by use ofthe

disjunctive "or" inthestatute to shield a contractor from liability for restitution to its subcontractor's
employees? 366 Md. at 421. Statutory interpretation included a look at legislative history (a 1988 report),
and recognition thatthe law is thatcodification is presumed to be forthe purpose of clarity rather than
changing themeaning of a statute. 366 Md. at 422-23. ". . . [E]ven a change in the phraseology of a
statute by a codification will not ordinarily modify the law unless the change is so radical and material that
the intention ofthe Legislature to modify the lawappears un mistakably from the language ofthe Code."
Id}52 Clearly the Legislature intended thatthe failure of a subcontractor to conform to the law meant
liability is on the subcontractor, not the contractor." 366 Md. at 425. In statutory construction, the Court
may"considerthe consequences resulting from one meaning ratherthan another, and adoptthat
construction which avoids an illogicalor unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistentwith common
sense." 366 Md. at 425. It is a natural presumption that the Legislature"does not intend to use words in
vainor to leave a part of its enactment without sense or meaning, but intends that every part of it shall be
operative." 366 Md. at 425-26.
This statute says what It means and means what It says

o

The Court in KcKay v. Dept. of Public Safety, 150Md. App. 182,819 A. 2d 1088 (2003) reversedthe
decision ofthe ALJ and circuit court on a matter of law interpreting a statute. In a matter of statutory

interpretation, the Courtstatedthat SPP §11-108(a)(2) allows an appointing authority and an employee to
agree to the "imposition of a lesser disciplinary action as a final and binding action, not subject to further
review." 150Md. App. at 195. Allowance of that bargaining mechanism meant the bargainmade in this
case disciplining a corrections employee couldnot be rescinded despitethe fact the Warden statedhe came
upon other evidencefollowingthe time the bargain was made. 155 Md. App. at 198.
The standard ofproofapplicable to an administrative proceeding
o Determiningthe standard of proof applicable to an administrative proceeding is a matter of law. In a

proceeding underLEORB, the standard is by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Coleman v. Anne Arundel
Police, 369 Md. 108, 122, 797 A. 2d 770 (2002).

A certificate ofneed

o

It was proper for the Maryland Health Resources Planning commissionto summarily deny a certificateof
need to establish and operate open-heart surgery units because approval would be inconsistent with the
existing State Health Plan. Adventist Healthcare v. Suburban Hospital, 350 Md. 104, 711 A. 2d 158 (1998).
A certificate of need is required before a person may develop, operate, expand, change, or invest capital in

health care facilities or services in Maryland. 350 Md. at 107.153 COMAR §10.24.01.10C(1) permitted
Staff to move for summary decision to deny a docketed certificate of need application "if the proposed
project is inconsistent with one or more standards ofthe State health Plan that make the project
unapprovable." All decisions ofthe commission on certificate of need applications "shall be consistent
with the State health plan and the standards for review established by the Commission." 350 Md. at 121.
The Court commented that the case presented issues that underlie other issues and did not "fall nearly and
exclusively into either the area of fact-finding or the area of law determination." What the Commission did
in making its decision was to determine and apply principles of procedural and substantive law, "but mostly
it exercised its expertise and judgment in applying the law to the facts." Id.
What the applicants wanted to do was to challenge the validity and applicability ofthe State plan. The
plan is required to be updated every five years. The certificate of need process is a quasi judicial process
and making application for a certificate of need is not the appropriate way to correct, amend, or update the

151 The Act is codified at SFP §17-201, et. seq. Somehistory ofthe recodification ofthe Act is set forth atTriangle, 366Md. at
418-26.

152 The Court cited Hoffman v. KeyFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 286 Md. 28,37,416A. 2d 1265 (1979) and other cases. Triangle,
366 Md. at 422-23. Case law discussing this principle was discussed. 366 Md. at 423-24.

153 The Court detailed the Maryland process enacted in response to theNational Health Planning and Development Act of 1974
and the implementation of a comprehensive State Health Plan for Maryland. Suburban Hospital, 350 Md. at 105-120.
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State Health Plan. 350 Md. at 123-24. Other remedies were available because HG §19-114(c) provided that

annually or upon petition the Commission shall review the State Plan. Also a Declaratory Judgment Action
could be filed pursuant to Cts. §3-406.
The extent to which the court goes to ascertain statutory intent
The old "Itmeans what It says and It says what It means

o

Denied zoning classification of property, the Petitioner inAnnapolis Market PlaceL.L. C. v. Parker, 369
Md. 689, 715, 802 A.2d 1029, 1044(2002) found no relief in the Court of Appeals. First of all the case is a
good example ofthe extent courts have to goto in order to ascertain statutory intent. Analysis here was
extensive with the Court holding that an AnneArundel Code requirementthat Petitionermake "an
affirmative finding" regarding the adequacy of facilities and schools meantthe evidence was not sufficient
for the Boardof Appeals to havegranted the zoning classification. General evidence was not sufficient to
satisfy the burden on the Petitioner. The case is lengthy. Its holding is that when a statute requires that rezonings not be granted except on the basis of an"affirmative finding that. . . "transportation facilities,
waterand sewage systems, storm drainage system, schools, and fire suppression facilities [are] adequate to
servethe uses allowedby the new zoningclassification. . .," 369 Md. at 693, 720-23, meanswhat it says

and says what it means.154
What does the Maryland law say?
What does the federal law say?

o

Dep't ofHealth v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 771 A. 2d 1051 (2001) saw the Court interpreting lawand
concluding that guardianship commissions andattorneys' fees of an attorney appointed guardian ofthe
property of a mentally incompetent individual may notbe paid from available income under theMedicaid
Assistance Program as these payments do not qualify as a personal needsallowance. 364 Md. at 111-12.
The Court reviewedthe law pertainingto the Maryland Medical AssistanceProgram.364 Md. at 113-117,
119-22. The reviewby the Courtwas from a decision by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(SG §10-222). The issue was whether the administrative agency committed an error of lawor whether its
decision was supported by substantial evidence, or is "arbitrary or capricious." 364 Md. at 118. The Court
agreed withthe ALJthat "the personal needs thatare contemplated by the statutory personal needs
allowance are incidental items used for clothing or for grooming one's body" and did not include legal fees

orthe commissions of a guardian. 364 Md. at 122.155
Surgically look at what the legislature had to say
o In MVA v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 844 A. 2d 388 (2004) a driver contested a suspension for failure to take a
breadth test. Final decision making authority had been delegated by MVA to an ALJ. "The Statement of
Probable Cause indicated that respondent's refusal ofthe test occurred shortly after he was placed in an

officer's patrol car, but it did not indicate the exacttime ofthe refusal." 380 Md. at 169. The Respondent
did not testify or offer any evidence duringthe hearing. He argued that he had not been properly advised
and that two hours had passed before he was advised. 380 Md. at 169-70. The Court examined the
procedure set forth in Trans. §16-205.1. Statutory construction principles were considered. The
Legislature specifically set forth the six issues to be considered at a suspension hearing, and one of those
issues was not whether the officer requested the test within two hours ofthe suspect's apprehension. 380
Md. at 178. The Respondent should have generated this issue.

154 The Parker Court stated:

. . . In this case, it appears that the Board simply adopted, as positive fact, the negative declaration of a County
employee, Mr. Kevin Dooley, that "there were no issues related to the adequacy of public facilities except for
transportation systems." Therefore, although the Board found "persuasive" the testimony of Petitioner's expert engineer
that "the water, sewerage and storm drainage systems" would "be adequate to serve the uses permitted within the C3
zone," the Board erred in rendering no affirmative findings regarding the question (or in failing to explain the
irrelevancy of such an inquiry on the facts before it) whether adequate off-site water, sewerage, and storm drainage
systems were either in existence or programmed for construction in the County's capital improvements plan.
Parker, 369 Md. at 318-19.

155 This decisionreversed a circuit court determination that the Medicaid fees could be used to pay commissions and attorneys
fees to the guardian. Campbell, 364 Md. at 122, 125.
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Two statutes pertaining to the same situaiton

o Statutory construction is sometimes required when statutes are alleged to be conflicting. A good
brief summary of construction is set forth in Dixon v. DepYPublic Safety, 175 Md. App. 384,
927 A. 2d 445 (2007):

We conclude that the exclusive remedy provision of CS. § 10-308 applies here. Thus,

Dixon [a prison inmatefiling a claim for negligence when he was severely injured while
on a work detail] was requiredto file a claim with the Sundry Board, rather than the IGO.
If '"two statutes, one general and one specific, are found to conflict, the specific statute
will be regardedas an exception to the general statute.'" Anderson, 395 Md. at 194
(citation omitted). As the Court explained in State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695
A.2d 143 (1997), "when two statutes appear to apply to the same situation, the Court will
attempt to give effect to both statutes to the extent that they are reconcilable." To the
extent of an irreconcilable conflict, "the specific statute is controlling...." Id. at 116. See
also Anderson, 395 Md. at 183, 194; Mayor ofOakland v. Mayor ofMountain Lake Park,
392 Md. 301, 316-17, 896 A.2d 1036 (2006). 22 But, even assuming that appellant's
claim related to a "condition of confinement," the result is the same - Dixon failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.

175 Md.App. at 421-22.

(8). Was the agency decision arbitrary and capricious?

Separate and apartfrom the provisions ofthe MAPA andwhether one is entitled to rights undera
"contested case," is the law which states "because the circuit court nonetheless retains the power to

review agency decisions to prevent illegal, unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious administrative action and

[an appellate court has] authority on direct appeal to review the circuit court's exercise ofthat power."156
The Court of Appeals has stated that "there are circumstances when an agency acts neitheras a finder

offact nor asan interpreter of law but rather in a "discretionary" capacity."157 ". . . [C]ourts owe a
higher level of deference to functions specifically committed to the agency's discretion than they do to
an agency's legal conclusions or factual findings. Therefore, the discretionary functions ofthe agency
must be reviewed under a standard more deferential than either the de novo review afforded an agency's

legal conclusions or the substantial evidence reviewafforded an agency's factual findings. In this regard,
the standard set forth in [SG] §10-222(h)(3)(vi), review of'arbitrary or capricious' agency actions,
provides guidance for the courts as they seek to apply the correct standard of review to discretionary

functions ofthe agency."158
In 2004, when the Court of Appeals earmarked the "arbitrary or capricious" standard as being
different from a review of a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, it referred to a 1993 case where a
Board charged to review the conduct of a police officer decided to reopen the hearing to receive
additional evidence. This was held to be within the discretion ofthe Board.159 The same court stated

156 Hurl v. Boardof Education ofHowardCounty, 107Md. App. 286, 305, 667 A. 2d 970 (1995). As issue in this casewas
whether a teacher who was involuntarily transferred had a right to a contested case hearing under the MAPA. 107 Md. App. at
304.

157 Spencer v. Board ofPharmacy, 380Md. 515, 529, 846 A. 2d341 (2004) citing Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330Md.
540,625A.2d914.

158 Spencer, 380 Md. at 529-30.
159 Spencer v. Board ofPharmacy, 380Md. 515, 529, 846 A. 2d341 (2004) citing Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330Md.
540, 569-570, 625 A2d 914, 928 (1993)
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"Although a few of our cases appear to conflate substantial evidence review witharbitrary orcapricious

review, itdoes not follow that they are one and the same."160
In a case where the Court of Special Appeals remanded a case disciplining a pharmacist to the Board
of Pharmacy with directions to that Board to send the case to OAHto conduct a hearing, the Court of
Appeals said that was error. While what the Board of Pharmacy did inconducting the hearing was
improper (due process violation of fairness intheconduct ofthe hearing), that did notmean that a court
has theright to say the Board, on remand, will not act properly. "The proper course, in view ofthe
Board's discretion to refer, was to remand the case to the Board with instructions to curethe defectsthe

reviewing court found at the original hearing, but without amandate requiring referral ofthe case tothe
OAH."161

. ". . . [I]n order to determine whether theboard's decision was arbitrary and capricious, the
reviewing court must have an understanding ofthe findings of fact onall material issues." The
arbitrary or capricious standard of review ismost deferential to an agency. When . . "an agency exercises
its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner," a court will intervene and reverse the agency action.
So long as the agency's exercise of discretion does not violate regulations, statutes, common law
principles, due process and other constitutional requirements, it isordinarily not reviewable bythe
courts.163

Significant Case Decisions:

A sanction cannot be imposed that is not authorized by statute.

The statute creating any administrative agency is an envelope within which the agency is able legally to act,
including the right ornotofthe agency, to pass regulations in furtherance of its purpose. That was the
holding in Thanner Enterprises v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 414 Md. 265, 995 A. 2d257 (2010). The
Baltimore County Liquor Board had no authority to prohibit Thanner "from playing outdoor music as a
sanction for violating [statutes and rules pertaining to disturbance ofthe neighborhood through the playing
of loud noise]" .. because althoughthe Boardhad the authority
"The lawfulness ofthe Board's prohibition of outside music at Appellant's establishment turns on
whetherthe General Assembly has granted the Board the authority to impose such a sanction." 414 Md. at
273. Statutory interpretation ofthe Board's authority under Article2B was the focus. "An agency's

authority extends only as far as the General Assembly prescribes." 414 Md. at276. Admittedly, the liquor
board hadauthority to establish rules and regulations governing the "playing of music and the use of soundmaking devices" pursuant to Article 2B §9-201.414 Md. at277-278. However: "An agency's authority to
promulgate regulations restricting certain conduct does notnecessarily grant that agency the authority to
160 Spencer, 330 Md. at530 quoting Insurance Comm 'r v. Nat 7bureau, 248 Md. 292, 300-31, 236 A. 2d 282 (1967). The Court
stated:

We do not encounter, or decide, this issue of whetherthe arbitrary and capricious standard in § 10-222(h)(3)(vi) will

govern every type of agency action notencompassed by §10-222(h)(3)(i)-(v). It is notable, however, that incontrast to
the first five grounds for judicial review in §10-222(h)(3)(i)-(v), §10-222(h)(3)(vi) does notdelineate the type of
agency decision to which it applies, cf §10-222(h)(3)(i)-(iv) (implicitly and necessarily involving legal determinations
by the agency); §10-222(h)(3)(vi) (explicitly applying to evidentiary, factual findings), and could conceivably bea
"catch-all" standard of review for anyother agency action. And even inthe absence of an applicable statutory scheme
providing for judicial review, we have held an implied limitation upon an administrative agency's authority isthat its
decisions "be not arbitrary or capricious." see alsoourline of cases explainingmandamus actionsas they applyto
ministerial or non-discretionary functions of administrative agencies, discussed in Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd. v. Gould,
273 Md. 486, 500-504, 331 A.2d 55, 65-66 (1975).
380 Md. at 550, n.4. (citations omitted)

161 Spencer v. Board ofPharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 534, 846 A. 2d 341 (2004).
162 Board ofCounty Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 35, 837A. 2d 1059 (2003)
citing Mehrling 371 Md. at 62-63.

163 Bondv. DPSCS, 161 Md. App. 112, 123-24, 867 A. 2d 346 (2005)
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impose any conceivable sanction for violations ofthose regulations.164" 414 Md. at278. "When
considering the implied powersof local liquorboards, this Courthas consistently held, based on a survey of
the Article 2B statutory scheme, that the General Assembly intended to grant the boards specific delegated
powers, ratherthan broad delegated authority." 414 Md. at 279. Article 2B §16-507(e) "sets forththe
sanctions that the Board may impose when a licensee violates [its] regulations" That statute lists three
sanctions that may be imposed - imposition of fine, suspension or revocation of license). 414 Md. at 277,
279.

The agency decision Ispresumed correct
As to a discretionary sanction, the agency need not justify the sanction so long as it is within sanctions allowed
by the statute to be imposed
o Termination of employment was the issue inAviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 873 A. 2d
1145 (2005).Maryland State Retirement Agency v. Delambo, 109 Md. app. 683, 675 A. 2d 1018(1996)
was overruled. Noland's employmentwas terminated based upon his striking a patient twice and failing to

report the incident. An exhaustive review ofthe facts and applicable rule was made by the Court. The
circuit court reversed the agency decision determining that the agency did not give sufficient weight to the
mitigating factors that Noland"was acting in self defense and the defense of others,"which are "recognized
defenses in Maryland which may excuse even criminal offenses." The circuit court found the agency
decision arbitrary. Noland, 386 Md. at 568. The Court reversed the circuit court determination.

Atissue was whether there was substantial evidence to support theagency decision.165 Spencer v. State
Board ofPharmacy, 380 Md. 515,529-31, 846 A. 2d 341 (2004) statedthatjudicial review of a lawful and
authorized administrative disciplinary decision or sanction, ordinarily within the discretion ofthe
administrative agency, is more limitedthanjudicial review of either factual findings or legal conclusions . .
." Noland, 386 Md. at 575. Delambo had imposed upon the Executive Branch administrative agencies
numerous non-statutory requirements in employee disciplinary cases. These enumerated factors showing
that alternate sanctions were considered, and explaining why the punishment fits the misconduct have no

support in MAPA. Noland, 386 Md. at 579. "In sum,when the discretionary sanction imposedupon an
employee by an adjudicatory administrative agency is lawful and authorized,the agency need not justify its
exercise of discretion by findings of fact or reasons articulating why the agency decided upon the particular
discipline." Reviewing courts are not allowed to overturn a lawful and authorized sanction on the basisthat
the sanction is disproportionate. The agency decision is presumed correct. Noland, 386 Md. at 581.
Failure to Interview the police officer before charging

o

It was not arbitrary and capricious for a police disciplinary board not to interview the alleged
police officer offender in proceedings governed by the LEOBR as "there is no requirement in
the statute for a mandatory interview ofthe officer by independent investigators." Colemanv.
Anne Arundel CountyPolice Dept, 136 Md. App. 419, 430-31, 766 A. 2d 169 (2001).

Theysaid this was an emergency action but it took themforever to bring the charges
o Dr. Mullan's license to practice medicine was summarily suspended for practicing medicine under the
influence of alcohol in Board ofPhysician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 848 A. 2d 642
(2004). There was a delay in the investigation ofthe danger prior to a summary suspension order being
entered. Discussing case law concerning the passage of time from complaint to summary suspension
procedures, the Court stated that the delay is to be considered as evidence and could be relevant "in
determining whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it ordered the summary suspension
in the first place." "The length ofthe investigatory period leading up to summary suspension does not play
a role in the consideration of whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency's factual finding
that the situation 'imperatively requires emergency action.'" 385 Md. at 171.

164 ("[Regardless of any rule making authority that the Liquor Board mayenjoy, it maynot impose a sanction that exceeds the
confines of its expressly or impliedly delegated powers.") 414 Md at 276 quoting Board ofLiquor License Commissioners v.
Hollywood Productions, Inc., 344 Md. 2, 10, 684 A.2d 837 (1996).

165 This 2005decision referred to the 1999decision in Boardof Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-69, 729
A. 23d 376 (1999) as its extensive review ofthe role of a court in reviewing an adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency.
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Nothing is 100% certainty

o

Board of County Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 837 A. 2d 1059 (2003) reversed
determining that it couldnot be 100% certain thatrealproperty to be developed wassafe from explosives
and thusthe property was not to be developed. "The 100% certainty standard was arbitrary because it is
impossible to demonstrated, based on a 100% certainty requirement, that any parcel of land is completely
safe. Therefore, by applying an incorrectstandard, the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious." 154

Md. App. at 33.166 The Board's determination constituted anerror of law and the agency decision isowed
nodeference. A remand was ordered. 154 Md. App. at 34.167
Discretion means there Is no disproportionate test

o

In MTA v. King, 369 Md. 274, 799 A. 2d 1246 (2002), the Court noted that the COSA stated that
termination of King's employment"was disproportionate to the offense" and that King's misconductwas
not "so serious as to warrant dismissal." 369 Md. at 290. The Court discussed judicial authority under SG

10-222(h). "The grounds set forth in § 10-222(h) for reversing or modifying an adjudicatory administrative
decision do not include disproportionality or abuse of discretion. As long as an administrative sanctionor
decisiondoes not exceed the agency'sauthority, is not unlawful, and is supported by competent, material
and substantial evidence, there can be no judicial reversal or modification ofthe decision based on
disproportionality or abuse of discretion unless, under the facts of a particular case, the disproportionality
or abuse of discretion was so extreme and egregiousthat the reviewing court can properly deem the
decision to be 'arbitrary or capricious.' In the case at bar, the Court of Special Appeals rejected King's

argument thatthe administrative decision was arbitrary or capricious, and King did not seek certiorari
reviewof that holding. In addition, even assuming arguendo that termination was disproportionate to King's
misconduct, it was clearly not so disproportionate as to be "arbitrary or capricious"within the meaningof §
10-222(h)[3](vi). 369 Md. at 291.
He should have the license because he Is African-American
Where Is this In the criteria"

That Is arbitrary and capricious

o

Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439,455-58, 800 A. 2d 768 (2002) involved the granting of a towing license

in Baltimore County. Baltimore County should not have granted the permit based on sole criterionthat
applicant was African-American as this wasnot a criteria to be considered in determining the need for
additionaltowing service. It was a longstanding practiceto use defined criteria. There was a proper basic
needs standard in operation. Grantingthe license meantthat Mr. Freeman [The Chief of the Department of
Permits and Development Management], deviatedfrom regulations. He could not determine"need" other
than based on established criteria. He could not define "need" in another contest.

. . . The Board of Appeals was legally correct to conclude that the DPM, using race alone as the
sole needed criterion, should not have granted appellant's towing license application and that its
action was arbitrary and capricious.. . .
369 Md. at 461.

Mr. Freeman knew ofthe past, consistent interpretation of need and, albeit perhaps wellintentioned, improperly departed from the past consistent practice ofthe DPM to apply this single,
newly-created standard when faced with the new license application. Such a departure from past
consistent interpretation and practice is a matter better addressed either by a legislative entity, or
by the adoption of a regulation.
369 Md. at 458.

Your refusal to reopen the record was arbitrary and capricious!
o InB&S Marketing v. Consumer Protection Division, 153 Md.App. 130, 162, 835 A. 2d 215 (2003),
appellants argued unsuccessively that the Division abused its discretion in denying their motion to reopen
166 «jne correct standard is whether th evidence supports a finding of unreasonable risk and, if so, whether it could be
ameliorated." Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. at 33.

167 A remand was in order in this case. "Nevertheless, when and administrativeagency renders a decision based on incorrect
legal standards, but there exists some evidence, 'however minimal, that could be considered appropriately under the correct
standard, the case should be remanded so the agency can reconsider the evidence using the correct standard." Southern
Resources, 154 Md. App. at 34.
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the recordto showthat property returns did not increase significantly after they included an optionto return

property intheir options sheet. 153 Md. App. at 165. The Division hadalleged thata sales-leaseback
transaction was actually a usurious loanand emphasis had been placedby the Division on the fact that few
returns of merchandise were made. The Division's refusal to reopen the record "was neither arbitrary nor

capricious," as the Division's decision was not premised solely on the small number of returns. All
circumstances were considered. 153 Md. App. at 166.

That discipline imposed was/was not disproportionate to themisconduct
o The court in Solomon v. Boardof Medicine, 155Md. App. 687, 705-06, 845 A. 2d 47 (2004) dismissed the

argument thatthe Board of Physicians exceeded its authority in revoking a license. Assuming arguendo
that the revocation was disproportionate to her misconduct, it was not so disproportionate as to be arbitrary
and capricious. Dr. Solomon's license wasrevoked because she failed to comply with a lawful
investigation. 155 Md. App. at 708-09.
Great discretion as to the sanction imposed

o

It was the State's argumentin Dep'tPublic Safety v. Neal, 160Md. App. 496, 864 A. 2d 287 (2004), cert
denied, 386 Md. 181 (2005) that an ALJ acted "arbitrarily and capriciously by imposinga one-month
suspension without pay, instead of imposing the greater sanction of termination." The ALJdecision
reversedthe decision made by the Wardento terminate employment. "If there is some evidence pointing in
each direction, the issue is, by definition, 'fairly debatable,' and the decision ofthe [ALJ], whicheverway it
goes, may not be reversed onjudicial review as having been arbitrary or capricious." 160 Md. Apo. At
518.

o Dr. Cornfeld complained that a sanction (suspension and long term probation) imposed upon him
was disproportionate to his alleged offense (patient not harmed and asked him to deliver her next
child for conduct in leaving the operating room and misrepresenting his instructionsto hospital
personnel) so as to constitute an abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious agency action
considering the facts ofthe case in Cornveld v. Board ofPhysicians, 174 Md. App. 456, 921 A.
2d 893 (2007). Agencies have broad latitude in fashioning sanctionswithin the legislatively
designed limits and in this casethe Court said it did not see the sanction imposed as "extreme and
egregious" as to warrantjudicial intervention. 174Md. App. at 487.

(9). Disposition.

Whenthe Court of Special Appeals remandeda case "directing [the Board of Pharmacy] to delegatethe
authority to conduct the contested case hearing andto issue the final administrative decision in this case

to the OAH," thatwas error.168 SG 1-0222(h) sets forth the scope ofjudicial review ofthe final
administrative agency decisions in contested cases. The Court of Appeals stated: "The proper course, in
view ofthe Board's discretion to refer, was to remand the case to the Board with instructions to cure the

defects the reviewing court found at the original hearing, but without a mandate requiring referral ofthe
case to the OAH."169

A reviewing court may remand the case for further proceedings, affirm the final decision, or reverse
or modify an administrative agency's decision if "any substantial right ofthe petitioner may have been
prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision" is, inter alia, erroneous, "unsupported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence in light ofthe entire record as submitted," or "arbitrary or

capricious" by the provisions of SG §10-222(h).170
168 Spencer v. Board ofPharmacy, 380Md. 515, 524, 846A. 2d 341 (2004).
169 Spencer, 380Md. at 534.
170 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 59, 806A. 2d 662(2002).
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(10). Expertise ofthe Agency.

What expertise does a particular agency have? Towhat extent is a court to defer to thatagency expertise
in interpretation of statutes and regulations? "The expertise ofthe agency in its own field should be
respected.'" Therefore, '"an administrative agency's interpretation and application ofthe statute which the
agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.'" When
reviewing the ALJ's legal conclusions, however, '"thecourt "must determine whether the agency
interpreted and applied the correctprinciples of lawgoverning the caseand no deference is given to a

decision based solely on an error of law.'""171
Significant Case Decisions

A business qualifying as commercial agriculture
o There was error when the Court of Special Appeals did not properly defer to the presumed

expertise ofthe Boardof Appeals of Baltimore County in interpreting the Baltimore County
Zoningregulations in Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 783 A. 2d 169(2002). As issuewas
whether Kahl's business in raising snakes qualified as commercial agriculture under the
definition of farm in a R.C. 4 zone. The Board of Appeals conclusion that Kahl "was not using
the land for the raising of animals" had been overturnedby the intermediate appellate court.

366 Md. at 174. Application ofstatutory construction principals,172 lead tothe conclusion
"there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board of Appeals' decision to find

that the breading, raising, and selling ofsnakes is not a permissible use in an R.C. 4 zone."173
Because properdeference wasnot given to the decision ofthe Boardof Appeals, the decision
was reversed.174
o

Policeboard expertise In determining what conduct undermines theDepartment's Interest In good order
o

Substantial evidence was found in Travers v. Baltimore Police Department, 115 Md. App. 395,

693 A. 2d 378 (1997) in terminatinga police officer from employment for insubordination or

disrespect to an officer dueto direct testimony from superiors that he "'showed absolutely no
cooperation whatsoever,' his attitude was 'very antagonistic ... no professionalism what-soever,' and that he was 'abrupt' and 'verbally uncooperative' during the investigation, despite
the fact that Lieutenant Henderson was dressed in full uniform." The Court said: "Mindful of

the board's expertise in determining whatconduct undermines the Department's interest in
'good order, efficiency, or discipline" we shall not disturb the board's conclusions concerning
Charge 1 and Charge 4, Specification 1 (insubordination toward Lieutenant Henderson." 115
Md.App. at 43.

(11). Agency Must State Basis of Decision

171 Solomon v. Boardof Medicine, 155 Md. App. 687,696. 845 A. 2d 47 (2004).
172 To ascertain the intent ofthe legislative body, the Court recited therules of statutory interpretation, the actions and discussions
ofthe Baltimore county Planning Board as legislative history, the testimony of experts in land zoning. Solomon, 155 Md. App. at
175-189.

173 Kahl, 366Md. at 189. Although Judge Cathell applied the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, he threw in a bit of home
spun Worcester County logic to reach the same result, a concept to which manyof us can relate:
... A snake is no more the equivalent of chickens, pigs, cows, goats, and sheep, than are lions, tigers, and elephants.
In arriving atthis assumption, we do not relyon treatises, scientific documentation, or published works; we rely on
common sense. A snake, however loveable it may be to some, is not a farm animal unless legislatively declared to be
such. A boa constrictor can be an animal on a farm, but that not make it a "farm animal," any more than a fox on the
way to raiding the hen house is a "farm animal."
366 Md. at 191.

Judge Cathell: Lovelable? A snake?
,74A:a/z/,366Md.atl91.
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Inorder for judicial review to occur, an agency must be fairly specific asto its findings, and the reason for
the decision made. Meaningful findings are required to facilitate judicial review. It is a necessity that
"administrative agencies resolve all significant conflicts in the evidence and then chronicle, in the record,
full, complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.'" "[Findings of fact must be
meaningful andcannot simply repeat statutory criteria, broad conclusory statements, or boilerplate
resolutions." This is compelled by the nature ofjudicial review of an administrative agency's final
decision.. . ,"175 Thereviewing court must know how and why the agency reached its decision. "It must
knowwhat it is reviewing." "Without findings of fact on all material issues, and without a clear statement
ofthe rationale behind the [final decision maker's] action, a reviewing court cannot properly perform its
function." "At a minimum, one must be able to discern from the record the facts found, the law applied,

and the relationship between the two."176
Statutory authority requires meaningful findings be made. "Even in the absence of statutory authority,

meaningful findings are required to facilitate judicial review."177 "The objective ofthese statutory
requirements is two-fold in that it seeks to apprise the parties ofthe basis for the agency's decision and to
facilitate judicial review." Judicial review cannot occur unless the court understands the basis forthe
agency decision andthe facts relied upon by the agency in making its decision. A party has a
fundamental rightto a proceeding "before an administrative agency to be apprised ofthe facts relied upon
bythe agency in reaching its decision and to permit meaningful judicial review of those findings." A
court must know what a decision means before it becomes the duty ofthe court to say whether it was right
or wrong.

178

"The term "findings requirement" refers to the obligation of an agency (or OAH if it has been
delegated theauthority to make the final decision) to "provide findings of fact on all material issues, and
present a clear statement ofthe rationale for its decision byexplaining how it applied the relevant facts to
the applicable law."179

Agencies arerequired to "resolve all significant conflicts inthe evidence and then chronicle, inthe
record, full, complete and detailed findings of fact andconclusions of law." "". . .[Findings of fact
must be meaningful and cannot simply repeat statutory criteria, broad conclusory statements, or

boilerplate resolutions."180
"The purpose ofthe findings requirement is threefold:

175 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 64, 806 A. 2d662 (2002). ThisCourt made reference to Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md.
41, 55-56, 310 A.2d 543, 551 (1973) where a preprinted form was filled out by the local boardof zoning appeals to deny an

application for a special use exception. ThatCourt noted that there were "no findings of fact worthy ofthe name and we think
citizens are entitled to something more than a boiler-plate resolution" 371 Md. at 64.

176 Mehrling v. Nationwide Insurance, 371 Md. 40, 64, 806A. 2d 662 (2002).
177 Case law on pointwas cited by the Court: Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 220, 630 A.2d 753, 763 (1993)
(concluding the findings requirement ofthe Transportation Articleand the APA were not satisfied );Harford County v. Preston,
322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991) (concluding the agency violated the findings requirement ofthe Harford County
Zoning Code); Blackburn v. Bd. ofLiquor License Comm'rs, 130 Md. App.614, 624, 747 A.2d 725, 730 (2000) (requiring the
Board of Liquor License Commissioners to set forth specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, even in the absence of an
express requirement to do so); Baker v. Bd. of Trustees, 269Md. 740, 747, 309A.2d 768, 772 (1973) (stating in dictum that
"even in the absence of a statutory provision," the rightof a party to be apprised ofthe facts relied upon by an agency in making
its decision "is frequently required by a courtasan aid to judicial review") (citing 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, § 16.05 444-49 (1958)). Mehrling, 371 Md. at 62-63.

178 Mehrling, 371 Md. at64-65.
179 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 63, 806A. 2d 662(2002) citing ARNOLD ROCHVARG, MARYLAND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.71 at 70 (MICPEL 2001).

180 Board ofCounty Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 34, 837A. 2d 1059 (2003).
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1. requiring an articulation ofthe reasoning process makes the decision-maker accountable to the
public;

2. it allows the injuredparty to understand the reasons behind the agency's decision; and
3. most important, the findings requirement assists in facilitating judicial reviewofthe agency's
decision."181

"Judicial review of administrative action differs from appellate review of a trial court judgment. In

the latter context the appellate court will search the record for evidence to supportthe judgmentand will
sustain thejudgment for a reason plainlyappearing on the record whetheror not the reason was expressly
relied upon by the trial court. However, in judicial review of agency action the court may not uphold
the agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency's findings and for the reasons stated by the
agency. "The courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agencyaction.
Significant Case Decisions

no requirementfor a court to search therecordfor evidence tosupport afinding
o In UnitedSteelworkers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 79-80,472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984), the Court
stated: "were we to search the subject record for evidence sufficientto support any one or more ofthe
theories advanced by Steelworkers or by MOSH, andthento decide if that theory constitutes a violation of
thegeneral duty clause, we would be performing theadministrative function that MOSHA commits to the
Commissioner, and not our proper function ofjudicial review."
Exceptions to ALJ decision

Theresponsibility ofthe agency to resolve conflicts
Full and completefindings offact

o

Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 806 A. 2d 662 (2002) was a case where the Insurance Commissioner
was required to considerthe exceptions filed to the ALJ decision. APA §10-216(a)(3). The ALJ had
dismissed Ms. Mehrling's opposition to the Insurance Commissioner's attempt to terminate her as an agent
for Nationwide. The dismissal was due to the ALJ determination that only the Bankruptcy Trustee had

standing to bring the case. Exceptions filed contained new evidence to the effectthat her bankruptcy had
been dismissed. "As a threshold matter in the present case, it is unclear whether the [Commissioner] indeed
considered the new evidence in Petitioner's exceptions." 371 Md. at 65. That new evidence created a
material dispute "that merited a clearerresolution by the [Commissioner]. "As previously explained, the
ALJ was not informed that Petitioner's bankruptcy case had been dismissed prior to issuance of his
proposed decision. Accordingly, the ALJ's "detailed" findings of fact and "well-thought out"
discussion concerning the rationale for his proposed decision arguably was contrary to evidence that
was subsequently provided to the [Commissioner] in Petitionees Exceptions.. . ." 371 Md. at 66.
Thus, no adequate factual findings were made and no meaningful judicial review was had. 371 Md. at 66.
The Associate Deputy Commissioner failedto "resolve all significantconflicts" or make "full,
complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law" from which we may perform
properlyour function. Petitioner presented the MIAwith a second opportunity to elaborate on the
basis for its decision in her Motion for Reconsideration. Unfortunately, the Associate Deputy

Commissioner was not up to the task in his response. Accordingly, the appropriate disposition of
this case is to remand to the MIA to prepare legally adequate findings of fact and conclusions of
law based on the administrative record as a whole, with a cautioning note that if evidence ofthe
termination of Petitioner's bankruptcy is admitted into evidence, it may be appropriate for the MIA
to remand this matter to the ALJ for his consideration.
371 Md. at 66-67.

181 Board of County Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. 10, 34-35, 837A. 2d 1059 (2003) citingcases.
182 United Steelworkers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 79-80, 472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984).
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You say he failed to cooperate?
Just where Is that in the record

o

Substantial evidence was found in Travers v. Baltimore Police Department, 115 Md. App. 395, 693 A. 2d

378 (1997) in terminating a police officer from employment for insubordination or disrespect to an officer
due to direct testimony from superiorsthat he "'showed absolutely no cooperationwhatsoever,' his attitude
was 'very antagonistic ... no professionalism what-so-ever,' and that he was 'abrupt' and 'verbally
uncooperative' during the investigation, despite thefact that Lieutenant Henderson wasdressed in full
uniform." The Court said: "Mindful ofthe board's expertise in determining what conduct undermines the

Department's interest in 'good order, efficiency, or discipline" we shallnot disturb the board's conclusions
concerning Charge 1 and Charge 4, Specification 1 (insubordination toward LieutenantHenderson." 115
Md. App. at 43. However, when it came to a finding thatthe police officerdisobeyed a lawful orderof
comment, the decision was different: "In the case at bar, out review ofthe record failed to uncover
evidence that Lieutenant Henderson ordered appellant to leave the apartment.. . . Accordingly, we
conclude the record is bereft of substantial evidence such that reasonable minds could conclude that

appellant failed to obey a command or orderof a superior officer. (Charge 2, Specification 1 and Charge 4,
Specification 2). 115 Md. App. at 426-27.
Adult entertainment In Baltimore City

The opinion does not show us why the nonconforming usepermit wasnot granted
Before we cansay an error was committed, we mustknow whathappened and why
o Mobee v. Baltimore, 165 Md. App. 42, 884 A. 2d 748 (2005) involved an applicationto obtain a
nonconforming use permit for adultentertainment in Baltimore City(The"ClubBunns"). Three out of five
members ofthe Board of Municipal and ZoningAppeals of Baltimore City voted to allow appellantto

continue presenting adult entertainment. A supermajority of4/5 was required to approve the application so
it was denied. In this case, the Court said that the minority was required to issue findings of fact and

conclusions of law in supportof its decision so thatjudicialreview may occur. 165Md. App. at 44-45.

Citing and quoting case law, theCourt gives a good summary ofthe respective responsibilities ofthe Board
and a court reviewing the decision ofthe Board:

1. On judicial review, the Court must determine if substantial evidence existed forthe Board's decision;
2. To make that determination, the Court must be able to discern from the records the facts found, the law
applied, and the relationship between the two;

3. TheBoard is required to resolve all significant conflicts in the evidence and thenchronicle, in the
record, full, complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law;
4. Findings of fact mustbe meaningful andthe agency cannot simply repeat statutory criteria, broad
conclusory statements, or boilerplate resolutions;
5. the absence of such findings not only violates the fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before
an administrative agency to be apprised of facts relied uponby the agency in reaching its decision; but
precludes meaningful judicial review ofthe agency decision; and
6. In the absence of adequate findings of fact, an errorof lawoccurs whichrendersthe Board's decision
arbitrary and capricious.
165 Md. App. at 54-55.

". . .[N]o principled legaldistinction can be drawn between what is required of a prevailing majority
in rendering its decision and that which is required of a prevailing minority in imposing its will." At issue
in this case was whether the use should be continue because it was legally established prior to September

10, 1993. "Yet, despite the evidence, the prevailing minority made no findings as to whom or whatit
believed, how it interpreted the records presented or the controlling statutes involved. In otherwords, we do
not know whetherthe minority found the evidence ofthe establishment of a nonconforming use insufficient
because of gaps in the supporting evidence or because it interpreted that evidence differently than the
majority didor because it found thatevidence either too ambiguous or too incredible to beworthy of belief.
Nor do we even know what definition of adult entertainment the minority applied. Without this

information, we have no way to ascertain whether the prevailing minority's decision is the produce of error
or not." 165 Md. App. at 59.

When It Isproper to remand to the agency
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o

Remand was the appellate court determination in Board of County Comm. V. Southern Resources, 154Md.
App. 10, 837 A. 2d 1059 (2003). TheBoard of Appeals committed an errorof lawandwas arbitrary and
capricious in applying a 100% certainty standard thata parcel of land is completely safefor development..
Therefore, by applying an incorrect standard, the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious." 154Md.
App at 33.183 A remand was inorder inthis case. "Nevertheless, when and administrative agency renders a
decisionbased on incorrect legal standards, but there existssome evidence, 'however minimal, that could
be considered appropriately under the correct standard, the case should be remanded so the agency can
reconsider the evidence using the correct standard." 154 Md. App. at 34.

A failure to specify whichfacts supported the conclusion that the state employeepossessed drugs at work
o In Bondv. DPSCS, 161 Md. App. 112, 867 A. 2d 346 (2005), the Court reviewed the decision ofthe
agency eventhough the decision was deficient in not specifying the portion of a statute appellant violated.
The decision failed to acknowledge the significance ofthe distinction between an employee's possession of
marijuana on-the-job and off-the job in disciplining the stateworker. There was a failure to specify what
facts supported the conclusion that the employee used or possessed drugs at work, and the decision never
clearly drew the inference of fact that it was more likelythan not that appellant used or possessed
marijuana at work. Bond, 116 Md. App. at 124. The Courtsaid it took this action of review because:
We do so because we can discern that the ALJ either concluded, (1) as a pure matter of fact, that
one can reasonably infer, based on appellant'spositive drug test, that appellant actually smoked or
possessedmarijuana at work, or (2) as a mixedquestion of fact and law, one can reasonably
conclude that the presence of detectabletraces of marijuana use in appellant's body constitutes use
or possession of drugs at work under S.P.P. § 11-105(3).

Bond, 161 Md. App. at 124-25.184
We know what you did but why did you do what you did?
Stating that applicants had not sustained the burden ofproofIsnot enough
o A remand was made to the Board of Appeals of Anne Arundel County in Becker v. AnneArundel
County, 174 Md. App. 114, 920 A. 2d 1118(2007) involving the placement of a septic system and
the effort to obtain variances from set back and buffer requirements in order to build a home. The
Court said it knew what the Board did but did not know why it did what it did. Repeatedly, the
Board of Appeals said in its written opinion that the applicants had not proven their case when the
Board found the applicants had not proved their request was a minimum, not simply less than
would be permitted on lots not impacted by environmental factors. 174 Md. App. at 126. "A
meaningful Board explanation is especially importantwhen, as here, a house can be legally built
on the property in question, but not without variances, and a potential constitutional taking is a
serious concern." 174 Md. App. at 141. Statements by the Board that that the applicants had not
proven their case was not sufficient to satisfy the explanation requirement by the Board.
"Specifically, we did not see evidenceof an adverse impact on water quality, or that the use would
impair the use or development ofthe adjacent property." "There was no finding by the Board as to
appellants' reasonable needs, or reference to evidence, and why the proposed structurewas not the
minmum necessary to meet those needs." No credibility findings adverse to the position ofthe
applicants were made by the Board of Appeals.174 Md. App. at 143-44.
Well, sometimes there is (<implted"

Sometimes implication as to an agency is allowed as it was where it was in Woodfield v. West River
Improvement, 395 Md. 377,910 A. 2d 452 (2006) where it was alleged that the Board of Liquor
Commissioners of Anne Arundel County did not address directly the issue of Bassford's status as owning
an interest in more than one liquor license in the county. Implied in the statement by the Board that there
had been no credible evidence that Bassford was a silent partner meant to the Court that the finding of no

183 "The correctstandardis whetherth eevidencsupports a finding of unreasonable risk and, if so, whether it could be
ameliorated." Southern Resources, 154 Md. App. at 33.

184 S.P.P. §11-110(b)(1) requires the Department of Corrections to delegate final decision-making authority to OAH for employee
discipline cases. Bond v. DPSCS, 161 Md. App. 112, 122, 867 A. 2d 346 (2005)
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evidence found constituted a finding by the Board that Bassford had no interest in the liquor license
submitted by Woodfeld, 395 Md. at 383.

(12). Complete record:

An agency decision must be made on a complete record. When an ALJ expressly refused to consider
evidence presented by an applicant for a day care licensethat charges against her family member having

been declared by DSS to be founded, that was error.185
But what is at issue here is the extent ofthe "complete record" that was subject to the ALJ's consideration.
We hold that the ALJ's decision was not based on the "complete record," as required by COMAR, because
the ALJ expressly refused to consider any evidence Ms. Thompson sought to present relevant to the merits
ofthe child abuse allegation. In effect, the ALJ heard only one side ofthe contested case; she only
considered the DSS record that CCA had reviewed when it determined to deny the registration. Ms.

Thompson was not permitted to develop the record. Consequently, the ALJ's decision contravened
COMAR 07.04.03.07 , which specifically permits both CCA and Ms. Thompson to present evidence. The
ALJ's comment, supra, that she was only required to determine whether CCA correctly applied its
regulations irrefutablyestablishes that she limitedher review to an examination ofthe agency's basis for its
action. As Judge Smith observed, the ALJ failed to recognize her responsibility to consider both sides of
the case before her and to base her decision on the complete record. The ALJ's failure to consider Ms.

Thompson's evidence was erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious.186

185 Dept. ofHuman Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175, 200, 201, 652 A. 2d 1183 (1995).
186 Thompson, 103 Md. App. at 202.
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A. The General Rule and Categories.

Case law has developed to tell us that the doctrine of a failure to (or necessity to) exhaust administrative
remedies categorizes available administrative remedies into three types: (1) exclusive, (2) primary, and
(concurrent)

A brief overview oftreatment of these categories in this Chapter 11 focuses on the following:
Exclusive administrative remedy

•

Petitioning police officersfiling of a declaratory judgment action, upon receipt of a letter from the
Administrator ofthe Retirement System that QualifiedDomestic Relations Orders included payment under
a direct retirement option program was in error becauseof a failureto exhaust administrativeremedies.
Whether those benefits were separate from or integralto ordinary benison benefits was within the purview
ofthe agency to determine. Brown, 375 Md. 661.

•

Whether obesity is coveredwithinthe meaning of a Maryland discrimination statute had to be determined
before the MarylandCommission of Human Relations as agency construction ofthe statute which it
administers is entitled to weight. An action under the Declaratory Judgment Act could not be maintained.
Mass Transit, 294 Md. 225.

•

A failure to exhaust administrative remedies by allowing the County Board of Appeals to determine
whether an error occurred in the adoption of an ordinance,meant a trial judge properly dismissed a
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Mandamus and OtherRelief. Josephson, 353 Md. 667

Primary administrative remedy
• While the homeowner has the concurrent right to file an action against a contractor for damages in court or
before the Home ImprovementCommission, the right and responsibility to determine whether the
•

contractor had to be licensed with the Commission was for the Commission (Agency) to determine, not a
court. Foster v. Panoramic Design, 376 Md. 118
Consistent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, SureDeposit's request for a Declaratory Judgment to

determine that its surety bond program did not violatethe Consumer Protection Act could not be
maintained. The reviewing court will be in a better position to render global and appropriate relief in this
dispute if it has the benefit ofthe Division's final view on the panopy of claims. SureDeposit, 383 Md. 462.
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Concurrent administrative remedy
• Statute states the right of a homeowner to file law action against a contractor or to proceed with an
administrative action before the Home Improvement Commission are concurrent remedies with the option
to the homeowner. Fosler v. Panoramic Design, 376 Md. 118

•

Legislative history under Maryland's Prisoner Litigation Act showed there was no intent to require an
exhaustion of administrative remedies before an inmate can file suit for a failure to provide adequate

•

medical services against a private corporation.Adamson v. Correctional Medical, 339 Md. 238.
Actions for fraud and neglect common law actions for money damages against insurers and their agents are
not required by the insurance code, on either an exclusive or primaryjurisdiction basis, to first be submitted
to the Insurance Commissioner of Maryland for a final agency decision. Expertise by the Commissioner is
not relevant and the insurance law does not require there be an exhaustion of remedies. Zappone, 349 Md.
45.

The relationship between administrative andjudicial remediesthat ordinarily falls into one of three

categories depends on legislative intent.1 There isno presumption that the administrative remedy was
intended to be exclusive. There is a presumption that the administrative remedy is intended to be

primary, andthat "a claimantcannotmaintain the alternative judicial action withoutfirst invoking and

exhausting an administrative remedy that is available."2 Considering the doctrine ofexhaustion of
administrative remedies as it relates to State common law and State constitutional law, the Court of

Appeals has stated: "Neitherthe enactments by the General Assembly nor the decisions of this Court
dispense withthe requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted in actions to enforce rights under

the Maryland Constitution orrights under state statutes."3 "Where a legislature has provided an
administrative remedy for a particular matter, even withoutspecifyingthat the administrativeremedy is
primary or exclusive", [theCourt of Appeals] has "ordinarily construed the pertinent [legislative]
enactments to requirethat the administrative remedy be first invoked and followed" before resort to the
courts." "When the legislative body expressly statesthat the administrative remedy is primary or
exclusive or must be exhausted, the mandatory nature ofthe exhaustion requirement is underscored. Such

express language 'is totally inconsistent with the notion thatthe [administrative agency's] jurisdiction

over [the matter] can be circumvented.'"4
"The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires that a party must ordinarily exhaust

statutorily prescribed administrative remedies, generally evidenced by a "final decision" by the

administrative agency, before the resolution ofseparate and independent judicial relief in the courts."5
"The statutory frameworks from which . . . administrative remedies arise ... do not always act as a

complete bar to the pursuit ofalternative judicial relief."6 The nature ofadministrative remedies, where
an aggrieved party has an alternative judicial remedy under another statute or under common law or
equitable principles, has been categorized by the Court of Appeals:
1Josephson v. City ofAnnapolis, 353 Md. 667, 674-75, 728 A. 2d690 (1998) citing and summarizing the holding inZappone v.
LibertyLifeInsurance Co., 349 Md. 45, 706 A. 2d 1060 (1998).

2Josephson, 350 Md. at675. The Court cited Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 493, 677
A.2d 567 (1996) for the statement thatthe Court of appeals "has'ordinarily construed the pertinent [legislative] enactments to
require that theadministrative remedy be first invoked and followed' before resort to the Courts"). Clinton v. Board of
Education, 315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989) stated: "Ordinarily, when there are two forums available, one judicial
andthe otheradministrative,... and no statutory directive indicating which should be pursued first, a party is often first required
to run the administrative remedial course before seeking a judicial solution."

3Josephson, 353 Md. at694-95 citing Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, 342Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d
567(1996).

4Josephson, 353 Md. at677-68.
5Arroyo v. Board ofEducation ofHoward County, 381 Md. 646, 661, 851 A. 2d576 (2004). See, e.g., Bell Atlantic ofMaryland,
Inc. v. Intercom Systems Corp., supra (holding that public utility consumers "must exhaust the statutory remedies provided [in
the Public Utilities Article] before pursuing [to conclusion] available independent judicial reliefin the form of common law
actions") (alteration added).

6Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 349 Md. 45,60,706 A. 2d 1060 (1998).
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"First, the administrative remedy may be exclusive, thus precluding any resort to an alternative

remedy. Under this scenario, there simply is no alternative cause of action for matters covered by

the statutory administrative remedy.7
"Second, the administrative remedy may be primary but not exclusive. In this situation, a
claimant must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy, and seek judicial review of an
adverse administrative decision, before a court can properly adjudicate the merits ofthe

alternative judicial remedy.8
"Third, the administrative remedy and the alternative judicial remedy may be fully concurrent,

with neither remedy being primary, and the plaintiff at his or her option may pursue thejudicial

remedy without the necessity ofinvoking and exhausting the administrative remedy."9

One purpose ofthe exhaustion doctrine "isto prevent the possibility 'thatfrequent and deliberate
clouting ofadministrative processes could weaken the effectiveness ofan agency by encouraging people
to ignore its procedure.'"10 "The exhaustion doctrine isgrounded, in part, in the prudential concern that a
court must allow the executive's jurisdiction in the first instance overa controversy within the executive's

expertise.11
B. Legislative Intent—Is jurisdiction exclusive, primary, or concurrent?
Whether the administrative remedy isexclusive, primary, or concurrent, is ordinarily a question of

legislative intent. "Occasionally, the General Assembly will expressly set forth its intent in this regard."12

" . . .[M]ost often statutes fail to specify the category into which an administrative remedy falls."
There are principles of statutory construction to consider.

Exclusive remedy14
7Zappone, 349Md. at60.

8Zappone, 349 Md. at 60-61 citing 3 separate case decisions stating that under these circumstances (primary, but not exclusive],
itisappropriate for the trial court toretain jurisdiction, for areasonable period oftime, over the independent judicial action,
pending invocation and exhaustion ofthe administrative procedures. Id.
9Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 349 Md. 45, 61, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998) citing 3 cases.

10 Danaher v. Dept. ofLabor, 148 Md. App. 139, 811 A.2d 359 (2002) citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969)
and the Court's prior decision inBoyd v. Supervisor ofAssessments ofBaltimore city, 57 Md. App. 603, 606, 471 A. 2d 749
(1984) (utilizing expertise of agency and following legislative directive that agency decide certain matters).
11 Chestnut RealEstatev. Huber, 148 Md. App. 190, 199, 811 A. 2d 389 (2002).

12 Zappone, 349 Md. at 61 giving examples of(1) Art. 25A §5U [Chartered Counties ofMaryland] providing that the
administrative and judicial review proceedings shall be exclusive; (2) Art. 41§4-102(k) specifying that the remedy isprimary by
stating "no court shall entertain an inmate's grievance or complaint within the jurisdiction ofthe Inmate Grievance Office or the
Office of Administrative Hearings unless and until the complainant has exhausted the remedies provided in this section.;" and (3)
Art. 48A §230A(f) providing "Nothing contained inthis section isintended to . . . deprive any private right or cause ofaction
to, or on behalf of any claimant or other person. . . Itisthe specific intent ofthis section to provide an additional administrative

remedy . . This section may not be construed to impair the right ofany person to seek redress in law or equity for any conduct
which is otherwise actionable." Id., at 61-62.

u Zappone, 349Md. at61.

14 What does "primary" vs. "exclusive" mean? How does "concurrent" jurisdiction fit into the picture? There isadifference

between the doctrine of exhaustion andthe doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Both doctrines are concerned "with promoting proper

relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charges with particular regulatory duties." Arroyo v. Board of
Education ofHoward County, 381 Md. 646, 662, 851 A.2d 576 (2004) citing United States v. Western Pacfic Railroad
Company, 352 U.S. 59 (1956). "Exhaustion applies where aclaim iscognizable in the first instance byan administrative agency
alone -judicial interference iswithheld until the administrative process has run its course" Arroyo, 381 Md. at 658. "Primary
jurisdiction, on the other hand, applies where aclaim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement oftheclaim requires the resolution of issues which, under aregulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence ofan administrative body - in such acase the judicial process is suspended pending referral ofsuch issues to the
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"Ordinarily a statutory administrative andjudicial review remedy will be treatedas exclusive
only when the Legislature has indicated thatthe administrative remedy is exclusive, or when
there exists no other recognized alternative statutory, common law, or equitable cause of
action."15 "... [W]here neither the statutory language northe legislative history disclose an
intentthat the administrative remedy is to be exclusive, and where there is an alternativejudicial
remedy under another statute or under common laworequitable principles, there is no

presumption that the administrative remedy was intended to be exclusive."16
Primary remedy

Where neitherthe statutory language northe legislative history disclose an intentthat the
administrative remedy is to be exclusive, andwhere there is an alternative judicial remedy under
another statute or under common law or equitable principles, there "is in this situation, however, a
presumption thatthe administrative remedy is intended to be primary, and that a claimant cannot
maintain the alternative judicialaction without first invoking and exhausting the administrative
remedy."17
This presumption is rebuttable "and other factors are pertinent." Legislative intent may be

ascertained from the statutory language, the statutory framework, or the legislative history.1
"Thecomprehensiveness ofthe administrative remedy is a factor to be considered. A very
comprehensive administrative remedial scheme is some indication thattheLegislature intended
the administrative remedy to be primary, whereas a noncomprehensive administrative scheme

suggests the contrary.19
"Anotherfactor is the administrative agency's view of its ownjurisdiction. Consistent with

the principle that an agency's interpretation ofthe statute which it administers is entitled to
weight, [the Court of Appeals has] relied on the agency's interpretation that the remedy before the

agency was not intended to be primary."20
"An extremely significant consideration under ourcases is the nature ofthe alternative

judicial cause of action pursued by the plaintiff. Where that judicial cause of action iswholly or
partially dependent upon the statutory scheme which also contains the administrative remedy, or
upon the expertise ofthe administrative agency, the Court has usually held that the administrative
administrative body for itsviews."14 381 Md. at662. There is"no prohibition against filing an independent judicial action while
primary administrative proceedings are under way, but. . . there isaprohibition against deciding, i.e., adjudicating, the issue in
the independent judicial case until a final administrative determination is made." 381 Md. at660.
15 Zappone, 349 Md. at62. citing Bowman v. Goad, 348 Md. 199, 202, 703 A.2d 144, 145 (1997) (recovery of taxes or
governmental voluntarily paid under amistake of law means administrative remedy is exclusive); Insurance Commissioner v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y ofthe United States, 339 Md. 596, 623, 664 A.2d 862, 876 (1995) (general statement ofthe law);
Moats v. City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519, 527, 529, 597 A.2d 972, 975-976, 977 (1991) (Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of
Rights procedures are an officer's exclusive remedy) Muhl v. Magan, supra, 313 Md. at480, 545 A.2dat 1330 (general statement
ofthe law); Nordheimer v. Montgomery County, 307 Md. 85, 96-98, 512 A.2d379, 386-387 (1986); Potomac Elec. Power v. P.
G. County, 298 Md. 185, 189-191, 468 A.2d325, 327-328 (1983); Apostol v. Anne Arundel County, 288 Md. 667, 672-673, 421
A.2d 582, 585 (1980). 349 Md. at 62-63.

16 Zappone, 349 Md. at63. The Court stated ina footnote that sometimes opinions inthe area use theword "exclusive" when the
Court actually means "primary."

17 Zappone, 349 Md. at63. citing Md. Reclamation v. Harford County, supra, 342 Md. at493, 677 A.2dat576; Luskin's v.
Consumer Protection, 338 Md. 188, 194-199, 657 A.2d 788, 791-793 (1995); Clinton v. Board ofEducation, 315 Md. 666, 678,

556 A.2d273, 279 (1989) Quesenberry v. WSSC, 311 Md. 417,424, 535 A.2d481, 484(1988); Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n
v. Crawford, supra, 307 Md. at 13, 511 A.2dat 1085; Bd. ofEd. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, supra, 305 Md. at786, 506 A.2d
at631; Prince George's Co. v. Blumberg, 288Md. 275, 283-284, 418 A.2d 1155, 1160 (1980), cert, denied, 449U.S. 1083, 101
S. Ct. 869, 66 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1981).

18 Zappone, 349 Md. at 64 citing National Asphalt v. Prince Geo's Co., 292 Md. 75, 79, 437 A.2d 651, 653 (1981) and Md.-Nat'l
Cap. P. & P. v. Wash. Nat'l Arena, supra, 282Md. at596-597, 386A.2d at 1223-1224.

19 Zappone, 349 Md. at 64citing tobecompared Luskin's v. Consumer Protection, supra, 338 Md. at 196-197, 657 A.2d at 792;
and Bd. ofEd. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, supra, 305 Md. at 787-792, 506 A.2d at 631-634; with Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. &P.
Comm'n v. Crawford, supra, 307 Md. at 25-26, 511 A.2d at 1091-1092. 349 Md. at 64-65.

20 Zappone, 349 Md. at65 citing National Asphalt v. Prince Geo's Co., supra, 292 Md. at80, 437 A.2dat653-654.
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remedy was intended to be primary and mustfirst be invoked and exhausted before resortto the
courts."21
Concurrent remedy

". . . [W]here the alternativejudicial remedy is entirely independent ofthe statutory scheme
containingthe administrative remedy, and the expertise ofthe administrative agency is not
particularly relevantto the judicial causeof action, the Court has held that the administrative
remedy was not intended to be primary and that the plaintiff could maintain the independent

judicial cause ofaction without first invoking and exhausting the administrative procedures.22
"When an administrative agency has either primary or exclusivejurisdiction over a controversy, the

parties to the controversy must ordinarily exhaust theiradministrative remedies before seeking ajudicial
resolution. That is so because, although the court may well have subject matter jurisdiction over the action
before it, the exhaustion doctrine bars the court from exercising that jurisdiction, thereby gratifying the

paramount legislative intent that the matter be dealt with first by the Executive Branch."23 There is a
reason for this exhaustion rule. "The decisions of an administrative agency are often of a discretionary

nature, and frequently require an expertise which the agency can bring to bear in sifting the information
presented to it. The agency should be afforded the initial opportunity to exercisethat discretion and to
apply its expertise. Furthermore, to permit interruption for purposes of judicial intervention at various
stagesofthe administrative process might well undermine the very efficiencywhich the Legislature
intended to achieve in the first instance. Lastly, the courts might be called upon to decide issues which

perhaps would never arise ifthe prescribed administrative remedies were followed."24
There is an interplay of exhaustion principles and primaryjurisdiction. When discussing primary
jurisdiction we are discussing a judicially created rule designed to coordinate the allocation of functions
between courts and administrative bodies. Both an agency and a court have concurrent jurisdiction over
the same subject matter and there is no statutory provision to coordinate the work ofthe court with that of

the agency.25 "The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires thata party must exhaust
statutorily prescribed administrative remedies, generally evidenced by a 'final decision' by the

administrative agency."26
With primaryjurisdiction cases, there is the subsequent question of whether a circuit court exercises
only appellate jurisdiction or tries the case de novo. With primary and concurrentjurisdiction cases,there
is the subsequentquestion of when and under what circumstances an agency decision is resjudicatato an
issue before a court.

21 Zappone, 349Md. at65 citing Quesenberry v. WSSC, supra, 311 Md. 417, 535 A.2d 481 (plaintiffsought damages for breach
of contractual rights under a statutory pension plan- Court determined that the plaintiff was first required to invoke and exhaust
the administrative remedies provided by the statutory pension plan) See also, e.g., Clinton v Board ofEducation, supra, 315 Md.
at 678-679, 556 A.2d at 279; Bd. ofEd. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard,supra, 305 Md. at 790-792, 506 A.2d at 633-634; Md.
Comm'n on Human Rel. v. Beth. Steel, 295 Md. 586, 592-594, 457 A.2d 1146, 1149-1150 (1983); Comm'n on Human Rel. v.
Mass Transit, 294 Md. 225, 233, 449 A.2d 385, 389 (1982).

22 Zappone, 349 Md. at65-66 citingSee, e.g.,Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Crawford, supra, 307 Md. at 25, 511 A.2d at
1091; Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. v. Wash. Nat'I Arena, supra, 282 Md. at 598-599, 386 A.2d at 1224.

23 State Retirement v. Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 65-66, 792 A. 2d 277(2002). In Arroyo v. Boardof Education of Howard County,
381 Md. 646, 658, 851 A. 2d 576 (2004), the Court put it this way: "The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires
that a party must exhaust statutorily prescribedadministrative remedies, generallyevidenced by a 'final decision' by the
administrative agency, before the resolution of separate and independent judicial relief in the courts." Id., at 661.

24 Arroyo, 381 Md. at661-62 quoting Soley v. State Commission on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526, 356 A. 2d 254(1976).
25 Id., at659 citing and quoting Boardof Education for Dorcester County, 305Md. 774, 506 A. 2d 625 (1986).
26^/royo,381Md.at611.
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Significant Case Decisions

Injunction entered in error

Must follow statutory mandate to reduce compensation benefits
o Granting an injunction against the State Retirement and Pension System of Maryland from complying with
a statutory mandate to reduce disability retirement benefits by amounts equivalent to workers'
compensation benefits received by reason ofthe same work-related disability was held to be error bythe

Court ofAppeals. An administrative remedy was provided and resort to the circuit court was improper.27
State Retirement v. Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 55, 792 A. 2d 277 (2002).28
Limitations when primary exhaustion doctrine evident

o

Robert Arroyo's employment as a guidance counselor was terminated. Arroyo v. Board ofEducation of

Howard County, 381 Md. 646, 661, 851 A. 2d 576 (2004).29 The appellate court needed todetermine when
exhaustion ofthe administrativeremedy was final and completeso it could determine when limitations

began to run (under the discovery doctrine) onArroyo's wrongful termination cause of action filed in
circuit court. 381 Md. at 658. Independent litigation maybe filed whilethe administrative agency activities
are in process where the agency has primary jurisdictions. 381 Md. at 659-60. There is a prohibition
against deciding thejudicial case until theagency matter hasbeen determined. 381 Md. at 660.
No right to bring a direct suit for overtime wages
Statute created grievance procedure

o

Maryland Military v. Cherry, 382 Md. 117, 854 A. 2d 1200 (2004) held thatMilitary Department airport

firefighters could not bring a direct suit in circuit court for overtime wages30 for attending National Guard
drills, annual training and otherfederally mandated military training because they had failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies. As a condition of employment, the respondents were required to maintain

membership in the Maryland/United States AirNational Guard. The employees had a right to bring a
grievance under SPP §12-103(b) forovertime claims. SPP §14-103 establishes thatsovereign immunity is
not a defensewhich a State may raise "in any administrative, arbitration, or judicial proceeding involving

an employee grievance or hearing. . ." Even though Maryland law provides thatemployees areentitled to
benefits provided by FLSA if those benefits are"greater" than benefits provided under Maryland law, that
does not mean that directjudicial actionmay be maintained in Maryland. Cherry, 282 Md. at 124. The
Supreme Courthas heldthat the FLSA didnot constitutionally authorize actions such as suitsfor overtime
pay against the state in statecourts. A failure to exhaust administrative remedies meantthat the casehadto

bedismissed. Cherry, 382 Md. at 128-29.31
27 Maryland law requires thatdeduction to be made. SPP §29-118(b)(1). Thompson's injury occurred while he was working asa
maintenance employee. Thereafter, he retired on disability benefits. Hethenreceived an award of workers' compensation
benefits. Thompson, 368Md. at 56-57. The circuit courtenjoined the State Retirement and Pension system from exercising the
setoff, an actionthe Court characterized as being basedon no morethan sympathy so Thompsonwould be ableto supporthis
family. Thompson, 368 Md. at 58. SPP is subject to the provisions ofthe MAPA. Thompson, 368 Md. at 33-64.

28 Thegranting ofthe injunction wasreversed andtheCourt directed on remand thatthe complaint be dismissed. TheCourt
commented that "there is not even a pretense here of any valid attemptby Thompsonto pursue the administrative remedythat
was available to him." Thompson, 368 Md. at 66, 71. In whatthe Courtreferred to as a rare circumstance it reviewed the merits
ofthe casethoughit was dismissed. Judge Wilnerreviewed the evolvement ofthe law that required the deduction from the
pensionreceived by Thompson. Thompson, 368 Md. at 67-70.
29 Mr. Arroyo had beeninvolved in a physical altercation with another teacher. There was a transfer and termination proceedings
wereinstituted becauseof Arroyo's failure to returnto work. Arroyo, 381 Md. at 652. The circuit court holdingwasthat
limitationshad run on Arroyo's right to file a wrongful termination action. Arroyo, 381 Md. at 672.
30 The actionwas broughtpursuantto pursuantto LE §3-401, et. seq, SPP §8-301, et. seq., COMAR 17.04.02.05 and the Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §201, et. seq. Cherry, 382 Md. at 119.

31 The Courtsaid it had previously decidedthe samepoint in Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 788 A. 2d 636 (2002). The
claims for overtime compensation are based on a provision in Title 8 of SPP. The employees are not entitled to bring a direct
action in court. Cherry, 382 Md. at 124. The EleventhAmendment to the United States Constitution provides a state with
immunity to claims arising under federal law and asserted by a citizenof that state in federal court. The EleventhAmendment is
applicable to actions in state court and Congress lacksthe authority underthe Commerce Clauseto abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity to suits in its own courts. The FLSA cannot constitutionally authorize private suits for damages againsta state in state
court. Cherry, 382 Md. at 122.
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Statutory construction

The employee was requiredtofollow the statutory processfor appeal
o PSCv. Schisler, 389 Md. 27, 882 A. 2d 849(2005)was a case where Wilson also claimed that her
termination from PSC violated her dueprocess rights by failing to provide an impartial agency adjudicator

for herpost-termination administrative appeal. 389 Md. at 38 The circuit court agreed buttheCourt of
Appeals reversed. Chairman Schisler, the individual who terminated Wilson, was the head of her
"principal unit" and the one under thestatutory scheme who would ordinarily hearher appeal. She argued
Schisler was biasedagainsther and that the failure to supply her with an impartial trier for her appeal
deniedher a fundamental constitutional right citingArticle24 ofthe Maryland Declarationof Rights. The
Court said it wouldnot reachthis question because it concluded that Wilson failed to invoke and exhaust

herstatutory remedies provided to a management service at-will employee ofthe PSC who isterminated
for reasons other than misconduct. 389 Md. at 88-89.

In this case, [SPP] §11-113 provided a specific statutory administrative appeal process for certain
categories of State employees, of which Wilson was one. Although Wilson apparently submitted
an administrative appeal pursuant to §1-113 following her initial termination, shefailed to do so
with respect to her re-termination, instead opting to file an unsuccessful motion to hold the
Commission in contempt in the action in the Circuit Courtarising from the initial termination. We
find that, before Wilson couldseek a judicialforum to resolvethe disputes she seeksto raise with
her re-termination, she was required to file and prosecute to a final administrative decision an

administrative appeal under §11-113.32
389 Md. at 90.

Nothaving filed thatappeal, thedoctrine ofexhaustion of administrative remedies applied and thecase
was dismissed. 389 Md. at 93-94.

Unconstitutional bias was alleged by Wilson. There is a constitutional exception to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine. In this case, Wilson did not attack the constitutionality of SPP §11-113,

butrather as applied to her situation. Additionally, there was no record of whatthe specifics of Wilson's
allegations of unconstitutional bias were. 389Md. at 91-92. "Furthermore, the Chairman's responses were
not flippant, frivolous, or facetious ontheir face." Citing Spencer, theCourt said there was no factual
predicate for specific personal biasor perse requirement of recusal. 389 Md. at 93.
Home Improvement commission
Alternative remedy for direct suit

o

Homeowners were not required to exhaust administrative remedies in court prior to resorting to a suitfor
damages in the circuit court in Fosler v. Panoramic Design, 376Md. 118, 131-32, 829 A. 2d 271 (2003).
TheHome Improvement statute specifically stated thatadministrative remedies did not haveto be
exhausted priorto litigation. 376Md. at 131-32. However, the situation is different when the Declaratory
Judgment action sought a ruling thatthe contractor was unlicensed. No statutory provision specifically
excluded the responsibility to proceed administratively. To determine whether a contractor is licensed, the
Commission's jurisdiction is primary as that determination rests with the Commission which is responsible
for its administration. 376 Md. at 134. This was not a case where it was clear that a "person or entity was

engaging in the home improvement business" [and] "needed a license from the Commission." 376 Md. at
135. Administrative interpretation ofthe statute is to be given considerable weight. Id., at 136. Licensure

determinations were for theagency. 376 Md. at 137.33

32 Simply stated, theCourt did notknow what theCommission and Chairman Schisler would do hadjudicial review been
requested. Effort to filethe appeal wasminimal, shecould have succeeded on appeal or Schisler mayhave concluded authority
should be delegated to another individual. Wilson, 389 Md. at 91-92.

33 There wasa bit of a practical problem hereas the Commission hadstayed the administrative proceeding pending exhaustion of
the administrative remedy. The Courtpresumed that withitsdecision, the administrative proceeding wouldgo forward, and if
not "mandamus" may be available to enforce administrative compliance." Fosler, 376 Md. at 138.
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There Is a Prisoner Litigation Act

But that act does not cover suits for failure to provide medical coverage
o In Adamson v. CorrectionalMedical, 339 Md. 238, 753 A. 2d 501 (2000), the Court held that an inmate is

notrequired to exhaust remedies under the Prisoner Litigation Actof Maryland [CJ §5-1001, et. seq.]
before entering suit in a Maryland courtfor failure to provide adequate medical services against a private
corporation thatis contracted to provide medical care to prisoners in the custody ofthe Division of
Correction. 339 Md. at 244. Statutory construction principles were used to examinethe statute. 339 Md. at
251-56. The entireregulatory scheme wasexamined to ascertain legislative intent. 339 Md. at 261-64. The
agency interpretation of its role in conjunction withthe statute was discussed. 339 Md. at 265-66. No
mentionwas made in the "legislative history of curtailing prisoner malpractice lawsuits against private

contractors or private entities. The statute was designed to prevent or inhibit the influx of prisoner claims
against State officials andemployees in Maryland's state courts andto lessen the burden onthe Attorney
General in defending such prisoner claims." 339Md. at 260. The Courtstated: "We conclude thatthe
General Assembly, while it was free to do so, didnotcraftthePLA or the CSA in a manner that envisioned
the relevant administrativeremedy as encompassing prisonermalpractice complaints against private
medical service providers under contract with the State." 339 Md. at 272.

The Maryland Insurance code

Not an exclusive orprimary remedyfor allegedactsoffraud and negligent misrepresentation
o Provisions of Maryland's Insurance Code pertaining to unfair trade practices by insurers andtheiragents do

notprovide a exclusive or primary remedy for alleged acts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 349 Md. 45, 67, 706 A. 2d 1060 (1998). "Although there isa legal
presumption that a statutory administrative and judicial review remedy is intended to beprimary, that
presumption isrebutted under the circumstances here. The plaintiffs' asserted causes of action indeceit and
negligence arewholly independent ofthe Insurance Code's Unfair Trade Practices subtitle. No
interpretations or applications ofthe Insurance Code or of any regulations by the Insurance Commissioner
are involved. Instead, under the plaintiffs allegations and theory ofthe case, their right to recover money

damages is totally dependent upon the common law tort principles applicable to deceit and negligence
actions. Moreover, the expertiseofthe Insurance Commissioner would appear to be irrelevantto these
common law causes of action." 349 Md. at 67-68.

Declaratory judgment action

"Thesepension benefits are not marital property"
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The agency got the right to determine the validity ofthe claim
o Brown v. Retirement System, 375 Md. 661, 826 A. 2d 525 (2003)was an action where retired police
officerssought declaratoryjudgment that their benefits under deferred retirement option plan were not
marital property and were to be distributed entirely to them. "The Retirement system is a governmental

pension planoffered by Baltimore City and is codified in [the] Baltimore CityCode.. ." 375 Md. at 665.
No separate account is established and no funds are segregated. 375 Md. at 666. A panelof hearing
examiners conduct hearings on all matters relatingto claims for disability and special death benefits and the
Board of Trustees ofthe Retirement System "has the authority to determine the validity of claims for
benefits other than those claims subject to resolution by the Panel of Hearing Examiners." The Court

examined provisions ofthe Code. 375 Md. at672.34 "We conclude that actions for declaratory judgment
were not appropriate in this case becausepetitioners failedto exhausttheir statutory administrative
remedies." 375 Md. at 663. The issue was whether a "Deferred retirement option plan" compensation

34 Inthiscase, the petitioners wentto court rather thanmake a request ofthe Board of Trustees to heartheircase after the
Administrator ofthe Retirement System informed them that the QDROs did not exclude certain retirement benefits and those
benefits would be paid out as marital property. Brown, 375 Md. at 673.
The circuit court had dismissed the case and had also had ordered that the benefits in question be treated as ordinary benefits

for purposes of payments pursuant to the parties' Judgments of Divorce. TheCourtsaid that dismissal meantthat the petitioners
had nothing more to be decided and were out of court. Brown, 375 Md. at 674.
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retirement benefit is marital property pursuant to the Baltimore City Code. It was the agency rightto

determine the validity of claims.35 375 Md. at 674-75.
Declaratory judgment action to determine whether obesity Is covered within the meaning of discrimination Act
No: Go to Human Relations Commissionfor that Determination and exhaustyour administrative remedies
o

In Commission on Human Relations v. Mass Transit, 294 Md. 225, 449 A.2d 385 (1982), the Court held

thatthe principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies barred an employer's [MTA] declaratory
judgment action seeking a statutory interpretation asto "whether obesity is covered within themeaning of
the discrimination statute." Three women had been denied employment on the basis of obesity. The

Maryland Commission on Human Relations found a violation. Administrative remedies had to be

exhausted. This was because agency construction ofa statute which itadministers is entitled to weight.36
The agency wasrequired to give the employee the rights to which he wasentitled
o The Courtreversedan agency decision to discharge John Richard Danaherfrom State employment in
Danaher v. Dept. ofLabor, 148 Md. App. 139, 811 A. 2d 359(2002). The agency did not investigate the
matter, meet with the employee or consider mitigating circumstances as requiredby SPP §11-106. As to
the allegation of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court saidDanaher senta letter to the
Secretary asking for a hearing, and information was not given to the employee so as to allow himto
particularize hisallegations. 148 Md. App. at 162. Hewas notgiven thehearing to which he was entitled
so as to allow him to particularize. No waiverof rights was seen. 148 Md. App. at 162-63.
Declaratory judgment action to contest rezonlng

Wrong: you shouldhave appealedthe zoningdecision through the administrative process
o A "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Mandamus andOther Relief contesting the rezoning of property

previously annexed byAnnapolis was dismissed inJosephson v. City ofAnnapolis, 353 Md. 667, 728 A. 2d
690 (1998) for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Instead of appealing the rezoning decision
pursuant to section 21.88.020 ofthe Annapolis City Code and thereafter seeking judicial review, the
Complaint was filed. 353 Md. at 670. The Code gave a right to appeal a zoning action by a local legislative
body. 353 Md. at 672. Section 21.08.060 ofthe Annapolis City Code provided a method for establishing
zoning designations of newly annexed land within thecity when the zoning designation is not created
during the annexation process. The County Board of Appeals is authorized to hearappeals when an error in
the adoption of an ordinance is alleged. 353 Md. at 680. A failure to exhaust the administrative remedies

meant the trial judge properly dismissed the Complaint filed. 353 Md. at680-81.37
35 From the Court decision:

In the instantcase, petitioners did not exhausttheirspecific administrative remedies. Each petitionerreceived a letter
from the Administratorofthe Retirement System. The letternoted that the Retirement System recently reviewed the
Members' QDROsand determined that because the ordersdid not excludeDROP benefits,those benefitswould be paid
out as marital property along withthe Members' otherretirement benefits. Petitioners, however, did not seek a hearing
before the Board, from whose determination they could have petitioned for judicial review. Instead, dissatisfied with
the substance ofthe letter regarding their DROP benefits, petitionersfiled an action for declaratory and injunctive {826
A.2d 533} relief against the RetirementSystem. In the CircuitCourt complaint,petitionerssought a declaration that
DROP benefits "be excluded from marital property" to be paid out under the divorce decrees and QDROs and that the
entire amount ofthe DROP benefits be disbursed to them. Petitioners also sought and obtained an injunction to enjoin

the Retirement System from disbursing DROP monies until the court declared the parties' rights. The basis for the
declaratory action, petitioners argue to this Court,was to determine whether the Retirement Systemwas correct in its
interpretation ofthe relationship betweenDROPand otherRetirement Systembenefitsand whetherthe Retirement
System properly was distributing DROPbenefits. Petitioners desired a determination of DROP'S role in the Retirement
System-whether DROP is separatefrom or integral to ordinary pensionbenefits. As such, petitionersfirst should have
sought a hearing before the Board for a determination of this issue,one within the Board's purview. We hold that
petitioners failed to exhaust their statutory administrative remedies.
Brown, 375 Md. at 674-75.

36 Brown v. Retirement System, 375 Md. 661, 670-71, 826A 2d 525(2003).
37 TheCourtdistinguished the caseof Northeast Plaza Associates v. President andCommissioners ofNorth East, 310Md. 20,
526 A.2d963 (1987), saying that Northeast was a limited case because to the extent there is an exceptionto the requirement of
exhaustion it "appliedonly to simultaneous, combined annexation/rezoning resolutions or procedures." Josephson, 353 Md. at
680.
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These parties entered into a settlement agreement

Therefore: no need to exhaust administrativeprocess through zoning
Go directly to whether the settlement agreement was violated
o Chestnut Real Estatev. Huber, 148 Md. App. 190, 811 A. 2d 389 (2002) involved the owners and

developers ofthe Blakehurst Life CareCommunity in Baltimore County, Maryland and a neighborhood
association quarreling over the manner in which Blakehurst intended to improve its property. Interpretation
of a restrictive covenant was at issue and injunctiverelief was sought. One issue was whether the parties

were required to exhaust administrative remedies. 148 Md. App. at 198. The Courtstated: "Butthe remedy
sought here by the Advisory Board [ the neighborhood association], a mandatory injunction, is purely
equitable innature, anda preeminently judicial function thatis notwithin the expertise of zoning
administrators or the Board of Appeals. Appellees have invoked the equitypower ofthe courtsto return the
Blakehurst property to itsstatus quo ante, to wit: theremoval of structures that exist in direct contravention
ofthe restrictive covenants. Althoughadministrative bodiesmay exercise certain quasi-judicial functions,
for example, rendering findings of fact and making conclusions of law to decide disputes between parties,
see, e.g., Department ofNatural Resources v. Linchester Sand &Gravel Corp., 21A Md. 211,219-21, 334
A.2d 514, 520-21 (1975), the remedy effected subjudice - a mandatory injunction - is purelya judicial
prerogative. Because the construction ofthe offending structures was a fait accompli, theAdvisory Board's
sole recourse to effect their removal would be to enlist the aid ofthe chancellor." 148 Md. App. at 199.
(footnote omitted)

Employee action againstcountyboard ofeducation for agediscrimination
Noprivate right ofaction but must go through administrative process
o Former employee actionagainst county board of education for age discrimination in employment,

violations of FairEmployment Practices Actandcommon law wrongful discharge. The Board is an arm of
state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity. Norville v. Board ofEducation, 160Md. App. 12,
862 A. 2d 477 (2004). Boardcould not assert sovereign immunity as a defense to claimunder$100,000
asserted by former employee for alleged agediscrimination. The employee did not have private right of
action against board underFEPA, andavailability of administrative remedy by wayof FEPA preempted

employee's common law claim for wrongful discharge. 160 Md. App. at75-76.3
A concurrent remedy
The Insurance code. . .

o

In Mardirossian v. Paul Revere LifeInsurance Co., 376 Md. 640, 831 A. 2d 60 (2003), the Court stated, in

response to a request from Maryland's District Court for certification of a question of law, thatthe right to
sue an insurer on an oral contract for the insurer to provide an insurance policy is a concurrent remedy to

38 From the Courtopinion:
Here, the Board is within the purview ofthe Act. And, appellantwas provided with an administrative remedy by way
of Article49B. Becauseappellanthad a statutory remedy available to him, he cannot pursue a commonlaw wrongful
discharge claim. Compare Molesworth, supra, 341 Md. at 637 (recognizing common law claim for wrongful discharge
based on sex discrimination because, due to size of employer,Art. 49B did not apply). Accordingly, we shall affirm the
circuit court's dismissal of appellant's common law wrongful discharge claim.
Norville, 160 Md. App. at 76.

Anne Arundel County Bd. ofEduc. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93,, 390 Md. 93, 887 A.2d 1029, 1035-36(2005) decidedthe case
on certiorari on the grounds of res judicata even though issue of res judicata was not raised in petition for writ of certiorari
becausedoing so would promote judicial economy and avoid unnecessary expense by obviating the need for a separate appeal.
"The case is a suit alleging age discriminationbased upon the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 - 634 (Supp. Ill 1994) ,1 Md. Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol., 2005 Cum. Supp.) Art. 49B, § 16(a) ,2 common law
wrongfuldischarge and intentional infliction of emotional distressfiled by David Norville, a media specialist employed by the
Anne Arundel County Board of Education (the Board) against the Board. Because the ADEA claim was adjudicated on the merits
in a suit filed by Norville in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Norville v. Anne Arundel County Bd.
ofEduc, No. Civ.A. MJG-99-764, 1999 WL 1267696 (D. Md. Nov. 23, 1999), we shall hold that this action is barred by the
principles of res judicata." 390 Md. at 97
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anyreliefthatthe Maryland Insurance Administration may offer. The contract is enforceable by specific
performance under Marylandcommon law. 376 Md. at 648.

Primary jurisdiction
Declaratory judgment actions
When the Consumer Protection Division files charges
There was an administrative remedy available to resolve. . .

No Doubt: a court would have been In a better position to. . . had It the benefit ofthe administrative process

o

SureDeposit v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 483, 860 A. 2d 871 (2004) is a casewhere SureDeposit filed a
Declaratory Judgment Action to resolve its contention with the Consumer Protection Division and asked
the court to determine that "its surety bond program" does not violate the Consumer Protection Act. The

product was soldto tenants as an alternative to paying a security deposit to landlords. 383 Md. at 467-68,
471. The Division filed an administrative statement of charges against SureDeposit, alleging multiple
violations ofthe CPA. 383 Md. at 873. RP §8-203 defines security deposits. Among the Division's

charges were that SureDeposit claimed its product to be a security deposit; claimed to be a fee other than a
security deposit. The CPA "specifies no exclusive administrative remedy committed to the Division for
resolution of a dispute involving the SDL." 383 Md. at 482.
"It is clear that an administrative remedy was available to resolve the alleged violations ofthe CPA and
even the related claims based on the SDL." A declaration as to the SDL "would not terminate the entire

controversy, which includes numerous independent allegations of violations ofthe CPA." It was not
"entirely clear on the record ofthis case. . . at this juncture, thatthe declaratory judgment sought could
adjudicate theDivision's charges against SureDeposit's officers. By thesame token, as SureDeposit's
complaint includes a request for a declaration astothe viability ofthe Division's CPA claims, asit facially
does, it would be inappropriate for a court to accept that invitation in advance ofthe Division being allowed
to bring to bear, through the designated regulatory scheme, itsparticular expertise to render a final
administrative decision regarding the CPA matters. There is little doubtthat a reviewing courtwould be in
a better position to render global and appropriate reliefinthis dispute were it to have the benefit ofthe
Division's final view on the panoply of claims." 383 Md. at 484-85. When a court believesthat more
effective relief can and should be obtained by another procedure, that court is justified in refusing a
declaration because ofthe availability of another remedy." 383 Md. at 485.
"It is obvious in this case that Division review and action will be effective and efficient because it will

address the allegations concerning boththe CPA andthe SDL. Thus, it is impossible to conclude, as a
matter of law, that the Circuit Court's decision to reject SureDeposit's complaint is well removed from this
Court's declaratory judgmentjurisprudence decided overthe last sixtyyears. Lastly, it is no coincidence
that this result is consistent with the doctrine of primaryjurisdiction that "a party is often first required to
run the administrative remedial course before seeking a judicial solution."" 383 Md. at 484.

Montgomery county, what are you doing?

o

Owners of pets not requiredby countycodeto repay the cost of care, post a bond, or arrange adequate care
as a condition of appealing to county hearing boardfrom decision by animalservice directorconcerning
confiscated animals. There was no failure to exhaust administrative remedies in Coroneos v. Montgomery

County, 161 Md. App. 411, 869 A. 2d 410 (2005)

Not everything goes the administrativeremedy route when a state employee is involved
o Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 862 A.2d 941 (2004) discussedtermination of a professoron an
allegation of "incompetence" and "willful neglect of duty." The Court of Appealsreversed a jury verdict
and remanded, finding that a jury could not review whether the factual bases for termination actually
occurred or whether they were proved by a preponderance ofthe evidence. The proper role of the jury was
to review the objective motivation, i.e., whether the employer acted in objective good faith and in
accordance with a reasonable employer under similar circumstanceswhen it decided there was just cause to
fire an employee. Judge Eldridge dissented sayingthat the majority had missed the point that the jury
should not have heard the case in the first instance because there was a failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, an issue the majority did not address. 384 Md. at 91, 95.
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Areyou tryingto circumvent the administrative process?

o

Heery International v. Montgomery County, 384 Md. 129, 862 A.2d 976 (2004) involved a dispute arising
from the contractors' alleged mismanagement of othertradecontractors duringthe construction of a
detention center. The Countyfiled for administrative dispute resolution againstthe contractors; the
contractors filed a court action claimingthat the county's administrative dispute resolution process did not
have jurisdiction overthe county's claims but instead only contemplated claims initiated by a contractor
against the county. Characterizing thecase as an initiative bythecontractors to circumvent thecounty's
administrative dispute resolution process, TheCourt saidthatthe contractors failed to showthat the
county's administrative process was palpably without jurisdiction by notproducing any legislative history

to support such a claim and byfailing to show that the administrative dispute resolution process would
result in any irreparable injury. 384 Md. at 150-151.

A circuit court claim for overtime pay

But: they are government employees and there Is a process. . .

o

InMaryland Military v. Cherry, 382 Md. 117, 854 A. 2d 1200 (2004), Military Department airport
firefighters were told bytheCourt that they could not bring a direct suit in circuit court for overtime
wages39 for attending National Guard drills, annual training and other federally mandated military training
because they hadfailed to exhaust their administrative remedies. As a condition of employment, the
respondents were required to maintain membership inthe Maryland/United States Air National Guard.
Theemployees had a rightto bring a grievance under SPP §12-103(b) for overtime claims. SPP §14103 establishes that sovereign immunity is not a defense which a State may raise"in any administrative,
arbitration, orjudicial proceeding involving anemployee grievance or hearing. . ." Even though
Maryland law provides thatemployees are entitled to benefits provided by FLSA if those benefits are
"greater" than benefits provided under Maryland law, that does not mean that direct judicial action may be
maintained 382 Md. at 124. The Supreme Court hasheld thatthe FLSA did not constitutionally authorize
actions suchas suits for overtime pay against the state in state courts. A failure to exhaust administrative
remedies meant thatthe casehadto be dismissed. 382Md., at 128-29.40

Exclusive remedy for Inmate Injured on the job

o

Things getcomplicated when more than one statute may cover an dispute and then statutory construction
steps inas was the case with Dixon v. Dep't Public Safety, 175 Md. App. 384, 927 A. 2d445 (2007).
Dixon, an inmate at the Maryland House of Correction in Jessup, was seriously injured whenhe fell intoa
ventilation shaftwhileon a prison workdetail andhe filed a tort suit against the Department. The circuit

court granted a motion forsummary judgment to the Department onthebasis thatDixon was only entitled
to pursue his claim for compensation against the Sundry Claims Board. That decision was affirmed. 175
Md. App. at 388. The Court discussed Title 10, Subtitle 3 ofthe Correctional Services Article governing
theprocedure for filing of a claim by a DOC inmate to recover forwork-related injuries sustained while

incarcerated. 175 Md. App. at388.41 There was the Prisoner Litigation Act42 (PLA - CJ §5-1001, et. sec.)
to be consideredwith its statutory requirement that there be an exhaustion of administrative remedies. CJ §
39 Theaction wasbrought pursuant to pursuant to LE §3-401, et. seq, SPP §8-301, et. seq., COMAR 17.04.02.05 andthe Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §201, et. seq. Cherry, 382 Md. at 119.

40 The Courtsaid it had previously decidedthe samepoint in Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 788 A. 2d 636 (2002). The
claimsfor overtime compensation are based on a provision in Title 8 of SPP. The employees are not entitled to bring a direct
actionin court. Cherry, 382 Md. at 124. The Elevanth Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution providesa state with
immunity to claims arisingunder federal lawand asserted by a citizen of that state in federal court. The Eleventh Amendment is
applicable to actions in state court and Congress lacksthe authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity to suits in its own courts. The FLSA cannotconstitutionally authorize private suits for damagesagainsta state in state
court. Cherry, 382 Md. at 122.

41 Judicial review is provided for by CS §10-308 bothin the Circuit Courtandthe Courtof Special Appeals. Dixon, 175 Md.
App. at 391.

42 Priorlitigation discussing the interplay between the Inmate Grievance Office and the Prisoner Litigation Act was reviewed as
Massey v. Galley, 392 Md. 634, 643, 898 A. 2d 951 (2006) summarized the legislative history ofthe PLA.Dixon, 175Md.App.
at 418-422.
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5-1003. 175 Md. App. at 392. Section § 10-210 of CS. governing hearings in inmate grievance matters by
OAH has a specific requirement that administrative remedies beexhausted before there may bejudicial
review. 175 Md. App. at 394.

Dixon argued that the procedure didnotapply to his negligence claims, 175 Md. App. at 401, butstatutory
construction (legislative history, fiscal notes, regulations passed) showed otherwise: "We agree with the circuit
courtthat the administrative remedy set forth in CS. § 10-308(c) constituted appellant's exclusive remedy:'

175 Md. App. at 408.43 Dixon's Claim for Compensation alleged hewas injured by anaccident "arising out of
and in the course of [his] employment." 175 Md. App. at 414. Case law considering the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrativeremedies was reviewed by the Court which found a clear legislative intent that the statutory

remedy was exclusive. 175 Md. App. at 417. Dixon was required to file a claim with the Sundry Board, rather
than the IGO. Statutory construction of two conflicting statutes, onegeneral and one specific means thatthe
specific statute will be regarded asanexception to the specific statute to theextent they are irreconcilable. An
attempt would be made to give effect to both statutes if they were reconcilable. 175 Md. App. at 422.

The Public Service Commission authority

o Sprenger v. PSC, 400 Md. 1, 926 A. 2d238 (2007) was a contest to the Public Service Commission's
approval ofa plan ofClipper Windpower toconstruct a facility inGarrett County, Maryland. The suit
challenged theprocess bywhich the Facility was approved. There had been an adjudicatory administrative
hearing and theCircuit Court had dismissed thecase onthe basis thatthepetitions forjudicial review had
notbeen timely filed. 400Md. at 11. The appellants hadrequested a Declaratory Judgment andthat
process was discussed bytheCourt, 400 Md. at20, along with the doctrine ofthe exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 400 Md. at 24-25. The Circuit Court was correct in dismissing the petition for

declaratory relief because administrative remedies provided bythe Legislature had notbeen followed. 400
Md.at33.

Zoning

o Respondent use cardealers were required to invoke and exhaust administrative remedies prior to obtaining
judicial review ofthe constitutionality ofa zoning ordinance establishing a minimum lotsize of25,000 sq.
ft. for used motor vehicle, mobile home, or camping trailer lots in Prince George's County v. Ray's, 398
Md. 652, 922 A. 2d 495 (2007). Discussing the delegation by the Stateof zoningpowerfor mostof Prince

George's County to the Prince George's County District Council, 398Md. at 635-36, both the Circuit Court
andthe Court of Special Appeals had found thatthe ordinance setting the lot size violated so-called
"substantive due process" principles. 398Md. at 640. Thecase did not fall within the "constitutional
exception" to the exhaustion rule. 398 Md. at 644. Discussing Zappone v. Liberty Life, andthe exhaustion
doctrine, the Court stated that it had not yet decidedwhether adjudicatory remedies under the Act were
exclusive or simply primary, 398 Md. at 647,but the Courtsaidthat its prior opinions had made it clearthat

the adjudicatory remedies provided by the Regional District Act for the resolution of zoning issues like
those presented mustbe pursued andexhausted before resort to the courts. 398 Md. at 647-48. Discussing
the "constitutional exception" to the exhaustion requirement, the Court stated that "administrative agencies
are fully competent to resolve issues of constitutionality andthe validity of statutes or ordinances in
adjudicatory administrative proceedings which aresubject tojudicial review." 398 Md. at 650-51 (case law
discussed). The Court stated:./?™/, the attack upon the ordinance had not been to the ordinance"as a
whole," including all of its parts and applications; second, the plaintiffs "substantive due process" and
"equal protection attacks uponthe ordinance were factually based andthe Circuit Court declaratory
judgment rested upon the court'sfindings of fact, and third, "the pursuit andexhaustion ofthe appropriate
administrative proceedings mightwell result in the plaintiffs' obtaining reliefwithout the necessity of
reaching the constitutional issues at the administrative levelor uponjudicial review." 398 Md. at 655-56.

43 The Court reviewedthat rules for statutory interpretation and as applicable to this case. Dixon, 175 Md. App. at 408-414.
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An inmate injured by another inmate

o

An inmate brought battery and intentional infliction causes of action in a circuit court against a fellow
prisoner and the State ofMaryland for violations ofMaryland Declaration ofRights, for injuries occurring
when he was attacked by fellow prisoner, while working in kitchen of prison laundry facility. The Court in
Jennifer v. State, 176 Md. App. 211,932 A. 2d 1213 (2007) held that Jennifer's exclusive remedy "lies with
theSundry Claims Board" and affirmed thecircuit court grant of summary judgment. There is a Sundry
Claims Board Act in Maryland which provides thatthe act is the "exclusive remedy against the State for a
Claim," Corr. Serv. "§10-308(c) made by 'an individual' who was engaged in work for wages while an
inmate in a correctional facility in the Division of Correction." Jennifermaintained that the Act did not

apply because the injury did notarise out of his work and was notaccidental. 176 Md. App. 216. Another
exercise in statutory interpretation saw Judge Krauser forthe Court tracing the history ofthe Actwith the
Court stating: "Certainly, [Jennifer] would nothave suffered the injury he did 'but for the fact thatthe
conditions andobligations ofthe employment placed [him] in the position where he was injured." 176 Md.

App. at223. "[W]e conclude that 'not accidental' isa catch-all phrase and, inthat capacity, refers to
injuries which, while nottechnically 'self-inflicted,' are ones which the claimant played some role in
bringing about." 176 Md. App. at 229.

C. Summary and Cookbook Methodology

Anyone faced with the problem of determining when and under what circumstances a statutory remedy is
primary, exclusive or concurrent has a wide choice of case law to consult for direction. SureDeposit v.
Curran, 383 Md. 462, 860 A. 2d 871 (2004) stated and summarized the rules. Because this is a fairly
recent case andJudge Harrell gives a very good summary ofthe principles of lawand cookbook
methodology a court may use todetermine the issue, it is reproduced here in large part. If you read all of
this and conclude that there are not all that many bright line rules here, and that some inconsistency may
sometimes be seen, you are correct. It is not you; it is the law.

. . . [Declaratory judgment is an inappropriate remedy where the primary jurisdiction doctrine
properly is implicated. Luskin's Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 338Md. 188, 657A.2d 788 (1995)
Primary jurisdiction

is a judicially created rule designed to coordinate the allocation of functions between
courts and administrative bodies. The doctrine is not concerned with subject matter

jurisdiction or the competence of a court to adjudicate, but rather is predicated upon
policies ofjudicial restraint: 'which portion ofthe dispute-settling apparatus-the
courts or the agencies-should, in the interests ofjudicial administration, first take the
jurisdiction that boththe agency andthe courthave.1 It comes into play when a court
and agency have concurrent jurisdiction overthe same matter, and there is no

statutory provision to coordinate the work ofthe court with that ofthe agency.44
*

*

*

Primaryjurisdiction is relevant only ... where the claim is initially cognizable in
the courts but raises issues or relates to subject matter falling within the special
expertise of an administrative agency.

Washington Natfl Arena, 282 Md. at 601-602, 386 A.2d at 1225-26 (citations and footnote
omitted). We have recognized that an additional concern ofthe primary jurisdiction doctrine is the
preservation ofthe "uniformity and integrity ofthe regulatory scheme...." Id. at 603, 386 A.2d at
1227(citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440, 27 S. Ct. 350, 355, 51
L. Ed. 553, 558-59 (1907)). An administrative agency decision, particularly in its area of special

expertise, helps a court becausethe court usually relies on the "special expertise and technical
knowledge normally employed in administrative fact-finding and rule-making." Id. For example, in
Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., we stated that an "administrative agency's interpretation and
application ofthe statute which the agency administers shouldordinarily be given considerable
SureDeposit, 383 Md. at 478-79.
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weight by reviewing courts." 376Md. 118, 136, 829 A.2d 271, 282 (2003) (quoting Md Div. of
Labor v. Triangle Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366Md. 407, 416, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001)). This
reliance, however, is not blind. A court does not err or abuse its discretion if it seeks to answer a

purely legal question that merely overlaps an available administrative remedy. See Washington
Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. at 602-604, 386 A.2d at 1226-27.

As a result, a trial court, faced with a request for a judicial remedy such as declaratory

judgment in a situation where a related administrative agency action is pending, is usually
confronted with three possible courses of action. First, the court may defer wholly to the
administrative regulatory schemeand terminate the petition or complaint, leavingthe matterto
disposition by the administrative agency, without priorjudicial intervention. In that situation,

judicial review ofthe final agency decision usually will be available to an aggrieved party.5
Secondly, the court may stay its consideration ofthe invoked judicial remedy and awaitthe
result ofthe administrativeproceedings before addressing the appropriateness ofthe relief sought
in the litigation. Maryland Reclamation Assocs. v. Harford County, 382 Md. 348,367, 855 A.2d
351, 362 (2004) (directingstay ofjudicial proceeding until administrative remedies exhausted);
Arroyo v. Bd ofEduc, 381 Md. 646, 660, 851 A.2d 576, 584-85 (2004) (observing that a party
mayfile an independent judicialaction during pendency of primary administrative proceedings and
the trial court may stay thejudicial action but, should not decide it until the "final administrative
determination is made"); Md.-Nat'l Capital Park& Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1,18,
511 A.2d 1079, 1087- 88 (1986) (explaining that a stay by the trial court may be appropriate when
an administrative remedy and an independent judicial remedy besidejudicial review ofthe
administrative decision arises). Once the administrative process runs its course, the court may then
entertain the pendingjudicial action(with or without any subsequently filed action for judicial
review), giving due weightand deference to the administrative agency's decision in its area of
particular expertise. Crawford, 307 Md. at 18, 511 A.2d at 1088.
Third, the court may exercise its discretion, if appropriate to do so, and provide a judicial
remedy in advance of final action in the administrative proceeding. This option is best used when
the court is faced with a purely legal question that is independent of or merely overlaps an
administrative agency's area of expertise.See Washington Nat'lArena, 282 Md. at 603-604, 386
A.2d at 1226-27 (holding that evaluatingthe validity of a contract clause that waived a party's right
to challengewhether real estate improvements were subjectto real estate taxes was a purely legal
questionthat the Property Tax AssessmentAppeal Board had no expertise to resolve because its
primary expertise lay in reviewing the assessmentand valuation of real property for tax purposes).
nl346
nl3 The trial court should be alert to situations where exercising such discretion may be

contrary to the wisdom ofthe general rule requiring a party to "run the administrative remedial
course before seeking a judicial solution." Clinton v. Bd. ofEduc, 315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d
273, 279 (1989); but, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in AttorneyGrievance
Comm'n v. Davis, 379 Md. 361, 842 A.2d 26 (2004), and Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Lichtenberg, 379 Md. 335, 842 A.2d 11 (2004).

SureDeposit here first questions whether the Division has primary jurisdiction concerning the
allegations of violations ofthe SDL. nl4 We summarized the three general and relevant types of
potentially overlapping administrative and judicial jurisdictional considerations in Zappone v.
Liberty Life Insurance Company 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998). nl5 The first category
45 SureDeposit, 383 Md. at479-80.
"SureDeposit, 383 Md. at480-81.
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addresses situations where the administrative remedy is intended by the Legislature to be exclusive
and must be exhausted before recourse may be appropriate to the courts. Id. at 60, 706 A.2d at

1067. When a statute explicitlydirectsan administrative processand remedy, our policy is set
clearly by the General Assembly to maintain the uniformity of the regulatory scheme. Id. nl6 One
"special form" of statutory remedy is where a party is required to submit its complaints to the
exclusive remedy of an administrative agency. See Id. at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068-69 (listing exclusive
remedy provisions). As a result, a preemptively or prematurely filed petition for declaratory
judgment, where there is provided an exclusive administrative remedy for the subject matter,

should not then beentertained, if at all, until the administrative remedy is exhausted.47
nl4 Section 13-101, etseq., ofthe Commercial Law Article specifically creates the Division
and enables it to enforce and administer the CPA. While the CPA grants the Division no

explicit powerto administer the SDL, the CPAdoes prohibit unfairpractices under 13-301
in the sale, or offer for sale, of "any consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer

services...." §13-303. We could find no parallel provisions in the Real PropertyArticle of
the Code committing enforcement or administrative powers to any particular executive
branch agency with regard to the SDL.

nl5 We recognized a fourth category, not relevant in the present case, wherethe
administrative agency's enabling statute expressly requires the judicial remedy to be
exhausted first. Fosler, 376 Md. at 130-33, 829 A.2d at 278-80 (holding that §8-408 ofthe

Home Improvement Law (Md. Code, Business Regulation Art.) explicitly requires stay of
the administrative action and exhaustion of the judicial remedy).

nl6 Analysis underthe Declaratory Judgment Act reaches the sameresult. Section 3-409(b)
states that if "a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that
statutory remedy shallbe followed in lieu of a proceeding underthis subtitle." Md. Code
(1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.) ofthe Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

47 SureDeposit, 383 Md. at481-82.
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A. Employee Grievances.

"The Legislature hasenacted a uniform grievance procedure foremployees to invoke to resolve certain
disputes. A grievance means a dispute between an employee and the employee's employer about the
interpretation of and application to the employee of(i) a personnel policy or regulation adopted bythe
Secretary; or (ii) any other policyor regulation overwhich management has control." Six subject areas
are excludedby the general definition of what may be grieved:
1. a pay grade or range for a class;
2. the amount or the effective date of a statewide pay increase;
3.

the establishment of a class;

4. the assignment of a class to a service category;
5.

the establishment of classification standards; and

6. an oral reprimand or counseling."1
The Court of Special Appeals in 2002 described Maryland State Merit System:

. . . Following a study undertaken by a TaskForce appointed by the Governor, the so called
State MeritSystem was revised by the State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996
(the "Act"). The General Assembly created the State Personnel Management System ("SPMS,f)
to govern the employment of persons in the Executive branch of State government. See S.P.P. §6202 et seq. SPMS falls "underthe authority ofthe Secretary of Budgetand Management." S.P.P.
§6-101.

Pursuant to S.P.P. §6-102,the "basic purpose" ofthe SPMS "is to provide a system of
employment for employees underthe authority ofthe Secretary." To that end, the SPMS
"establishes categories of servicefor employees based on the general nature ofthe employee's
duties or method of appointment." S.P.P. §6-102(l)(i). In particular, it "groupsemployees into
classes based on specific duties...," S.P.P. §6-102(2)(i), and "provides for a system of merit
employment in the skilled serviceand professional service," based on a "standard" of "business
efficiency." S.P.P. §6-102(3). Further, SPMS "provides procedures for the appointment,
discipline, and termination of employees in each service." S.P.P. §6-102(l)(ii). Additionally, it

provides "a process for the...prompt removal ofemployees." S.P.P. §-102(4)(ii).2
Specifically, within SPMS, thereare six employment categories: skilled service; professional
service; management service; executive service; specialappointees; and temporary employees.
See S.P.P. §§6-401 to 6-406 . Under S.P.P. §6-401(a), "all positions in the Executive Branch of
State government that are included in the StatePersonnel ManagementSystem are in the skilled
service," unless otherwise provided.

Collectively, the various provisions ofthe Act combine to refute the perception that a person
employed by the State is virtually guaranteed continued employment, without regard to the
quality of performance. Instead, the legislative schemeprovides for a system in which a skilled
employee's continued employment depends upon satisfactory job performance. That view is
reflected in S.P.P. §2-301(a), which states: "In keeping with State efforts to reinvent government,
restructuring ofthe State's personnel system should enhance the delivery of services to citizens in

aneffective and timely manner."3
S.P.P. §6-403(a) defines the circumstances under which a position is in the "management service"
and §6-4029(a) provides the circumstances under which a position is in the "Professional service."

Employee performanceappraisals are providedfor. S.P.P. §7-501, et. seq. Disciplinary actions, layoffs
1Kram v. Md. Military Dept, 374 Md. 651, 657, 824 A. 2d 99 (2003); SPP §12-101.
2Danaher v. Dept. ofLabor, 148 Md. App. 139, 155, 811 A. 2d 359(2002). (citations omitted)
1Danaher, 148 Md. App. at 156.
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and terminations are governed by S.P.P. §11-102, et. Kseq. Regulations are required to be implemented
to establish policies and procedure with regard to disciplinary actions related to employee performance.
S.P.P. §11-111. Thresholds exist fortermination depending on the categorization of an employee as
being in skilled, professional, ormanagement service. S.P.P. §§ 11-109, 11-113. Provision is made for

automatic termination. S.P.P. §§ 11-105, 11-106. 11-305.4
S.P.P. §11-106 requires the appointing authority to do an investigation of employee misconduct, to
meet with the employee, consider any mitigation circumstances and thereafter to determine appropriate

disciplinary action prior totermination.5
Significant Case Decisions

"Classification standard" not a defined term

Whatcan be grieved and what need not be grieved or cannot be grieved
o At issue in Kram v. Maryland Military Department, 374 Md. 651, 824 A. 2d 99 (2002) was whether
militaryairport firefighters could grieve under SPP §12-101(b)(2), the requirement that they maintain their
membership in the Maryland Air National Guard. The Court said this requirement was a "classification
standard" which could not be the subject of a grievance. 374 at 660. "Classification standard" is not a
defined term within SPP. Section §4-202 of SPPdirectsthe Secretary to "establish standards and general

procedures to be usedto classify positions." 374 at659. The Secretary created standards for the guidance
of individual agencies. The language ofthe statute andlegislative history indicated that classification was
to include duties and responsibilities; knowledge, skills and abilities; education and experience
requirements; andspecialrequirements for one or more positions to which the selection standards andrates

of pay can beapplied. 374 at 661.6
The grievance procedure
This "second look"provision
Look at the whole statute

o

Whether a correctional employee had resigned due to the fact she was absentwithout notice was an issue in
Dept. of Corrections v. Thomas, 158Md. App. 540, 544, 857 A. 2d 638 (2004). COMAR 17.04.04.03D
statedthat an employee may separate from employment by resigning and being absent without leave is the
equivalent of a resignation. 158 Md. App. at 545.The COMAR regulation had a "second look" provision
and the Court held that the employee sufficiently invoked this provision. 158 Md. App. at 552. That
provision providedthat the resignation "may be expunged by the appointing authority when extenuating
circumstances exist, and the employee had good cause for not notifying the appointing authority." 158 Md.

4Danaher, 148 Md. App. at 159-60.
5Dept. ofPublic Safety v. Thomas, 158 Md. App. 540, 553, 857 A.2d638 (2004). This case also givessome background stating
that the State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996 causes the merger ofthe former Department of Personnel into
the Department of Budget and Management. Id., at 554.

6Interesting is the fact thatthe Cram Court included a suggestion to the firefighters asto how their dispute may otherwise be
addressed:

"Although a grievance may in some ways be an exclusive administrative remedy, this does not mean that the
Employees aredeprived of any and all remedies to resolve what they contend is Management's unconstitutionally
inequitable treatment of military firefighters in terms of retirement benefits, overtime pay, or the use of paid State
leave. Forexample, as the employees did in McKamey v. State, 268 Mont. 137, 885 P. 2d 515 (Mont. 1994)could file a
declaratoryjudgment action in circuit court. As to overtime issues, the Employees could also pursue an action in
federal court under the FLSA. With respect to retirement benefits, when and if one ofthe Employees is discharged
upon reaching the Guard retirement age, he could then appealhis termination on constitutional grounds. I offer these
potential alternatives in response to the Employees' contention that this proceeding is their only recourse, without
offering any opinion or conclusion as to whether or to what extent the Employees might be successful in pursuing their
claims in another forum."

Kram, 374 Md. at 662.

The employees had argued that under the State Personnel System Reform Act of 1996 the grievance process was designed to
be an "exclusive remedy" for an employee in the State Personnel Management System. Id.
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App. at 551. Thomas had the burdento prove this discretionary provision should inureto her benefit.
There was some question as to whether Thomas tendered medical certificatesto excuse his absence. A
hearing had to be held on this issue. 158 Md. App. at 552-53.
Even this "at-will" State employ has some rights to grieve

o

Danaher v. Dept. ofLabor, 148 Md. App. 139, 155,811 A. 2d 359 (2002) saw the Court reversingand
remanding a case involving termination of a Maryland State employee for violation of a sexual harassment
policy. Even though the employee was an "at-will" employee, the Statedid not comply with its statutory
responsibility to investigate alleged misconduct, meet with the employee, consider any mitigating
circumstances, and then to "determine appropriate disciplinary action, if any, to be imposed." SPP §11106. 148 Md. App. at 166, 176. SPP §11-106 "does not detail how the Employer was to conduct the

required investigation." Nevertheless, using a dictionary definition, the inquiry had to be careful or

systematic and adhere tobasic principles offairness. 148 Md. at 169.7 Termination ofa State employee
with prejudicemeans that the employeemay not be employed with the State in any capacity for three years.
148 Md. App. at 176.

There Is a binding agreement provision resolution alternative in this case
o The Court of Special Appeals held that when the Departmentof Corrections entered into a binding

agreement with a corrections officeras punishment for negligence of that officer resulting in the deathof an
inmate, the agreement precluded the Departmentfrom rescinding it and imposing the more severe sanction
of termination at a later date. KcKay v. Dept. ofPublic Safety, 150 Md. App. 182, 186, 819 A. 2d 1088
(2003). In a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court stated that SPP §11-108(a)(2) allows an appointing
authority and an employee to agree to the "imposition of a lesser disciplinary action as a final and binding
action, not subject to further review." 150 Md. App. at 195.Allowance of that bargaining mechanism
meant the bargain made could not be rescinded despite the fact the Warden stated he came upon other
evidence following the time the bargain was made. 150 Md. App. at 198.
The overall picture ofthe grievance procedure
Imposition ofsanctions
Rights ofprobationary employees
o PSC v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 882 A. 2d 849 (2005) discussed the 1996 enactment ofthe State Personnel

Management System Reform Act and the procedure for the imposition of sanctions to classified and other
employees ofthe State. 389 Md. at 68-69 Those rights do not apply to probationary employees. 389 Md.
at 71-72. There is a distinction in the process between an employee's performance and misconduct of an
employee. 389 Md. at 72-73.
ALJfinal administrative authority over grievance procedures

o

Dept. PublicSafety v. Myers, 392 Md. 589, 898 A. 2d 464 (2006) held that an A1J, as the final
administrative authority under Maryland's statutory grievance procedure for most State Executive Branch
employees had the authority, if he or she concludes that the employee is performing duties that entitlethe
employee to be in a different classification,to direct that the employee be placed into the proper
classification. 392 Md. at 590. Discussing some history ofthe State personnel law (§§ 6-401 through 6406 ofthe State Personnel and Pension Article (SPP)), the inclusion of employees into categories and the
workings of government units, the Court discussed the term "grievance" as used in the statute. 392 Md. at
591-92. This case involved seven employees working at various correctional institutions, the work history
of these employees and their reclassification. Concluding that an employee had sustained her burden of
proof that she did the kind of work set forth in the specifications for a position designated as APS II, the
ALJ ordered she be reclassified to that position. 392 Md. at 593-96. Other employees were found not to
have sustained their burden of proof. 392 Md. at 596. The circuit court affirmed as did the Court of Special
Appeals.
"As we have observed, 'grievance' is defined very broadly." It includes any dispute concerning the

7In McKay, therewas no meeting with the employee giving hima meaningful opportunity to respond. Nor was the veracity of
the allegations checked. McKay, 150 Md. App. at 170 A number of disciplinary options are available to the employer, 150 Md.
App. at 171, but before determining which of those optionsto exercise, the Department of Labor had to satisfy the statutory
requirements"by conducting an investigation and considering mitigatingcircumstances." McKay, 150 Md. App. at 176.
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interpretation and application of a personnel policy or regulation, with some exceptions. 392 Md. at 597.
"There is nothing in the definition remotely suggesting that a dispute over whether an employee is
performing duties that have been assigned to a different position and, for that reason, is entitled to be
reclassified to the positionto which those duties have beenassigned, is excludedfrom the grievance

procedure, and, indeed, both the statute and theregulations promulgated by DBM expressly recognize that
kind of reclassification grievance." 392 Md. at 598. "Unquestionably, an employee may use the grievance

procedure to complain thatthe employee's duties andresponsibilities are thoseassigned to a different
classification. Indeed, as we observed, SPP §12-1030}) provides that, unless another procedure is provided

by SPP, the grievance procedure "is the exclusive remedy through which a nontemporary employee in the
[SPMS] may seek an administrative remedy for violations ofthe provisions of this article."" 392 Md.at
598-99. "We do not share DPSCS's view that allowing the ALJ, as the final decision maker in a grievance

proceeding, to directan appropriate reclassification will significantly impinge upon thejurisdiction and
responsibility of eitherthe principal unit or DBM in devising or implementing the classification system; nor
will itjeopardize the integrity ofthe SPMS. TheALJ is not changing the definition or description of classes
or positions but is simply determining, based on the facts presented, that a particular employee is executing
duties and responsibilities that those agencies haveassigned to a different position and that the employee is
therefore entitled to be in that position." 392 Md. at 600.

Interpretation ofagencyregulations can sometimes be the subject ofappellate disagreement
Employee compensation time.

o

Thepolitical process probably began to finally decide whether a Maryland State employee is entitled to be
paid as "worktime" for the entire timespent driving from home directly to an out-ofregular work place
site, or whether the employee's normal commute timeto the regular workplace is to be deducted from the
time spent driving to the out-of-workplace site after thedecision inMiller v. Comptroller, 398 Md. 272,
920 A. 2d 467 (2007)8. A majority of 5 against a minority of 2 saw different results in interpreting a

myriad ofregulations9 addressing the issue. Employee compensation case law discussion of statutes and
regulations wasreviewed in considerable detail bythe Court. TheCourt majority heldthatCOMAR
17.04.11.02B(l)(j) "does not entitle employees to compensation for all the time spenttraveling between
home and a work site other than their assigned office and that [SPP §12-203(b)] requires a remedyto be

limited to compensation for claims existing within 20 days prior to the initiation ofa grievance.10" 398 Md.
at 286. Interpreting the same group of regulations, theminority saw the issue differently. No benefit can
be seen to the reader in going into great detail as to the interpretation issue in this case. Suffice it to say
that what is or what is not consistent with the statutoryscheme creating an agency and the regulations that
come forth from the agency can be seen differently by judges ofthe same court.
The ALJ as finder offact?
Can the ALJ enter a lesser penalty?

Be careful: Lookat the statute. Who has to make whatfinding, when, where, how and what. . .
o Termination of a State of Maryland employee following an incident in which Neal placed her hands around
the throat of an inmate11 wasreversed in Dep't Public Safety v. Neal, 160Md. App. 496, 864 A. 2d 287
8Miller's job intheComptroller's office required herto conduct audits at field locations going directly to remote locations from
her home. Miller, 398 Md. App. at 276.

9"[T]he interpretation of anagency rule is governed bythe same principles that govern the interpretation of a statute." Miller,
398Md. at 282-83. The minority said that the majority failed to apply the appropriate standard of review and that it confused

appellate court jurisprudence. 398 Md. at 289. They said that regulatory language had to be interpreted according to its "natural
andordinary meaning" and that the majority did not accordingly interpret the law, 398Md. at 292, and that "The majority's
conclusion directly contradictsthe ordinary and plain language of COMAR 17.04.11.02B(1)G). 398 Md. at 294.
10 SPP§12-203(b) doesstatethat a grievance procedure must be initiated by the employee within a 20 day period following the
occurrence or the employee'sfirst knowledge ofthe occurrence, Miller, 398 Md. at 297, but the minority said that the ALJ or
final decision maker's authority under §12-303 to "grant 'any appropriate remedy' availableunder Section 12-402(a)" and that
meantthat the GeneralAssembly could not have intended remedies under Section 12-402to be restricted by Section 12-303's
filing requirements." 398 Md. at 297.
11 The Court detailed the facts ofthe incident where the inmate had been bumping the Correctional Officer. Neal, 160 Md. app. at
499-501.
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(2004), cert denied, 386 Md. 181 (2005). Neal was terminated12 and upon appeal, an ALJ determined she
shouldbe reinstated and a 30 day suspension without pay imposed. The ALJ was convinced that the
incident was more in the nature of horseplay that wasnot all that bad. 160 Md. App. at 499. Within the

opinion isdetailed theState disciplinary procedure for correctional officers consisting of a mitigation
conference, COMAR regulations pertaining to discipline (with different categories of infractions) andthe
facts applicable to the case being considered. 160 Md. App. at 504, 511-16. Asto the contention that the
ALJ erred in not making a determination thatthe discipline imposed by Warden Maloofwas a clearabuse
of discretion: "The ALJ's decision that the evidence did not support any ofthe factual bases underlying
automatic termination of Neal from employment amounted to a decision that the sanction of automatic
termination was unreasonable." A reviewing court is requiredto defer to the ALJ fact-finding. 160 Md.

App. at 515-16. Under the circumstances of this case, considering the charges against Neal, theALJ "was
authorized to impose a modified sanction from thetermination thatwas imposed by the warden. The
sanction of a one-month suspension without pay is a lesser sanction than the termination sanction imposed
bythewarden. Accordingly, it is a modification ofthe termination, which the ALJwas authorized to
impose." 160 Md. App. at 518.

Conditions on imposing administrative discipline - unavailability ofthe employee

o In a continuing sagaofjudicial review of administrative decisions pertaining to the termination of
a State of Corrections employee13, the Court ofAppeals inDep't Public Safety v. Donahue, 400
Md. 510, 929 A. 2d 512 (2007) held that Donohuewas properly discharged. SPP §11-106

imposes conditions onthe taking of disciplinary action against a State employee which includes a
requirement thatthe appointing authority must take action against the employee "no later than 30
days afterthe appointing authority acquires knowledge ofthe misconduct for which the
disciplinary action is imposed." 400 Md. at 527.

". . . SPP §11-106(a) requires the appointing authority to meet withthe employee and
consider any mitigating circumstances before taking any disciplinary action." 400 Md. at 531.
"Under State Personnel and Pensions Article §1l-106(a)(2) and COMAR 17.04.05.04D3, in a

disciplinary action, a State employee may be deemed unavailable to meetwith the appointing
authority when, afterthe appointing authority has made a reasonable, good faith effort to notify
the employee ofthe meeting and the employee has been given a reasonable amount of timeto
receive and respond to the notice, the employee fails to respond to the notice or appear at the
meeting." Discussing the meaning ofthe word "unavailable" and whether Donohue was
unavailable for meeting with the Warden to discuss the charges against him, he had no valid
complaint when the letters and telephone calls to him neverreached him. "In the absence of any
information indicating where Donahue mightbe or, if he was not, in fact at home and was simply
ignoring the communications when he might be returning, the Warden was not required to keep
postponing the meeting from dayto dayor week to week, waiting to see if Donohue might call,
write or appear. Wardens have otherthings to do. We hold that the warden made a reasonable,
good faith effortto notify Donohue, that Donohue was given a reasonable amount of time to
receive and respond to the notice, and that he failed to do so. That equates to his unavailability."
400 Md. at 536-37.

B. License Suspensions.

There is a specific provision in the MAPA (SG §10-226) dealing with the suspension of licenses. License
is broadly defined by that sectionto mean any permission required by law that is not required only for

12 Termination procedures under COMAR and categories of disciplinary procedures were set forth in the opinion in great detail.
Neal, 160 Md. App. at 504, 511-16.

13 The courtdetailed the 10 year path ofthe proceedings. Donohue, 400 Md. at
515-526.
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revenue purposes. Thatpermission may be intheform of an approval, certificate, charter, permit,

registration orlicense.14 Many, many licenses are issues by the State ofMaryland.
Generally, a license may not be revoked or suspended until the licensee is first given written notice of

the facts that warrant suspension orrevocation, and an opportunity tobe heard.15
There is a provision for summary suspension if the licensing authority finds that "the public health,
safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action," andthe licensee is promptly given "written
notice ofthe suspension, the finding, andthe reasons that support the finding," and an "opportunity to be
heard."16 "The discretion to issuea summary suspension orderif the agency so chooses necessarily
includes the discretion to issue the order when the agency chooses."
The statute reads:

SG §10-226. Licenses - Special provisions.
(a) Definitions.-

(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) "License" means all or any part of permission that:
(i) is required by law to be obtained from a unit;
(ii) is not required only for revenue purposes; and
(iii) is in any form, including:
1. an approval;
2. a certificate;
3. a charter;

4. a permit; or
5. a registration.

(3) "Unit" means an officer or unit that is authorized by law to:
(i) adopt regulations subject to Subtitle 1 of this title; or
(ii) adjudicate contested cases under this subtitle.

(b) Renewal andexpiration.- If, at least2 calendar weeks before a license expires,the licensee makes
sufficientapplicationfor renewal ofthe license, the license does not expire until:
(1) the unit takes final action on the application; and
(2) either:

(i) the time for seeking judicial review ofthe action expires; or
(ii) any judicial stay ofthe unit's final action expires.
(c) Revocation ofsuspension.-

(1) Exceptas provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a unit may not revoke or suspend a license
unless the unit first gives the licensee:

(i) written notice ofthe facts that warrant suspension or revocation; and
(ii) an opportunity to be heard.
(2) A unit may order summarily the suspensionof a license if the unit:
(i) finds that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action; and
(ii) promptly gives the licensee:

1. written notice ofthe suspension, the finding, and the reasons that support the finding; and
2. an opportunity to be heard.

14 That"permission" from the State may be in the form of aUnitwhich is defined to mean anofficeror unit authorized to adopt
regulations or adjudicate contested cases.

15 SG §10-226(c)(l). Thus, this is noticeand opportunity to be heard prior to the effective date of any revocation or suspension.
Boardof Physician QualityAssurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 165, 848 A. 2d 642 (2004).
16 Mullan, 381 Md. at 165-66.COMAR 10.32.02.05(F)(2), passed by the Board of Physicians sets standards for summary
disposition. Id. SG 10-226(c)(2) statesthe Board"may" issue a summary suspension means the Board is not compelledto issue
such a suspension even when it makes a finding that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action.
381 Md. at 166-67.

17Mw//0«,381Md.atl68.
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Significant Case Decisions

TheInvestigative subpoena and the burden on the health careprovider or the patient tofile for a protective order
o Instructive for the dire consequences that can result by not properly utilizing the proper legal procedures to
contest a subpoena issued by an agency, the result ofthe opinion in Maryland Board ofPhysicians v. Eist,
417 Md. 545, 11 A. 3d. 786 (2011). Any experienced family law attorney will wonder aloud how the

complaint to the Boardof Physicians by an estranged husband/father in a very contentious domesticthat a

psychiatrist had overly medicated his wife and sons managed toreceiv so much attention bythe Board.18
Psychiatric records from Dr. Eist were the subjectof a subpoena issued by the Board; Dr. Eist made inquiry
of his patients who said the records shouldnot be disclosed; the court appointed attorney for the children
determined that their psychiatric "privilege" should not be waived; Dr. Eist refused to release the records
andthe Boardreprimanded and fined him for the failure to cooperate with a lawful investigation. 417 Md.
at 548, 550-551.

The ALJ considering the case determined that "Dr. Eist had acted in good faith because he relied upon
the advice of counsel" and therefore he had not violated any tenet of his professional responsibility under §
14-404(a)(33) HO. The Board did not agreeand reprimanded Dr. Eist him and fined him $5,000. The
circuit court reversed, 417 Md. at 559, and the Court of Special Appeals at 176 Md. App. at 135 concluded
"... [T]he Board's interest in obtainingthe patients' psychiatric recordsto investigate the standard of care

allegation ... did not outweigh the patients' privacy interest in those highly personal records..." 417 Md.
at 560.

On certiorari, the Court pointed to HO §14-404(a)(33) which allows the Board to "reprimand any
licensee, place any licensee on probation, or suspend or revoke a license if the licensee .. .(33) fails to
cooperate with a lawful investigation conducted by the Board." HO §14-206(a) gives the Board authority to
issue subpoenas, and HG § 4-306 requires a health care provider to disclose medical records "without the
authorization of a person in interest" to a licensing and disciplinary board.
The Court of Appeals stated: "We shallhold that because Dr. Eist nor the patientstook any appropriate
action to challenge die subpoena, such as filing in the Circuit Court a motion to quash or a motion for a
protective order, as requiredby the applicable statutes, and because Dr. Eist clearly failed to comply with

the subpoena in atimely manner, the Board's decision was legally correct." 417 Md. at 549.l9
Title 14 of HO authorizes the Board of Physicians to take disciplinary action against health providers
and to investigate allegations of conduct warranting disciplinary action. The Board has the statutory
authorityto issue subpoenas. 417 Md. at 562. The Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records (HG
Subtitle 3 provides that a health care provider shall disclose a medical record without authorization ofa
person in interest in response to a subpoena for investigation involving the improper practice of a health
care professional. 417 Md. at 563. HG §4-307"concerning mental health medical records, reiterates that,
in connection with a Board investigation, records must be provided to the Board regardless of a patient's
authorization, and that the appropriate procedure for weighing a patient's privacy interests against the
Board's need for the records is for the patient or the health care provider to file a court action to quash the
subpoena or for a protective order" under HG §4-307(k)(l)(v)(l). 417 Md. at 563-64.
If the patient and/or the health care provider believe that there are grounds for not producing the
records, the patient or the health care provider must file a motion to quash the subpoena or a motion for
a protective order pursuant to Maryland Rules 2-403 or 2-510. This is the route chosen by the General
Assembly for the resolution of constitutional or other objections to the subpoena. The General

Assembly did not provide for an action bythe Board to enforce the subpoena. n Furthermore, the
General Assembly did not provide that the health care provider could refuse to comply with the

18 It is interesting to notethe very large number of amicus briefs filed on behalfof various psychiatric associations
asking the Court of Appeals to keep its nose out ofthe privilegethat exists between a patient and his/her psychiatrist
or psychologist.

19 Aftercharges were brought against Dr. Eist the records were turned overto the Board and upon Peer Review, it
was determined that: "no breach in any applicable standard of care in his treatment or conduct with the patients."
417 Md. at 553-54.

252

N.

subpoena, fail to file a motionto quash or a motion for a protective order, and later, in a disciplinary
action, defend on the ground that the patient's privacy rights were infringed by the subpoena.
417 Md. at 564-56

What does the statute say? May the license be revoked because of . . . ?
o Revocation ofthe license of a physician by the Boardof Physicians was reversed by the Court of Appeals

upon the entry ofan Alford plea ofthe crime ofsecond degree assault (4th degree sexual offense had also
been charged) and the physician was granted PBJ in Rudman v. Maryland State Board ofPhysicians, 414
Md. 243, 994 A.2d 985 (2010). The Board interpreted the court decision as one where the physician had
pled guilty to a crime of moralturpitude andruled thatit was required to revoke. 414 Md. at 246.
When the physician enteredhis pleahe did not withdraw his plea of not guilty to the sexual offense
charge, he denied he had committed eitheran assault or a sexual offense, and the circuit court had no
opportunity to evaluate the strength ofthe proffered evidence. Thus, there was no basis for the conclusion
that a conviction had occurred. 414 Md. at 260-61. "Because Petitioner has not been found guilty of a crime

of moral turpitude, and has never admitted thathe hascommitted any criminal offense, the Board does not
have the authority to revoke Petitioner's license without giving him the opportunity for a hearing pursuant
to the hearing provisions of H.O. 14-405." 414 Md. at 262.
License suspensionfor violation ofagency probation conditions

o

Cohen v. Boardof Physicians, 160Md. App. 277, 863 A.2d 358 (2004) was the casewhere a physician's
license was revoked when that physician had had a number of difficulties with the licensing agency over
the years. "Appellant argues thatthe Board exceeded its statutory authority when it revoked his license
because the ground of revocation, i.e.,violation of probation, is not found in [HO § 14-404]. 160 Md. at
282. Among the authority provisions givento the Board upon a finding of a statutory violation is the
authority to revoke a license. The Board's findings in 1995 thatthis psychiatrist committed"boundary
violations" andwas "guilty of immoral and unprofessional conductin the practice of medicine" in violation
of HO §14-404(a)(3). Dr. Cohen's license couldhavebeen revokedatthattime but he was placed on five
years probation subject to conditions. Dr. Cohen entered into a consent order where he agreed that"if he
failed to meet the terms ofthe Consent Order, the Board would be able to impose any appropriate

sanction." 198 Md. at 283. Nothing producedby Dr. Cohen gave evidence to the fact that the
determination of revocation of license was arbitrary and unreasonably severe. 198 Md. at 284.

Thepassageoftime and Its Impact on the right to summarily suspend
o Dr. Mullan's license to practice medicinewas summarily suspended because he was practicing underthe
influence of alcohol in Board ofPhysician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 848 A. 2d 642
(2004). There was a delay in the investigation ofthe danger prior to a summary suspension order being
issued. Discussing case law concerning the passage of time from complaintto summary suspension
procedures, the Court stated that the delay was to be considered asevidence andcould be relevant "in
determining whetherthe agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it ordered the summary suspension
in the first place." "The length ofthe investigatory period leading up to summary suspension doesnot play
a role in the consideration of whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency's factual finding
that the situation 'imperatively requires emergency action.'" 381 Md. at 171.
Discipline ofa dentist

o

Rosov v. Dental Examiners, 163 Md. App. 98, 877 A. 2d 1111 (2005) affirmed the Board determination of
a violation ofthe dental act by: (1) the failure of a dentist to properly attend and notify the patient relative
to her injectionwith Lidocaine with a needle that had previously punctured the skin of his dental assistant;
(2) his misrepresentation to the Board of attemptsto contact the patient; (3) his failure to comply with CDE
guidelines; and his failure to properly document the file . Nothing indicated that Dr. Rosov should be
given one more opportunity. Rosov, 163 Md. App. at 122-25. The Complaint in this case was filed by his
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dental assistant, not the patient. The Court said that fact did not matter given the substantialevidenceon
inappropriate conduct. 163 Md. App. at 126, 20
Representation ofImproper settings on surgical Instrument

o

The Court of Special Appeals did a bit of a stretchin Comfeld v. BoardofPhysicians, 174 Md. App. 456,
921 A. 2d 893 (2007) when it determined that a physician engaged in unprofessional conduct in the
practice of medicineby misrepresenting to both a hospital peer review investigator and the Boardthat
impropersettingson a surgical instrument he used were not made to his specifications. At issue was what is
included in the phrase within the physician's disciplinary statute of "professional misconduct in the

practice of medicine21" as"practice medicine" isdefined byHO §14-404. Dr. Cornfeld was cited for a
number of violations. Before Cornfeld, appellate courts of Maryland had occasion to consider the issue:
McDonald (physician's effort to influence a witnessscheduledto testify against him in a malpractice case);
Banks (sexual harassment of hospital employees); and Finbucan (consensual sexual relationship with
patients). Fundamental principles of medicalethicsrequirethat "[a] physicianshall deal honestlywith

patients and colleagues^.]" 174 Md. App. at 479. With peer review being astandard practice (citing cases
and other commentary),"to exclude dishonesty in hospital peer review proceedings as sanctionable
misconductin the practice of medicinewould meanthat lying directly to a patient about what occurred
during her surgery would qualify as unprofessional conduct in the practice of medicine, but lying to a
hospital about the same surgery during peer review proceedings concerningthat same patient would not

qualify as unprofessional misconduct in the practice of medicine." 174Md. App. at 481-82. Cornfeld's lie
concerning his conduct at a treating physician beforepeer review and the Board constitutedunprofessional

conduct "inthe practice ofmedicine." 174 Md. App. at482.22
Delayin the Board investigation was addressed by the Court, stating its concern by the delay, but also
statingthat the failure ofthe Legislature to provide a penalty for this delay and the lack of prejudice to Dr.
Cornfeld meant there was no reversible error. 174 Md. App. at 483-84.

Dr. Cornfeld complainedthat a sanction(suspension and long term probation) imposedupon him was
disproportionate to his allegedoffense (patient not harmed and asked him to deliver her next child for
conduct in leaving the operating room and misrepresenting his instructionsto hospital personnel) so as to
constitute an abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious agency action considering the facts ofthe case

in 174Md. App. 456, 921 A. 2d 893 (2007). Agencies have broad latitudein fashioning sanctions within
the legislatively designed limitsand in this casethe Courtsaid it did not see the sanction imposed as
"extreme and egregious" as to warrant judicial intervention. 174 Md. App. at 487.

C. Insurance Cases.

No industry is regulated more than the insurance industry. "Under Insurance Art., §2-210(a)(2), any
person claiming to be aggrieved by a decision ofthe Commissioner is entitled to a hearing on the matter.
A hearing held pursuant to Insurance Art., §2-210 is conducted in accordance with the contested case
provisions ofthe APA §§10-201-10-227. . . . [T]he Rules of Procedure promulgated by the OAH in
COMAR 28.02.01, and the regulations promulgated by the MIA [Maryland Insurance Administration] in
COMAR 31.02.02, complement the contested case provisions ofthe APA." Sometimes the regulations

are duplicative ofeach other and the statute.23 SG §10-206(a)(l) requires OAH to "adopt regulations to
govern the procedures and practice in all contested cases delegated to the Office [of Administrative

Hearings] and conducted under this [(Administrative Procedure Act - Contested Cases)] subtitle."24 "In
20 Rosov involveda six-daycontested evidentiary hearing. Rosov, 163 Md. App. at 107. This is another Courtthatnotedthat
judicial review of administrativeagency decisions is narrow and reciting the substantial evidence case.
21 The ALJ had determined this conduct did not fall within "the practice of medicine."The Board of Physicians determined it did.
Cornfeld, 174 Md. App. at 468.

22 Cornfeld also complained that a delay in Board investigation prejudiced him butthe Court found no prejudice. Cornfeld, 174
Md. App. at 484. The Board finding that Cornfeld violated the standard of carewas supported by evidence presented. 174 Md.
App. at 485-86.

23 Mehrling v. Nationwide Insurance, 371 Md. 40, 51-53, 806 A. 2d662 (2002).
24 Mehrling, 371 Md. at 52-53.
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addition, the [M]APA authorizes an agency to adopt itsown regulations to govern procedures in contested
case hearings." SG §10-206(b) states that"each agency may adopt regulations to govern procedures under
this [(Administrative Procedure Act- Contested Cases)] subtitle and practice before the agency in
contested cases."25

The [Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA)] "has promulgated regulations in COMAR 31.02.02
governing how a contested case hearing isto beconducted bytheOAH, and the Commissioner 'retains

authority over delegated cases to the extent provided in that chapter.' See COMAR 31.02.02.0IB ™
26

"Section 10-213 ofthe APA specifies with particularity the evidencewhich may be offeredand
considered in a contested case, and provides generally that "eachparty in a contested case shall offer all

ofthe evidence thatthe party wishes to have made part ofthe record." APA §10-213(a)(l). "Findings of
fact mustbe based exclusively on the evidence of record in the contested case proceeding and on matters

officially noticed in that proceeding." APA §10-214(a)."27 "Ifthe MIA has not delegated to the OAH the
authority to make the final decision in a contested case or category of contested cases ... the ALJ
prepares a proposed decision containing "proposed findings offact, conclusions of law, ororders in
accordance withthe agencyfs delegation under §10-205 of this [(Administrative Procedure ActContested Cases)] subtitle." APA §10-220(a). The proposed decision is submitted by the OAH to the
Commissioner for his or her consideration and a final decision in the matter. See APA §10-220(a). Upon

motion of a party, the ALJ also may issue a proposed or final decision (depending upon the delegation of
authority bytheMIA) "dismissing a complaint or other agency action, or any request for hearing which
fails to state a claim for which agency reliefmay be granted." COMAR 28.02.01.16B. A proposed
decision dismissing a complaint is reviewed bythe Commissioner in the same manner as any proposed
decision."28

Parties may fileexceptions with MIA to an ALJ proposed decision. COMAR 31.02.02.10C provides:
"exceptions to the proposed decision shall be inwriting unless specified otherwise bythefinal decision
maker." In considering a party's exceptions, the final administrative decision maker, in this casethe
Associate Deputy Commissioner, "shall personally consider each part ofthe record that a party cites in its

exceptions or arguments before making afinal decision." APA § 10-216(a)(3).29 The regulation details
what the record before the Commissioner shall contain. The Commissioner then issues a final order.

While the Commissioner is bound by the ALJ's findings of facts that are supported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence, he/she is not bound by any legal analysis, proposed conclusions of law

orproposed order.30 The Commissioner may affirm, reverse, ormodify the proposed decision orremand
the caseto AOH for further proceedings. When a remand is ordered, it is incumbent uponthe
Commissioner to set forth, with particularity, the basis for the reversal, modification or proposed

decision. The MAPA requires specific findings offact and conclusions oflaw.31
Significant Case Decisions
The Commissioner's review ofthe ALJ decision

o

The Insurance Commissioner was required to consider exceptions filed to an ALJ decision in Mehrling v.
Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 64, 806 A. 2d 662 (2002). When the Commissioner reviewed the ALJ decision,

25M?/zr/wg,371Md.at53.
26 Mehrling, 371 Md. at 53.
27 Mehrling, 371 Md. at 53.
28 Mehrling, 371 Md. at 53-54.
29 Mehrling, 311 Md. at 54.
30 Mehrling, 31\Md. at 55.
31 Mehrling, 371 Md. at 55-56.
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Mehrling offered additional information that the status ofherbankruptcy case did notpreclude heraction to
prevent Nationwide from terminating heras an agent. That new evidence, offered as partofthe exceptions
to the ALJ decision, was part ofthe recordand had to be considered by the Commissioner. It was not clear
whether the Commissioner considered this new evidence. 371 Md. at 65. The Commissioner's final order

did not provide"adequate factual findings and a clearstatement ofthe rationalefor the agency's
conclusions so as to permit 'meaningful' judicialreview." 371 Md. at 66. Filing exceptions "is the only

appropriate method for aparty to present post-hearing evidence for an agency's possible consideration."32
Because ofthe authority ofthe Commissioner, a review is not confinedto the record compiledbefore the
ALJ. It is the function of a court to reviewed a "final decision." 371 Md. at 60.

D. LEORB.

The Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights [formerArt. 27, §§ 727-734D] was enacted in 1974." The

primary purpose ofthe LEOBR is "'to guarantee certain procedural safeguards to law enforcement
officers during any investigation or interrogation thatcould lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or
dismissal.'"33 "It is the officer's exclusive remedy in matters of departmental discipline." The Legislature
has recognized thatthe nature ofthe duties of police officers are different from thatof other employees.
The LEOBR grants "extensive rights to law enforcement officers thatare not available to the general

public." The LEORB [former Art. 27, §730] "provides a detailed recitation governing the conduct ofthe

hearing and the introduction ofevidence."34 "A state police officer confronted with disciplinary
proceedings is entitled to protections afforded bythe contested cases provisions ofthe APA [SG §10202], aswell asthose provided under theLEOBR. [former Art. 27, §727(b)(l)] "County police agencies.

. .are not included within the purview ofthe State APA."35 The LEOBR affords protection during any
inquiry into his conduct which could lead tothe imposition ofa disciplinary sanction. It provides a police
officer due process protection when theofficer is investigated and/or interrogated as a result of a

disciplinary-type complaint.36 LEOBR Is presentlyfound in the Public Safety Article, §3-101, et. seq.
Section 729A ofthe LEORB prohibits a law enforcement agency from prohibiting secondary

employment by a police officer butthe agency "may promulgate reasonable regulations as to a law
enforcement officer's secondary employment." When Montgomery County passed regulations and a
police officer was determined to have violated those regulations, an issue arose as to whether a Chiefs
power to discipline an officer whoviolated the secondary employment directives could include
prohibiting thatofficer from engaging in secondary employment for a three month period of time. The
Court concluded that enactment ofthe LEORB was not to define the substantive authority of a Chief of

police. "While it describes the authority ofthe hearing board to recommend, and confirms the power of
the chiefto impose, certain disciplinary sanctions, it does not define the scope ofthe Chiefs authority to
discipline.38

32 Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 61-62, 806A. 2d 662(2002).
33 Colemanv. Anne ArundelPolice, 369 Md. 108, 122, 797 A. 2d 770 (2002).

34 Coleman, 369 Md. at 122-23.
35 Coleman, 363 Md. at 137-38.
36 FOPNo. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 181-82, 680 A. 2d 1052 (1996). This Courtsaid that the enactment was not for the

purpose of defining the scope ofthe substantive authority ofthe Chiefof Police. FOPNo. 35, 343 Md. at 181.
37 FOP No. 35, 343 Md. at 173-74. In writing this opinion, Judge Robert Bell detailed the enactment of regulations by

Montgomery County whichprohibited publicemployees from engaging in any otheremployment unless that employment was
approved by the Montgomery County Ethics Commission. Id., at 161-73. TheOfficer did notquestion the authority ofthe Chief
to issue a letter of reprimand. Id.

38 FOPNo. 35, 343 Md. at 184. "Its primary functionbeing to provide a procedural frameworkfor the protectionof law
enforcement officers subjectto disciplinary action, the LEOBR is notan effective vehiclefor definingthe types of disciplinary
sanctions available to the Chief." 343 Md. at 183.
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Significant Case Decisions
Probationary status and LEOBR

o

Mohan v. Norris, 158Md. App. 45,854 A. 2d 259(2004) heldthat a police officer, who is certified for

permanent appointment by theMaryland Police Training Commission, but is a probationary police officer

employee ofthe Department ofState Police is "not covered by the LEOBR"39 158 Md. App. at 62. Some
State Police employees are "police employees," who are assigned lawenforcement powers authorized by
statute. 158 Md. App. at 263. Article 41 ofthe Maryland Code discusses appointment as a police officer.
Statutory interpretation rules were stated. Anofficer "who does not have a permanent appointment is at
most in a probationary status underthe LEOBR." 158 Md. App. at 266. "The General Assembly
necessarily wasaware, when it enacted the 1975 law excluding officers "in a probationary status" from
LEOBR coverage (except in brutality cases), thatpolice officer employees ofthe State Police, otherwise
covered by the LEOBR, were by statute "in a probationary status" for 24 months after theirdates of
appointment. We glean, from the General Assembly's use of precisely thesame language to create the
LEOBR probationary status exclusion as was used to establish the probationary period forpolice officers of
the State Police, that it meant for the exclusionto apply to probationary police employees ofthe State
Police —an outcome consonant with the autonomy the Secretary ofthe State Police has in employment
decisions over probationers withinthat law enforcement agency." 158 Md. App. at 62.
This decision was affirmedby the Courtof Appeals in Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 871 A. 2d 575

(2005). The answer was No! Norris, 386 Md. at 64. Reviewing the statutory scheme, legislative history,
treatise andcase law history40, theCourt determined, that even though Mohan was permanently certified,
he was in his "initial entry" into the employment ofthe State Police. Although his permanent status

prevented him from being placed "inprobationary status" for the purpose ofthe MPTCA, that certification
status was no barrierto being placed"in probationary status," for purposes ofthe LEOBR, by his new

police employer. Norris, 386 Md. at 78. Thus the protections ofthe LEOBR were unavailable to Mohan,
Norris, 386 Md. at 81.

Debarment and LEOBR

o

Boyle v. Park &Planning, 385 Md. 142, 867 A. 2d 1050 (2005) concerned an investigation as to whether
park police officers were using their official positions and state property to further conflicting private
interests. 385 Md. at 144. The Court stated that debarment proceedings did not constitute punitive action

within the meaning of LEOBR andtherefore LEOBR procedures were inapplicable to a procedure to debar
individuals (orderthat rendersa person ineligible to bid on or be awarded a public contract). 385 Md. at
146. LEOBR procedural protections "applyonly when there is a prospect of disciplinary action or punitive
measure that is within the substantive authority ofthe Chief of Police to impose." "If there is no possible

disciplinary action that the Chiefcan impose, even upon a sustaining of every charge made against the
officer, the hearing board procedure serves no function; it leads nowhere." 385 Md. at 155. Boyleand
Pauley resigned their positions and were not seeking reinstatement as policeofficers. Thus, no sanction
couldbe imposed by the Chief of Police and the LEOBR had no applicability." 385 Md. at 156-57.

E.MVA.

More MVA hearing are conducted by OAH than any other type of hearings. A number of decisions case
have arisen, many of which are found elsewhere in this book.
Significant Case Decisions
That sworn statement as primafacte proofof . . .

o

Najafiv. MVA, 418 Md. 164, 12 A. 3d 1265(2011) saw the Court stating once again that the sworn
statement of an arresting officer is prima facie evidence ofthe refusal to take a chemical breadth test.

39 In writing thisopinion, the Court detailed the history ofthe LEOBR, Norris, 158 Md. App. at 261-62, discussed the State
Police as a principal department of Maryland State government created in 1935, Norris, 158 Md. App. at 262-63.
40 The Courtdiscussed Moore v. Town ofFairmount Heights, 285 Md. 578, 403 A. 2d 1253 (1979)
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"Najafi alleges that he did notrefuse because theofficer failed to ask himto makean election, after Najafi
unsuccessfully attempted to contact his attorney." 418 Md. at 185. The sworn statement prima facie case
was sufficientto address the Najafi argument in this case because the ALJ determined thattestimony by
Najafi atthe administrative hearing didnot rebut the presumption attendant to the sworn statement. 418
Md.atl88.41

Refusal to take a bloodtest becauseofafear ofneedles as a defense? - no way
o

At issue in MVA v. Dove, 413 Md. 70, 991 A.2d 65 (2010) and Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 4 A.3d 976

(2011) was whether the ALJ correctly determined thatDove should have his driver's license suspended for
refusing a bloodtest while a hospital emergency room patient "at a time when Dove asserted thathis
refusal was justified because of his fear of needles, his preference for a breath test, andthe later
administration of an alcohol content test by the hospital staff." Substantial evidence was of record to sustain
the ALJ decision that the test was refused. 413 Md. at 75. SG §10-222(h) was the statutory authority for

judicial review and inthis case the substantial evidence finding of a fact determination was the focus of
review. 413 Md. at 79-80. After reviewing the statutory authority upon which a test may be ordered by a

police officerunder Maryland's "implied consent statute" and the consequences of license suspension for a
failure to take or submit to the test, the Court stated that there was substantial evidence that the
circumstances warranted a blood test for alcohol concentration pursuantto CJ §10-305(a)(l)(ii). 413 Md.
at 86. "Dove's fear of needles does not excuse his knowing, voluntary refusal ofthe alcohol concentration
test offered to him." 413 Md. at 91. Before the ALJ was medical record evidence that Dove had received

pain medication b an intravenous drip. 413 Md. at92. The breath test"administered by Calvert Memorial
Hospital staff did not nullify Dove's refusal ofthe alcohol concentration test."Thattest was for the purpose

ofgiving medical care, not at the request ofthe police officer. 413 Md. at 92, 94.42

41 While I realize that there are a significant number of agency cases involving the
suspensionof a driver's license for the failure to take a chemical test and/or because of a
high alcohol levelcontent, and also that one appearing before an agencyhas the right to
have a subpoena issued for the attendance ofthe policeofficerupon the assertion of
specific facts to demonstrate that the officer will testify in favor ofthe license, this whole
idea of confrontation by paper is very worrisome. To me, allowing this procedure is a
diminution ofthe right to confrontation of witnesses and the right of cross examination
which for hundreds of years has been a mainstay of English/American law and
fundamental due process and fairness. In this case as in the prior case of MVA v.
Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 666 A. 2d 511 (1995), expediency has won the day. The
troublesome difficulties encountered with this process cause me to write that in the
hope that there be no future erosion of individual rights in favor ofthe State in this or
any other regard. John F. Fader II
42 The Court stated:

The fact that the preliminarybreathtest performedat CalvertMemorial Hospital showed a reading of0.00
is irrelevantto the analysis of whether Dove refused the required blood test. The purpose ofthe sanction for
refusal is not to punish driving under the influence directly, but rather"to provide an incentive for drivers
detained under suspicion of drunk driving to take, ratherthan refuse, a test for alcohol concentration.". . .
Dove arguesthat the preliminary breathtest result, 0.00, should have been applied to a "probable cause"
analysis. Dove, however, ignores the fact that a probable cause analysis has no place in this case. Section
16-205.1(a)(2) ofthe Transportation Article does not require probable cause when an officer requests an
alcohol concentration test, but rather permits a test "if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving
or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol." Suspicion based on reasonable grounds is a
lower standard than a preponderance ofthe evidence or probable cause. In this case, the record provided the
ALJ with substantial evidence that Officer Traas had reasonable suspicion that Dove was driving his

258

Refusal to submit to blood alcohol test

o

MVA v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 796 A. 2d 75 (2002) addressed the issue of whetherthere was a refusal to
submit to a blood alcohol concentration test in light ofthe two hour time limitation for tests (CJ §10-303)
where an individual "suspected of drivingwhile intoxicated has expresseda desire to consultwith an

attorney prior tomaking a test decision." 368 Md. at 484.43 Trans. §16-205.1 sets forth the general testing
policy applicable to individuals suspected of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated. 368Md. at
491. This law was enacted for the protection ofthe public and not primarily for the protection ofthe
accused. 368 Md. at 492. Due process considerations were discussed. 368 Md. at 494-95. "In order to
protect the licensee'sdue process right, the rightto consult with counsel priorto deciding whether to
submitto a breathalyzertest must be meaningful and comportwith traditional notions of essentialfairness"
There is no bright line rule which will effectively ensure that the due process right to communicate with

counsel priorto submitting to a breathalyzer test... is heeded in all circumstances without risking being
overbroad or under-inclusive." 368 Md. at 495-96. Case law has given some guidance "as to what types of
communication would be considered an exercise of the . . . due process right to communicate with
counsel." 368 Md. at 496-97. The burden to prove a refusal is on the MVA. 368 Md. at 497. In this case

anyrefusal appeared due to the officer's hastin concluding thatAtterbeary refused to takethe test. Only 20
minutes had passedfrom the time Atterbeary saidhe would submit to the test to the timethe Officer
determined he had refused because he wanted to speak to an attorney "... [0]n the facts and
circumstances of this case, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Atterbeary refused to submit to
the breathalyzer test." 368 Md. at 499-500.

F. State Procurement Contracts.

"State procurement contracts are subject to an exclusive, statutorily-prescribed procedure for resolving

disputes. The procedure consists offour parts.44 First, the dispute must be submitted tothe agency
procurement officer for attempted resolution.45 Second, the agency head may approve, disapprove, or
modify the procurement officer's decision.46 Third, the decision ofthe agency head may be appealed to
the Maryland State Board ofContract Appeals ("MSBCA").47 Fourth, the MSBCA's decision is subject

to judicial review under the contested case provisions ofthe Maryland Administrative Procedure Act."48
The 2003 case oi Engineering Management v. Maryland State Highway Adm., 375 Md. 211, 215, 825 A.

2d 966 (2003) details the procedure for processing state procurement claims.49 x375 Md. at232.
Jurisdiction is over a claim timely filed and otherwise meets the requirements of COMAR 21.10.04.
Statutory provisions are found in SFP §§15-211, 15-215, 15-215 and 15-219. Id.
The Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals is an "agency" within the ambit ofthe Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act..50

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, based on the odor of alcohol detected on Dove's person at the
scene, his watery eyes, and his involvement in a motor vehicle collision.
Dove, 413 Md. at 94-95 (citations and some quotes from prior court cases omitted).
43 The Court cited SG 10-222 "Standard of Review."

44 Engineering Management v. Maryland State Highway Adm., 375 Md. 211, 215, 825 A. 2d 966 (2003) citingSFP §§15-21515-223.

45 SFP §15-217.
46 SFP § 15-218(d) & §15-219(c) & (d).
47SFP§15-219(g).
48 SFP §15-223.

49 Engineering Management, 375Md. at232. Jurisdiction is taken over a claim timely filed and otherwise meets the
requirements of COMAR 21.10.04. Statutory provisions are found in SFP §§15-211, 15-215, 15-215 and 15-219.

50 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Mass Transit Admin., 111 Md. App. 634, 683 A.2d 1127 (1996), aff d, 349 Md. 299, 708 A.2d 298
(1998).
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Significant Case Decisions
Summary disposition?

Where do you see that procedure authorized

o

Summary disposition by theBoard of Contract appeals inEngineering Mgt. v. State Highway, 375 Md.
211, 825 A. 2d 966 (2003) was reversed. The Board violated procedures set forth in its statute because it
didnotadopt rules allowing a summary disposition procedure. Id., at 232-32. Thus, the agency action was
unlawful and required reversal. Id., at 236.

Oh! the tangled webs we weave

When you deal with the State ofMaryland. . .

o

Dept. ofPublic Safety v. PHP, 151 Md.App. 182, 824 A. 2d986 (2003) is an appeal from a decision bythe
Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals. The Department's statement concerning thenumber of inmates
in billable population count wasnot an erroneous misrepresentation of a material matter and could not
reasonably be reliedupon by contractor when preparing proposal to provide health-care to inmates on a per
inmatebasis, Contractor's overestimation of numberof inmatesthus did not entitle it to equitable

adjustment.51 Contention that misrepresentation existed and overhead costs were therefore too much for
profit. Accuracy of information presented was discussed. The Court reviewed theverbal and written
representations made bythe Department to all offerors and concluded the Department has not assumed any

responsibility for estimating or guaranteeing the number ofinmates." 151 Md. App. at 204.52

Summary disposition procedures?
Where do you see that allowed In the law?

o

Summary Disposition procedures by theMaryland State Highway Administration in denying a claim were
declared by the Court of Appeals to be illegal because theMaryland State Board of Contract appeals
MSBCA "violatedthe procedures set forth in its enabling statutewhen it proceededto grant a summary

disposition . . in the absence ofadopted rules ofprocedure."53 SG §10-206(b) states that "each agency
may adopt regulations to govern procedures under this subtitle and practice before theagency in contested
cases." MSBCA's enablingstatute is moredirect. SFP §15-201 states: "In accordance with Title 10,
Subtitle 1 ofthe State Government Article [the APA], the Appeals Board shall adopt regulations that

provide for informal, expeditious, and inexpensive resolution ofappeals before the Appeals Board."54
Without the adoption of regulations providing for summary disposition the MSBCA, it may not apply
summary disposition to the cases before it.Engineering Management v. Maryland State Highway Adm.,
375 Md. 211, 235, 825 A. 2d 966 (2003). Additional funds were requested by Engineering Management

51 PHP's position was thatbecause it was being paid ona "perinmate" basis, it faced substantially higher monthly costs of
operation than it hadplanned. It blamed its predicament upon which it claimed were misrepresentations by the Department asto
the total number of inmates. PHP, 151 Md. App. at 186.

52 The Courtdiscussed the cases of Trionfo & Sons, Inc., v. Board ofEducation, 41 Md. App. 103,395 A. 2d 1207 (1979)and

Raymond International, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 45 Md. App. 247, 412 A. 2d 1296 (1980). Issues of whether a contractor is
required to verify information independently, when and under what circumstances a contractor is not reasonably ableto discover
the true facts, when compensation may be due for inaccurate and misleading representations made by government, etc. were
examined. PHP, 151 Md. App. at 201-03."A contractor may pursue the Government for damages under a contractfor a

misrepresentation in contract documents." 151 Md. App. at 196. TheCourt saidthat Trionfo "doesnot stand for theproposition
that,absent a provision releasing an ownerfrom responsibility for the accuracy of information furnished to a bidder, a bidder is
entitled to rely on such information." 151 Md. App. at 204.

53 Engineering Management, 375Md. at 235. Additional funds were requested by Engineering Management for repainting
bridges to comply with OSHA changes relating to leadpaint exposure. 375Md. at 217. SG §10-210 allows summary disposition.
Thereare variousforms of judicial reviewof administrative decisions underthe APA. 375 Md. at 227. Procedural vehiclesare
not used to determine factual disputes. They are to determine whetherthere is a dispute over a material fact or facts that should
be tried. ". . . [T]here is no significant conflict betweenthe deference given to factual determinations made by an agency and
the principles of summaryjudgment [providedby Rule 2-501]" Id., at 228-29. Summaryjudgment "is inappropriate where
matters - such as knowledge, intentor motive- that ordinarily reserved for resolution by the fact-finderare essentialelementsof
the plaintiffs case or defense." 375 Md. at 230. SG 10-210 "does not describethe modality of action as summaryjudgment..."
375 Md. at 231. "The question thus becomes whether the MSBCA properly implemented the ability to grant summary
disposition, and, if so, whether it properly granted it in this case." 375 Md. at 231. "Here, the MSBCA was directed by statute
that it 'shall adopt regulations,' yet it failed to do so with regard to summary disposition." 375 Md. at 234.

54 Engineering Management 375 Md. at 231.
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forrepainting bridges to comply with OSHA changes relating to lead paint exposure. 375 Md. at 217. SG
§10-210 allows summary disposition. There arevarious forms ofjudicial review of administrative
decisions under the APA. Id., at 227. Procedural vehicles are not used to determine factual disputes. They
are to determine whether there is a dispute over a material fact or facts that should be tried. 375 Md. at ". .

. [Tjhere is no significant conflict between thedeference given to factual determinations made by an
agency andthe principles of summary judgment [provided by Rule 2-501]" 375 Md. at 228-29. Summary
judgment "is inappropriate where matters - such asknowledge, intent or motive - thatordinarily reserved
for resolution by the fact-finder are essential elements ofthe plaintiffs case or defense." 375 Md. at 230.
SG 10-210"does not describe the modality of action as summaryjudgment..." 375 Md. at 231. "The

question thusbecomes whether the MSBCA properly implemented the ability to grantsummary
disposition, and, if so, whether it properly granted it inthis case." 375 Md. at 231. "Here, the MSBCA was
directed by statute that it 'shall adoptregulations,' yet it failed to do so with regardto summary
disposition." 375 Md. at 234.

G. Zoning.

There areso many appellate court decisions on zoning, that the author of these materials thought thetopic

deserved special consideration to treat some reoccurring issues.55 One issue that arises from time to time
is whether a vested right has been obtained so as to preclude a political subdivision from or opposing
individual from56

Notall zoning authority comes from the Express Powers Act, art. 25A. Unlike most other home rule
chartered counties in Maryland which receive theirbasic zoning authority from Article XI-A ofthe

Maryland Constitution, theExpress Powers Act, Code (1957, 1994 Repl. Vol.), Art. 25A, § 5(x), and
their county charters, the exclusive source of Montgomery County's zoning authority is the Regional

District Act, Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 28, § 8-101 etseq.57 Each county
determines how a case is to move through the zoning process.

Decided in 2003, the case of Lewis v. Dept. ofNatural Resources, 111 Md. 382, 833 A. 2d 563

(2003), reconsideration denied. 377 Md. 456, contains anexhaustive review ofthe standard of review for
appellate review of a zoning board decision.
We havevery recently set out the standard of review for this Court's review of zoning board decisions in
Stansbury v. Jones, 372 Md. 172, 182-85, 812A.2d312,318-20 (2002), where we said:
"Almost a half-century ago, in a case involving a denial of a use permit, we stated: Tt is a clearly
established rule in the law of zoning that a court may not substitute its judgment for that ofthe

ZoningBoard.'Dorsey Enterprises, Inc. v. Shpak, 219 Md. 16,23, 147A.2d 853, 857 (1959) .
ChiefJudge Hammond wrotefor the Court in State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 309, 236 A.2d 282,292 (1967) , that 'under .. . [either] ofthe

standardsthe judicial review essentially shouldbe limitedto whether a reasoningmind reasonably
could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached, (alteration added).'

"Whether reasoning minds couldreasonably reach a conclusion from facts in the record is the essential
test. If such a conclusion is sufficiently supported by the evidence, then it is based upon substantial
evidence. Forty years ago in Snowden v. Mayor andCity Council ofBaltimore, 224 Md. 443, 447-48, 168
A.2d 390, 392 (1961), we noted that:
377 Md. 405-06.

'The substantial evidence test "means that the reviewing court's inquiry is whether on the record

the agencycould reasonably makethe finding."... Substantial evidence is "suchrelevant
55 Bryan v. Makosky, 380 Md. 603, 846 A. 2d 392 (2004) is a case discussing the complaint of a member ofthe county planning
and zoning commission concerning the appointment of a replacement. Though not generating an issue focusing onjudicial
review, it does give some insight into the appointment to office process.

56 Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158,783 A. 2d 169(2002).

57 Montgomery County v. Revere National Corp., 341 Md. 366, 383, 671 A. 2d 1(1996).
58 In Anne ArundelCounty, zoning decisions are first made by the County's Administrative Hearing Officer and from therean
appeal may be taken to the County Board of Appeals. Becker v. Anne Arundel County, 174 Md. App. 114, 119, 920 A. 2d 1118
(2007).
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The heartofthe
fact finding process often is the drawing of inferences from the facts. The administrative agency is
the one to whom is committed the drawing of whatever inferences reasonably are to be drawn
from the factual evidence. "The Court may not substitute its judgment on the question whether the
inference drawn is the rightone or whether a different inference would be better supported. The
test is reasonableness, not Tightness.'"[Citation omitted.]
Overtwenty years later we opined, 'if the evidence makesthe issueof harm fairly debatable, the
matter is one for the Board's decision, and should not be second-guessed by an appellate court.' Board of
County Commissioners for Cecil County v. Holbrook,3U Md. 210, 218, 550 A.2d 664, 668 (1988) . See
also Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., Inc. v. Comptroller ofthe Treasury, 302 Md. 825, 490 A.2d 1296 (1985) and

Comptroller ofthe Treasury v. World Book Childcraft International, Inc., 67 Md. App. 424, 508 A.2d 148
(1986).

"In White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 44, 736 A.2d 1072, 1079 (1999) , we much more recently restated the
general standard of review that:

'Injudicial review of zoning matters, including special exceptions andvariances, "the correct test
to be applied is whether the issue before the administrative body is 'fairly debatable,' thatis,
whether its determination is based upon evidence from which reasonable persons could come to
different conclusions." Semblyv. County Bd. ofAppeals, 269 Md. 177, 182, 304 A.2d 814, 818
(1973) . See also Boardof County Comm'rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 216-17, 550 A.2d 664,
668 (1988) ; Prince George's County v. Meininger, 264 Md. 148, 151,285 A.2d 649, 651 (1972);

Zengerle v. Boardof County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 1, 17, 276 A.2d 646, 654(1971); Gerachis v.
Montgomery County Bd. ofAppeals, 261 Md. 153, 156, 274 A.2d 379, 381 (1971) . For its
conclusionto be fairly debatable, the administrative agency overseeingthe variance decision must
have "substantial evidence" on the record supporting its decision. See Mayor ofAnnapolis v.

Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 395, 396 A.2d 1080, 1087 (1979) ; Montgomery County
v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686,706, 376 A.2d 483,495 (1977) , cert, deniedsub
nom. Funger v. Montgomery County, 434U.S. 1067, 98 S. Ct. 1245, 55 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1978);
Agneslane, Inc. v. Lucas, 247 Md. 612, 619,233 A.2d 757, 761 (1967) .'
377 Md. at 306-07

See also People's Counsel for Baltimore County v. Mangione, 85 Md. App. 738, 743-44, 584 A.2d 1318,
1320-21 (1991) ; Terranova v. Boardof Trustees ofthe Fire andPolice Employees Retirement Sys., 81 Md.
App. 1, 8-9, 566 A.2d 497, 500-01 (1989) cert, denied, 319 Md. 484, 573 A.2d 808 (1990); Tennison v.
Shomette, 38 Md. App. 1, 5, 379 A.2d 187, 190 (1977) , cert, denied, 282 Md. 739 (1978) ;Fitzgeraldv.
Montgomery County, 37 Md. App. 148, 153, 376A.2d 1125, 1128 , cert, denied, 281 Md. 737 (1977), cert,
deniedsub nom. Mutyambizi v. Maryland, 439 U.S. 854, 99 S. Ct. 164, 58 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1978) ; Anne
Arundel County v. MarylandNat'lBank, 32 Md. App. 437,440, 361 A.2d 134, 136 (1976) .
"Nonetheless, we have also indicated in our cases that where an administrative agency's conclusions
are not supported by competent and substantial evidence, or where the agency draws impermissibleor
unreasonable inferences and conclusions from undisputed evidence, such decisions are due no deference. In
Behoir Farms Homeowners Association, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 267-68, 734 A.2d 227, 232 (1999) ,
we stated:

'Generally, a decision of an administrative agency, including a local zoning board, is owed no
deference when its conclusions are based upon an error of law. Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569, {377 Md. 408} 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998) ("We may reverse an
administrative decision premised on erroneous legal conclusions." (citing People's Counsel v.
Maryland Marine Mfg.., 316 Md 491, 497, 560 A.2d 32, 34-35 (1989))) .'
377 Md. at 407-08.

"In Maryland Marine Mfg., supra, 316 Md. at 496-97, 560 A.2d at 34-35 , we said:
'As we have frequently indicated, the order of an administrative agency must be upheld on judicial
review if it is not based on an error of law, and if the agency's conclusions reasonably may be

based upon the facts proven. But a reviewing court is under no constraints in reversing an
administrative decision which is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.' [Citation
omitted.] [Emphasis added.]

We noted in Washington National Arena LimitedPartnershipv. Comptroller ofthe Treasury, 308 Md.
370, 378, 519 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1987) (quoting Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 302 Md. at 834,490 A.2d at 1301
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), that: '"areviewing court is under no statutory constraints in reversing a TaxCourt order which is
premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.'"
"We said in Elliott v. Joyce, 233 Md. 76, 81We hold that "on the record" before us, the Board could not "reasonably make" the reclassification

andgrantthe special exception. Therefore, itsaction inso doing was arbitrary and capricious in a
legal sense. To permit a gasoline station in the residential surroundings ofthe subject property
would not promote the safety, health or general welfare ofthe community, but would constitute,
we think, invalid "spot zoning." Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148A.2d 429 [1959];
Hewitt v. County Comm'rs, 220 Md. 48, 151 A.2d 144 [1959] .' [Alterationsadded.]
"The standard in respect to judicial review is, generally, the same whether the agency grants
or denies relief." [Some emphasis added.]

We also note that '"Such [zoning] ordinances are in derogation ofthe common law right to so use private

property asto realize it highest utility.'" White, 356 Md. at 48, 736 A.2d at 1082 (quoting Aspen Hill
Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 313-14, 289A.2d 303, 308 (1972) (quoting Landay
v. Board ofZoning Appeals, 173 Md. 460, 466, 196A. 293 (1938)) .
377 Md. at 408-09.59

Significant Case Decisions
An error of law

o

Reversing a Montgomery County Boardof Appeals decision, the Court of Appeals in Remes v.
Montgomery County, 387Md. 52, 874A. 2d 470(2005) held thattwo lots had merged for zoning purposes
and therefore, the issuance of a permit to build on one ofthe lots was error.
Lot 11 and Lot 12 were under common ownership, and at the time of that common ownership,

they were used in service to one another. Thepermit should not have issued, absent further zoning
action. In order for Lot 11 to be utilized separate and apart from Lot 12, there would have to be a
resubdivision ofthe combined lot, creating two lots both of which meet the requirements of both
the zoning ordinance and the subdivision regulations. In that process it may well be necessary to
seek zoning variances as to setbacks, or to remove the setbackencroachments in the structure on
Lot 12.. . .'

Remes, 337Md. at 87.60
This deference to the Board. . .

o

The Court in Lewis v. Dept. ofNatural Resources, 311 Md. 382, 833 A. 2d 563 (2003) reversed a Zoning
Board decision denying his request for a zoningvariance to constructa hunting camp on his property
located within a Critical Area Buffer. The majority of 4 ruled that it would not defer to the agency because
errors of law were committed. 377 Md. at 437. The minority of 3 said there was substantial evidence to

upholdthe Board's determination becauseLewisshouldnot be able to do what he wished on
environmentally sensitive property without regardto legal constraints on public policy. 377 Md. at 456.
This is a lengthy opinion. Lewis sought reversal of a zoning appeals board denial of a zoning variance to
construct a hunting camp on his property located within a Critical Area Buffer. In a very intense
disagreement (4/3), the Courtheld the zoning appeals boardcommitted a number of errors of law and
remanded for a new look at the request for a variance. 377 Md. at 390. "We hold that while the Board
purported to use the standards set forth in Belvoir Farms, White, andMastandrea, in determining the fate
of petitioner's variance, the statements by Boardmembers and the Board's final written decision illustrate

59 In zoning cases, the standard of review onjudicialreview requires the courtto "consider all ofthe evidence before the zoning
authority [and that] the decision is 'fairly debatable' if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole."
Becker v.Anne Arundel County, 174 Md. App. 114, 137-38,920 A. 2d 1118(2007). ". . [A] reviewing court may not upholdan
agency's decision if a recordofthe facts on whichthe agency acted or a statement of reasons for its action is lacking." 174Md.
App. at 138-39.

60 Examining various ordinances, the Courtexplained thatZoning differs from planning; the doctrine of zoning merger wasnot a
change in common lawthat was contrary to public policy; changes in the common law are generally applied prospectively; and
that the Courtof Appeals will hesitate to apply a changeto the common lawwhere such a change would be contraryto public
policy set forth by the General Assembly.
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thatseveral impermissible legal standards were utilized. In addition, the record contains little or no
empirical data to support the Board's conclusions orto refute thestudies and reports of petitioner's experts.
The Board's decision is thus arbitrary and capricious. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals' and the
Circuit Court's affirming ofthe Board's decision anddirect the Circuit Courtto remand this caseto the
Boardfor a reassessment of petitioner's variance request in light of our holding." 377 Md. at 409. The
focus of attention was on the Wicomico County Code and the Critical Area Commission guidelines. As to
variances, the Board was required to use criteriato "determinethe ultimate question of whether strict
enforcement of § 125 would deny petitionera reasonable and significant use of his land. In doing so, it is
clear that the Board should apply a standard that does not look to whether petitioner would be denied all
reasonable uses of his entire property, but rather a standard that should determine if petitioner'sproposed
use is a reasonable and significant one in consideration of all ofthe § 125-36factors. As we shall discuss,

although the Board purported to act otherwise, it essentially applied the incorrect 'unconstitutional takings'
standard." 377 Md. at 417. Examiningthe "SpecificFindingsof Fact," the majority determinedthat the

agency usedincorrect standards of law in denying the variance request and that meant its decision are
arbitrary and capricious." 377 Md. at 435. Courts cannot ordinarily eithergrant or denyvariances, but the
courtreviews the agency finding onjudicial review. 377 Md. at 436. This is a very lengthy case withthe
majority disputing the hardship finding onLewis' property as a whole, which it saidignored the language
ofthe ordinance. 377 Md. at 453. This whole decision has to be carefully read and considered with the

issue of hardship comes to the forefront Also to be readis the decision on the motion for reconsideration
filed. It remains to be seen how this decision will affect the future of zoning variance determinations.
Snakes, snakes and more snakes

o

In Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 783 A. 2d 169 (2002), the Court stated there was no vested right to raise,

breed, and keepreptiles or snakes on a property zoned for otheruses because a lawful permit had not been
obtained. "In the case subjudice,respondent obtained a permitand completed substantial construction;
however, he is not entitled to have a vested right because there has been no change, applicable to his case,

in the zoning law itselfand the permitwas improperly issued." 366 Md. at 193-94. Equitable estoppel was
discussed and found not applicable to the facts presented. 366 Md. at 194-99.

The right to Impose conditions when granting a variance
o The Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals had the authority to impose a condition (designating Conway
Road as access to the site) upon the grant of a specialexception to allow the establishment of a sand, gravel
and rubble landfill when that condition was not sought during earlier proceedings before the county

administrative hearing officer.61 Protests during the hearing process caused Halle to suggest an alternate

access tothe proposed site avoid both wetlands and traffic problems.62 The application was granted upon a
determination that the landfill would advance the public welfare ofthe County.63 Conditions placed by the
Boardof Appeals addressed the access issue designating Conway Road as the entranceto the operations,
requiring the construction of a right turn land, designating the size ofthe accessroad and how the access
road was to be obtained. Halle v. Crofton CivicAssociation, 339 Md. 131, 136-37, 661 A. 2d 282 (1975)

Protestantsobjected to the grant ofthe application saying this change meant that notice ofthe extent of
matters to be considered at a public hearing had not been properly given and that a new application needed
to be filed. Halle, 339 Md. at 139. The holding: "The board here imposed a true condition, not an illusory
61 TheBoard of Appeals allowed thechange in the proposed access roadbutthe Circuit Courtreversed finding thatthe change
substantially changed the Halle application. The Court said that the Board of Appeals had the right to consider new issues but
that it could not indiscriminately entertain matters which in effect changed the nature ofthe original controversy or application
and that the change in road access impermissibly enlarged the substance of Halle's application. Certiorari was taken by the Court
of Appeals upon Halle's appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Halle, 339 Md. at 139-39.

62 Hallefiled an application for sand and graveland rubble landfill operation in Anne Arundel County in Odenton which was
denied by the AA County's administrative hearing officer resulting in an appeal to the AA County Board of Appeals. Expert
testimony addressed the impact ofthe operation upon vicinal properties. Protrestants claimed harsh environmental impact,
floodplain problems and the potential threat of Patuxent road access to residential communities. Halle, 399 Md. at 136.

63 Evidence presented at the lengthy hgearings consisted of: (1)photographs ofthe property, (2) a site-inspection, and(3) expert
testimony on subjects including traffic impact and road improvements, environmental protection and wetland preservation,
hydrology and groundwater contamination, land use planning and development, civil and environmental engineeringrelatedto
landfill development and acoustical engineering. Halle, 339 Md. atl35-36
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one. Contrary to the circuit court's conclusion, the condition imposed does in fact restrict Halle's use ofthe
property. We shall uphold that condition, as it isjustifiable interms relating to the public health, safety and
welfare." Halle, 339 Md. at 148-49

The powerto impose conditions uponthe grant of a variance or special exception is one which is
implicit in the power to grant a variance or special exception. 'This is so because the whole basis
for the exception is the peculiar hardship to the applicant, and the Board is justified in limiting the
exception in such a way as to mitigate the effectupon neighboring property and the community at
large.' Both a variance and a special exception authorize uses which otherwise wouldnot be
permitted. Having been giventhe power to authorize such unusual uses,the Board must also have
the powerto limit those usesto protect the health, safety,and welfare ofthe community."
/fa//e,339Md.atl41.

The variance vs. the exception

o Mueller v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County 64, 177 Md. App. 43, 934 A. 2d974 (2007) discussed
two adjoining undersized waterfront lots, on oneof which there was a home built in 1960. In 2004, a
variance was soughtasto the undeveloped lot in order to construct a dwelling on it. Reviewingthe
applicable zoning regulations and the effectofthe Chesapeake Bay Critical AreaBufferrequirements, 177
Md. App. at71-75. The Board of Appeals discussed several variance criteria such as the uniqueness ofthe
property and in itsorder reliefon BCZR §304, a"grandfather provision that protects a landowner from a
change inthe zoning law, 'if inter alia, the lotwas recorded by deed prior to 1955, orthe lotwas recorded
as part of a validly approved subdivision prior to 1955." 177 Md. Apop. At 84-85. Statutory interpretation,
undertaken by the Court as it discussed the grandfather clause and prior case decisions. The Circuit Court
concluded thatthe properties hadmerged for zoning purposes because they were undercommon
ownership. The circuit court was not correct inthis and nomerger occurred and the Board of Appeals was
not clearly erroneous in finding no merger and that there was entitlement to the variance as the criteria for a
variance were satisfied and there was no self-inflicted hardship. 177 Md. App. at 101.

"The very essence of zoning is territorial division [of land within a jurisdiction] according to the
character ofthe land and the buildings, their peculiar suitability for particular uses, and uniformity of use
within the zone. The authority stems from the State's police powerto regulate in the interest ofthe general
welfare." "At least one function of zoning is 'to preserve varioustypes of neighborhoods, be they
residential, industrial, commercial or historical. Planning is a broader concept, encompassing the

development of a community and the creation of'goals for orderly growth and development including the
establishment of viable neighborhoods forwhich it delineates appropriate boundaries,' and 'suggesting]
methods for implementation andachievement of those goals, including proposals for future land use and
zoning classifications.'"
"A variance is an authorization for [that]... which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance. The burden is

on the applicant to show facts that warrant a variance. In general, 'the specific need for the variance 'must
be substantial and urgent and not merely for the convenience ofthe applicant^] Ordinarily, a variance is
warranted if the 'applicable zoning restriction ... is so unreasonable as to constitute an arbitrary and
capricious interference with the basicrightyof private ownership,' or otherwiseresults in 'unwarranted
hardship.'" 177 Md. App. at 70. A variance is sometimes confused with a special exception but they are
different. "[T]he variance and exception are designedto meet two entirely different needs. The variance
contemplates a departure from the terms ofthe ordinance in orderto preclude confiscation of property,
while the exception contemplates a permitteduse .. .[once] the prescribed conditions therefor aremet."
"The general rules is that the authorityto grant a variance should be exercised sparinglyand only under
exceptional circumstances." 177 Md. App. at 71.

Judicial review of legislative action?

o

Art.66B §2.09(a)(ii) provides that an "appeal" [actually Judicial Review] maybe taken to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City by any person aggrieved by "[a] zoning action by the city Council." At issue in
Armstrong v. Baltimore City, 390 Md. 469, 889 A. 2d 399 (2006) was whether residents opposing the

64 This case givesa history ofthe development of zoning regulations in Baltimore County beginning January 2, 1945. Mueller,
177 Md. App. at 69.

265

establishment of a parking lotwere entitled tojudicial review when the Mayor andCity Council of
Baltimore passed an ordinance, as required pursuant to then existing §10-504 ofthe Baltimore City Zoning
Code which required such an ordinance before a parking lotcould be established pursuant to §10-503 ofthe
Baltimore City Zoning Code. Was the passage of thatOrdinance a zoning decision from which a petition
for judicial review could be filed. CJ §12-301 "does notpermit an appeal from a final judgment of a court
entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of... a local legislative
body." 390 Md. at 402.

Zoning and retrospective apltcatlon

o Oneofthe peculiarities of zoning law surfaces withthe caseof Layton v. Howard County, 399
Md. 36, 922 A. 2d 576 (2006), wherethe Courtof Appeals held in a land use or zoning context
there may be retrospective application of a related statutory law which is amended during the
course of litigation. The Petitioners were unsuccessful in obtaining a special exception to operate
a charitable and philanthropic institution inHoward County. While the case was onjudicial
review a pertinent portion ofthe Howard County Code was amended, changing the"definition

upon which the Board had relief in making its initial zoning decision to deny Frisky's permission
to operate a primate sanctuary." 399 Md. At38. Discussing the standard of review of
administrative agency decisions inthecontext of special exceptions, 399 Md. At 48-49, the Court
noted thatas a general rule, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and are to beconstrued
accordingly. 399 Md. At 62. Discussing prior case law inthezoning context and distinguishing
other non-zoning decisions, the Court reaffirmed its prior decision of retrospective application in
the zoning context. 399 Md. At 71.

Homeowner seekingfront yard zoning variance

o Homeowners sought review of Board of Appeals decision denying a front yard zoning variance
for construction of a garage in Chesley v. Annapolis, 176 Md. App. 413, 933 A. 2d 475 (2007).
The holding wasthatthere was substantial evidence to support the Board's decision thatdenial of
the variance did not impose a hardship on the homeowners. Judge James Eylerfor the Court
discussed the Annapolis Code setting minimum setbacks, the allowance of variances from the set
back variances provided that certain conditions (conditions which are enumerated in the opinion
and discussed) are satisfied, and the Chesley's development ofthe property. Additional
discussion by the Court focused on the definition of a hardship, the Critical Areas Law as it
applied to the request forthe variance, discussion of a self-created variance (which the Court
stated was a fact in this case), neighborhood impacttestimony and the position ofthe protestants.
A variance authorizesthe property owner"to use his property in a manner forbidden" by

applicable zoning. Although "the purpose of a variance is to protect the landowner's rights from
the unconstitutional application of zoning law[,]" variances are frequently permitted in
circumstances when application ofthe setback requirement would not constitutea 'taking'.
There are differenttypes of variances, including the "ordinary" front yard setback
variance at issue here and the variances from the setbacks established by statute for

critical areas in an effort to regulate development of waterfront properties. Not

surprisingly then, "there are different criteria that mustbe met for 'ordinary' or 'general'
zoning variances and critical area variances.
176 Md.App. at 423-24.

The Court discussed the findings ofthe Board relative to the conditions upon which a

petition for a variations is based andthe application to this case. 176 Md. App. at 424-26.
"The burden of showing facts to justify . . . [a] variance rests upon the applicant[.] In cases

involving critical area variances, it has been madeclear by statutethat applicants "have the
burden of meeting all ofthe requirements" enumerated in the law governing such variances.
176 Md.App. at 427-28.
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Much analysis ofthe conditions of granting a variance and the applicability to the facts of
this case is set forth in the opinion. It is must reading for those involved in the "variance"
process.

Acourt may not substitute its judgment for that ofthe zoning Board.65 Judicial review is essentially
limited to determining whether a "reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion

the agency reached.66 This isthe essential test. "Ifsuch a conclusion is sufficiently supported by the
evidence, then it isbased upon substantial evidence."67 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind mightaccept to support a conclusion. "Theadministrative agency is the oneto whom is
committed the drawing of whatever inferences reasonably areto be drawn from the factual evidence." It
is not the right of a court to substitute itsjudgment onthe question whether the inference drawn is the
right one or whether a different inference would be better supported. The test is reasonableness, not

Tightness.68 Previously, the test was whether the evidence makes the issue of harm fairly debatable. If so,
the decision is for the Board to determine.69

The test in zoning matters applies to determinations of special exceptions and variances. For
something to befairly debatable there must besubstantial evidence onthe record supporting the
decision.70 Where the agency's conclusions are notsupported by competent and substantial evidence, or
where the agency draws impermissible or unreasonable inferences and conclusions from undisputed
evidence, such decisions are due no deference.71 As with the decisions ofother agencies, no deference is

owed to aZoning Board when its conclusions are based on an error oflaw.72 The standard ofreview is
the same whether the agency grants ordenies relief.73
Variances

Wehold, therefore, that the unnecessary or unwarranted hardship standard, or similar standards, are less
restrictive than the unconstitutional taking standard. Theunwarranted hardship standard, and its similar
manifestations, are equivalent to the denial of reasonable andsignificant use ofthe property. Whether a

property owner has been denied reasonable and significant use ofhis property isa question offact best
addressed bythe expertise ofthe Board of Appeals, not the courts. Thus, we leave the application of this
standard to petitioner's variance application to theBoard on remand." Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 282, 734
A.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
Special exceptions

"Byclassifying a given use as a special exception use, the legislature, in essence, established a
presumption thatthe use is consistent with thegeneral welfare. A special exception use 'in a zoning
ordinance recognizes that the legislative body of a representative government has madea policy decision
for all ofthe inhabitants ofthe particular governmental jurisdiction, and that the . .. use is desirableand

necessary in its zoning planning provided certain standards are met.'"74 When an agency reviews an
65 Lewis v. Dept. ofNatural Resources, 377Md. 382, 405, 833 A. 2d 563 (2003) citing Dorsey Enterprises, Inc. v. Shpak, 219
Md. 16, 23,147 A.2d 853, 857 (1959), a case denying the issuanceof a use permit.

66 Lewis, 377 Md. at 405 citingStansbury v. Jones, 372 Md. 172, 182-85, 812 A.2d 312, 318-20(2002), in which the courtsaid it
had recently set out the standard for review of zoning decisions.
67 Lewis, 311 Md. at 405-06.
68 Lewis, 377 Md. at 406.
69 Lew/*, 377 Md. at 406.
70Leww,377Md.at407.
71 Lewis, 111 Md. at 407.
72 Lewis,311 Md. at 407-08.
73 Lews, 377 Md. at 408.
74 Handley v. Ocean Downs, 151 Md. App. 615, 642, 827A. 2d 961 (2003) citing Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md.
App. 1, 7-8, 666 A.2d 1253 (1995).
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application for a special exception, with the presumption of validity, the agencies duty is 'to judge
whether the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would be adversely affected and whether

the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent ofthe plan.'"75 This
means that the reviewing agency or board must decide "whether there are facts and circumstances that
show that the particular use proposed at the particular location proposed would have any adverse effects
above andbeyond those inherently associated with such a special exception use irrespective of its location

within the zone."76 "Only when a proposed special exception use will have 'an adverse effect above and
beyond thatordinarily associated withsuch uses,' must the administrative board deny the use. When the
proposed usewould create a substantially similar effect if it were located elsewhere within the same zone,

the adverse impact is not sufficiently unique to justify denial ofthe application.77 "Thus, the applicant in
a special exception situation has only a limited evidentiary burden."78
"Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will showthat his use meets the

prescribed standards and requirements, hedoes not have the burden of establishing affirmatively that his
proposed use would bea benefit to the community. If heshows to the satisfaction ofthe Board that the
proposed use would be conducted without real detriment tothe neighborhood and would notactually
adversely affect the public interest, he has methis burden. The extent of any harm or disturbance to the
neighboring area and uses is, of course, material
If a requested special exception use is properly

determined to have an adverse effect upon neighboring properties in the general area, itmust be denied.79
A zoning board may be required to consider whether conditions or safeguards should be imposed
upon the granting of a special use permit before its approval. "The whole purpose of such conditions or
safeguards is 'to protect the comprehensive plan and to conserve and protect property and property values
intheneighborhood[.]'"80
Significant Case Decisions

Board ofzoning appeals action

o

In Handley v. Ocean Downs, 151 Md. App. 615, 827 A. 2d 961 (2003) there was objection to the location
of an Off Track Bettingfacility anywhere in the county. "As such, the opposition failed to negatethe
presumption, generated by thelegislature's inclusion of'sattelite simulcast facilities' as approved special
exception uses in the CityCode, thatthe OTB facility would be in the 'interestofthe general welfare.'"
"Appellants failed to negate the presumption that 'the [proposed OTB facility] would haveany adverse
effects above and beyondthose inherently associated with such a special exception use irrespective of its
locationwithin the zone." Approval by the Board of ZoningAppeals was proper. Id., at 644.

Vestedrights to avoid downsizing?

75 Hadley, 151 Md. App. at615 citing Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 11, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981).
76 Hadley, 151 Md. App. at642-43.
77 Hadley, 151 Md. App. at643 citing Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md. App.612, 625, 329 A.2d 716 (1974) (application to locate
funeral home in residential zone could not be denied because opponents presented neither facts nor reasons that it would "affect

adjoining and surrounding properties in any way otherthan [those that] result from the location of any funeral home in any
residential zone").
78 Id.

79 Hadley, 151 Md. App. at 643. Oneargument made in this case is by the Appellants wasthatthere was a failure to identify the
neighborhood underconsideration. The Courtstated thatevidenceofthe impactof a special exceptionuse on the neighboring
properties is relevant to determine whetherthe use causes an extraordinary impacton them. However, in this casetherewas no
authority for the proposition asserted that the Board must explicitly define the neighborhood. Research by the courtuncovered
the factthat cases reversing zoning boards for a failure to define the neighborhood have all involved the "change in conditions"

portion ofthe "change or mistake" rulethat is applied in piecemeal zoning cases. Abrams, Guideto Maryland Zoning Decisions
§1.4 (3rd ed 1992,2000) wascited along with case law. Hadley, 151 Md. App. at645. In anyevent, the record showed the Board
did consider the neighborhood in its findings. 151 Md. App. at 645-46.

80 Hadley, 151 Md. App. at646. The Court said there wasno evidence before the Board thatthe proposed use wouldhavean
uniqueimpacton the comprehensiveplanor neighboring properties in this case. Therefore, there was no need to consider the
imposition of conditions. Id.
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There was no vested right in a particularzoning so as to avoid downzoning in PrinceGeorge's County v.
Sunrise Development, 330 Md. 297,299,623 A. 2d 1296 (1993). The County Council of Prince George's
County downzoned property belonging to Sunrise Development andthereafter an immediate stop work
order wasgiven on a 467 dwelling unitdevelopment. 330Md. at 303. A grading permit hadbeen issued to
Sunrise which claimedthat a singlecolumn footing, though not visiblefrom the main road on which is was
located, was sufficientto vest rights in a priorzoning classification. 330 Md. at 306. The Court discussed
the standard for determining commencement of construction particularly focused on two cases, Rupp v.
EarlH. Cline & Sons, 230 Md. 573, 188 A. 2d 146 (1963) and O'Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 425 A.

2d 1003 (1981). "The only building permit relied upon for work done at the site in advance ofthe
downzoning was for the column footing." Id., at 308. Upon reviewing case law,the Courtstated: "It is
clearfrom all ofthe foregoing that a theoretical, reasonably diligent building inspector is not the test ofthe
beholder. That test is far too narrow to satisfy the concept ofthe 'public.'" 330 Md. at 314.

Here, the pouringof a single 2f X 2' footing in the centerof a nearlyten acre wooded site is the
only construction to which Sunrise can point for its vested rights argument. The evidence is that
building inspectors, who knew thatthe footing had been pouredand who were on the property
looking for the footing, could not seewhere it was. They wereableto locate it onlyby use ofthe
siteplan. A member ofthe public is notrequired to be equipped with the column footing version
ofthe site plan to observe if this construction had started. Fromthe standpoint of a member ofthe
general public who is either viewing theproperty from itsboundaries or is consensually onthe

property, the footing isnotso clearly thecommencement of construction as to render the Board's
finding to the contrary arbitrary, capricious or without substantial evidence on the entire record.
330 Md. at 314.

Factfinding:

Credibility as to whetherone has an Interest In more than one liquor license
This statute has Its own administrative review process to be followed

o

A question in Woodfieldv. West River Improvement Ass'n, 395 Md. 377,910 A. 2d 452 (2006) was

whether one Bassford had a direct orindirect interest in an application for a liquor license.81 Art. 2B §9301 states that in Anne Arundel and certain other counties an individual may not own more than one

interests in a liquor license. 395 Md. at 386. Characterizing the position ofthe protestants' assertions of his
multiple interests as "very, verythin." Citing the statutory judicial review standard for liquorboard
decisions the Court found there was substantial evidence for the Board determination that Bassford did not
have a financial interest in the Woodfield license. 395 Md. at 393.

Sometimes the statutory structure contains its ownjudicial review test as it does for local licensing
liquor boards:
. . . The Court must deal with the record as it is, not as it could have been, and on the record we

have, we cannot conclude that the Board was clearly erroneous in its finding regarding Bassford.
Art. 2B, §16-101(e)(1) sets forth the standard to be applied injudicial review actions from liquor
board decisions. Though articulated differently, the statutory standard is consistent with the more
general law regarding the review of administrative agency decisions:
"[T]he action ofthe local licensing board shall be presumedby the court to be properand
to best serve the public interest. The burden of proof shall be upon the petitionerto show
that the decision complained of was against the public interest and that the local licensing
board's discretion in rendering its decision was not honestly and fairly exercised, or that
such decision was arbitrary, or procured by fraud, or unsupported by any substantial
evidence, or was unreasonable, or that such decision was beyond the powers ofthe local
licensing board, and was illegal."
Compare Maryland Code, §10-222(h) ofthe State Government Article , setting forth the standard
for judicial review under the State AdministrativeProcedures Act, and see UnitedParcel v.
People's Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226,230 (1994) (court's role injudicial review of
administrative agency decision "limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the

81 An evidentiary hearing wasconducted pursuant to §10-202(a)(2)(ii) of Article 2B. Mostofthe evidence presented whether
granting the ClassB licensewas in the public interest or would be detrimental to public safety. Woodfield, 395 Md. at 37-38.
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record as a whole to supportthe agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the
administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.").
Woodfield, 395 Md. at 393.

Zoning regulations as a validexercise ofgovernmentpolicepower
Historic preservation

o

"It is well-settled that zoning regulations are a valid exercise of a government's police power so long as the
limitations imposed are in the public interest and related substantially to the health, safety, or general
welfare ofthe community." "This Court has repeatedly stated that the preservation of architecturally or
historically significant areas is a validexercise ofthe governmental power." "This case invites examination
of a decision of Respondent, the Mayor and council of Rockville, Maryland to designate as

historically/architecturally significant and, as a result, place within Rockville's historical district a certain

piece ofimproved real property ("Spates Bungalow")82. Casey v. Rockville, 400 Md. 259, 306, 307,264,
929 A. 2d 74 (2007). The case deals in detail witha number of important issues: (1) the historic designation

action by Rockville, Maryland; (2) statutory interpretation83; (3) environmental guidelines84; (4) economic
feasibility studies85; (5) the taking ofproperty through the regulatory process86; (6) ripeness ofjudicial
review toan allegation oftaking ofa property interests87; and (7) due process considerations.
Not many people practice zoning lawin Maryland without being thoroughly familiar with Guide to
Maryland Zoning Decisions by Stanley D. Abrams, Esq. Chapters from this book are:
Chapter 1. Change or Mistake Rule in Maryland.
Chapter 2. Floating Zones.

Chapter 3. Decisions ofthe Zoning Authority andJudicial Review Thereof
Chapter4. Standingto Appeal; Aggrievement and Appeals.
Chapter 5. Rezoning and Subdivision on the Basis of MasterPlans,
Recommendations of Local Planning Commission.

Chapter 6. Due Process and Evidentiary Matters.

Chapter 7. Consideration ofthe Impact of Rezoning on Public Facilities.
Chapter 8. Overzoning- The Relevancy of Need.
Chapter 9. Unconstitutional Taking of Property by Failure to Rezone; Confiscation.
Chapter 11. Related areas.

Chapter 12. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions.
Chapter 13. Recent Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Decision.

82 The Court discussed the involved facts, the designationprocess, the Rockville Code provisions, economic feasibility questions,
and the triggerfor review of historical significance at Rockville, 400 Md. at 265-278, 281- 285.

83 "[W]hen thestatutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nordelete language so as to 'reflect an
intent not evidenced in that language."' Rockville, 400 Md. at 290.

84 "Thepurposes ofthe environmental guidelines, as adopted byResolution 11-99, areto 'establish a comprehensive and
cohesive methodto protect the city's existing natural resources during andafter the development process", as well as to
'providfe] for the identification of existing natural resources andpreserving various environmental management strategies and
criteria to govern development withinthe City of Rockville." Rockville, 400 Md. at 292. The Courtdiscusses environmental
guidelines at 400 Md. at 293-305.

85 Discussing regulatory takings and consideration ofthe economic feasibility associated withidentifying and preserving
historically designated property is discussed by the Court at Rockville, 400Md. at 279-285, 285-88 (external features guidelines).
Art. 66B § 8-101, et. seq is discussedthroughoutthe opinion.
"... [E]mpowered political subdivisions may adopt
zoningprocedures for designating as historic an area of a particular pieceof property."400 Md. at 280.
86 "The Mayorand Council's Refusal to Consider Economic Infeasiability at this Juncture [placingthe property in Rockville's
Historic District Zon] did Not Work a Taking ofthe PropertyWithoutJust Compensation."Rockville, 400 Md. at 305-06
(discussing financial hardship, prohibited uses of property, final decisions,Maryland Reclamation Associates).
""[A]governmental action, while not risingto the statusof a compensable 'taking' of property, may amountto an invalid
deprivation of property rights without due process of law..." 400 Md. at 306.
87 See Rockville, 400 Md. at 312-18.
88 It was the Court decision that a failure to consider economic feasibility at the juncture ofthe case of historical designation was

not a deprivation of property withoutdue process of law. Rockville, 400 Md. at 318-321. Somedue process contentions were not
properly preserved for appeal. 400 Md. at 321-24.
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When it comes to enforcement of zoning regulations, it is the District Court of Maryland that has

exclusive original jurisdiction to enforce a zoning code for which equitable relief is provided. Carroll

County v. Love Craft, 384 Md. 23, 40, 862 A. 2d 404 (2004) citing CJ §4-408(8).89
H. Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program.

The Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program is one where State imposed regulationsare locally

enforced.90 Among other regulations, a "buffer" is required to becreated by local jurisdictions. These

buffers act as a "setback" for development protecting the Chesapeake Bay's water qualify.91
Who is to decide what and when with the often integration of a number of ordinances in the

development and zoning process is a question of law for the court to determine.
The Courtof Appeals held in Montgomery County v. Revere National Corp., 341 Md. 366, 671 A. 2d

1(1996)93 that Montgomery County was bound bythe provisions of a settlement agreement incorporated
in a circuit courtjudgment. The agreement ended sixteen yearsof litigation between the County and the
ownerof a billboard companyand granted to the owner the right to maintain its billboards withinthe
County for a period often years, despite a County zoning regulation prohibiting all billboards. There was
no impermissible interference with undermined legislative and executive discretion in the enactment and
enforcement ofthe County's zoning regulations. "Undersomecircumstances courts have ordered that
local governments specifically perform theircontracts." Id., at 385. The agreement in this casedid not
obligate Montgomery County to rezone or amend zoning regulations. Id., at 387. As a general matter,
"executive discretion in the enforcement and execution ofthe laws can be limited by contract." Id., at

388. "A requirement that the government adhere to thatexercise of discretion, and be held to its contract,
ordinarily does not constitute an unlawful interference with future executive discretion." Id., at 390. The
compromise in this case was a reasonable settlement of a dispute. Id., at 392. Montgomery County was
requiredto perform its obligations under the agreement. Id., at 394.

Vested rights in a particular zoning classification may be obtained by a partyto avoid downzoning
provided there is a substantial beginning of construction readily visible for the public to see and

recognize.94
I. Board of Education and Education Matters.

A number of appellate court decisions over the years have addressed appeals from the Maryland State
Board of Education. ". . . [A]s a result of a combination of legislation and long-standing case law, the
State Board has the "last word" on controversies or disputes involving the proper administration ofthe

public school system, thereby leaving the courts of this State with limited power to interfere. Thisbroad
and comprehensive power, referredto as the StateBoard's "visitorial power," arises out ofthe Education
89 Judge Wilner's opinion refers to this case asa procedure nightmare, oneproblem being an evident failure to recognize that the
CircuitCourt exercised appellate jurisdiction over the DistrictCourtdecision, and therefore, further appeal could only be by a
Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Carroll County, 384 Md. at 40.

90 Lewis v. Dept. ofNatural Resources, 377Md. 382, 391, 833 A. 2d563 (2003).
91 Lewis, 377 Md. at 394. Anothercasediscussing the Chesapeake Bay Critical AreaProgram and its interaction with local
zoning anddevelopment regulations(on the issue of"undue hardship" and variances) is Beckerv. AnneArundelCounty, 174 Md.
App. 114, 130-134, 920 A. 2d 1118 (2007).

92 Capital Commercial v. Montgomery County, 158 Md. App. 88, 854 A. 2d 283 (2004). Parking space compliance for an
expansionprojectand setback compliance saw the Court determining that where the Department of Permitting Services (DPS)
makes a decision on a parking facilities plan, the County Council determined that DPS "be the agency exercising the power to
determine parking setbacks, ratherthan the Montgomery County Planning Boardofthe Maryland-National CapitalPark and
Planning Commission. 158 Md. App. at 101.

93 See comment: 26 U. Bait. L. Rev. 11, Annual Review of Maryland Law (1996).

94 Prince George's County v. Sunrise Development, 330 Md. 297, 308, 623 A. 2d 1296 (1993).
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Article ofthe Annotated Code ofMaryland. Section §2-205(e) ofthe Education Article . . "95 It is the
State Board's right to explain thetrue intent and meaning ofthe Education Article and the bylaws, rules
and regulations adopted by the Board. The State Board decides all controversies and dispute under the
law. A county superintendent's decision may be appealed to thecounty board, and then maybe Anther
appealed tothe State Board. "Thus, appeals concerning the intent and meaning of a provision ofthe
education Article or of a State Board bylaw are taken from county boards to the State Board."

There are exceptions to the State Board's right to make a final decision beyond judicial interference:
1. the matter involves a purely legal question;
2.

the State Board has contravened a state statute;

3. the State Board exercised its powerin bad faith, fraudulently, or in breach of trust; or

4. the State Board exercised its power arbitrarily or capriciously.97
Significant Case Decisions
The teacher who does not want to be transferred

o In Hurl v. Board ofEducation ofHoward County, 107 Md. App. 286, 667 A. 2d970 (1995), the Court of
Special Appeals held that ateacher objecting toan involuntary transfer from one school to another was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing because she failed to allege sufficient facts to indicate that the
superintendent acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or with discriminatory reasons. Ed. §6-201(b) allows the
transfer ofteachers "as the needs ofthe schools require." 107 Md. App. at 295.98 The issue was whether a
teacher, who was involuntarily transferred, had aright to a"contested case" hearing under the MAPA. The
circuit court had dismissed the case because sufficient facts had not been alleged by the teacherto support
the contention that the transfer decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Court stated: "Decisions contrary

to law or unsupported by substantial evidence are not within the exercise of sound administrative

discretion, but are arbitrary and illegal acts." The Court also referred to Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.
1990) defining the term "arbitrary" as including something done "without adequate determining principle,"

"nonrational," and "willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for facts and
circumstances presented:' and the term "arbitrary and capricious" as "willful and unreasonable action
without consideration or in disregard of facts orlaw orwithout determining principle." "Finally, the State

Board regulations define decisions of acounty board as being 'arbitrary' where 'contrary to sound
educational policy' and/or where a'reasoning mind could not have reasonably reached the conclusion the
county board reached." COMAR 13A.01.01.03E(l)(b). 107 Md. App. at 306. The Court examined every
reason stated by the teacher and concluded that none of her allegations (she had been successful and
experienced; she was never forewarnded; she was not properly consulted and notified; her work record was
crystalline) contained specific facts from which itcould bedetermined that the transfer decision was
arbitrary or capricious. 107 Md. App. at 307-310. "Although the reasons were notto her liking, this does
not make the decision itself arbitrary. 107 Md. App. at 310.

Is uthlsn particular question within thejurisdiction of administrative remedies offered?
o Itwas proper for an ALJto dismiss thecomplaint of parents under the Individual with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)99 for a lack of jurisdiction because thedisputed question was a medical orethical
question, nota special education issue inJohn A. v. Board ofEducation, 400 Md. 363, 929 A. 2d 136
95 Hurl v. Board ofEducation ofHoward County, 107 Md. App.286, 298, 667A. 2d 970(1995),
96 Hurl, 107 Md.App. at 299.
97 Hurl, 107 Md.App. at 299.
98 An issue in the case had to do with whether the State Board's decision fit within the MAPA definition of "contested case."

"We need not decide whether the APA applies to thiscase, because the circuit court nonetheless retains the power to review

agency decisions to prevent illegal, unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious administrative action and [an appellate court has]
authority ondirect appeal to review the circuit court's exercise of that power." Hurl, 107 Md. App.at305.
99 The Court discussed the history of this federal act to ensure that all children with disabilities haveavailable to thema free

appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and to
prepare them for further education and itscurrent provisions contained in 20 U.S.C. §1400, et. seq., and its Maryland Counterpart
contained in Education §8-401, et. seq. John A., 400 Md. at371-75. Discussion focused onthelegislative purpose ofthe federal
act and its Maryland counterpart. 400 Md. at 387-88.
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(2007). John A suffered from Bi-Polar disorder, ADHD, and Sensory Integration Disorder and qualified
for special education under the Act.100 At issue was the effect medication was having on the child and the
request ofthe school authorities to consult with the child's physicians concerning the administration of
medication duringschool time,which permission the parents would not allow. 400 Md. at. 377-78. It was
the determination by the ALJ that the issue involved "the rights ofthe Parents to control the release of
medical information about their child againstthe right of nurse to speak to the treating physicianwhen
administering medication the physician prescribed," which was not a provision affecting free appropriate

education and that the dispute therefore fell outside the provisions ofthe Act. 400 Md. at. 380.101 What the
subject matter jurisdiction was under the Act for a contest to care from which an administrative orjudicial

remedy could be sought was discussed by the Court in detail.102 The Board was concerned with potential
liability if it administered blindly drugs "to students without theability to contact physicians regarding
withholding the drugs if circumstances suggest it prudent doso. 400 Md. at 391. Asto theparents' claim of
a right to privacy and the right to a patient-physician privilege, the Court stated: "Congress never intended
that these issueswould be resolvedunder the auspices ofthe IDEA." The conclusion: ". . .[T]hisdispute
falls outside the scope ofthe IDEA as a medical treatment issue, and not a special education issue." 400
Md. at 393-94.

Applicationsfor waiver - charterschools

o Only the State Board ofEducation has original jurisdiction over waiver applications (request for a waiver
for having to follow Education Rules and Regulations) submitted pursuant to Ed. §9-106(b) for Charter
Schools. Referring to statutory authority and prior case decisions, theCourt inPatterson Park v. Teachers
Union, 399 Md. 174, 923 A. 2d 60 (2007) stated theparamount role ofthe State Board of Education in

interpreting the public education law oftheState ofMaryland. The Board ofEducation has the last word in
most cases and itsbroadauthority has been characterized bythe Court of appeals as a "visitatorial power of
the most comprehensive character." 399 Md. at 196. The powers ofthe State Board are notwithout limit
but "decision ofthe State Board of Education are entitledto greater deference than those of most other
administrative agencies. 399 Md. at 196-97.

In Patterson Park it was the position ofthe Baltimore City School Boardthat applications for waiver
first hadto be brought before thatbody, as opposed tothe State Board. At issue were hiring practices
without collective bargaining restraints. The State Board of Education has primary review overall

education provisions. 399 Md. at202.103 The provisions ofTitle 9 ofthe Education Article, dealing with
Charter Schools, are not subject to waiver. Charter Schools are defined as being non sectarian, tuition-free,
and are open to all students. 399 Md. at 200. When Ed. § 9-106(b) spoke of an "appeal" made to the State
Boardfor a waiver,that did not meanthe process should involve a local subdivision. The use ofthe word

"appeal" here is a misnomer as legislative history, including anopinion by the Attorney General showed.
399 Md. at 206.

J. Home Improvement Commission.

"In 1962, the General Assembly enacted the Maryland Home Improvement Law, now codified at Md.
Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), §8-101 et seq. ofthe Business Regulation Article. This law,
which had its genesis in a 1961 report ofthe Governor's Commission to Studythe Home Improvement
Industry in Maryland, is a regulatory scheme designed forthe protection ofthe public. As the title ofthe
original statute explained, the lawwas enacted, in part, cwith the intention of'providing generally forthe
100 Each child who qualifies is to have an individualized education plan. Administrative action may be sought by a parent asto
anymatter "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement ofthe child, orthe
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." Provisions are made by the Act givingthe right to bring a civil
action in any State courtof competentjurisdiction in accord with the provisions ofthe Act. John A., 400 Md. at 373.
101 Discussing the parents' contention thatthe medication issue wasa"related service" underthe Act, the Court reviewed
provisions ofthe Act andcase decisions from other forums and determined thatthe child's need formedication to receive the
special education services meantthatthe issue involving medication would be a"related service." John A., 400 Md. at381-87.

x^ John A., at 389-94.
103 Detailed within the opinionwere the positions ofthe parties to this case andsome casedecisions concerning detailing the
authority ofthe State Boardof Education. PattersonPark, 399 Md. at 192-95.
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regulation ofthe home improvement business for all persons in the State,' and 'establishing a system of
licensing certain contractors and salesmen under a new administrative agency to beknown as the
Maryland Home Improvement Commission." 'TheCommission's primary functions areto investigate
complaints about home improvement contractors, and to administer the licensing of those contractors in
this state."'104

"In 1981, the General Assembly enactedSubtitle 4 ofthe Home Improvement Law, establishing the
Fund. The Fund was createdto provide a remedy for homeowners who suffer an 'actual loss that results

from [inter alia,] an act or omission by a licensed contractor.'" See BR §8-405(a).105
"Subtitle 4 [ofthe Act] sets forth an administrative remedy before the Commission for claims against
theFund, and provides for a contested case hearing before the Commission and payments by the
Commission to claimants.. . . [P]rior to 2000, the maximum amount that a homeowner could recover
from the Fund for actual loss due to the unsatisfactory work of a home improvement contractor was

$10,000.00. By Chapter 144 ofthe Acts of2000, the General Assembly increased that amount to$
15,000.00. As amended, §8-405(e)(l) reads: 'The Commission may not award from the Fund [] more than

$ 15,000 to 1claimant for acts or omissions of1contractor.'"106
K. Consumer Protection Division.

The reach ofthe Consumer Protection Agency of Maryland State Government is enormous.
Significant Case Decisions
Very broadpowers by statute

o

From Consumer Protection v. George, 383 Md. 505, 860 A. 2d 896 (2004):
The Consumer Protection Division is entrusted with broad powers to enforce and interpret the
Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code (1975,2000 Repl. Vol), §13-101 et seq. ofthe Commercial
Law II Article. Consumer Protection Division v. Consumer Pub'l Co., 304 Md. 731, 745, 501

A.2d48, 55 (1985). In adopting the Act, the General Assembly concluded that "it should take
strong protective and preventive steps to investigate unlawful consumer practices, to assist the

public in obtaining relieffrom these practices, and to prevent these practices from occurring in
Maryland. It is thepurpose of this title to accomplish these ends andthereby maintain thehealth
and welfare ofthe citizens ofthe State." CL §13-102(b)(3). The General Assembly further

provided that the Act should be "construed and applied liberally to promote itspurpose." CL §13105.

We summarized the statutory powers ofthe Division in Consumer Publishing:
383 Md. at 513

The Consumer Protection Division and the Attorney General of Maryland, like the Federal Trade
Commission, clearly have a mandate"to protectthe consumer" from "deceptive practices." See CL

§13-102; Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 765, 501 A.2d at 66. Not unlikethe FTC which has
"wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practice
disclosed," {Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 473, 72 S. Ct. at 803, 96 L. Ed. at 1087 (internal citation

omitted)), the Maryland Consumer Protection Division also has "broadpowers to enforce and
interpret the Consumer Protection Act." Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 745, 501 A.2dat 55.
Thosebroad powers, however, mustfit within the statutory schemeestablished by the General
Assembly.
383 Md. at 522-23.

104 Landsman v. Maryland Home Improvement Commission, 154 Md. App. 241, 248-49, 839 A. 2d 743 (2003) (footnote omitted)
citing Shade v. State, 306Md. 372, 377, 509 A.2d664 (1986); Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258Md. 290, 294, 265 A.2d759
(1970); Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., 376 Md. 118, 126, 829 A.2d 271 (2003); and Brzowski v. Maryland Home
Improvement Comm'n, 114 Md. App. 615, 628, 691 A.2d699, cert, denied, 346Md. 238, 695 A.2d 1227 (1997) (code citations
omitted).

105 Landsman, 154 Md. App. at 249.
106 Landsman, 154 Md. App. at 249-50 (footnote omitted)
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The opinion ofthe expert

o

T-Up, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, 145 Md. App. 27, 801 A. 2d 173 (2002) sawthe Court
affirming the Consumer Protection Division determination that therewas a violation ofthe Consumer
Protection Act by falsely advertising two products sold as curesor treatments for cancer, AIDS, and HIV.
145 Md. App. 35, 50. The case is a goodexample ofthe intense fact finding whichsometimes involves the
Consumer Protection Division ofthe Office ofthe Attorney General, the application of Federal Trade
Commission law, and an evaluation ofthe scientific process upon which claims for medication and

products canbe made. There was no error in excluding thetestimony of an expert thatwould testify to the
factthat "representations in the audio tape and in the brochure withrespect to the efficacy and safety of
cesium chloride and the treatment of many forms of cancer are accurate." 145 Md. App. at 50-51. "The

theory ofthe violations ofthe Actcharged against the appellants in this case is thatthey lacked reasonable

substantiation for their product claims." 145 Md. App. at39.107 Rule 5-702 concerning an expert's opinion
was discussed. The ALJ determination that the testimony ofthe witnesses' experience was not scientific as

a formal study is required to be was noterroneous. 145 Md. App. at 53."Applying the FTC cases, wehold
thattheAgency didnot err inconcluding that a reasonable basis for such product claims requires at least

two adequate, well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies." 145 Md. App. at 50.108
L. Liquor Boards.

Liquor Boards and the regulation of alcohol are the prerogative of subdivisions throughout Maryland
through Article 2B ofthe Maryland Code. How does allof this authority locally result in enactments

governing the subdivision. Pursuant toArticle XI-A ofMaryland's Constitution enables Baltimore City
and counties to adopt a home rule charter, "to achieve a significant degree of political self determination."
The purpose of thisconstitutional provision "was to transfer the General Assembly's power to enact many

types of. . . public laws to the Art. XI-A home rule" jurisdictions.109 Pursuant to the directive ofthat
constitutional provision, the Legislature has granted express powers to home rule counties which are
contained in Article 25A ofthe Maryland Code. Oncea charterhas been adopted,"no public local law
shall be enacted by the General Assembly for saidCityor County on any subject covered by the express

powers granted" by the General Assembly.110 See Constitution, Article XI-A, §4. "The Legislature has the
power to describe thefield within which the local authorities may legislate, but having once done this, it
cannot restrict or limit this field of legislationwithout changing its boundaries" Among the express

powers granted to aCharter is the authority to enact local zoning laws.111

107 "The standard which the Agency required the appellants to meet in orderto substantiate their product claims is set forth most
clearly in the Agency's final order. It directs the appellants to cease anddesist from making any representations concerning the
"efficacy, performance, safetyor benefits" ofthe Company's products "unless, at the time the representation is made, [appellants]
possess and rely upon competent andreliable scientific evidence thatsubstantiates therepresentation." Theorder further defines
"competent and reliable scientific evidence". . ."
T-Up, Inc. 145 Md. App. at 47-48.

108 Within the opinion there is analysis addressing the ALJruling thatindividuals werenot qualified to express an opinion on
subjects.

109 Piscatelli v. Liquor Commissioners, 378 Md. 623,633,837A. 2d 931 (2003).
110 Piscatelli,378 Md. at 634. The Piscatelli Court discussedParkv. BoardofLiquor LicenseCommissioners, 338 Md. 366, 658
A. 2d 687 (1995). That case involvedthe enactment of a new liquor license classification for BaltimoreCity providingfor on-

premises consumption. Some ofthe facilities wereoperating under non-conforming use zoning permits and obtaining the newA2 license would violate the non-conforming use permits and requirements. Article 2B §18A(h) was added to provide that for

purposes of zoning in Baltimore city,the operation conducted by a Class A-2 permit holderwhich provided that no rezoning
wouldbe required in changinga licensefrom a B-D-7to an A-2 license. Holdingthat zoning was within the expresspowers
granted to Baltimore City, the enactment underArt. 2B §18A(h) was unconstitutional. Id., at 637-39.
1,1 Piscatelli,378 Md. 635-36.
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Significant case decisions
The right to make a decision may be lost

o

One issue in Woodfield v. West River Improvement Ass 'n, 395 Md. 377, 910 A. 2d 452(2006) was whether
the circuit court lost its authority to make a decision injudicial review once 90 days elapsed from the filing
ofthe administrative record with the court. Section 16-101(e) of Art. 2B deals "generally with the

procedures governing anaction for judicial review of a liquor board's decision." The law provides that
unless the licensing boarddecision is to be affirmed unless the"affirmed, modified, or reversed by the
court within 90 days afterthe record has been filed in thecourtby the local licensing board." The90 day

period may beextended. 395 Md. at 384. Even when determining whether a statutory command is
mandatory of directory, thecourts "have essentially looked to the context ofthe enactment and ultimately
to the legislative intent in determining what, if any, sanction to impose for noncompliance." 395 Md. at
389. Statutory interpretation at work saw theCourt determining thata 1991 legislative amendment deleted
an automatic affirmance requirement and thatthetrial judgehadextended the period in thiscase. 395 Md.
at 390-91.

Evidentiary hearings - accommodation ofthepublic- evidence issues

o Liquor licenses are controlled inMaryland by Article 2B which provides for anevidentiary hearing when
anapplication ismade for a license. An application for a license isto be"refused" ifthe granting ofa
license is not necessary for the accommodation ofthe public, the applicant has made a material false
statement in the application or thegranting ofthe license will disturb the peace ofthe residents inthe
neighborhood.112 Woodfield v. West River Improvement, 395 Md. 377, 380, 910 A. 2d452 (2006). Liquor
licenses havedifferent classifications depending of what may be soldand when. A Class H (Beer, Wind

Liquor) Music and Sunday license, restricting consumption toon the premises, was issued by the Board of
License commissioners in Anne Arundel County though Woodfield had requesteda ClassB (Beer, Wine,

Liquor) Music and Sunday license, which would have allowed a sale for consumption "on the business or
elsewhere." Woodffield, 395 Md. at 383 FN3.

Contestants were the West River Improvement Association and members ofthe Galesville

Community. Article 2B § 9-101(a) provides that an individual may not have an interest in more than one a
liquor license and one ofthe issues inthe case was whether Charles Bassford had an interest inanother
liquor license inAnne Arundel County that precluded the issuance of a liquor license to Woodfield. The
case presents a good view ofthe application ofthe standard ofjudicial review. At issue was whether the
Court of Special Appeals hadsubstituted their judgment forthatofthe Board of License Commissioners.
The Board found Bassford did not have an interest in another liquor license ("notwithstanding the

allegation of a silent partner [] there hasn't been any credible evidence that has been produce[d] inrising to
the level that this applicant has made any false . . material statements or committed fraud in the

application"). Both the Circuit Court (by "any reasonable interpretation ofthe evidence presented, a trier of
fact would conclude that Mr. Bassford has a direct or indirect interest in this applicant") and the Court of

Special Appeals (relying on the Dun and Bradstreet report notadmitted into evidence andconsidering
Bassford's capacity of Annapolis Produce "we assume" Woodfield, 395 Md. at 388) found he had. The
Court ofAppeals determined both courts had substituted their opinion for that ofthe Board and reversed
with instructions to the circuit court to reinstate the Board of License Commissioners' decision.

The WestRiverImprovement Association alleged that Bassford already owned two restaurants with
liquor licenses andwas a silent partner in theWoodfield establishment, Woodfield, 395 Md. at 381.
Evidence at the hearing included Woodfeld's testimony that Bassford ownedno interest, the application,
submittedunder oath, which did not show Bassfordas an owner, statements of Counsel that Bassfordhad

noownership,113 theproffer of a Dun & Bradstreet report showing an ownership interest by Bassford, and
112 Among theconsiderations when a Board considers whether a liquor license should be issued are thepublic need, thedesire for
the license, the numberfna locationof existinglicenses, the impact that the license wouldhave on the general health, safety, and
welfare ofthe community, including issues relating to crime, traffic conditions, parking or convenience. Woodfield, 395 Md. at
380.

113 One troubling aspect ofthe decision wasthe absence of appellate court comment on various representations made by Counsel
for Woodfeld that Bassford had no interest in the license. I would have expected the Court of Appeals to have cautioned triers of

facthearing administrative matters that statements by attorneys arenot evidence in the case. Woodfield, 395 Md. at 382.
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somehearsay statements by protestants that Bassford owned or had an interestin two otherrestaurants.
Woofield, 395 Md. at 3&3

Withthe court's role on judicial review beingto determine whetherfact determinations made by the
agency were clearly erroneous, i.e. whether there was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to
support theagency's findings and conlusions, the Court reviewed the credible evidence before the Board of
License Commissioners.

The Board had before it Woodfield's application, in which, under oath, he averred that no one, other
than he, was "in any way pecuniarily interest[ed] in the license appliedfor or in the business to be
conductedthereunder during the continuance ofthe license, if issued." Woodfield confirmedthat statement,
under oath, at the hearing when, in direct response to the Board chairman's question, he stated that Bassford

hadno interest in the applied-for license. That constituted evidence - substantial evidence, as it came under
oath from the applicant - thatBassford would have no interest in the license. TheBoard was entitled to
creditthat evidence. Aside from unsupported statements by protestants that Bassford had an interest in two
otherrestaurants, all that stood in opposition to Woodfield's assertion regarding the license at issue were(1)
Rogers's unsuccessful attempt to show that a Dun &Bradstreet report indicated that Bassford was president
of Annapolis Produce, and (2)the statement byWoodfield's counsel that, while he believed that Bassford
was a principal of some kind inAnnapolis Produce, hedid not know what interest Bassford actually had in
the company.
Woodfield, 395 Md. at 393.

M. Election Laws

Teaching this court following the Election of2006 means a note tothe election laws ofMaryland and
how, if, and when the administrative process is applicable.
Significant Case Decisions

Thearrangement ofthe ballot and candidate eligibility

o

Theelection lawstatute allowing judicial review ofthe content and"arrangement" of a ballotrefers solely
to theappearance and order of information contained onthe ballot and does notembrace a candidate's
eligibility. Ross v. Board ofElections, 387 Md. 649, 876 A.2d 692 (2005). ThePetition of contest was
"untimely, and thus, as a matter of law, barred bylaches." Atissue was whether thecircuit court properly
interpreted Section 9-209 ofthe Election Law Article. Legislative intent was discussed and statutory
interpretation tools were applied. 387 Md. at661-667. The Petition for redress was notgoverned by
Section 9-209, but by Section 12-202 ofthe "Election Code providing for a ten-day "window" for seeking
judicial redress for an action or omission that violates the Election Law and has or would change the

outcome ofthe election once the registered voter knows ofit." 387 Md. at668.114
Declaratory reliefrequested

What constitutes thepracticeoflaw InMaryland andtherefore eligibilityfor this office
o Abrams v. Lamone, 398 Md. 146, 919 A. 2d 1223 (2007) was the challenge to the right of Thomas E. Perez
to be a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Attorney General in Maryland in the 2006 primary.
Based on an opinion by the Attorney General ofthe State of Maryland, Perezfiled for the office withthe
state Board of elections, which accepted him as a candidate. That certification was challenged seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to test the State Board's rightto certify the candidacy as meeting

qualifications pertaining to thetime the candidate practiced law in Maryland. 398Md. at 157. The Circuit
Court'sgrantof a summary judgment in Perez's favor was reversed by the Court of Appeals following a
review of legislative and constitutional history finding that Mr. Perezwas not eligible to run for the Office
114 A dissent of 2 judges considered the fact thatappeals from grants of summary judgment, asa general rule, will consider only
thegrounds upon which thetrial court relied in granting summary judgment. That dissent was addressed to what was termed a
"shortcut" where none was permitted and which constituted an exception to the general rule. "The exceptions will eventually
swallow the rule." Ross,387 Md. at 680-81. Quarrel with the majority focused on what the minority saidwas no demonstration
ofthe interrelatedness of §§ 9-909 and 12-202. 387 Md. at 680.
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primarily becausehis federal practice was not sufficient to meetthe requirements ofthe law. 398 Md. at
208.

Invalidation ofsignatures

o An petition for an expedited judicial review115 was filed by the Nader for President group on August 27,
2004pursuant to EL §§6-209 and 6-210(e) ofthe Board of Elections decision to invalidate signatures on a

petition to have Mr. Nader placed ontheballot inthe 2004 Presidential Election. "The sole issue presented
... is whether, when the signatories are otherwise eligible to vote in this State,the State Board's
invalidation of . . . 542 "wrong county" signatures were proper."The Court in Nader v. Board of
Elections, 399 Md. 681, 684, 926 A. 2d 199 (2007) heldthat the signatures were invalid because the signers

were registered in a county other than the one specified onthe sheets they signed. Discussing Maryland
constitutional law, portions ofthe election code (EL), and case law, the Court reversed theCircuit Court
decision, upon testimony taken inthe circuit court, that the requirement that the signatures presented in

support ofa petition had toreflect the correct county where the signer was registered tovote. 399 Md. at
708.116 A minority of 3judges dissented and stated they would affirm thejudgment ofthe Circuit Court
becauseEL 6-203 and COMAR 33.06.05.01.A do not violate state constitutionalprovisions or otherwise
violate plaintiffs' civil rights. 399 Md. at 708.

N. Medicaid.

Talk about the complexities of federal and state regulations and you have health care reimbursement as
the focus of attention and headaches.
Ah! These reimbursement Issues

o Medicaid reimbursement disallowance (HG §15-101, et. Seq.)117 was at issue inCommunity Clinic v.
DHMD, 174 Md. App. 526, 922 A. 2d607 (2007). Maryland adopted regulations which included a cap on
administrative expenses. The validity ofthe capper se, and whether the cap conflicted with federal law,
was not at issue.118 The Court: "Consistent withbothofthe basestouchedin the federal directive, we hold

that the federal requirement for state reimbursement of 100% ofan FQHC's [federally-qualified health
center, i.e. Community in this case] reasonable cost is satisfied by a state system that affords the FQHS the
opportunity to demonstrate that its costs, albeit in excess ofacap, are reasonable." Community, 174 Md.
app. at 546. Thus, the legal issue was whether the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial
evidence. Itwas because theSecretary's finding that appellants' administrative costs, inexcess of 33-1/3
ofthetotal costs (the cap was atthis 1/3 figure) were unreasonable "issupported by the presumption of
unreasonableness created bythe validity adopted Cap regulation, bythe approval ofthat presumption by
federal authorities, and bythe recognition oftheunreasonableness of excess costs implicit in other states'

adoptions ofcomparable caps on administrative expenses. Phrased another way, the Secretary did not act
arbitrarily orcapriciously in declining to draw the inference (which likewise may have been supported by
substantial evidence) that appellants' costs were reasonable. Nor did the Secretary actarbitrarily in

concluding that appellants' primary evidence, due to the absence ofspecific comparisons toadministrative

115 Though the opinion by the court refers to"judicial review," the review here was one where testimony was taken and evidence
wasproduced before the circuitcourt.Nader, 399 Md.at 692-94.

116 This isone ofthose election year cases where anexpedited hearing was granted bytheCourt ofAppeals and a decision
handed down onSeptember 20, 2004 with theopinion following some time later. Nader, 399 Md. at696.
1.7 Abrief sketch ofthe federal/state system of reimbursement issetforth inthe opinion at Community Clinic v. DHMD, 174 Md.

App. 526, 530-33, 922 A. 2d 607 (2007).

1.8 The cap was adopted in accord with the MAPA and approved by HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration) as complying
with federal law and thus ispresumed to bevalid with the burden being upon one attacking the cap orany other regulation being
to provethat it not valid. Community, 174 Md. App. at 544.
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costs of other FQHCs, did not persuade him that appellants' administrative costs, in excess ofthe Cap,

were reasonable."119 174 Md. App. at 548-49.

O. Tax Court and Taxes.

AT&Tv. Comptroller, 405 Md. 83, 950 A. 2d 86 (2008)
"This case involves a sales and use tax imposed by Maryland on charges made by out-of-state

vendors to Maryland consumers of telecommunications information services beginning withthe
area code '900'. We are asked whether AT&T Communications of Maryland (AT&T), over

whose long-distance lines the communications from out-of-state vendors120 were transmitted to
Maryland consumers, was obligated to collect the taxfrom Maryland consumers and, failing to
have done that, to be responsible for payment ofthe tax to the Comptroller."
405 Md. at 87.121

"The uncontested factual findings in this case establish only that AT&T acted as a common

carrier with regard to the 900 number transactions at issue. Thus ... AT&T may not beheld
responsible for the 900 number sales and use tax on transactions between Maryland consumers
and the information services vendors without violating the Commerce Clause ofthe U.S.

Constitution. The Comptroller's assessment against AT&T inthiscase is notpermissible."
405 Md. at 105.

Comptroller v. Science Applications, 405 Md. 185, 950 A. 2d 766 (2008)
Taxpayer obtained favorable judgment and asked Comptroller ofthe Treasury for a tax
refund. "We hold that the Tax Court hasjurisdictionto hear a claim for intereston a

refund and, on the merits, because theTaxCourt committed noerrors of lawand its
conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, we shall affirm." 405 Md. at 189.
"The Tax Court's inference constitutes substantial evidence upon which its finding that

the Comptroller owed SAC interest on the refund was based." "The Tax Court inferred
from the Comptroller's letter and subsequent denial of SAIC's appeal thatthe State's
laws and policies at thetime SAIC filed theoriginal return required that SAIC pay tax on
the sale of NSI shares." 405 Md. at 205-206.

Wildwood Medical v. Montgomery County, 405 Md. 489, 954A. 2d 457 (2008)

This was an appeal from the Maryland tax Court determination and this was affirmed by the
Court ofAppeals that the transfer of property from partnership of co-owning individuals to LLC
composed ofthe same individuals was exempt from recordation and transfer taxes. 405 Md. at
503.

119 The ALJ found "It is the intent ofthe program thatproviders will be reimbursed the actual costs of providing highquality

care, regardless of how widely theymay vary from provider to provider except where a particular institution's costs are
found to besubstantially out of linewith otherinstitutions in the same area which aresimilar in size, scope of services,
utilization and other relevant factors." She found that Community's costs were reasonableand there was no evidence

presented that its costs were out ofline. Community, 174 Md. App. at539 (Emphasis in original). The Secretary ofDHMH
rejected the ALJ's conclusion finding the Cap was reasonable, the Board ofReview affirmed, as did the circuit court. 174 Md.
App. at 541-42.

120 The Courtdiscussedthe CommerceClause ofthe UnitedStatesand the validity of a state tax imposed on a transaction where

anout-of-state entity is oneofthe essential parties at pp. 93-97. Carriers are ordinarily classified as either private orcommon
carriers. 405 Md. at 97-98.

121 Discussion inthis opinion focusing onThe Maryland Tax Court asan administrative agency isfound at pp. 92-93 ofthe
opinion.
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A. Ex Post Facto Laws

The prohibition ofthe U.S. Constitution against the enactment ofexpostfacto laws may apply to
administrative regulations.
Significant Case Decisions

Guidelinesfor security classification ofinmates and transfer ofInmates

o

Watkins v. Division ofPub. Safety, 377 Md. 34, 831 A.2d 1079 (2003) discussed Division of Correction
directives, promulgated as"guidelines" forthe exercise of discretionary administrative authority. These
guidelines concerned the security classification of inmates, theassignment andtransfer of prisoners among
the State prison institutions, and were formulated to establish policy regarding an inmate's eligibility for
work release and family leave. TheCourt stated these were not expostfacto laws and are not violative of
Article I ofthe United States Constitution and Article 17 ofthe Maryland Declaration ofRights.1 When the
Maryland General Assembly enacted a statute thatchanged an inmate's eligibility for parole during his

incarceration, the ex postfacto clause may be violated.2 Numerous cases held the ex postfacto prohibition
to be "inapplicable to changes by the United States Parole Commission in the Commissioner's own
1Prisoners made their allegations first to the Inmate Grievance Office, and then to circuit court for judicial review. The APA was
applicable through S.G. §10-222 andCorr. Serv. §10-202. Watkins. 377Md. at45.
2Watkins, 377 Md. at 48 quotingGluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 672, 574 A.2d 898, 913 (1990).
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discretionary guidelines for granting parole." 377 Md. at 48-49. While the prohibition applies only to a law,
the concept ofa law is broader than a statute enacted by a legislative body, "and may include some
administrative regulations. Itdoes not encompass 'guidelines assisting [agovernment agency] in the
exercise of its discretion." 377 Md. at 49.

Had we gotten to the ex post facto Issue

o Interesting is the case ofDelmarva Power &Light v. Public Service Commission, 371 Md. 356, 809 A. 2d
640 (2002). The PSC passed an Order (Order No. 76292) that placed certain requirements on the electric
and gas utilities and imposed limitations on the relationship that those utilities had with their non-regulated
affiliates. 371 at 359. The Court of Appeals voided thatorder because the PSC was subject to requirements
ofthe MAPA andfailed to comply with the requirements to pass thatorder as a regulation. 371 at 161. The

Legislature met and passed legislation that would have overturned the appellate decision. 371, at364.
Reviewing Article II, §29 ofthe Maryland Constitution requiring that a law may not embrace more than
one subject and the one subject it ispermitted andpurports to embrace must bedescribed inits title. 371 at
367-68.4 The question presented bythe attempted corrective legislation was a substantial one. The single
subject rule was violated. 371 at 378. Though the Court did not consider the ex postfacto issue, it could
have proved to be interesting in this case.

B. Sanctions:

Normally, a court cannot interfere with sanctions imposed upon a licensee. Unless those sanctions are
arbitrary andcapricious, not what is allowed by the statute, or illegal, a courtmustdeferto the exercise of
the discretionary authority by the agency. No disproportionality argumentmay be entertained through
judicial review. Recent decisions by the Court of Appeals have made this highest level of deference to
administrative determinations very clear. See Chapter 10. Judicial Review (8). Was the agency
decision arbitrary and capricious, p 202

Significant Case Decisions
Review ofsanctions on appeal

o

In a case involving disciplinary action imposed by the Board of Chiropractic Examiners, the Court of
Special Appeals vacated the Board's decision with respect to sanctions imposed against Dr. Regan in
Regan v. Board ofChiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 524, 707 A. 2d 891 (1998). This was
because during oral argument counsel informed the COSA that an agreement had been reached by Ihe
parties which the Court found to have constituted a probationary period and status almost equal to what the
Board had ordered. A remand was made to the Board for clarification in view ofthe agreement reached.

So long as It is within what Is allowed by law
o MarylandAviation v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 873 A. 2d 1145 (2005) saw the Court of Appeals holding: "...
[W]hen the discretionary sanction imposed upon an employee by an adjudicatory administrative agency is
lawful and authorized [i.e. within what is allowed by the statute], the agency need not justify its exercise of
discretion by findings of fact or reasons articulating why the agency decided upon the particular discipline.
A reviewing court is not authorized to overturn a lawful and authorized sanction unless the

"disproportionality [ofthe sanction] or abuse of discretion was so extreme and egregious that the reviewing
court can properly deem the decision to be arbitrary or capricious." 386 Md. at 581. The terminated
paramedic hit the patient twice in the face because the patient was a combative psychiatric prisoner, who
3The Watkins Courtsaid that when the rules are "merely guides" that "may be discarded where circumstances require" they are
not subject to the ex post facto prohibitions. The Commissioner of Correction had discretion to (1) "establish policy guidelines
for security classifications without legislative ratification, (2) hold, assign and transfer prisoners among the State prison
institutions as it deems necessary, and (3) to establish policy regarding an inmate's eligibility for work release and family leave.
Watkins, 377 Md. at 52-53 (citing statutory and case law authority). There was no violation of "Federal and State constitutional
prohibitions against ex post facto laws." 377 Md. at 53.
4The Court discussed the reasons behind the constitutional enactment. Delmarva, 371 Md. at 367-78.
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was spitting and screaming explectives and removing aface shield. The blows were to prevent the patient
from spitting and to protect the police officers and the paramedic team from possible exposure toa
communicable disease. 386 Md. at 560-61.

Both the circuit court and the Court ofAppeals haddetermined the agency decision was arbitrary and

reversed. Maryland State Retirement Agency v. Delambo, 109 Md. App. 683, 675 A. 2d 1018 (1996), and
its application in this case, was reversed. Delambo had held that before an agency can terminate an
employee from his orher employment, that agency must take into consideration the employee's (1) overall
employment history inState service, (2) attendance record during that period oftime, (3) disciplinary
record atthepresent agency and at other State agencies as well, (4)work habits, and (5)relations with
fellow employees and supervisors. 386 Md. At569. Both the circuit court and the Court of Special
Appeals were oftheopinion that, while hitting the patient was unwarranted, the act did not automatically
constitute excessive force. 386 Md. at 570. MTA v. King, 269 Md. 274, 799 A. 2d 1246 (2002) was a case

where theCourt of Special Appeals reversed anagency determination because the termination of
employment was disproportionate tothe offense, and because King's conduct was not "soserious asto
warrant dismissal." The Courtof Appeals reversed stating: "As long as an administrative sanction or
decision does not exceed the agency's authority, is notunlawful, andis supported by competent, material
and substantial evidence, there can be no judicialreversal or modification ofthe decision based on

disproportionality or abuse ofdiscretion unless, under the facts of a particular case, the disproportionality
or abuse of discretion was so extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can properly deem the
decision to be 'arbitrary or capricious'" 386 Md. at 574. And, inSpencer v. Board ofPharmacy, 380 Md.
515,529-531, 846 A. 2d 341 (2004), the Courtof Appeals explained that "judicialreview of a lawful and
authorized administrative disciplinary decision or sanction, ordinarily within the discretion ofthe
administrative agency, is more limited thanjudicialreview of eitherfactual findings or legalconclusions."

Spencer said thata higher level of deference isowed to discretionary functions ofthe agency than to legal
conclusions or factual findings. 386 Md. at 575.

C. Waiver:

As in other areas of law, the concept of waiver is applicable in administrative law, and an administrative
agency may waive its right to bring disciplinary proceedings and other actions. Waiver involves a
determination of fact.

Significant Case Decisions
Waiver Is a question offact
o The Board of Pharmacy did not waive its right, as a matter of law, to bring disciplinary proceedings against
a Pharmacist for failure to timely renew her license to practice by renewing her license during the pendency
of its investigation of possible wrongdoing concerning the timeliness of her application for renewal of her
license. Spencer v. Board ofPharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 522, 846 A. 2d 341 (2004)

D. Immunity & Privilege.

Immunity from civil suit ordinarily attends those performing peer review responsibilities.5 Other
immunity and privilege issues are discussed in administrative law cases, including the fact that those
making a complaint and presenting information to an administrative agency have an absolute immunity
that precludes court action against them. The application of other privileges depend upon the facts of a
particular case.
5In Ostrezenski v. Siegel, 111 F. 3d. 245(1999), theCourt affirmed dismissal of District Courtdismissal of a 42 U.S.C.A. §1983
action against a physician who conducted a peer review of Ostrzenski at the behest ofthe Maryland Board of physician Quality.
177 F. 3d. at 247. Members of a state medical disciplinary board are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for performing
judicial or prosecutorial functions. Though Siegel was not a Board member, he was one step removed from "judicial" functions
because "he nevertheless may be entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity if he is engaged in a protected prosecutorial
function." 177 F. 3d. at 249. Peer review was analogous to the duties of a prosecutor reviewing evidence to determining whether
charges should be brought. 177 F. 3d. at 250-51.
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Significant Case Decisions

Just what Isprotected byaprivilege * Whatprivilege?

o Quashing an administrative subpoena for the appearance ofanews reporter to verify statements ofapolice
officer at a police disciplinary hearing was error and not protected by privilege. Prince George's County v.
Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 584, 822 A. 2d 537 (2003). ". . [N]either the First Amendment nor the

Maryland Shield Law entitles [reporters] to refuse to testify at [an] administrative hearing." Id6

Defamation In administrative proceedings

o

Adefamation action bya Montgomery County school teacher arising outof statements made during an

administrative proceeding, was barred by the same absolute privilege that attends statements ofwitnesses in
ajudicial proceeding.7 The statements were made during an administrative proceeding. Reichardt v. Flynn,
31A Md. 361, 377, 823 A. 2d 566 (2003).8 The statements against the teacher was that hemade
inappropriate sexual comments during the time he coached a cross-country tract team. 374 Md. at362.
"The administrative proceedings and appeals that were available to Flynn were much more extensive than
most administrative proceedings in a non-public education matter. He was entitled to hearings, two levels
of administrative appeals, andjudicial review.. . . The Circuit Court correctly held thatFlynn's
defamation action was barred by absolute privilege." 374 Md. at 377.

E. Multiple Statutes.

Litigating administrative law cases means that it must always bekept in mind that a number ofstatutes
may control the procedural process. Disciplinary matters involving state police officers always will
involve both the MAPA and the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights. Many other statutes, such as
the insurance code, contain a substantial amount of procedural requirements, in addition to the substantive

law applicable. Therefore, the litigant mustoften be aware ofthe procedural requirements of MAPA,
OAH and the particular agency involved.

6Disciplinary proceedings were brought against Officer Lot for a statement attributed to him in the Washington Post to the effect
that he would have shot someone had he been on the scene. Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 584. Lot wanted the Post reporter to testify
in the administrative proceeding. First Amendment law was reviewed and found not applicable as newspaper reporters have no
better testimonial privilege than other citizens. The law was examined in depth. 150 Md. App. at 587-99. "Officer Lott has a

right to cross-examinewitnesses who testify againsthim." 150 Md. App. at 597. There is a Maryland Shield Law which changed
the common law of no privilege afforded newsmen. 150 Md. App. at 600. Court ordered disclosure is a part of that law when
there is a significant legal issue and the information could not be otherwise obtained. Id., at 602. Remand was required for the
trial court to make a determination of whether the witness was compellable. 150 Md. App. at 603.

7Writing for the majority in Reichardt, Judge Eldridge commented onthe privilege attendant to judicial and administrative
hearings. Reichardt, 31A Md. at 367-76.

8The Court of Special Appeals in Reichardt had heldthat the statements were not absolutely privileged. Reichardt, 374 at365.
The Court of Appeals discussed Educ. Art. §4-205 affording the teachera hearing and appeal process. The absolute privilege
applicableinjudicial proceedings had been held applicableto administrative proceedings in Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434
A. 2d 547 (1981). The Gersh Court held the privilege applied to some administrative proceedings. Because the proceeding in
Gersh was substantially an ordinary open public meeting and did not resemble an adjudicatory administrative proceeding or a

contested case administrative proceeding under the Administrative ProcedureAct, the doctrine was not applicable. 374 Md. at
369-70.

9Onejudgedissented in Reichardt stating the Court had no power "to modify the common lawto create new absolute privileges
(absolute immunity). . ." Reichardt, 31A Md. at 378. The dissent contained an extensive examination ofthe absolute immunity
privilege, and concluded: "To continue on the path this Court has taken in recent years is, in my view, a totally unwarranted
extension ofthe principles of immunity, and, more important, is an affront to the constitutional provisions found in Article 40 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights." Reichardt, 31A Md. at 402.
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Significant Case Decisions
LEOBR and MAPA

o "... [A] police officer confronted with disciplinary proceedings isentitled tothe protections afforded by
thecontested case provisions ofthe Maryland Administrative Procedure Act(APA), Md. Code, State Gov't
§10-201 et. seq., as well as those oftheLaw Enforcement Officers' Bill ofRights (LEOBR), Md. Code, art.

27 §§ 727-734C." Travers v. Baltimore Police, 115 Md. App. 395, 407, 693 A. 2d 378 (1997).10

Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 350 Md. 540, 625 A. 2d914 (2004) is a case considering this same
issue where the Court stated:

The MSP is a state administrative agency subject to the requirements ofthe Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), Code (1984,1992 Cum.Supp.), §§ 10-101 through 10-405 ofthe State
Government Article. As a law enforcement officer, Zeigler is entitled to the protections ofthe Law
Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), Code (1957, 1992Repl. Vol.), Article27, §§

727 through 734D . The LEOBOR requires that a law enforcement agency provide an officer with
notice and a hearing before taking punitive action against the officer. As the entitlement to a
hearing brings thiscase within thedefinition of a "contested case" under theAPA, Zeigler is also
entitled to the protections afforded by the contested caseprovisions ofthe APA.
Travers, 115 Md. App. at 353. (footnotesand citation omitted)
The MSP is a state administrative agency subjectto the requirements ofthe Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), Code (1984,1992 Cum.Supp.), §§10-101 through 10-405 ofthe State
Government Article. As a law enforcement officer, Zeigler is entitled to the protections ofthe Law
Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, §§
727 through 734D. The LEOBOR requires that a law enforcement agency providean officerwith
notice and a hearing before taking punitive action against the officer. As the entitlement to a
hearing brings this case within the definition of a "contestedcase" under the APA, Zeigler is also
entitled to the protections afforded by the contested case provisions ofthe APA. Sugarloafv.
Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641, 651-653, 663-668, 594 A.2d 1115, 1119-1120, 1126-1128 (1991).
From MarylandState Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 553, 626 A. 2d 914(1993).

Insurance code and MAPA

o

In Frombergv. Insurance Commissioner, 87 Md. App. 236, 589 A. 2d 544 (1991), the Court stated:
Judicial review of an insurance commissioner determination had to be read with the insurance code, then

Article 48A §40(4) which allowed the court to consider the agency record "together with such additional
evidence as may be offered by any party to the appeal." 87 Md. App. at 243-44. Thus, the circuit court
should have allowed a California Study into evidence in Fromberg's effort to discredit Allstate's contention
that Fromberg's past accident history demonstrated an enhanced chance of future accident involvement so
as to allow Allstate to cancel insurance coverage. 87 Md. App. at 238-40.
MOSH and MAPA

o

"Two procedural statutes are in operation during a MOSH administrative hearing and review. They are
Title 5 (MOSH) ofthe Labor and Employment article (LE), Md. Code Ann. (1991 Repl. Vol. & Supp.
1995) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), State Government article (SG), § § 10-201 et seq.,
Md. Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1995)." Bregunier Masonryv. Maryland Commissioner, 111 Md. App. 698,
705, 684 A. 2d 6 (1996).

10 In Moman v. Norris, 158Md. App. 45, 854A. 2d 259(2004), theCourt determined that a police officerwho is certified for
permanent appointment by the Maryland Police Training Commission, but is a probationary police officer employee was not a
"law enforcement officer," under LEOBR and not entitled to the administrative law rights granted under that statute. 158 Md.
App. at 48, 62.
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F. Attorneys Fees.

There is a section inthe Maryland Administrative Procedure Act thatallows a small business or non

profit organization to recover litigation expenses incurred in acontested when an agency brings an action
inbad faith orwithout substantial justification.11 A contested case "is a proceeding before, or dispute

with, an agency that entitled a party to an agency hearing."12 Investigation ofa possible antitrust violation
prior to the filing ofacomplaint by the Consumer Protection Division does not constitute acontested
case.13

S.G. §10-224. Litigation expenses for small businesses and nonprofit organizations.
(a) Definitions.-

(1) In this section, the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2)"Business" means a trade, professional activity, or other business that is conducted forprofit.
(3) "Nonprofit organization" means an organization thatis exempt or eligible for exemption from
taxation under § 501 (c) (3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
(b) Scope ofsection.- This section applies only to:
(1) an agency operating statewide;
(2) a business that, on the date whenthe contested case or civil action is initiated:
(i) is independently owned and operated; and

(ii) has lessthan 50 employees, including, if a corporation owns50% or more ofthe stock ofthe
business, each employee ofthe corporation; and
(3) a nonprofit organization.
(c) Reimbursement authorized.- Subject to the limitations in this section, an agency or court may award
to a business or nonprofit organization reimbursement for expenses that the business or nonprofit
organization reasonably incurs in connection with a contested case or civil action that:
(1) is initiated against the business or nonprofit organization by an agency as part of an administrative or
regulatory function;
(2) is initiated without substantial justification or in bad faith; and
(3) does not result in:
(i) an adjudication, stipulation, or acceptance of liability ofthe business or nonprofit organization;
(ii) a determination of noncompliance, violation, infringement, deficiency, or breach on the part ofthe
business or nonprofit organization; or
(iii) a settlement agreement under which the business or nonprofit organization agrees to take
corrective action or to pay a monetary sum.
(d) Claim required in contested case.(1) To qualify for an award under this section when the agency has initiated a contested case, the
business or nonprofit organization must make a claim to the agency before taking any appeal.
(2) The agency shall act on the claim.
(e) Amount(1) An award under this section may include:
(i) the expenses incurred in the contested case;
(ii) court costs;
(iii) counsel fees; and
(iv) the fees of necessary witnesses.
(2) An award under this section may not exceed $10,000.

11 SG §10-224. Maryland Pharmacists v. Office oftheAttorney General, 115 Md. App.650, 694A. 2d 492(1997).
12 Maryland Pharmacists, 115 Md. App. at 658.
13 Maryland Pharmacists, 115 Md. App. at 158. This case involved an allegation by the Hallmark Card Co., Inc. concerning
activities ofthe Maryland Pharmacists Association, Inc. concerning mail order prescription plans. 115 Md. App. at 653. Analogy
to Maryland Rule 2-101(c) and the institution of a civil action was made by the Court. No such document was ever issued by the
Attorney General in this case. 115 Md. App. at 659.
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(3) The court may reduce or deny an award to the extent that the conduct ofthe business or nonprofit
organization during the proceedings unreasonably delayed the resolution ofthematter in controversy.
(f) Source of award.- Anaward under this section shall be paid as provided in the State budget.
(g) Appeals.-

m b

(1) If the agency denies an award under this section, the business ornonprofit organization may appeal,

as provided in this subtitle.

(2) An agency may appeal an award that acourt makes under this section.
[An. Code 1957, art. 41, §§ 244,255A; 1984, ch. 284, § 1; 1986, ch. 256; 1988, ch. 110, § 1; 1993, ch. 59, § 1.]

Other statutes allowthe award of attorneys fees to a party and the wording ofthose statutes and
ordinances need to be consulted for the details of when and under what circumstances fees may be
awarded.

Significant Case Decisions

County code provisions for attorneys fees

o

Firefighters filed grievances that lawn cutting and other maintenance actions were notwithin their duties in
Montgomery County v. JAMSA, 153 Md. App. 346, 836 A. 2d 745 (2003) The COSA hadearlier
determined the claims were grievable. 153 Md. App. at 350. On remand, the Montgomery County Merit
system Protection Board hadlegislative authority to award attorney's fees for services rendered onjudicial
review ofthe Board decisions. The Montgomery County Code authorized the Board to orderthe County to

pay "all or part" oftheemployee's reasonable attorney's fees.14 153 Md. App. at 355.
Montgomery Code and the lodestar approach

o

ManorCountry Club v. Flaa, 387 Md. 297, 874 A. 2d 1020(2005) discussed the correct approach to be
applied in calculating attorney's fees where the awardof such fees is permitted in accord with the
provisions ofthe Montgomery County Code. The Code stated criteriato be applied to a determination of
the discretionary award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a discrimination suit (time and labor,
novelty, skill, etc.). Flaa, 387 Md. at 397. Flaa prevailed before the Montgomery County Human
Relations Commission in a substantial way when asserting her claims of discrimination against Manor
Country Club.
The Court discussed the lodestar approach to determine attorney's fees, and said that approach was
unnecessary considering the statutory criteriathat was required to be considered. Flaa, 387 Md. at 312-16.
What prior opinions by the Court indicated was that in the absence of other statutory criteria for calculating
an attorney's fees award, one must begin with a lodestar figure, i.e. a result obtained by multiplying a
number of hours by an hourly rate. Flaa, 387 Md. at 319. Thus, the Panel's attorney's fees calculation
made pursuant to an analysis of each ofthe criteria contained in the former §27-7(k)(l) ofthe Montgomery
County Code resulted in a properly determined award of attorneys fees in the amount of $22,440.

Just to whom does this provision allowingfees pertain?
o In Montgomery County, there is a code provision allowing county employees to recover fees in certain
appeals in personnel actions. Kensington Fire v. Montgomery County, 163 Md. App. 278, 281, 878 A. 2d
662 (2004). Golden, a volunteer firefighter, appealed the decision ofthe Fire Administrator's imposition of
additional punishment, which decision was overturned administratively and on judicial review by the
circuit court. Interpreting the Montgomery County Code, the Court held that "the language, context, and
purpose ofthe relevant statutory provisions entitle volunteer firefighters to attorney's fees when the County
seeks judicial review of an unfavorable Board decision." This entitlement to fees pertained to volunteers as
well as county employees. Kensington, 163 Md. App. at 289.

14 The Board wasofthe opinion thatthe Code didnot allow anaward of attorney's fees for services rendered in connection with
judicial review of Board decisions. Id., at 351. The Montgomery County Charter stated that the County Council shall prescribe by
law a merit system for County Employees. The Board was given authority to accomplish the remedial objectives ofthe Code
including ordering the county to pay all or part of an employee's reasonable attorney's fees." Id., at 353.
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The fact that the fee petition was filed after the circuit court affirmed the Board decision was not fatal
because such requests are generally viewed as collateral matters. Kensington, 163 Md. App. at288. "Ifthe
trial court retains jurisdiction over collateral matters even afterthe entry ofa final judgment, isfollows that
an appeal filed in the underlying case does not encompass the court's subsequent resolution ofany
collateral matters." In this case, there was no appeal ofthe Board's decision not to awardfees within30

days, and thus the issue was notable to beappealed. Kensington, 163 Md. App. at 290.

G. Injunctions.

Various statutes give administrative agencies the authority to seek injunctive action. Most of these
injunctions are sought ina circuit court. When the right to an injunction is addressed to the general equity
power of a court, as opposed to any applicable statutory criteria, the Maryland Rules of Procedure set
forth the procedure that must be followed:
Title 15, Chapter 500. Injunctions
15-501. Injunctions - Definitions.
15-502. Injunctions - General provisions.
15-503.Bond - Temporary restraining order and preliminaryinjunction.
15-504. Temporary restraining order.
15-505. Preliminary injunction.

"The very function of an injunction is to furnish preventative reliefagainst irreparable mischiefor
injury, andthe remedy willnotbe awarded where itappears to the satisfaction ofthe court that the injury
complained of is notofsuch a character. Suitors may not resort to a court of equityto restrain acts, actual
or threatened, merely because they are illegal or transcend constitutional powers, unless it is apparent that
irremediable injury will result. The mere assertionthat apprehended acts will inflict irreparable injury is
not enough. The complaining party must allege and prove facts from which the court can reasonably infer
that such would be the result."15
"Irreparable harm is a pliant term adaptable to the unique circumstances which an individual case
might present." An injury is irreparable "where it is of such a character that a fair and reasonable redress
may not be had in a court of law, so that to refuse the injunction would be a denial ofjustice - in other
words, where, from the nature ofthe act, or from the circumstances surrounding the person injured, or
from the financial condition ofthe person committing it, it cannot be readily, adequately, and completely

compensated for with money."16
"The function of a court in deciding whether to issue an injunction authorized by a statute . . . to
enforce and implement congressional policy is a different one from that ofthe court when weighing

claims oftwo private litigants."17 No every violation will automatically require a court to issue an
injunction. Equity allows a remedy to befashioned depending onthe necessities ofthe particular case.18
When a statute provides for an injunction a circuit court's freedom to make an independent assessment of
the equities and the public interest is circumscribed to the extent that the legislation involved has already
made such assessments.19

15 State Comm on Human Relations v. Talbot County Detention Center, 370Md. 115, 140, 803 A. 2d 527(2002) quoting ElBey
v. Moorish Sci. Temple ofAm., 362 Md. 339, 354, 765 A. 2d 132 (2001).

16 Human Relations, 370 Md. at 140.
17 Human Relations, 370 Md. at 137.
18 Human Relations, 370 Md. at 137.
19 Human Relations, 370 Md. at 138.
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Significant Case Decisions

Injunction following ethics commission ruling
Ethics commission issued order requiring former senior level employees of Anne Arundel County from

instituting class action litigation against County pertaining to development impact fees. The circuit court
denied a motion to disqualify counsel. Commission then filed in circuit courta Petition for Permanent

Injunction. Ethics Commission v. Dvorak, 189 Md. App. 46, 51, 983 A. 2d 557 (2009). Reviewing the
Public Ethics Law and case lawand injunctive practice, and court stated: "In an injunctive actionof this

type, when the legislation at issue is one that affects orpertains to the public interest, courts need not
necessarily adhere to a traditional balancing ofthe equities." 189 Md. at 80.The case was remanded for
further proceedings. 189 Md. at 85. Res Judicata was also discussed and the Court reviewed thatdoctrine.
189Md. at 87-88. A trial judge affirmed the Ethics Commission finding of facts and the case was
dismissed on appeal for a lackof appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the administrative conclusion of an ethics
violation is a finaljudgment, conclusive and binding. The Petition in this case for an Injunction was an
action basedon that prior administrative proceeding finding that appellees violated the ethics order.
"Therefore,issues decided by the circuitcourt, or essential to the judgment, such as the timeliness ofthe
ethics Complaintor retroactivity, cannotbe re-litigated." 189Md. at 89.
A state agency asking for an Injunction
o A circuit court was asked to issue an injunctionin State Comm on Human Relations v. Talbot County
Detention Center, 370 Md. 115, 803 A. 2d 527 (2002). The request was not to enjoin actions which violate

the law but was a request to enjoin actions which arguably impede the Comm on HumanRelations from

performing the lawful taskof conducting anuninhibited investigation of raceandgender discrimination in
the workplace and sexual harassment in the same workplace. The Commission soughtan injunction to
prohibit agents from the Detention Centerfrom appearing at confidential witness interviews and from
insisting that the interviews be recordedand transcribed. 370 Md. at 141. Art. 49B §4 grants the
Commission the power "to bring a civil action for injunctive relief, outlines when and where such action
can be brought, and further establishes the criteriaunderwhich an injunction may be sought or granted, i.e.
'to preservethe status ofthe parties or to preventirreparable harm.'" 370 Md. at 129. As opposedto a
situation where the request for injunctive relief is addressedto the equity jurisdiction ofthe court, the
statute a statute may narrow the circuit court discretionary authority by replacing considerations in equity

with statutory criteria. 370 Md. at 129-30.20 It was not required thatthe commission file a complaint
against the Detention Center. 370 Md. at 132.21 "While the investigative process may, inpart, protect an
employer from frivolous claims, it was never intended to provide an impenetrableshield through which no
investigation could be conducted in confidence and without undue influence or intimidation by the
employer accused of violating the statute. The Legislature did not mandate that the preliminary
investigation must be conducted through formal transcribed interviews where both the witness and the
accused are privy to the questioning process. . ." 370 Md. at 135. Here the Legislature provided "if the
Commsision believes that appropriate civil action is necessary to . . . prevent irreparable harm . . . the
Commission may bring action to obtain a temporary injunction." Art. 49B §4. It is this standard that courts
are to utilize when considering a request for injunctive relief in this case. The issue becomes whether the
Commission has satisfied the court that a reasonable necessity exists to preserve the status ofthe parties or
prevent irreparable harm. If so, the injunction should be issued. 370 Md. at 138-39.
The Court stated that the Commission request for an injunction was temperate and reasonable. "The
public has an interest in ensuring unfettered investigations of illegal company practices, particularly when
civil rights are at issue." 370 Md. at 141-42. "The Commission's pursuit of an unfettered, uninterrupted,
and comprehensive preliminary investigation, if hindered or disrupted by the Detention Center's actions,
would constitute a denial ofjustice, particularly because the comprehensive and ubiquitous nature of our
State's anti-discrimination legislation suggests both the Legislature's goals and the indispensable nature of
tools of enforcement it afforded the Commission, such as the injunctive relief provided in Section 4." 370
Md. at 144. The Court ordered the circuit court to grant the injunction. Id.

20 The Courtsaidthe casepresented a novel question as to the degree of discretionary authority a circuit courtmaintains when
considering injunctions sought pursuant to, and authorized by a specific statute. Supreme Court and other federal cases were
examined. Human Relations, 370 Md. at 128-30.

21 Appellate court authority to review the circuit court decision was pursuant to Cts. §12-301. Human Relations, 370Md. at 132.
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Stay

o Maryland rule 7-205 states that the "filing ofa petition [for judicial review] does not stay the order or
action ofthe administrative agency. Upon motion and after hearing, the court may grant a stay, unless

prohibited by law, upon the conditions as to bond orotherwise that the court considers proper." There is a
"nostay" provision in LE 9-741 relating to appeals from a decision bythe Worker's Compensation
Commission ordering thatcompensation bepaid. Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 156 Md. App. 543, 847 A. 2d
520 (2004). Therefore, a Commission order may notbe enjoined by a circuit court under thecircuit court's

plenary equity power, to circumvent the "no stay" provision. 156 Md. App. at 556.22
Enjoining the use ofproperty

o

InJoy v. Anne Arundel County, 52 Md. App. 653,451 A.2d 1237 (1982), the Court considered the scope
of an injunction issued by a circuit court. Anne Arundel County complained that Joy's useofthe property
as ajunkyard, resource reclamation facility and a hazardous waste facility was in violation of applicable
zoning regulations. The Court said that last two paragraphs ofthe injunction were said to be unexceptional.
"They merely require Joy to comply with the County Code. Nordoes there seem to be any substantial basis
forobjecting to the first paragraph, which in effect does the same thing, by ordering Joynotto bring
materials on the property, by implication, while he lacks a certificate of use. TheCircuit Court hadbefore it
ample evidence of Joy's continuing activities ontheproperty, andof his disposition to defy the county
authorities." There was anotherparagraph directing Joy"to removematerials from the property," whichthe
Courtalso found to be appropriate as Joy "brought materials onto the property in connection with activities
that were unlawful because he had failed to obtain the necessary certificate of use. It was not unreasonable
for the chancellor to order him to remove them." 52 Md. App. at 662-63. But the third paragraph:

"ordering Joy to returnthe property to its original topography, presents more difficulty. The record appears
to contain no evidence of what the "original"topography ofthe property was (whatever date "original" may
refer to) or how Joy changed it. Thus, it is not clearjust how Joy is to comply with this paragraph, or how
he might defend himself against a charge of contemptfor its violation." 52 Md. App. at 663.
The BB rules then in effect for injunction actions required the terms of an injunction to be described in
reasonable detail. Terms such as requiring a defendant to "to take such actions as shall be necessary to
prevent any future flooding ofthe Plaintiffs property
" are not sufficientto satisfy the rule of
specificity. The Court said that the requirement that Joy "restore the propertyto its original topography"
was too vague and overbroad to comply with Marylandrules. Because ofthe lack of specificity, the order
was vacated as to that third paragraph.

H. Estoppel.

There is a doctrine of equitable estoppel in equity law and it has some application against a

municipality.23 It is sometimes alleged that the actions of government are such that it ought to be
precluded, both at law and in equity, "from assertingrights which might have otherwise existed, either of
property, or contract or of remedy, as against another person who has in good faith relied upon such
conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some

corresponding right, either ofproperty, ofcontract, or ofremedy."24
"Of course, no principle is better settled than that persons dealing with a municipality are bound to
take notice of limitations upon its charter powers. Consequently, 'everyone dealing with officers and
agents of a municipality is charged with knowledge ofthe nature of their duties and the extent of their
powers, and therefore such a person cannot be considered to have been deceived or misled by their acts
when done without legal authority.' Therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel 'cannot be . . .

22 Though it would seem evident to somethat the clearlegislative "no stay"statement trumps jurisdiction by a circuit court, the
Gleneagles court detailed the history of LE §9-741, applied the rules of statutory interpretation and reached its decision. Hanks,
156 Md. App. at 552-57.

23 Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 194, 783 A. 2d 169 (2002).
24 Kahl, 366 Md. at 194.
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invoked to defeat the municipality in theenforcement of itsordinances, because of an error ormistake

committed by one ofits officers or agents which has been relied on by the third party to his detriment.""25
Estoppel against a municipality is"bottomed on the need for the interpretation orclarification of an

ambiguous statute or ordinance . . "26
Maryland recognizes a"vested rights" principle common and constitutional law. The doctrine focuses
on"whether the owner acquired real property rights which cannot be taken away by government

regulation." In construction and development cases, the focus isordinarily onwhether a permit has been
obtained andconstruction has begun as a condition precedent to escape the right of governmentto

downzone property.27
Significant Case Decisions

But the county Issued a permit

o Equitable estoppel was not applicable against Baltimore County, Maryland inMarzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md.
158, 194, 783 A. 2d 169 (2002) to allow thebreeding of snakes under an expanded definition of "farm"

under a particular zoning classification where the County had issued a permit to allow the activity. 366 Md.
at 199. Sympathy for the plight of Kahl who obtained the permit and had undertaken construction onthe
property did notmean hecould legally succeed. "We have held, generally, that permits that have been
issued that are in violation ofthe zoningordinances are unlawful and cannotbe grounds for estopping a
municipality from the enforcement ofthe ordinance." 366 Md. at 199.

o Sycamore Realty v. People's Counsel, 344 Md. 57, 684 A. 2d 1331 (1996) held that theCourt had not yet
adopted atheory of zoning estoppel in Maryland. 344 Md. at 69. The doctrine was examined indetail and

aCourt ofSpecial Appeals opinion recognizing alimited theory ofzoning estoppel was reversed.28

A reservation period

o

Petitioner's desire to erect a 220 unit townhouse complex was put on hold when the Baltimore County

Council reserved the 24.37 acre parcel for potential future acquisition for an 18 month period. During the
reservation period, the parcel was subject to downsized and onlya 132 unit could thereafter be built.
Appellate Courts are generally loath to "impose estoppel against the government when it is acting in a

general capacity."344 Md. at66. Maryland has recognized a"vested rights" derived from principles of
common and constitutional law. The doctrine focuses on "whether the owner acquired real property rights

which cannot betaken away by government regulation." 344 Md. at 67.29 Because the Petitioner had not
obtained a permit and had not proceeded to construction prior to the downzoning, no rights vested and the
Petitioner was not protected. However, a Baltimore County Code provision authorized the Petitioner to
recover "actual damages sustained" by reason ofthe County reservation, andthat was the only remedy
available. 344 Md. at 70.

25 Kahl, 366Md. at 195 quoting Inlet Associates v. Assateague House Condominium Association, 313 Md. 413, 545 A. 2d 1296
(1988).

26 Inlet Associates v. Assateague House Condominium, 313 Md. 413, 545 A. 2d 1296 (1998) reviewed the application ofthe
doctrine of equitable estoppel against a government entity. The doctrine wasnot applicable in the Inlet case where there was an
error in Ocean City Maryland's attempt to convey land through a resolution where the Charter clearly stated the conveyance had
to be by the passage of an ordinance. 313 Md. at436. The Court stated: "Consequently, '[e]veryone dealing with officers and
agents of a municipality is charged with knowledge ofthe nature of their duties and the extent of their powers, and therefore such
a provision cannot be construed to havebeen deceived ormisled by their acts when done without legal authority."' 313 Md. at4.,
at437. It is yourlegal responsibility to make sure the government has the right to do whatthe government agents claim it has the
right to do.

27 Sycamore Realty v. People's Counsel, 344 Md. 57, 67-70, 684 A. 2d 1331 (1996).
28 The Sycamore Realty Court discussed equitable estoppel, and the doctrine of zoning estoppel as it hasbeenadopted in some
stated. Sycamore, 344 Md. at 63-66.

29 The Sycamore Realty Court reviewed someMaryland case decisions. Id., at67-69.
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Developmentand downsizing

o

Where Petitioner's attempt to develop property was subject to downsizing in County Council v. Offen, 334
Md. 499, 639 A. 2d 1070 (1994), the Court of Special Appeals raised the issue ofthe applicability of
zoning estoppel on its own volition. That sua sponte action was said to have exceeded the authority ofthe

Court when that issue had neither been argued nor briefed. 334 Md. at505.30
I. Open Meetings Act

Subtitle 5 "Meetings" of Title 10 "Governmental Proceedings" inthe State Government Article contains

Maryland's "Open Meetings Act."31 Legislative policy is stated to be that public business should be
performed inan open and public manner for citizens to observe. Included intheopen meetings
requirement isthat the public beprovided with adequate notice ofthe time anlocation of meetings of
public bodies.32 Specific definitions are set forth for judicial, legislative and executive functions aswell
as the definition of a public body. "Public body" includes any"multimember board, commission, or
committee appointed bythe Governor orthechiefexecutive authority of a political subdivision ofthe

State. "Quasi-judicial" function is specifically defined to include contested cases under the MAPA.33
The Sections within Subtitle 5 are:

Subtitle 5. Meetings.
10-501. Legislative policy.
10-502. Definitions.

10-502.1. State Open Meetings Law ComplianceBoard.
10-502.2. Membership.
10-502.3. Quorum; meetings; compensation.
10-502.4. Duties.

10-502.5. Complaint.
10-502.6. Same - Prospective violation.
10-503. Scope of subtitle.
10-504. Conflict of laws.

10-505. Open sessions generally required.
10-506. Notice of open session.
10-507. Attendance at open session.
10-507.1. Interpreters.

10-508. Closed sessions permitted.
10-509. Minutes; tape recordings.
10-510. Enforcement.

10-511. Penalty.
10-512. Short title.

"A public body . . . must meet in open session, which the general public is entitled to attend, except
as otherwise provided for in the Open Meetings Act. . . The Open Meetings Act further specifies that

the public body must provide adequate notice ofthe meeting."34 "The Open Meetings act provides for
sanctions in cases of non-compliance. In particular, it provides that if a court 'finds that a public body
willfiilly failed to comply §10-505, §10-506, §10-507, or §10-509(c) of [the Open Meetings act] and that
no other remedy is adequate, [the court may] declare void the final action ofthe public body." §1030 The Offen case is discussed along with the doctrines of zoning estoppel and vested rights in Sycamore Realty v. People s
Counsel, 344 Md. 57, 684 A. 2d 1331 (1996).

31 SG §10-512.
32 SG §10-501.
33 SG §10-502. There is a State Open Meetings lawCompliance Board. See SG §§ 10-502.1 through 10-502.6.
34 Community andLabor United v. Baltimore CityBoard ofElections, 377 Md. 183, 187, 832 A. 2d 804 (2003)
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510(d)(4).35 The law contains statements ofapplicability and nonapplicability. Open sessions are
generally required.36 Some closed sessions are permitted.
"The first Maryland comprehensive legislation about open meetings came into effect in 1977, with
the enactment ofthe new sections 7 through 15 of Article 76A ofthe Maryland Code. The current Open

Meetings Act was the result ofa recodification ofthe provisions ofArticle 76Aby Ch. 284 ofthe Acts of
1984, without substantial change. Thus, the policy ofthe Open Meetings Act has remained unchanged,
that 'citizens be allowed to observe ... the deliberations and decisions that the making of public policy

involves.' [SG] §10-501 (a)."38 "While the Act does not afford the public any right to participate in the
meetings, it does assure the public right toobserve the deliberative process and the making ofdecisions
by the public body at open meetings. Inthis regard, it is clear that the Act applies, not only to final
decisions made by the public body exercising legislative functions at a public meeting, but as well to all
deliberations which precede the actual legislative act ordecision, unless authorized by [§10-508] to be
closed tothe public. * * * It is ... the deliberative and decision-making process in its entirety which must
be conducted in meetings open to the public since every step ofthe process, including the final decision

itself, constitutes the consideration or transaction ofpublic business."39
"The clear policy ofthe Open Meetings Act is to allow the general public to view the entire
deliberative process." "Observation by citizens is possible only when they have notice thatsuch

deliberations are planned by their elected representatives."40
If a circuit court concludes that there were Open MeetingsAct violations, and they were grievous

enough, it hasthe authority to remedy those violations with an action as severe as voiding the agency
decision. Before that can happen, the court mustdetermine that the Board 'willfully failed to comply'

with the Act, and that no other remedy isadequate. SG §10-510(d)(4).41
Significant Case Decisions

Theappropriate remedyfor a violation Is to declarethe action void
o Community andLabor United v. Baltimore City Board ofElections, 377 Md. 183, 196-97, 832 A. 2d 804
(2003) voided action by the Baltimore City Council for failure to comply with provisions ofthe Open

Meetings Act.42 When theCouncil met to discuss a proposal to restructure itselfthis constituted
deliberations that citizens had to be allowed to observe. "The record does not provide any significant
information about the deliberations that preceded the passage of this bill. On the contrary, the record shows
that the City Council wished to conduct these deliberations away from the scrutiny of citizens and the

media. In pursuit of this goal, the council first omitted to provide notice ofthe August 8 meeting, and when
this failed, successfully excluded citizens and the media from the meeting, where, presumably, the bill was
discussed. Assuming that the bill in question was not discussedat the luncheon meeting on August 12, the
only open meeting on record with any discussion of Bill 02-0654 is the evening meeting on August 12,
where the Council voted on the bill. The Council effectively prevented members ofthe public from

35 Board ofElections, 377 Md. at 188.
36 SG §10-505.
37 SG §10-508.
38 Community and Labor United v. Baltimore City Board of Elections, 377Md. 183, 193-94, 832A. 2d 804(2003) citing Wesley
ChapelBluemount Ass'n v. Baltimore County, 347 Md. 125, 137-138, 699 A.2d 434, 440 (1997).
39 Community andLaborUnited, 377 Md. at 193. citingNew Carrollton v. Rogers, 287 Md. 56, 72, 410 A.2d 1070, 1078-1079
(1980).

40 Community andLabor United, 377 Md. at 194.
41 Handley v. Ocean Downs, 151 Md. App. 615, 631, 827A. 2d 961 (2003) citing Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass'n v. Baltimore
County, 347 Md. 125, 128-29, 699 A.2d 434, 440 (1997).

42 The Courtreviewedthe definitions of publicbody andpublic business, the requirement that the body must meet in open
session and must provide adequate notice ofthe meeting. Community and Labor, 377 Md. at 187-88. The history ofthe Open
Meetings Act was set forth. Communityand Labor, 377 Md. at 193.
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observing most ofthe deliberations on the issue, in direct contravention to the expressly stated policy ofthe
Open Meetings Act. We hold that the Council willfully failed tocomply with §§10-505 and 10-506 ofthe
Open Meetings Act, and that the appropriate remedy was to declare the action ofthe Baltimore City
Council void. 377 Md. at 196-97."

The philosophy ofthe Act
Enforcement alternatives

o

Maryland's Open Meetings actiscodified inSG 10-501, et. seq. It applies to "public bodies," and that
includes the Board of zoning Appeals ofthe city of Cambridge, Maryland andCityPlanning andZoning
Commission of Cambridge. Handley v. Ocean Downs, 151 Md. App. 615, 633, 827 A. 2d 961 (2003).
"The Actembodies the philosophy thatpublic business should be performed in a public manner, accessible
to interested citizens, and that this type of open government is 'essentialto the maintenance of a democratic
society.' Such open government 'ensures theaccountability of government to the citizens ofthe Statef,]. .
. increases the faith ofthe public in government andenhances the effectiveness ofthe public in fulfilling its
role in a democratic society." SG §10-501. Id.

Ocean Downs involved an appeal from a decision by the Boardof zoningAppeals ofthe Cityof

Cambridge approving a special use permit authorizing anoff-track betting facility inCambridge. Id., at
620.43 One argument on appeal was that the Board violated theOpen Meetings Act. 151 Md. App. at 627.
It was claimedthat the Commission hearing notice was not posted in City Hall until the day ofthe hearing
in violation of SG §10-506(a). It wasalso alleged thatthe Board violated SG §10-508 by conferring ofifthe-record without voting first whether to close a session. 151 Md. App. at 634. Thetrial court did notrule
on thesealleged violations. Thereare enforcement provisions to the OpenMeetings Act. SG §10-510
states that a Petition is to be filed for enforcementwithin 45 days of a violation but does not say that is the

only method of enforcement. 151 Md. App. at 635-36. Other available remedies language intheAct means
the Legislature did notintend the petition route tobeanexclusive remedy forenforcement. 151 Md. App.
at 636-37. "This interpretation is consistent with the broad legislative policy to 'ensure theaccountability of
government [that] undergirds and pervades the Act.'" The Act effectively delegates enforcement ofthe Act
to thepublic. 151 Md. App. at 638. Appellant's claim in its Petition for Judicial Review was sufficient.
151Md.App.at639-40.44
Open meetings act and the public information act
o From Sugarloafv. Department ofEnvironment, 344Md. 271, 292,686 A.2d605, 616 (1996):
We find no merit in the plaintiffs' final argument that "the ALJ's determination that pre-hearing
discovery was not permitted denied [plaintiffs] dueprocess of lawas required by the United States
and Maryland Constitutions." (Plaintiffs' supplemental briefat 46). Thereis no provision in the
Maryland Administrative Procedure Actwhich provides for discovery at the pre-hearing stage.
Furthermore, under COMAR 26.01.02.21A, which governs the Department ofthe Environment

contested case proceedings, "discovery maybe takenonly in accordance with the stipulation ofthe
parties." Parties may, however, "request governmental documents under the Maryland Public
Information Act, State Government Article, §10-611 et. seq." COMAR 26.01.02.21B. There was

no stipulation in this case providing for discovery. Consequently, the ALJ properlydetermined
that, absent such stipulation,she was not authorized to require the extensive discoveryrequested
by the plaintiffs. Moreover, pursuant to COMAR 26.01.02.2IB,the plaintiffs requested certain
documents under the Maryland Public InformationAct which they received without delay.
Finally, the plaintiffs do not dispute the respondents' representations that the plaintiffs were
furnished with several documents.

The plaintiffs do not argue that the ALJ or the Departmentrelied upon any documentwhich
was not previously shown to the plaintiffs, or with regard to which there was no opportunity for
rebuttal. Cf. Rogers v. RadioShack, 271 Md. 126, 129, 314 A.2d 113, 115 (1974) ("We agree
43 Community involvement in this litigation was intense. The Court set out all the factsdealingwith the planned project. Ocean
Downs, 151 Md. App. at 622-27.

44 The Court stated: "If it had intended that the 45 day limit to apply to all Open Meetings Act claims, the legislature 91) would

have used broaderlanguage(i.e., a party 'shall file a claimbasedon a violation ofthe act within 45 days of such violation') and
(2) would haveset forththis limitation in a context independent of section 10-510(b)." . Ocean Downs, 151 Md. App.at 639-40.
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withRogers that underthe circumstances here, with no opportunity for cross-examination or
rebuttal, fundamental fairness would preclude reliance upon the report by an administrative
agency"). Theplaintiffs have cited no case inthe Supreme Court or in this Court, and weare
unaware of any such case, holding that dueprocess mandates pre-hearing discovery in an
administrative proceeding. SeeReplacement Rent-A-Car v. Smith, 99 Md. App. 588, 593,638
A.2d 1217, 1219(1994) ("TheMaryland Rules relating to discovery apply only to proceedings in
the circuit courts and not to proceedings before administrative agencies.... It is equallywellestablished that there is no broad constitutionalright to pre-hearing discovery in administrative

proceedings andthat any general right to such discovery must come from the statutes or rules
governing those proceedings. * * * Neither the State Administrative Procedure Actnorthe statute
governing the [agency] provides such entitlement..."), andcases there cited.
Thus, we perceiveno error in the ALJ's refusal to requirepre-hearing discovery.
344 Md. at 316-17.

J. Double Jeopardy.

Sometimes an argument isgenerated in administrative law that state action constitutes double jeopardy
against an individual or anentity. Most cases addressing this issue discuss the principal as not often
applicableto the administrative process.
Significant Case Decisions
Administrative remedies and criminal remedies

o

In State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 666 A. 2d 128(1995), cert, denied, 116 S. Ct. 1265 (1996),the Court said
the administrative suspension of a driver's license under Trans. §16-205.1 did not constitute "punishment"
within the ambit ofthe U.S.Constitution or Marylandcommon law so as to be double jeopardy precluding
the Statefrom bringing a subsequent prosecution for the crime of driving while intoxicated. 340 Md. at
240,266. The Court reviewed application ofthe doublejeopardy doctrine.340 Md. at 242-252;255-63.
License suspensions generally serve remedial purposes. 340Md. at 251. Disciplinary proceedings for
professional licenses have beenviewed in the same way. 340 Md. at 253. See: 26 U. Bait. L. Rev. 80,
Annual Review of Maryland Law (1996).

K. Retroactivity.45
When and under what circumstances is a statute or regulation concerning administrative law retroactive?

That is a question, the answer to which has consumed many, many case decisions. The same issues are
generated in administrative law cases.
Significant Case Decisions
A vested right

o

Landsman contracted with Somerville for home improvement in Landsman v. MarylandHome

Improvement Commission, 154Md. App. 241, 839A. 2d 743 (2003). Upon administrative adjudication,
Landsman made claim against the Home Improvement guarantyFund. At issue was whether there could be
a recovery of $15,000 against the fund, the maximum recovery by Ch. 144 ofthe Laws of 2000, or
$10,000, the maximum recovery at the time ofthe contract. 154 Md. App. at 246. "At the hearing of this
appeal is whether Landsman, having established an actual lossresulting from Somerville's abandonment of
the job in December, 1997, is entitled to benefit from the increased maximum amount provided under the

45 Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 805 A. 2d 1061 (2002) addressed the issue of late fees in consumer contractsand
subrogation in contracts between health maintenance organizations. Retroactivity was at issue. The Court held the retrospective
portions oftwo Acts of 2000 were unconstitutional. Id, at618.Vested rights andthe takings clauseofthe Maryland constitution
were discussed. The Constitution of Maryland prohibits legislation which retroactively abrogates vested rights. Id., at 623 The
Court did not reach the federal constitutional issues
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2000 amendment. The answer to this question is dictated by whether the amendment is to be applied

retrospectively orprospectively."46154 Md. App. at 250.47 Landsman had no vested right in property. 154
Md. App. at 254. The award is a monetary debt to the contractor forwhich the Commission may suspend
the contractors license. 154 Md. App. at 256-57. The potential for a license suspension does not create a
penalty for contractors. 154 Md. App. at 258.

A professional license is notan absolute vested right. It is, at most, only a conditional right which is

subordinate to the police power ofthe State to protect and preserve the public health and welfare.48
Somerville had no vested right in being shielded from the additional $5,000 owing to the Fund upon

payment of Landsman's claim. 154 Md. App. at 260. "Wefail to seehow a contractor is entitled to a
license where there has been a determination by the Commission that the contractor's acts or omissions
have caused actual loss to a claimant. A license is essentially a privilege, not a 'vested right." We therefore

conclude that suspension of a contractor's license pursuant to §8-411 does not infringe upon a property
right protected by the Maryland Constitution." 154Md. App. at 261.

L. Issue Preclusion

Res judicata? Issue Preclusion? Collateral estoppel? Are those doctrines applicable to administrative
law cases? There can be no issue preclusion in eithera judicial or administrative law case unlessthere

was a final judgment in thecasesaid to bethe benchmark of preclusion. A board's enforcement of its
licensing and disciplinary requirements serves to protect the public, and is remedial, rather than punitive.
Therefore, the principals of doublejeopardy and resjudicata do not apply.
Significant Case Decisions

An explanation ofres judicata

o

Lizzi v.WMATA, 384 Md. 199,206-07,862 A. 2d 1017 (2004) gives a good explanation ofthe doctrine of

resjudicata. Faced with thisdefense, a court and an administrative agency must examine the extent ofthe

prior ruling claimed to have disposed ofthe issue. 384 Md. at 207-08.49
There must be afinaljudgment

o

In Spencer v. Md. State Bd. ofPharm., 380Md. 515, 846 A.2d 341 (2004), the Courtof Appeals
determined that a licensee had been denied the right to a fair hearing before the Board of Pharmacy. The

Courtof Special Appeals had madethe same ruling but ordered a remandto the Board of Pharmacy. On
certiorari, it was alleged that a remand would create issues of resjudicata or doublejeopardy. The Court
saidthat argument was withoutmerit and frivolous. "The Board's enforcement of its licensing and
disciplinary requirements serve purposes essential to the protection ofthe public, which are deemed
remedial, rather than punitive, and therefore are not subjectto doublejeopardy principles, (holdingthat
46 "The Constitution of Maryland prohibits legislation whichretroactively abrogates vestedrights. The Landsman case is a primer
on retroactivity prohibited, when and underwhat circumstances. No matter how 'rational' underparticular circumstances, the
Stateis constitutionally precluded from abolishing a vested property rightor taking one's property and giving it to some one
else." Retrospective statutes abrogating vested property rights (including contractual rights) violate the Maryland Constitution.
"The particular provisions ofthe Constitution which are violated by suchacts are Article 24 ofthe Declaration of Rights and
Article III, §40, ofthe Constitution. A statute having the effect of abrogating a vested property right, and not providing for
compensation, does'authorize private property, to be taken . . ., withoutcompensation.' (Article III, §40). Concomitantly, such
a statute results in a person or entity being 'deprived of his . . . property' contrary to the 'law ofthe land.' (Article 24)."
Landsman, 154 Md. App. at 259-60.

47 The question is one of statutory construction. The Court reviewed the law regarding the retrospective or prospective
application of a law, which is a question of legislative intent.Landsman, 154 Md. App. at 251-254.
48 Landsman v. Maryland Home Improvement Commission, 154 Md. App. 241,259, 839 A. 2d 743 (2003).
49 In this case, a former employee ofthe Washington Metropolitan AreaTransit Authority sued for unlawful termination of
employment. A federal appellate courtdismissed the employee'srelated federal courtaction. "We hold that petitioner's present
claim concerning the ability ofthe personal-leave provisions ofthe FMLA to overcomethe sovereign immunity of this Stateis
barred due to the resjudicata effect ofthe Fourth Circuit's opinion in Lizzi v. Alexander, et. al, 255 F. 3d. 128 (2001)." Lizzi,384
Md.at213.
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where the purpose ofthe penalty is remedial, it is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes); (noting
thatthe "purpose of disciplinary proceedings against licensed professionals is not to punish the offender but
rather as a catharsis for the profession and a prophylactic for the public"). Even if double jeopardy were

applicable, which it is not,the rehearing would notbe precluded, as a newtrial (or rehearing) ordinarily is
not precluded by double jeopardy principles when a conviction is reversed on grounds otherthan
sufficiency ofthe evidence. The remand was not basedon insufficiency of evidencebut on defects in
procedure."

"Neither is resjudicata applicable in this casebecause there is no finaljudgment-the case is still on
appellate review~and because issue andclaim preclusion require a subsequent cause of action in which
those doctrinesmay take effect; this appeal is not a subsequent cause of action but all part ofthe same case,
(noting thatresjudicataprinciples preserve the conclusive effect ofjudgments, "except on appeal or other
directreview," and quotingRestatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982 ) that "whenan issue of fact or
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to
thejudgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the
same or a different claim")." 380 Md. at 534-35.

Afinding ofguiltfollowed by PBJ
o In Powell v. Md. Aviation Admin., 336 Md. 210, 647 A.2d 437 (1994), the Court of Appeals confronted an

issue of preclusion that is instructive here. The Court considered whether a guilty finding, followed by
probation before judgment, could begiven preclusive effect in a subsequent administrative disciplinary
proceeding. Mr. Powell, a Maryland Aviation Administration employee, was charged and found guilty in
the circuit court of telephone misuse. At sentencing, the conviction was set aside and he received probation
before judgment. Administrative disciplinary charges were also filed. The Court stated: ". . . [T]heALJ
erred ingiving conclusive effect to the guilty finding. That adjudicator could "second guess" the circuit
court judge inthe telephone misuse case. Powell iscorrect incontending that theALJ should have resolved
thecredibility dispute on all ofthe evidence and that, inthat process, the ALJ was free to substitute her
judgment for that ofthe circuit court on whether Powell had engaged inthe conduct alleged. Aremand is

required." 336 Md. at 218. The PBJ should not have been given conclusive effect.50
N. Substantive Due Process Rights.
Significant Case Decisions

o

In Thomas v. Dept. ofLabor, 170 Md. App. 650, 908 A. 2d 99 (2006) two school busdrivers, who were

employees ofthe Baltimore County Department ofEducation claimed that L.E. §8-909(c) violated the Due
Process Clause ofthe fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights in denying them

unemployment benefits during academic school years "because it discriminates between those school bus
drivers employed by county boards of education and those employed by private contractors." 170 Md. App.
at668.51 ". . . L.E. 8-909 was enacted to exclude those individuals employed by educational institutions

and with a reasonable assuranceof continued employment from eligibilityfor unemployment benefits

during regularly scheduled periods of unemployment. Congress had concluded that, because those
employed byeducational institutions know ofscheduled breaks inemployment they should beprepared for
the breaks thatregularly occurin theirchosen employment andshould prepare for them. The statute is

50 Dept. ofHuman Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175, 196, 652 A. 2d 1183 (1995).

51 Judge Kenney wrote for the Courtdescribing equal protection arguments andthe application of suspect
classifications and strict scrutiny, etc. Thomas, 170Md. App. at 668. No "sensitiveclassification" was found in this
case and therefore a rational basis standard was applied. Constitutionalattacks have occurred against state
unemployment law classifications:

("Where a state's unemployment insurance compensation statute neither involves a discemable fundamental
interest nor affectsany protected class with particularity, the relatively relaxed 'rationalbasis' standard
should be applied in determining whether the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.")
170 Md. App. at 669 (citations omitted)
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rationally related to achieving its objective." 170 Md. app. at 669-70.52 "Although privately employed bus
drivers may notbe subject to exclusion provisions of L.E. §8-909, any perceived inequitable treatment of
privately employed and publicly employed school bus drivers is a matter for the legislature to address. 170
Md.App. at 671.

52 Courts in other jurisdictions hadreached the same or similar conclusions. Thomas, 170 Md. App. at 670-71.
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